



Culture in Communication

Analyses of
intercultural situations

Edited by
Aldo Di Luzio,
Susanne Günthner and
Franca Orletti

CULTURE IN COMMUNICATION

Pragmatics & Beyond

New Series

Editor:

Andreas H. Jucker (*Justus Liebig University, Giessen*)

Associate Editors:

Jacob L. Mey (*Odense University*)

Herman Parret (*Belgian National Science Foundation, Universities of Louvain and Antwerp*)

Jef Verschueren (*Belgian National Science Foundation, Univ. of Antwerp*)

Editorial Address:

Justus Liebig University Giessen, English Department
Otto-Behaghel-Strasse 10, D-35394 Giessen, Germany
e-mail: andreas.jucker@anglistik.uni-giessen.de

Editorial Board:

Shoshana Blum-Kulka (*Hebrew University of Jerusalem*)

Chris Butler (*University College of Ripon and York*); Jean Caron (*Université de Poitiers*)

Robyn Carston (*University College London*); Bruce Fraser (*Boston University*)

Thorstein Fretheim (*University of Trondheim*); John Heritage (*University of California at Los Angeles*)

Susan Herring (*University of Texas at Arlington*); Masako K. Hiraga (*St. Paul's (Rikkyo) University*)

David Holdcroft (*University of Leeds*); Sachiko Ide (*Japan Women's University*)

Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni (*University of Lyon 2*)

Claudia de Lemos (*University of Campinas, Brazil*); Marina Sbisà (*University of Trieste*)

Emanuel Schegloff (*University of California at Los Angeles*)

Deborah Schiffrin (*Georgetown Univ.*); Paul O. Takahara (*Kobe City Univ. of Foreign Studies*)

Sandra Thompson (*University of California at Santa Barbara*)

Teun A. Van Dijk (*University of Amsterdam*); Richard J. Watts (*University of Berne*)

CULTURE IN COMMUNICATION

ANALYSES OF
INTERCULTURAL SITUATIONS

ALDO DI LUZIO

SUSANNE GÜNTNER

FRANCA ORLETTI

University of Rome III,

University of Konstanz

JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY
AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA



The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences — Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Culture in communication : Analyses of Intercultural Situations / Aldo Di Luzio, Susanne Günthner, Franca Orletti.

p. cm. -- (Pragmatics & beyond, ISSN 0922-842X ; new ser. 81)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Intercultural communication. I. Di Luzio, Aldo. II. Günthner, Susanne. III. Orletti, Franca. IV. Series.

P94.6.C855 2000

302.2--dc21

00-057183

ISBN 90 272 5100 2 (Eur.) / 1 55619 990 2 (US) (alk. paper)

CIP

© 2001 – John Benjamins B.V.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

John Benjamins Publishing Co. • P.O.Box 36224 • 1020 ME Amsterdam • The Netherlands
John Benjamins North America • P.O.Box 27519 • Philadelphia PA 19118-0519 • USA

Contents

Introduction	vii
<i>Aldo Di Luzio, Susanne Günthner and Franca Orletti</i>	
Section I: Theoretical Issues in Intercultural Communication	1
Communication, Contexts and Culture. A Communicative Constructivist Approach to Intercultural Communication	3
<i>Hubert Knoblauch</i>	
Contextualization and Ideology in Intercultural Communication	35
<i>John J. Gumperz</i>	
Asymmetries of Knowledge in Intercultural Communication: The Relevance of Cultural Repertoires of Communicative Genres	55
<i>Susanne Günthner and Thomas Luckmann</i>	
Section II: Case Studies of Intercultural Encounters	87
Three Ways of Analysing Communication between East and West Germans as Intercultural Communication	89
<i>Peter Auer and Friederike Kern</i>	
Cooperation, Collaboration and Pleasure in Work: Issues for Intercultural Communication at Work	117
<i>Jenny Cook-Gumperz</i>	
The Making of a Witness. On the Beheading of Rabbits	141
<i>Marco Jacquemet</i>	
Intercultural Negotiation	173
<i>Jochen Rehbein</i>	
Section III: Native/non-native Interactions	209
Constructing Misunderstanding as a Cultural Event	211
<i>Volker Hinnenkamp</i>	

Inter- and Intra-cultural Aspects of Dialogue-Interpreting <i>Frank Ernst Müller</i>	245
The Conversational Construction of Social Identity in Native/ Non-native Interaction <i>Franca Orletti</i>	271
External Appropriations as a Strategy for Participating in Intercultural Multi-Party Conversations <i>Gabriele Pallotti</i>	295
Index of Authors	335
Index of Subjects	337

Introduction

Aldo Di Luzio, Susanne Günthner
and Franca Orletti

University of Konstanz, University of Rome III

1. Preliminary observations

This volume is dedicated to questions arising in linguistic, sociological and anthropological analyses of intercultural encounters, a subject that is becoming increasingly relevant in the light of recent interest in multicultural societies. The collection focuses on the methodological possibilities of explanatory analyses of intercultural communication and explores the relationship between language and culture. It thus address the question of how participants in intercultural settings (both in institutional and informal contexts) (re)construct cultural differences and cultural identities. Empirical analyses go hand-in-hand with the discussion of methodological and theoretical aspects of interculturality and the relationship of language and culture.

The collected papers approach the relationship between language and culture through the framework of Interpretative Sociolinguistics. Their methodological approach is therefore influenced by the phenomenological and hermeneutic tradition of the Sociology of Knowledge, Ethnography of Communication and Ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis.

The volume aims at presenting new theoretical and methodological aspects of Intercultural Communication, focusing on issues such as ideology and hegemonial attitudes, communicative genres and culture-specific genre repertoires, the theory of contextualization and non-verbal (prosodic, gestual, mimic) contextualization cues in particular.

Section I contains more theoretically inclined papers on the relevance of ideology, communicative genres and contextualization conventions to the

analysis of Intercultural Communication. Papers in subsequent sections provide more detailed analyses, concentrating on methodological and empirical issues of ideology, genre and contextualization conventions in intercultural encounters. The papers collected in section II focus on interactions between cultural subgroups and analyze rhetoric and prosodic differences in contextualization conventions and repertoires of genres within these subgroups. Institutional and informal contexts are taken into account. The papers in section III focus on aspects of cooperation in native/non-native interactions: questions of asymmetry, misunderstanding and lay translations are studied in detail.

The papers highlight a number of interesting and important questions for the Intercultural Communication research, for example under what conditions can we talk of interaction as “intercultural communication” and how can it be differentiated from everyday conversation, which is not “intercultural”? What is the relationship between language, speech and culture in these intercultural encounters? What is the role of culture?

The papers also seek to clarify the role of ideology in the sociocultural knowledge of speakers and in the speech situations in which they interact, as well as the role of their hegemonial or non-hegemonial attitudes toward co-participants and their discourse.

The analyses examine the relevance of the variable realization of communicative genres as well as the contextualization of extralinguistic elements in the negotiation of meaning. These are all questions that have not been generally addressed in previous research in intercultural communication.

The volume is interdisciplinary. In addressing aspects of Intercultural Communication, scholars from Linguistics, Anthropology, Sociology and Psychology adopt an interactive view of language and all share the conviction that Intercultural Communication must be studied in actual dialogic contexts.

2. Organization

The volume is divided into three sections:

Section 1: The theoretically oriented articles collected in this section discuss the role of context and contextualization, culture-specific repertoires of communicative genres and linguistic ideologies as well as the need to include ethnographic information in the analysis of intercultural encounters.

Section 2: The articles in this section focus on the role of rhetoric,

prosodic and gestural devices in interactions between members of different speech communities. They are case studies of interpretative analyses of culture-specific contextualization conventions and different repertoires and uses of communicative genres in intercultural encounters (in institutional and informal settings).

Section 3: This section includes papers analyzing native/non-native interactions and focusing on both situative asymmetries and cooperation strategies.

All papers in the volume discuss general aspects of intercultural communication, such as cultural differences in contextualization conventions, linguistic manifestation of culture and ideology, and the use of communicative genres. They raise issues for intercultural communication research that are intended to stimulate discussion in the area of intercultural communication in new and relevant ways.

3. On the individual contributions

The first article of Section 1, “Communication, Contexts and Culture. A Communicative Constructivist Approach to Intercultural Communication”, by Hubert KNOBLAUCH, uses the basis of the “communicative turn” in cultural studies (especially in the sociology of culture) to set out a theory of communicative culture that may provide a foundation for research on intercultural communication. This theory starts with the notion of communicative action as developed by the sociology of knowledge, integrating the results of empirical research traditions such as conversation analysis, ethnography of communication and interpretative sociolinguistics. Cultural contexts are constructed by communicative action and are distinguished on three levels: immediate contexts are constructed by way of face-to-face communication in the “interaction order”; mediate contexts, which are constructed by mediated communication (Schütz), and reflexively related to these actions by particular forms of contextualization; these in turn are described with respect to their analytical features as well as to empirical investigations. Finally, the social context is set out in terms of social hegemony, ideology and its relevance for the study of intercultural communication.

John GUMPERZ’ paper on “Contextualization and Ideology in Intercultural Communication” deals with the influence of culture, language and thought, and in particular with the question of how culture, through language

and interaction, influences our way of thinking and interacting with members of different cultures. GUMPERZ demonstrates that in modern society the borders between different languages and cultures do not necessarily go hand-in-hand with geographical borders. In interactions, forms and functions of linguistic signs and communicative and interactive practices can only be evaluated adequately within their own cultural context. As the adequate and common evaluation of speaking practices and contextualization conventions is necessary for the common negotiation of meaning, intercultural communication is prone to misinterpretation. GUMPERZ argues that there are conventional inferences and situated contextualization cues that participants take as their basis for interpreting, at every point of an interaction, what the intention of the speaker is and what is expected as an adequate reaction. These inferences are not only based on common repertoires of communicative genres but also on common socio-cultural knowledge in general and linguistic ideologies. These influence the process of interaction as well as speakers' interpretations. This explanatory concept is illustrated by analysis of an intercultural episode involving a criminal court case brought against a member of an Indian minority culture in a North American town. Statements by the police, who had misinterpreted the cultural speaking practices of the Indian defendant using standards of White cultural speaking habits and ideologies, led to conviction of the Indian. It was only after anthropologists' ethnographic analyses of the cultural context had been taken into account that the behavior of the defendant was re-interpreted, and the judgment repealed.

Culture-specific differences in the distribution of social knowledge and differences in cultural speaking practices are also the topic of Susanne GÜNTNER's and Thomas LUCKMANN's paper on "Asymmetries of Knowledge in Intercultural Communication: The Relevance of Cultural Repertoires of Communicative Genres". Although the social knowledge of participants in interaction is never identical, social interaction in general and communication in particular still require a definable amount of shared knowledge among participants. Even if non-native speakers have excellent grammatical and lexical skills in a foreign language, they often face problems in negotiating meanings in intercultural encounters. The reason for these problems is based on various kinds of asymmetries of knowledge about culture-specific speaking practices. One explicitly relevant element of knowledge involving speaking practices in typical situations is, as GÜNTNER and LUCKMANN argue, the repertoire of communicative patterns and genres. Communicative genres are

historically and culturally specific, fixed solutions to recurring communicative problems. On the one hand, they guide the interactants' expectations about what is to be said (and done) in pre-defined types of situation. On the other hand, they are the sediments of socially relevant communicative processes. Communicative genres are socially constructed and thus vary from culture to culture. In intercultural situations, interactants often encounter different repertoires of communicative genres. Lack of knowledge of such differences may lead to problems in some situations. A good deal more treacherous, however, the authors claim, are situations in which interactants participate with repertoires of similar genres that are inadequately supported by knowledge about differences in the mode of employment of the genre, stylistic variations and subgenres, etc.

Section 2 of the volume deals with communication between people who speak the same language but belong to different cultural groups within one society and thus do not share the same ideologies and rhetorical or stylistic conventions concerning the realization of particular communicative genres.

The section begins with Peter AUER's and Friederike KERN's paper on "Three Ways of Analysing Communication between East and West Germans as Intercultural Communication". In their analysis of job interviews in the "neuen Bundesländern" (i.e. former East Germany) AUER and KERN discuss the question of the influence of West German discourse style on East German discourse conventions. On the basis of their empirical investigation, they argue that at an ideological level "West German discourse" tries to exercise hegemonical control over East German discourse". Job interviews represent a new communicative genre for East Germans. Thus, in interview situations they are confronted with communicative challenges — genre-specific expectations which they have not encountered before. The "job interviews" genre is thus a dynamic aspect in the changing speech ecology of former East Germany. How do the East German interactants deal with the problem? AUER and KERN demonstrate that in this kind of interview situation participants from former East Germany tend to re-activate a traditional, formal "East German" discourse style, mixed with certain elements of what they guess or assume to be a "West German style".

Jenny COOK-GUMPERZ' paper on "Cooperation, Collaboration and Pleasure in Work: Issues for Intercultural Communication at Work" focusses on forms of cooperation and politeness in service encounters between members of different subcultures. She analyzes interactions between staff and custom-

ers of an international restaurant chain with regard to the interactive ideology of this particular firm. The staff is educated in the firm's interactive ideology by special training courses in which they learn to deal with customers in a friendly and polite way. In intercultural service encounters in these restaurants, the acquired strategies of politeness, personal and friendly manners are supposed to lead to positive feelings in the customers and reduce the vulnerability of personal exposure. The analysis of interactions between the trained service people and their customers reveals that culture-specific ways of interacting do not create misunderstandings but are dominated by the trained politeness and personalization of communicative contacts. Thus, ways of communicating with customers are re-contextualized in this particular "service encounter" genre and are interpreted by the customers as signs of personal concern and friendly, emotionally involved cooperation.

Marco JACQUEMET's paper ("The Making of a Witness: On the Beheading of Rabbits") analyzes asymmetrical relations in intercultural communication. He documents interactional power asymmetries related to the issue of personhood and respect. In this kind of environment, respect was constructed in interaction through a logic of challenge and riposte, in which participants engaged in a ritual dance to determine a "one-up/one-down" asymmetry and establish a ranking hierarchy. Among the communicative weapons utilized, the social practice of addressing a person was found to carry a considerable interactional weight, being interpreted as an indicator of an individual's social standing and position within the community. By focusing on the use of address forms and participants' metapragmatic awareness of this use, this paper seeks to better understand the dynamics of interactional dominance, local ideology, and minorization processes.

In his paper on "Intercultural Negotiation" Jochen REHBEIN analyzes elements of verbal and non-verbal communication. His video analysis is based on a buying-and-selling interaction between an American professor and a German representative of a Swiss publishing house. Although the German representative realizes fragments from linguistic schemata of buying-and-selling activities in a brilliant British English performance, he does not achieve a successful negotiation of his own position. By contrast, the insistent and non-responsive negotiation of the American partner represents a typical example of the successful achievement of business aims. REHBEIN tries to show how especially those non-verbal means that are marked in culture-specific ways convey and govern speech activities, and how their use influ-

ences the result of intercultural negotiation. In addition, the author raises various questions that are relevant for the analysis of intercultural business negotiation: (i) to what extent can negotiating be conceptualized and reconstructed as a schema of a particular communicative activity or, rather, as a communicative “auxiliary device” and (ii) what role do non-verbal elements play in the realization of these schemata or devices for successfully negotiating controversial topics.

Section 3 concentrates on forms of asymmetries and cooperation in native/non-native interactions. Volker HINNENKAMP’s paper on “Constructing Misunderstanding as a Cultural Event” is based on video analyses of several kinds of misunderstandings occurring in intercultural encounters. HINNENKAMP poses the question of how misunderstandings are manifested interactionally and how interactants deal with such manifested misunderstandings. Furthermore, he asks how cultural aspects are contextualized in these particular sequences (of misunderstandings) and how culture as “habitus” and background knowledge of a person can become relevant in interaction. The author argues that additional data from the interactional episode and particular isolated constraints are not as relevant for making an episode “intercultural”. Instead one has to look at the common interactional history and the commonly constructed institutional constraints which are relevant for the interpretation. Thus, Hinnenkamp deconstructs the notion of culture and strives to aim at something close to situative interculture.

Frank E. MÜLLER’s paper on “Inter- and Intracultural Aspects of Dialogue-Interpreting” introduces various types of lay interpretation in ‘face-to-face’ interactions, where the interpreter translates the utterance immediately for the other participant. The first part of the paper discusses aspects of interpreting culture within the process of lay translations and shows how the interpreter (re)constructs and creatively reconstitutes topics that otherwise would be completely inaccessible to the co-participant. In the second part of the paper MÜLLER shows, on the basis of an analysis of lay interpreting between French and German metal workers and apprentices, how lay interpreters not only transfer aspects of one language and culture to another but also create specific forms of contextualizing meaning from one subculture, sublanguage and register to another.

Cooperation in institutional discourse among natives and non-natives is also the topic of the other papers in Section 3. The papers analyze institutional interactions between native and non-native immigrants and reveal that an

orthodox conversation-analytic approach is not sufficient to explain what is taking place in these settings. They demonstrate that besides sequential analyses of the ongoing interaction, ethnographic information about linguistic and sociocultural speaking norms of the participants is required for the investigation of intercultural communication.

Franca ORLETTI's paper "The Conversational Construction of Social Identity in Native-Non-native Interaction" analyzes two informal conversations between Italian native speakers and immigrants from Eritrea. She raises the question of whether symmetrical interaction is possible in this kind of communicative context in which members of a dominant culture interact with members of a non-dominant one. ORLETTI's analysis demonstrates that symmetrical forms of communication do appear in these interactions and argues that only in specific moments are these conversations contextualized as "intercultural encounters" by the participants themselves. Explicit references to "membership categories" seldom appear. However, the contextualization of "interculturality", "heteroculturality" and "asymmetry" can also be marked in non-verbal ways. The author also comments on the relationship between the contextualization of asymmetry and other situational factors such as ideology, friendly and cooperative attitudes towards the co-participants, discourse topic, communicative genre and modality.

Gabriele PALLOTTI's paper on "External Appropriations as a Strategy for Participating in Intercultural Multi-Party Conversations" analyzes forms of cooperation in the communicative behavior of a 5-year-old Moroccan girl communicating with her Italian friends and an Italian teacher in an Italian kindergarten. The paper studies cooperative strategies in producing interactive meaning between the non-native Moroccan child and her Italian classmates and shows how she internalizes and adapts the Italian language and Italian communicative strategies and cultural speaking conventions. Using video and audio data PALLOTTI shows two different types of appropriation, whose discourse functions have never been previously analyzed: (1) forms of internal appropriation (IA), which are repetitions of utterances directly addressed to the speaker (i.e. the Moroccan girl) and (2) forms of external appropriation (EA), which are repetitions of utterances addressed to other children. PALLOTTI demonstrates that both types of appropriation may be relevant to intercultural communication. Whereas IA seem to create cohesion and topical coherence, EA are used to construct constitutive elements of a communicative genre. In their formal structure, IA suggest equivalent reproduction of short sequences, whereas EA

show vague reproductions and interpretations of longer stretches of talk. In producing IA the speaker reconfirms known constructions, and in producing EA she attempts new constructions. However, both strategies are used both as a means of acquiring linguistic competence and as participation and cooperative accommodation strategies. According to the specific contextual situation, the speaker applies these strategies as a means of interpreting situationally the communicative episode at hand.

The papers in this volume were presented and discussed at a workshop on Intercultural Communication held in October 1994 at the Villa Vigoni in Menaggio (Como, Italy).

We wish to acknowledge the assistance of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft as well as the Third University of Rome, whose financial support made the workshop possible. We also extend our thanks to the Director of Villa Vigoni, Prof. Dr. Lill, and to his staff for their helpfulness and hospitality. We would also like to thank our publishing editor Isja Conen for her patience and support.

Section I

Theoretical Issues in Intercultural Communication

Communication, Contexts and Culture

A communicative constructivist approach to intercultural communication

Hubert Knoblauch
University of Zurich

1. Culture and the ‘communicative paradigm’

The analysis of the problem of intercultural communication depends on the clarification of the relationship between communication and culture. Is communication only one subordinate element of culture, and, if so, is intercultural communication only one of many paths between cultures? Is culture to be considered as one sub-system of the communication system, and intercultural communication as something similar to an interpenetration between systems? Or is culture at the very bottom of society, so that real intercultural communication falls prey to cultural relativism and becomes virtually impossible?

The relationship between culture and communication may appear obvious, if not trivial, to those influenced by the ideas of postmodernism, post-structuralism or cultural studies. However, even contemporary theoreticians like Richard Rorty still refer to culture in terms of science, philosophy or the arts. This traditional notion of culture has been defined by Scheler (1960: 31f; 60ff) as the “higher forms of knowledge”, i.e. the bourgeois notion of “representative culture” (Tenbruck 1990) which pursued the bourgeois ideals of ‘Bildung’. This elitist notion of culture had previously been attacked by Vico and ‘romantic’ thinkers such as Herder and the Grimms. In sociology, the discovery of culture beyond the ‘higher forms of knowledge’ goes back to authors such as Simmel who considered prostitution, fashion, or dining as cultural phenomena. With the “discovery” of everyday life, sociology came to

stress culture as something linked to meaningful or symbolic action. Yet the shift towards communication would not have been possible without the strong impact of Saussurian linguistics on anthropology (Lévi-Strauss), which came to consider culture in terms of the linguistic structure of “*langue*”. Before Lévi-Strauss, culture was understood as a system of meaning to be learned by its members; afterwards it was understood to be a system of signs.

This “pansemiotic” concept of culture has been criticised by another language-based research trend. As a consequence of “linguistic turn” theory, inspired by authors such as Wittgenstein and Austin, it has been argued that signs cannot be considered in isolation from the actions by which they are produced. Rather than focusing on sign systems (or a postmodern dissolution, bricolage or parody of these systems), anthropologists came to stress that culture was to be found in “*parole*”, the spoken language (Hymes and Gumperz 1964). This approach to culture follows what has been termed by Habermas (1988) the “communicative paradigm” (Habermas 1988). This paradigm is characterised by the idea that culture is being constructed in communicative actions. Although in English the notion of communication may be mistakenly understood to refer to a cybernetic model of information transmission, communicative action is meant here to include the performance of social action in the use of language as well as nonverbal signs, cultural objects and artefacts; the theory thus makes reference to the theories of social action developed by Max Weber and Alfred Schütz. Although programmatically proposing a theory of communicative action, I shall show that Habermas himself does not manage to avoid the structuralist notion of sign systems independent of social action. This has been much more successfully achieved by empirical approaches within the social sciences such as “conversation analysis”, “ethnography of communication” and, “interpretative sociolinguistics”, which show that “*language in use*” is one of the principal architects of this construction process. However, hardly any theoretical attempts have been made to recognise the contribution of these empirical approaches to the theory of communicative action and culture.¹

Evaluating of the theoretical consequences of such a diverse set of empirical approaches is a complex task. However, since all these approaches, as well as Habermas’ theory of communicative action, are based on the theory of social action of Max Weber, Alfred Schütz and other proponents of “interpretive sociology” or “*Verstehende Soziologie*”, I will take them as my common denominator and starting point. Within this framework I want to stress the unique contribution of Alfred Schütz. Schütz is widely considered to

be a theoretician of the “life-world” who clarified Weber’s notion of the subjective meaning by which social action is guided, oriented to and coordinated. Yet the fact that Schütz not only mentioned the role of communicative action but also asserted that the life-world is a thoroughly “communicative environment” has been hitherto ignored. Since he takes the socio-cultural life-world as being made up of communicative actions, it is reasonable to take this theory as a basis for a notion of communicative culture.

On this basis, I intend to develop a notion of communicative action which can provide a general framework for analysing intercultural communication. Communicative action will be shown to construct contexts which are reflexively generated by the very communicative actions which are performed in this context. This reflexive process will be referred to as “contextualisation”. At an analytic level, one can distinguish three different analytical aspects of communicative actions referring to the different ways in which contextualisation is achieved. Culture can thus be considered as the construction of contexts by means of communicative action.

In order to clarify this notion of communicative action, I shall first contrast it with Habermas’ theory of communicative action as well as with systems theory’s notion of communication (Section 2). Communicative action is characterised by reflexivity, a feature which is also emphasised in conversation analysis and interpretive sociolinguistics. Using the notion of reflexivity adopted by these approaches, it will be shown (Section 3) that it is reflexivity which relates communicative actions to their contexts. The three aspects of contextualisation will then be outlined in relation to the analytical features of communicative action (Section 4). These contexts constitute what may be called communicative culture, a notion which may be pertinent to the study of intercultural communication (Section 5).

2. Language, social and communicative action

The notion of communicative action was brought to the forefront of sociological discourse by Habermas’ (1981) well-known theory of communicative action. Yet, despite the importance of Habermas’ programmatic claim, his theory fails to solve the problem. There are two reasons for this:

A. For Habermas (1981: 114f), communicative action is characterised by the rationality of language; rationality is, so to speak, imparted in language since language allows for the distinction of different validity claims

(“Geltungsansprüche”) which roughly correspond to Bühler’s three functions of language (representation, expression and appeal).² Habermas also refers to speech act theory, but he opposes its “subjectivist” theory of meaning opting for an “intersubjective theory of meaning”: language should not be considered only as a means for transmitting subjective meaning but also as a medium by which actors can share meaning intersubjectively. Communicative action thus relies on the actors sharing the same “repertoire”, and it is this shared language which enables speakers to understand “the same matter in the same way” (1988: 136f). Language, as a normative system of signs, is not only detached from subjective intentions but also imparts the “dimensions of meaning and validity” (1988: 148) to which actors orient. Habermas’ notion of communicative action, therefore, is dependent on the existence of a language system which, by virtue of its semantic autonomy, bestows its rationality on actors.

This view has been particularly criticised by Bourdieu (1982). To Bourdieu, it is a mistake to look for social effects, i.e. the co-ordination of actions between speakers, in language (and so-called illocutionary effects); language does not work by means of a mechanism internal to its system. It is *the use of language in social contexts* which makes language work. Language, therefore, has to be considered as a form of practice rather than as a system that works independently of ongoing actions.³ A similar critique had already been voiced by Vološinov (1975: 95ff) who called the idea that language has a rationality of its own the “abstract objectivistic view of language”. As Vološinov argues, this view ignores speakers’ actions, the ways language is used and the social contexts in which language is used. Instead of the meaning of language guiding communicative action, it is rather the social use of language (and, for that matter, any sign-system) in action which constitutes its meaning.

B. In line with Horkheimer’s classical critique, Habermas distinguishes “teleological action” from “communicative action” (“strategic action” being a mixture of both). This categorical distinction refers to the way in which co-ordination is achieved between actors either as an interlocking of different utilitarian calculations of individual actors pursuing their own individual goals, or as a process of co-operative interpretation by which actors try to communicate and understand each other’s intentions. The former type of action is the basis of functional systems (such as economics or politics), whereas the latter, communicative action, defines what Habermas (referring to a notion coined by Schütz) calls the “socio-cultural life-world”. The difference between these two ‘spheres of life’ lies in the assumption that only

communicative action allows for rational understanding. Habermas concedes that everyday communication is “uneradically rhetorical”; yet the very fact that speakers, even if they disagree, go on talking to one another demonstrates their “contrafactual” orientation towards the possibility of rational understanding and coming to an agreement. By making this distinction between two types of action he builds up two distinct ontological spheres. Teleological action and its ‘functional rationality’ give rise to systems, whereas communicative action pertains to the ‘socio-cultural life world’. Although this distinction allows the ‘systemic colonisation of the life-world’ to be revealed, it establishes an opposition between ‘two worlds’.

Not only is it difficult to explain how these two worlds are held together but the separation is not even accepted by systems theory. Systems theory (or the theory of autopoietic systems) holds that communication is an all-penetrating phenomenon (Luhmann 1984). To systems theory, everything social is not only functional, but also communicative. Whereas systems theory proposes far too general and indistinct a notion of communication, phenomenologically orientated sociology⁴ provides an alternative theory of communicative action which explains how the context of communicative action is constructed by and provides meaning for these very actions.

Starting from Weber’s notion of action as any meaningful behaviour, phenomenologically orientated sociology tries to clarify the subjective content of meaning that guides action. As Schütz argues, *action* is any meaningful experience which is orientated towards and anticipates (“modo futuri exacti”) a future state of affairs. Thus, thinking about a problem may have just as much a right to be called an action as jumping into cold water (in order to save someone). Since communicative action is intrinsically orientated towards someone else, it is almost by definition a form of *social action*. But it is a special form of social action since it is not only orientated to another agent but also involves reciprocal orientation: in principle, it is orientated to some kind of “reply”. This reply may only be a form of thinking: “I want the other person to know that there is “x””; but it may also be another act of working or another communicative action: “I want the other person to do “y””, or “I want the other person to answer my question”.

Like Habermas, Schütz and Luckmann thus presuppose some kind of orientation towards understanding. However, whereas Habermas assumes language to provide for understanding, Schütz considers the basic intersubjective principle of *reciprocity* to lie at the heart of common understanding.

Reciprocity is not to be understood as “equality” of communicating partners, contrafactually assumed in the very act of communication. Reciprocity, rather, applies to any form of social interaction, as for example a conflict of interest or even a fight between unequals. It applies to acts of consciousness and their bodily counterparts such as the principle of the interchangeability of stand-points which is presupposed even in as simple an action as shaking hands, and the principle of reciprocity of motives which underlies intersubjective sequences of action (Schütz 1962: 12).

This problem of intersubjectivity is at the heart of Schütz’ thinking: how do we deal with the fact that we have no direct access to another person’s intention? How do we deal with the ‘transcendence’ of another person’s mind? Although we never conclusively solve this problem, we attempt to do so via communicative action, i.e. we indicate what we mean by way of some form of “objectivation”, “expression” or “sign”. These objectivations are products of action (to be more exact, ‘acts of working’), yet at the same time they are intended to ‘signify’ our intentions. Communicative action thus involves different processes, such as ‘intersubjective mirroring’, reciprocity, and taking the role of the other, yet it also requires a kind of “objectivation”, of producing an object by which the other’s intentions are “appresented”.

Schütz distinguishes several kinds of objectivation. Objectivations can be found at the elementary level of spatial and time references, such as *indications* and *marks*. References to subjective intentions are *signs in the narrower sense*, which are typically part of a more comprehensive sign system. The most important sign system is, of course, language since it provides actors with what Schütz calls “a store-house of pre-constituted types” of experience and action. Finally, signs which refer to a reality other than the reality of everyday life in which we communicate are called *symbols*; symbols may be found in the formalised language of mathematics, in the metaphorical language of poetry, or in the icons of religion.

Yet signs and other objectivations are not to be viewed in isolation from action. First, the referential meaning of signs is constituted in interaction.⁵ Moreover, signs are produced by the communicative action itself as products of an ‘objectivation’ in the common environment. Third, these objectivations are produced with the intention of transmitting some meaning. Since the understanding of this meaning is anticipated and, in the course of the production of meaning, indicated and ‘mirrored’ by the other’s expression, action or response, objectivations function as “co-ordination devices” for the interactants.

By means of objectivations actors can, so to speak, gear (i.e. coordinate) their actions into one another by retrospectively and prospectively interpreting (i.e. ‘synchronising’) their corresponding motives. This synchronisation of action-projects and the co-ordination of courses of action is shown in Schütz’s analysis of the question-answer sequence:

I ask you a question. The in-order-to motive of my act is not only the expectation that you will understand my question, but also to get your answer; or more precisely, I reckon *that* you will answer, but am undecided as to what the content of your answer may be. (...) The question, we may say, is the because-motive of the answer, as the answer is the in-order-to motive of the question. (...) I myself have felt on innumerable occasions induced to react to another’s act, which I had interpreted as a question addressed to me, with a kind of behaviour of which the in-order-to motive was my expectation that the other, the questioner, might interpret my behaviour as an answer. (Schütz 1964a: 14)

This example not only demonstrates how the synchronisation of motives (i.e. subjective intentions) and the co-ordination of the courses of conduct are interlocked. It also hints at a further, more important feature of communicative actions which in systems theory has been called the “problem of double contingency”: communicative actions which are projected as questions may never be answered; what was intended to be co-ordinated may fail in the course of the interaction. To put it another way, whatever actors may intend, they only know what they are doing as a result of corresponding acts of their co-actors. With respect to successful communicative action, this problem can also be reformulated as reflexivity of communicative acts: the answer is not only an answer, it also shows that the question has been understood as it had been intended to be understood. Although ‘perfect understanding’ is never achieved, reflexivity enables communicative action to achieve common understanding’ by both acting and indicating understanding of the act (mirrored by objectivation within the common environment of the actors and by reciprocal orientation towards each another).

3. Reflexivity, contextualization and context

Reflexivity of communicative action can be regarded as one of the subject matters of empirical research in *conversation analysis*. Conversation analysis (CA) started by analysing the mechanisms of communicative interaction,

especially with respect to the organisation of turn taking in conversations. Like other approaches, it takes a decidedly empirical approach to natural communication, i.e. communication in non-experimental settings, and use of (audio and visual) tape recordings of communicative objectivations in these settings. Although CA prefers the notion of “conversation” or “talk in interaction” it not only refers to the exchange of utterances, but also to interpretation. It is assumed that communicative actions are not only observable and interpretable by the scientific observer but that interpretation of utterances is the problem for the interactants themselves. This phenomenon is labelled “reflexivity” by CA. *Reflexivity* means that in the course of their actions, “participants” indicate the meaning of their actions and their understanding of prior actions. The ways in which the utterances are produced constitute the methods by which these utterances are made observable, understandable and accountable. This notion of reflexivity is strongly reminiscent of Schütz’s description of reciprocity. His above description of question-answer sequences echoes an account by Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson (1974: 44):⁶

When a speaker addresses a first pair-part, such as a ‘question’, or a ‘complaint’ to another, we have noted, he selects the other as next speaker, and selects for him that he do a second part of the ‘adjacency pair’ he has started, that is, to do an ‘answer’. (...) The addressee, in doing the second pair-part, such as an ‘answer’ or an ‘apology’, not only does that utterance-type, but thereby displays (in the first place to his coparticipants) his understanding of the prior turn’s talk as a first pair, as a ‘question’ or a ‘complaint’.

Moreover, CA analysis opts for a *strong notion of reflexivity*,

for it is a systematic consequence of the turn-taking organization of conversation that it obliges its participants to display to each other, in a turn’s talk, their understanding of other turns’ talk. (...) Regularly, then, a turn’s talk will display its speaker’s understanding of a prior turn’s talk... (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson 1974: 44).

Thus, in speech, speakers not only interlock their motives and co-ordinate their actions, they also demonstrate what kind of actions they are performing. This shaping of certain actions is brought about by the methods speakers use. By following these methods, speakers achieve a specific orderliness in their utterances.

This notion of reflexivity may be termed “strong” since conversation analysis assumes that the orderliness of utterances, their “systematicity”, is produced locally, i.e. by the very utterances which then form part of the order.

On this view, the order of conversation is, like any social order, an accomplishment of the actors in the situation in which their actions are performed. The social facts construed by these actions are exclusively the consequence of this situative, local production:

Not only is the allocation of turns accomplished in each turn for a next, but the determination of turn size is locally accomplished, that is, accomplished in the developmental course of each turn, under constraints imposed by a next turn and an orientation to a next turn in the current one (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson 1974: 41).

As a consequence, turns at talk construct the very context of which they are a part: on the one hand, utterances are “context-shaped”, i.e. they are embedded in a sequence of actions in such a way that the sequence guides their production and interpretation; on the other hand, they are also context renewing, since they themselves contribute to and constitute a part of this context (Drew and Heritage 1992: 18f). Context is thus characterised by its distinctive dependence on the local production of turn, by its *situatedness*. Because conversation analysis stresses the local character of situated actions, it analyses the features of observable communicative interaction in a very detailed way. CA is thus able to demonstrate the fine-grained reflexive interlocking of talk.

However, CA has been criticised for two reasons which have been most clearly formulated by Goffman (1981: 32ff): How can CA account for those elements which are not observable in momentary interaction (a problem especially pertinent for those conversation analysts who restrict themselves to the audio channel)? And how can CA account for those elements of the situation which lie beyond the few communicative turns under investigation? Thus, in stressing the local character of actions, Goffman argues that CA ignores the broader social context in which they occur. This argument is stressed even more by Bourdieu (1982) who criticises CA for its ‘pointilist hyper-empirism’. In his view, CA falls prey to a radical situationalism which takes actors to construct social reality anew in every moment without being able to rely on rituals, conventions and institutions.

Both these problems are addressed by an approach which is based on the “ethnography of communication”. Inspired by Gumperz and Hymes in the early 1960s, the ethnography of communication tried to describe the features of the situation in which language is used, i.e. the “speech event”.⁷ This speech event was analysed in terms of several components, such as “setting”, “partici-

pants”, “norms of interaction” etc. (Hymes 1962). However, as with conventional sociolinguistics, Hymes restricted context to a set of factors which could be determined independently of the ongoing speech event. A more reflexive notion of context was only introduced later by Gumperz’s *interpretive sociolinguistics* approach. Unlike the ethnography of communication, this approach considers interaction to be the crucial feature of communication. According to Gumperz (1981: 2), it is only by way of interactive communication that meaning and significance is bestowed upon utterances. Through its central notion of *contextualization* it can claim to have developed a “reflexive notion of context” (Auer 1992: 21f).

Contextualization means that in communicating, speakers and listeners use verbal and non-verbal signs to indicate what they are doing: arguing, debating, informing etc. These “contextualization cues” are not universal but depend on local contexts. It is the specificity of certain contextualization cues that makes up specific contexts. Thus, membership of a particular speech community is constructed by the use of certain cues which are to be understood as indexical for this community (ranging from certain prosodies, to lexical, stylistical and rhetorical features) (Di Luzio/ Auer 1992).

Yet context is not restricted to large-scale social categories, such as speech communities or networks; it also encompasses situations and communicative forms (cf. Luckmann and Günthner, this volume): competence in a job interview, sales talk or managerial meeting also presupposes certain contextualization cues with respect to the situated code and style used, the structuring of arguments and information, the sequencing of turns etc. Contextualization cues are not “variables”; one should rather say that situations are constituted by the use of these cues. For example, sales talk between immigrant British Indians is contextualized differently from sales talk between British English people, and this difference is brought about by the communicative actions through which the specific context (i.e. sales talk) is constructed (cf. Gumperz, this volume). Thus, context can neither be defined with respect to some basic universal apparatus nor by variables external to the communicative acts. Rather, *context is a feature which characterises the communicative actions*; typical contextualization cues are conventions within certain communities of practice by which typical contexts are constructed. In order to be a competent member of a culture one has to know and be able to perform (and negotiate) this contextualization. Culture thus consists of the “shared typifications that enter into the signalling and use of activity types in interaction, as well as systems of contextualization conventions” (Gumperz 1992: 51).

Gumperz evades the situationalism of conversation analysis by stressing the importance of social conventionalised cues for communication and their relation to larger communities. Moreover, Gumperz mainly focuses his empirical analysis on intercultural communication, stressing the close links between contextualisation cues, i.e. communicative conventions, and culture. As a linguist, Gumperz is also, of course, interested in the linguistic and paralinguistic features of these cues. However, the sociological question of how contextualisation relates to social action, social situations and larger collectivities still remains open.

4. Context and the three horizons of contextualisation

Since Malinowski's seminal essay on the significance of context for the understanding of language (1923), the notion of context has only recently been rediscovered. Current anthropological linguistics, however, still regards context as something to be distinguished from communication. Thus Hanks (1989: 96), for example, draws a distinction between "text" and the extra-textual context which constitutes the "broader environment (linguistic, social, psychological) to which text responds and on which it operates". Goodwin and Duranti (1992: 4ff) also stick to a definition of context in terms of "settings" and "extrasituational context" which are distinct from communication, and they leave the question of how the relation between communication and context is to be established open.

Whereas these anthropological approaches tend to maintain the distinction between communicative actions on the one hand and a different kind of context on the other, CA is concerned with the identification of the context as something speakers orient to in their actions. In orientating to their actions, certain 'features of the context' are made "relevant" (Schegloff 1992).

The idea of context, therefore, is not simply concerned with a frame within which an action or activity occurs, but rather an analysis seeks to specify, and provide evidence for, the relevance of features of context which inform the very accomplishment of the participants' conduct. (Heath and Luff 1992: 312)

To CA, different contexts can be considered as "contingent 'transformations', 'adaptations' of casual conversation", "derivations" or "variants" of the basic turn-taking model of conversation (Corsaro 1985: 170; Zimmerman and

Boden 1991: 15–17), i.e. of the “primary and prototypical form of language use” (Heritage 1985: 7). In analysing talk in different organisational settings (informal communication, legal settings, therapy sessions, sales talk etc.), in longer stretches of talk, and by comparing conversations in Western culture to those in other cultures (Moerman 1988), CA attempts to show how the respective contexts are produced by specific features of talk (lexical choice, turn design, sequence organisation etc.). CA thus succeeds in identifying a multiplicity of contexts which vary according to the organisation being studied. The features of ‘talk in interaction’ also exhibit peculiarities with respect to virtually any setting under investigation.

However, faced with such a variety of different organisations of talk with respect to social settings, one has to ask: can we find some order in these varying contexts? Are contexts just ephemeral, contingent features of situative communicative actions, or are they organised according to some overarching principle?

The answer I would like to propose is as follows: First, in arguing that context is being constructed in the very communicative actions which then form part of the contexts, one can conclude that the contexts of communicative actions are produced by the actions themselves. It is by way of their reflexivity that communicative actions produce their context. Second, actors’ consciousness serves to link communicative actions to the contexts produced by them over time. This explains the role of cognition and the stress we lay on the fact that communication is performed by actors.⁸ Third, since we assume that the general organisation of contexts depends on the type of communicative action performed, we can distinguish different levels of contexts depending on the type of communicative action.

In order to do so, we may find it helpful to turn to Schütz’ theory of social action and social “transcendences”. Although Schütz himself did not himself develop a theory of communicative action, I suggest that a notion of contextualisation by communicative action can be developed by drawing on three elements of his theory:

- a. Action: in his theory of action, Schütz distinguishes “*direct immediate social action*”, which is oriented towards a copresent participant, from *mediated action*, which extends action into a “secondary manipulatory sphere” that is out of reach.
- b. Transcendence: In a (widely ignored) categorical distinction, he divides the spheres of the social world into three levels, referring to different kinds of transcendence to be dealt with by interactants.⁹

- c. Objectivation: The various forms of objectivisation (see above) correspond to textual distinctions.

Let us now take these three theoretical elements (action, transcendence and objectivation) as a starting point for distinguishing *three horizons of contextualisation*:

1. the immediate we-relation of actual ongoing face-to-face interaction, which may be equated with what Goffman calls the “interaction order”; we will refer to communicative actions on this level as *immediate contexts*; here interactants communicate by the whole range of bodily symptoms and highly intense interlocking of motives and dense co-ordination of action occurs.
2. the social world in “potential reach” which we can act towards and which can act upon us by (nowadays mostly technologically) mediated action by which *mediate contexts* are constructed.
3. communicative, “symbolic” action with social collectivities, such as the state, society, the church; this level, which transcends the actual and potential reach of communicators, may be termed the *societal context*.

It should be stressed again that each of these contexts is constructed by communicative actions. For this reason, we ought to refer to them in the active mode as ‘contextualisations’ i.e. to three different ‘horizons’ of contextualisation. (Within phenomenology, ‘horizon’ has been used to refer to different degrees of reach of typifications and action projects.) Yet it is not only for the sake of brevity that we continue to talk about ‘contexts’. There is also a methodological reason for doing so: although subject to ongoing construction processes in social reality, we have to ‘reconstruct’ the order of these processes from the perspective of a scientific method rather than deconstruct them. In this methodological perspective, context is a theoretical “second-order construct” (Schütz 1962) which refers empirically to and has to be distinguished from the ongoing construction processes, the actors’ meanings and the reflexively produced, i.e. contextualised, order of their communicative actions.

4.1. *Immediate contexts*

Schütz’ first type of social action, ‘direct’ or ‘immediate’ social action, corresponds to the immediate contexts. This sphere of face-to-face interaction where both interactants are within mutual reach resembles what Mead has

called the primary “manipulatory sphere”. To Schütz, this immediate context is of primary importance since it is this and only this context in which the participants have access to the fullness of each other’s bodily symptoms (Schütz 1962a); one could say that it is characterised by the broadest range of intertwined modalities of communication, ranging from visual to acoustic, tactile and olfactory. Moreover these “symptoms” are perceived, interpreted and enacted in, so to speak, a holistic way. (In this respect Schütz, like Goffman, stressed the presence of bodies).

But there is another reason for the peculiarity of this “pure we-relation” or “encounter” (Schütz 1964a) as the “prototype of all social interaction” (Berger/Luckmann 1967/84: 31). It is here that the principle of reciprocity is elaborated to its fullest extent. It is here that the actions of A are produced in a “polythetical way” both with respect to time and modalities, and received by the addressee in shared, common time (which allows for the complex interlocking of action and motives in face-to-face interaction). It is this sharing of the polythetic constitution which is the basis for the “we-relation”.

This stress on the peculiarity and the distinctness of face-to-face interaction can also be found in the work of Erving Goffman. There are two reasons why Goffman can be regarded to be the most important analyst of the immediate context or, as Giddens (1987: 115) puts it, the “theorist of co-presence”: first, he analyzed the rituals and strategies of face-to-face interaction in greater detail than Schütz; secondly, he stressed the distinctness and peculiarity of this “sphere” which he came to call the “interaction order” (1981b).

In fact, Goffman not only analysed forms of rituals and strategies within this “order” (by the use of different metaphors, such as role, move, ritual etc.), he also stressed the contexts created by these actions which he called, interchangeably, “natural bounded units”, “basic interaction units”, “basic substantive units”, “their recurrent structures and their attendant processes” (cf. Williams 1980: 211). And although he rarely mentioned the role of communication in the construction of these units,¹⁰ he concentrated in most of his later work on the role of communication in “framing” situations. The immediate context is mainly made up of the *social situation*, i.e. when at least two interactants are in co-presence.¹¹ In order to grasp the specificity of the multitude of interactional situations, Goffman analysed different “ambulatory units” and types of social situation (“contact”, “encounter”, “social occasion”, “gathering” etc.) which form the basis of the distinction between different kinds of immediate context.

In building on the results of conversation analysis, Goffman (1981) also showed that the basic verbal and non-verbal (ritual as well as “systemic”) structures of exchanging actions (such as conversational pair sequences) may constitute a fundamental element of immediate contexts, exhibiting both a general applicability to highly different purposes as well as a very strong “context sensitivity”, i.e. a capacity to shape specific contexts. At the most basic level of immediate contexts we can identify the bounded communicative episodes as *communicative patterns* or *genres* (Günthner and Knoblauch 1995).

Communicative patterns, such as sayings, narratives, greetings and other “genre”-like forms, such as conversion stories, jokes or tall stories, may be considered to be communicative contexts for the particular communicative actions or action sequences by which they are constituted, insofar as the actors orient to and anticipate them as longer action sequences. These patterns usually exhibit an elementary structure of a beginning, middle and end which is constructed by the participants. As a frame of communicative orientation and a means of co-ordinating actions, these patterns have the function of relieving actors of the task of negotiating each communicative sequence step by step.¹² They may therefore be said to solve a certain communicative problem in such a way as to provide frameworks of expectation in common situations.

In the course of interaction, actors often produce chains of different communicative patterns, i.e. a greeting ritual may be followed by gossip, then by a joke, etc. The sequence of certain patterns and genres may thus constitute specific social or, to be more exact, communicative situations. Situations which are constructed communicatively can be described as ‘aggregations’ of sequences of different communicative patterns, the typicality of the situation being dependent on the combination of particular patterns coproduced by the interactants. In some cases, the interactants seem to follow typical expectations of communicative conduct, producing a structured sequence of events; situations which appear to the observer as more formally patterned may be called “*communicative occasions*”; this holds, for example, for the “genres” of medical consultation (Heath 1986), sales speeches (Knoblauch 1987), or church assemblies and meetings of “Anonymous groups” (Knoblauch 1995: 145–161). Communicative occasions seem not only to be structured in terms of the linguistic means used; non-verbal communicative actions also exhibit a structure with respect to “shared space” (which may also be endowed with other cultural signs), expected time shared, situational identities, partici-

pation status and the constellation within a participation framework (Günthner and Knoblauch 1995).

Whereas all these features of different communicative occasions may vary to a considerable degree, some are characterised by a focused communicative event; in line with research in the folklore of communication, we may call these events *performances* (Bauman 1990). Performances may not only include ‘traditional high art’ events but also events such as brethren-meetings (Borker 1986), tale-singers in Turkish coffee-houses (Basgöz 1975) or publicly-staged political debates in front of an audience.

Despite their differences, there is one thing these contexts have in common: they are immediate contexts, i.e. they form what Goffman (1981b) has called a “micro-ecological orbit” constituted through communication. As already mentioned, Goffman was very explicit in stressing the distinctiveness of this “interaction order” as a “reality sui generis” by distinguishing it from what he called the “social order”, i.e. institutional organisation, class differences, modes of production etc.¹³ This distinction is at its clearest where Goffman analyses the “interfaces” between the interaction order and the more traditional elements of social organisation: Goffman considers different kinds of key situations, people-processing-encounters and ceremonial occasions to constitute such interfaces with the social structure, the political and economic system. But although he conceded that letters and telephone conversations constitute special cases of interaction, he did not, surprisingly, account for one important “interface” which is currently becoming important in our daily lives: mediated communication.

4.2. *Contexts of mediated communication*

The notion of mediation is derived from Schütz’ theory of action. By mediated social action he means actions which are either transmitted in space (such as phone calls) or delayed in time (such as letters).

Since it is obvious that phone calls or letters are almost by definition communicative, we will use the expression *mediated communicative action*. The main feature of mediated communicative action, however, is negative. It is distinguished from immediate face-to-face interaction by participants’ lack of access to and use of full bodily symptoms and the whole range of intersubjective reciprocity. Whereas immediate contexts are characterised by the “primary manipulative zone”, mediated contexts are built up within what Schütz (and

Mead) call the secondary manipulative zone (Schütz and Luckmann 1979: 69ff, 313).

Mediation is, of course, made possible by certain “technologies of mediation” which are applied in an immediate context. Technologies of mediation make communicative actions accessible to other immediate contexts. The means may be quite different: broken branches on trees may signify where to go, a letter may be intended to be read after my departure, electronic mail or telephone chat may be used to establish a common but mediated context between participants. Yet, despite their ‘mediatedness’, the communality of mediated contexts and the principle of reciprocity typical of immediate communicative action still apply to the immediate form: any communicative action is *per definitionem* designed to be received by someone else, and whenever the reception occurs, the understanding, response or reaction establishes a minimal structure on which mediated contexts are built.

It is obvious that there are different degrees of mediation: whereas a chat or sales talk on the phone establishes a social relation at least for a short “lived time”, the design of an advertisement is generally addressed to anonymous recipients who are conceived of in a very mediated, anonymous and generalised way as market research “target groups”, “focus group”, “implicit readers” of novels or TV audiences. Thus, mediated contexts vary according to their degree of “interactivity”, i.e. the possibility of establishing a reciprocal relationship between participants. Unlike immediate contexts, reciprocity is restricted as regards the “fullness of bodily symptoms” with which we may reciprocally communicate (we hear other people’s voices, see digitally produced pictures of them, read their letters but not touch them). Even more importantly, mediated contexts are characterised by “*anonymisation*”: the means which are used in mediated communication are dependent on what may be transmitted technically.

On this basis, Schütz (1962a) has already suggested that the use of highly anonymous signs in mediated communication can transform the “we”-relation of immediate interaction into a “*Thr*-relation” (referring to the second person plural “you”) in which we communicate reciprocally as typical actors on the basis of anonymised signs and emblems. On these grounds, Soeffner (1992) has recently argued that in modern, complex society most interactions are guided by the standardised emblems and forms of self-representation with which membership of “style groups” is expressed. This argument has been confirmed by recent empirical life-style research (Schulze 1992) which shows

that these communicative forms are the basis of “scenes” and “milieus” and thus constitute mediated contexts on the basis of anonymisation only. By ‘scenes’ is meant face-to-face settings in which actors are communicating with each other on the basis of anonymous typifications, such as ‘raver’, ‘Scientologist’ or ‘nudist’. Milieus are made up of scenes.

With respect to mass communication, this anonymisation is more obvious. In order to maintain the possibility of synchronising intentions and coordinating actions, mediated contexts increasingly require not only anonymisation but also *standardisation* of signs. This obviously holds for the traditional means of mediated communication; love letters, war declarations or business orders follow a certain, standardised pattern (which has already been subject to classical rhetorical analysis). It also holds for conventional forms of mass communication; advertisements, television prayers or radio advice programmes take on genre-like forms which may become ritualised or even “canonised”, e.g. the television sermon. The intended action is conveyed to the addressees by means of these standardised patterns. Anonymisation also holds for the so-called interactive media; although a wide variety of communicative actions are conceivable, messages on electronic mail exhibit patterns that are as strong as the messages on answering machines (Knoblauch and Alvarez-Caccamo 1991); the same can be said about the new conventions in computer-mediated communication which range from certain signs (such as “BTW” for “by the way”) to the already conventionalised design of internet “homepages”. In fact, in terms of communicative culture, instead of an ‘anarchic variety’ of new forms, these new means of communication have produced only a small number of new communicative conventions. Because of this standardisation effect of mediated communication, one could even speak of a “secondary traditionalisation of communication” supporting the new “media culture”. Since addressees of mediated communication can only be orientated towards “*modo subiunctivi*” (Schütz and Luckmann 1984: 123), anonymisation even affects the status of participants in mediated interactions; whereas in phone calls “situated identities” are built up by standardised means (such as a ‘joyful’ voice, a complacent remark, “giving a mail order” etc.), phone tags on answering machines may construct a network of “telephone-relations”, and participation in an internet address may turn one into a fan of a particular soap opera. These situated identities become most pertinent in the case of communicatively mediated work, e.g. computer supported co-operative work (Heath et al. 1995). The contexts built up by these networks consist

of series of standardised work activities in which certain tasks (e.g. guiding an aeroplane to its gate) are performed and the identity of each participant defined.

Standardisation seems to be a general feature of mediated communication, constituting what may be called “media culture”. *Media culture* consists of communicative conventions within a network of technologically mediated communication, including mass communication between single senders and a mass audience as well as individualised mediated communication, e.g. electronic mail messages to particular receivers (or letters by mail). As Crane (1992) has shown, media culture not only builds on local social occasions in the interaction order (such as urban exhibitions, shows, performances), it may itself take the form of a social event, e.g. the focused interaction of a television audience with a particular TV show. (Of course, there is no *single* media culture, and investigation of the different contexts which develop on this basis is of great significance for the understanding of modern culture.)

Media culture rests on the material basis of technological mediation systems (ranging from telegraph-lines to satellites). This material basis introduces an important social structural element into mediated culture (and, as we shall see, into societal contexts). This “infrastructure” is the basis for the development of *social networks* as a structural component of media culture, i.e. the continuous communicative relations which are built up through mediated communication. Networks can be dependent on regular interaction, such as phone-“elective” relations, regular anonymous reception of mass-mediated communication (such as fan mail for particular movies), or, more directly, on the technical network of the means of communication such as the internet. Yet they impose certain structural restrictions on culture: the availability and accessibility of the systems and their use introduce “abstract” social differences of power, wealth, and knowledge at this level.

4.3. *The societal context, symbolic reality and hegemony*

Mediated contexts may be anonymous or they may be constructed by technological means; yet in principle they are characterised by reciprocity — as passive as the reception by a communication participant can ever be. This feature does not hold if we move on to large social collectivities, such as “society”, “nation” or “country”. Whereas sociologists traditionally conceive of such phenomena in terms of social structure, from the point of view of a

communicative approach to culture they appear to differ from the other two contexts because they cannot be addressed either by immediate or mediated communication. This is also the reason why Schütz conceived of these realities as symbolic:

Social collectivities and institutionalised relations, however, are (...) constructs of common-sense thinking (...). For this very reason, we can apprehend them only symbolically; but the symbols representing them themselves pertain to the paramount reality and motivate our actions within it" (Schütz 1962a: 353).

The notion of society as a symbolic reality, however, should neither mean to reify social collectivities nor ascribe them an ontological status. Nor should they be reduced to a cognitive category (as e.g. Husserl or Cooley have done) since their reality is not constructed or maintained by "cognitive activities" alone. To speak of social collectivities as symbolic realities means that they are contexts which are continuously constructed by communicative actions. Yet, the societal context is the realm of symbolic communication, i.e. of symbolically mediated knowledge and action, the symbolically shaped cosmos of world-views and of the traditions embedded therein (Soeffner 1990). Symbolic communication may even (and has to) make use of the very means which apply in other contexts: of the forms of immediate communication, mediated technology or the signs of anonymous communication. Yet, in contrast to immediate and mediated communication, symbolic communication refers to a reality beyond that in which each communication partner is communicating. Be it the Prime Minister, the President or the Chancellor, their acts of communication are still located in the interaction order of their life-world and transmitted by television, newspaper or radio. Their difference from other contexts is that they additionally "represent" something else; they are "appresenting"¹⁴ an order that is not tangible by means of different symbols; the Stars and Stripes, the ceremonial presentation as "head of government". It is this reference to and representation of an order which makes these actions *symbolic* actions. Thus, as Gumperz (1981) has shown with respect to linguistic minorities (such as Slovenian in Austria, German in Alsace or Catalan in Spain), speakers may communicate their ethnic identity by stressing their membership of a speech community through the use of a particular language variety.

A special feature of symbolic communication is its lack of reciprocity. In his proposal concerning the development of a political civic identity within

large social collectivities such as the European Union, Habermas tries to go beyond this feature by suggesting that civic identity may develop if the *citoyens* are able to interact communicatively on a reciprocal basis with this cosmion, by for example voting. However, in suggesting that reciprocity may be established in the future, he presupposes that the European Union is already being affected by symbolic communication, i.e. communicative actions which do not presuppose reciprocity.

The symbolic reality of social collectivities is particularly dependent on the means of communication by which it becomes defined and legitimated to a wider public. Typically, these means of communication are unequally distributed. Different elites of societies dispose of and fight for access to these means of communications (an observation supported by mass media research). This inequality of access to and disposal of the means of communication is best expressed by Gramsci's notion of *hegemony*. Hegemony means that certain social groups define the symbolic values dominant in a particular society (Laitin 1986: 105). The power to define these values is, of course, dependent on access to the means of communication and competence in using them. Hegemony is to be distinguished from ideology in that other social groups are not excluded from these values. The symbolic values are negotiated with other social groups in order to involve them in the common cosmion: "that is, hegemony is not maintained through the obliteration of the opposition but through the *articulation* of opposing interests into the political affiliations of the hegemonic group" (Turner 1992: 212). Since it is achieved through the articulation of interests, the hegemonial version of the cosmion is, almost by definition, a communicative construction.

Hegemonic versions may, of course, be contested, and there may be conflicts about hegemony between the different social groups involved. These conflicts are reflected in the communicative constructions of what Silverstein (1979) calls the "linguistic ideology". The very use of certain communicative forms indexicalizes, so to speak, social groups. By way of this social indexicalisation, the communicative actions by which the cosmion is constructed, maintained and changed are linked to the social structure. Thus it is not only the access and availability of the means of communication, i.e. the political economy, which supports the hegemony of certain groups; hegemonial inequality is expressed in and reflected by communicative forms, metapragmatic notions of language use, relations of genres to social categories and linguistic economy.

The unequal distribution of the means of communication may be described in terms of what Luckmann (1986) calls the “communicative budget”, i.e. the totality of communicative forms which affect a society’s continuity and change. Communicative budget refers to the unequal distribution of communicative forms with respect to social milieus and institutional structures. Thus, the notion of a communicative budget also implies the unequal distribution of the means of communication, thereby maintaining reflexivity of communication even at the “meso-” and “macro-” social levels: social milieus and institutional structures are not related to, but constituted by the communicative actions which are typical of them. Economic communication, for example, takes on specific forms which make it observable as economic; the same holds for religious, political or scientific communication; and even phenomena of institutional dissolution (such as the effects of religious “secularisation”) are expressed in and can be seen to be constituted by specific communicative forms, e.g. the use of conversion in Anonymous groups.

5. Contexts, culture and intercultural communication

As early as the 1930s Alfred Schütz had begun to analyse the world of everyday life. In his view the life-world in which we live and act is always a social and cultural one. It is culture which gives it its taken-for-granted character. Culture thus not only comprises ‘mastery’ of nature but also people’s knowledge, ideas and meanings. Culture involves the set of typifications of objects, ideas and actions, and a system of relevance which guides preferences for objects, ideas and action that are common to a certain group. Moreover, culture is not simply a “cognitive” phenomenon which allows us to “interpret” the world; it also imparts actions¹⁵ and is a pre-minent social phenomenon: “Culture and civilisation patterns of group life” include “all the peculiar valuations, institutions, and systems of orientation and guidance (such as folklore, mores, laws, habits, customs, etiquette, fashions) which (...) characterise — if not constitute — any social group at a given moment in history” (Schütz 1964: 92). It is by way of interactions that cultural meanings are negotiated.¹⁶ Since these negotiations are performed by communicative actions, the socio-cultural world of everyday life is not only being continuously constructed, it is also essentially cultural. Since “only here [i.e. in the world of everyday life, HK] communication with our consociates is possible”

(Schütz/Luckmann 1984: 306), this sociocultural life-world is constructed through communication. Building on the theory of Schütz as well as other empirical approaches to communication, we have argued that since the culture of the world of everyday life is constructed by means of communicative acts, it is essentially a *communicative culture*. By communicative culture we want to stress that culture cannot be reduced to knowledge, meaning, or sign-systems only. Communicative culture is neither located in the mind nor in the objectified system or discourse: it is produced, realised, and transformed in communicative actions.

True, the notion of the communicative culture of everyday life is only suggested by Schütz; yet it may provide a foundation for corresponding concepts of culture. Thus Burke (1979: 37) suggests that in history culture can be grasped by means of communicative forms. Wuthnow (1992) takes this even further with the notion of a “new sociology of culture” which considers culture to be mainly communicative. Culture consists of the discourses, texts, symbolic practices and communicative events that constitute the ongoing stream of social life. Wuthnow and Witten (1988: 53f) also suggest defining culture in terms of discourse and practice. From the perspective of the communicative approach, then, culture is not only “enacted”, it is to be seen as a continuous process of meaning construction through communicative action.

In drawing on Schütz’s theory, we have tried to show that the order of this construction process is accomplished through routine, typified forms, patterns and conventions of communicative action. On this basis we distinguished different contexts of what Schütz and Luckmann (1979: 25) call “common communicative environments”: immediate, mediated and societal contexts, each characterised by a specific form of communicative action (face-to-face communication, mediated communication and symbolic communication). Communicative culture is the mediated and immediate communicative actions and communicative forms performed in this society. With respect to social structure, communicative culture depends on the distribution of the means of communication; but it is even more dependent on the differentiated use of communicative actions and communicative forms of which it is constituted and by which it is structured into communicative situations, milieus and institutional organisations.

This notion of cultural context allows us to evade the common distinction of two ontological spheres of contexts, such as “outer” social structural context which appears to be “external” to interaction, and “inner” context

which seems to be immanent to interaction.¹⁷ The proposed concept of context, rather, suggests that the different analytically distinct horizons of context are interlocked, i.e. these contexts do not exist in isolation: “each of us is living in all three spheres at the same time: in the immediate sphere as well as in the symbolically constructed one” (Soeffner 1990: 67). Thus, by contextualising a certain immediate context (e.g. a managers’ meeting), participants may simultaneously carry out symbolic communicative acts, thereby contextualising their membership of ethnic, national or (with respect to certain symbolically highly charged professions, such as soldiers, politicians, priests or international sportspersons) professional collectivities. To give another example, work in high technology settings is frequently concerned with the management of activities by locally dispersed actors whose actions are coordinated by information and communication technologies. Yet, due to standardised and anonymised features of this technologically mediated communication, the factual use of these technologies depends on and is accomplished by face-to-face communication, in work situations, thereby linking mediated with immediate contexts. One should also stress that the adoption of three forms of contextualisation is simply a heuristic distinction based on general theoretical categories. As the examples have shown, the process of contextualisation requires distinctions that are much more subtle.

Using the general approach presented here, we not only propose a refined notion of communicative culture but also a sophisticated rationale for the problem of intercultural communication which will allow the notion itself to be redefined. It is commonly assumed that culture is something which is bounded and self-contained; this assumption is even presupposed in the notion of intercultural communication, which is regarded as communication between bounded cultures. If, however, we conceive of culture as contexts, we can try to identify different aspects of intercultural communication and focus on different aspects of context which do not (as is currently termed) “enter into” but constitute interaction. Without an *a priori* assumption of boundedness for culture which is ‘interpenetrated’ by intercultural communication, culture itself turns out to be constructed by communicative actions.

Culture, cultural habits and differences are not isolated entities but are embedded in and constructed by interactive processes (Günthner 1993: 16). Intercultural communication is thus not alien to culture but is itself contextualising in the ways described above. This may be best illustrated by the phenomenon of code-switching in multilingual societies, in which situa-

tions of intercultural communication are part of everyday life (Günthner 1993: 13ff). As Gumperz (1982) has shown, the switch by Indian minority language speakers to the majority language Hindi does not simply depend on caste relationships but on types of social interactions and situations, such as formal, goal-oriented (“transactional”) conversations or informal talk about personal matters. Code-switching by speakers of Slovenian in German speaking Austria is dependent on the typification of social situations. Thus certain types of situations and even activities carried out through language in the ‘interaction order’ are contextualised by the selection of a linguistic code. Code-switching is also shown to contextualise larger contexts. In an investigation of communicative forms of speakers in different areas of Belfast, Milroy (1980) has shown that speakers not only contextualise situations but also their membership of specific social networks which thereby constitute their local speech communities. The reason for the mediation of communicative contexts in intercultural communication can be seen in structural changes of ‘ethnicity’. Whereas ‘old ethnicity’ has been a “community of the ground” (Gumperz 1990), a “place-defined group” (Fitzgerald 1992: 113) linked by recurrent interaction, “new ethnicity” is based on different kinds of communication network. Communication by different interactive media, such as the telephone or the use of mass media (television, radio, newspapers) enables this kind of ethnicity to be contextualised as a “community of the mind”, a speech community sharing communicative habits by way of mediated communicative actions. Mediated and mass communication are also the means by which the symbolic reality of speech communities may be produced. Thus Anderson (1983) has shown how newspapers, book print and other forms of media communication lead to the construction of an imagined community on a larger scale, such as “nation”. Yet, because of its dependence on the means of mediated communication, the construction of this “imagined community” is subject to economic developments and political interests. To give an example, as a result of increasing urbanisation, industrialisation and political centralisation, the ‘symbolic value’ of the Hungarian speech community in Austria (Gal 1979) has deteriorated in favour of the German speech community. Moreover, by gaining access to the means of communication, certain “pressure groups” may attempt to communicate (more or less intentionally and ideologically) ethnicity, social groups and nations, thereby constructing highly symbolic contexts — a process which has recently increased in importance as a result of the recent spreading of ethnic conflicts and the creation of new ethnicities.

The notion of communicative culture built up by different forms of contextualisation in communicative actions is thus necessary for an understanding of the complexity and differentiation of modern intercultural communication. According to this view, *what is usually considered to be one culture turns out to be itself “pluricultural”, consisting of a myriad of different contexts*. The distinction between different horizons of communication may be one way to understand this culture from a theoretical point of view. Ethnographic analyses of communication in various sociocultural life worlds may be an empirical way of understanding cultural difference — whether or not the difference is a relevant feature of an actor’s communication. Either way, the implication is that cultures in modern societies are structurally characterised by pluralism. As a result, the phenomena hitherto considered to be intercultural communication themselves constitute contexts within and as part of pluralistic culture.

Acknowledgements

This article is based on *Kommunikationskultur* (Knoblauch 1995) and on a paper presented to the Department of Sociology at the University of Nottingham in May 1996. For comments on this article I am indebted to Aldo di Luzio, Robert Dingwall, Jon Hindmarsh Neil Jenkins and, particularly, Christian Heath and John Gumperz.

Notes

1. With the exception of e.g. David Bogen (1989).
2. Habermas refers to Popper’s theory of three worlds as subjective, social, and objective spheres. These are addressed by expressive, regulatory, and propositional utterance and correspond to different forms of social action; with respect to communicative action, he adds a fourth function, understanding.
3. Habermas tries to overcome this problem by over-stressing the notion of the “illocutionary force” of utterances; yet he still maintains that their illocutionary force depends on their semantic content.
4. Following Luckmann (1979), we prefer to speak of a phenomenologically orientated sociology since philosophical phenomenology provides only the foundations of the empirical science of sociology.
5. For a detailed analysis of the constitution of signs cf. Luckmann (1983).

6. Against the narrow notion of indexicality used in conversation analysis, which refers mainly to the speech context, Schütz holds a much broader notion of indexicality.
7. I will mention only Sherzer, Bauman, Briggs and Hanks. For an overview cf. Bauman and Sherzer (1975).
8. This is what most clearly distinguishes the constructivist approach presented here from systems theory and from 'constructionist' or 'discourse' approaches.
9. It is well known that Schütz distinguished three types of transcendence; but it is less well known that he subdivides the mediate level of the social, intersubjective transcendences into three further levels. This is the level which is referred to here.
10. Except, of course, for his pioneering description of turn-taking (Goffman 1972: 65) and his distinction of two types of communication in his "Presentation of Self in Everyday Life".
11. I would define a social situation as an environment of mutual monitoring possibilities, anywhere within which an individual will find himself accessible to the naked sense of all others who are 'present', and similarly find them accessible to him" (Goffman 1972: 63).
12. One should stress that patterns are not rigid norms but that participants may re-negotiate or reframe communicative patterns, and very often do so in order to change the definition of the situation.
13. One should stress that Goffman did not claim the interaction order to be more real or more important — it is just much easier to access for any person and for the social scientist (1981b: 9).
14. The notion of "appresentation" is at the very core of Schütz' theory of signs; suffice it to say that, with respect to symbols, the representing sign vehicle "invokes" something which transcends the reality of everyday life.
15. It should be stressed that this position is held, for instance, by cognitive anthropology as well as by the sociology of knowledge. Cf. D'Andrade (1995).
16. Geertz (1973: 11ff) also offers a profound critique of the cognitivist approach to culture.
17. Giddens (1987) suggests a distinction between a context "brought along" and a context "brought about".

References

- Anderson, B.
1983 *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London/New York: Verso.
- Auer, P.
1992 "Introduction". In A. di Luzio and P. Auer (eds.), 1–38.
- Basgöz, I.
1975 "The tale singer and his audience". In D. Ben-Amos and S. Goldstein (eds.), *Folklore. Performance and Communication*. The Hague: Mouton.

- Bauman, R.
1990 "Performance". In *International Encyclopedia of Communication* 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bauman, R. and J. Sherzer
1975 "The ethnography of speaking". *Annual Review of Anthropology* 4. 95–119.
- Berger, P.L. and T. Luckmann
1967 *The Social Construction of Reality*. New York: Free Press.
- Bogen, D.
1989 "A reappraisal of Habermas Theory of Communicative Actions in light of detailed investigations of social practices". *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*. 19(1), 47–77.
- Borker, R.A.
1986 "'Moved by the spirit': Constructing meaning in a Brethren Breaking the Bread service". *Text* 6(3), 317–337.
- Bourdieu, P.
1982 *Ce que parler veut dire*. Paris: Fayard.
- Burke, P.
1979 "Back to Burckhart". *New York Review of Books* 26(15), 35–37.
- Corsaro, W.
1985 "Sociological approaches to discourse analysis". In T. Van Dijk (ed.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. Vol. 1. London: Academic Press, 176–192.
- Crane, D.
1992 *The Production of Culture. Media and Urban Arts*. Newbury Park: Sage.
- D'Andrade, R.
1995 *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Di Luzio, A. and J. C. P. Auer
1992 "Identitätskonstitution in der Migration: konversationsanalytische und linguistische Aspekte ethnischer Stereotypisierungen". *Linguistische Berichte* 194, 327–351.
- Drew, P. and J. Heritage
1992 "Analyzing talk at work: An introduction". In Drew and Heritage (eds.), *Talk at Work*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–65.
- Fitzgerald, T.K.
1992 "Media, ethnicity and identity" In: Scannell P. et al (eds.): *Culture and Power*. Newbury Park: Sage, 122–133.
- Gal, S.
1979 *Language Shift*. New York: Academic Press.
- Geertz, C.
1973 *The Interpretation of Culture*. New York: Basic Books.
- Giddens, A.
1987 "Goffman as a systematic social theorist". In Giddens, *Social Theory and Modern Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 109–139.

- Goffman, E.
 1972 "The neglected situation". In P. P. Giglioli (ed.), *Language and Social Context*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 61–66.
 1981 *Forms of Talk*. London: Blackwell.
 1981b "The interaction order". *American Sociological Review* 48
- Goodwin, C. and A. Duranti
 1992 "Rethinking context: An Introduction". In *Rethinking Context*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 142.
- Gumperz, J.
 1981 *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 1990 "Theory and method in phiglossia". In R. Gusmani (ed.), *Aspetti metodologici e teorici nelle ricerche sul plurilinguismo nei territori del Alpe-Austria*. Udine.
 1992 "Contextualization revisited". In Aldo di Luzio and Peter Auer (eds.), *The Contextualization of Language*. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: Benjamins, 39–54.
- Günthner, S.
 1993 *Diskursstrategien in der interkulturellen Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Günthner, S. and H. Knoblauch
 1995 "Culturally patterned speaking practices — the analysis of communicative genres". *Pragmatics* 5, 1–32.
- Habermas, J.
 1981 *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
 1988 *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Hanks, W.
 1989 "Text and textuality". *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18, 95–127.
- Heath, C.
 1986 *Body Movement and Speech in Medical Interaction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heath, C. and P. Luff
 1992 "Explicating face to face interaction". In G. N. Gilbert (ed.), *Researching Social Life*. London: Sage, 306–327.
- Heath, C., M. Jirotko, P. Luff and J. Hindmarsh
 1995 "Unpackaging collaboration: interactional organisation in a City trading room". *Journal of Computer Supported Cooperative Work* 3(1), 141–165.
- Heritage, J.
 1985 "Analyzing news interviews". In T. Van Dijk (ed.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. Vol. 3. London Xxxx, 95–119.
- Hymes, D.
 1962 "The ethnography of speaking". In T. Gladwin, W. C. Sturtevant (eds.), *Anthropology and Human Behavior*. Washington D.C.: Anthropological Society of Washington.
- Hymes, D. and J. Gumperz
 1964 "The Ethnography of communication". *American Anthropologist* 4(1).

- Knoblauch, H.
 1987 “‘Bei mir ist lustige Werbung, lacht euch gesund’ — Zur Rhetorik der Werbeveranstaltungen bei Kaffeefahrten”. *Zeitschrift Soziologie* 16(2), 127–144
 1995 *Kommunikationskultur: Die kommunikative Konstruktion kultureller Kontexte*. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.
- Knoblauch, H. and C. Alvarez-Caccamo
 1992 “‘I was calling you’. Communicative patterns in leaving a message to answering machines”. *Text* 12 (4), 473–505.
- Laitin, D.D.
 1986 *Hegemony and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Luckmann, Th.
 1979 “Philosophy, social science and everyday life”. In Luckmann (ed.), *Phenomenology and Sociology*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 217–253.
 1983 *Life-World and Social Realities*. London: Heinemann.
 1986 “Grundformen der gesellschaftlichen Vermittlung des Wissens: Kommunikative Gattungen”. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*. Special Issue 27, 191–211.
- Luhmann, N.
 1984 *Soziale Systeme*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Malinowski, B.
 1923 “The problem of meaning in primitive language”. In C. K. Ogden and I.A. Richards (eds), *The Meaning of Meaning*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Milroy, L.
 1980 *Language and Social Networks*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Moerman, M.
 1988 *Talking Culture. Ethnography and Conversation Analysis*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sacks, H., E. Schegloff and G. Jefferson
 1974 “A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking in conversation”. In Jim Schenkein (ed.), *Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction*. New York, 5–56.
- Schegloff, E.
 1992 “On talk and its institutional occasions”. In P. Drew and J. Heritage (eds), *Talk at Work*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101–134.
- Scheler, M.
 1960 *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*. Bern and Munich: Francke.
- Schulze, G.
 1992 *Die Erlebnisgesellschaft. Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart*. Frankfurt and New York: Campus.
- Schütz, A.
 1962 “Common sense and scientific interpretation of human action”. In *Collected Papers I*. The Hague: Nijhoff 3–47.

- 1962a "Symbol, reality, and society". In *Collected Papers I*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 287–356.
- 1964 "The stranger: An essay in social psychology". In *Collected Papers II*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 91–105.
- 1964a "The social world and the theory of action". In *Collected Papers II*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 3–19.
- Schütz, A. and Th. Luckmann
1979 *Strukturen der Lebenswelt I*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
1984 *Strukturen der Lebenswelt II*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (engl. transl. *Structures of the Life World*. Vol.II. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1994).
- Silverstein, M.
1979 "Language structure and linguistic ideology". In P. Clyne et al. (eds.), *The Elements: A Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels*. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 193–247.
- Soeffner, H.-G.
1990 "Appräsentation und Repräsentation". In H. Ragotzky a. H. Wenzel (eds.), *Höfische Repräsentation*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
1992 *Die Ordnung der Rituale. Die Auslegung des Alltags 2*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Tenbruck, F.
1990 "Repräsentative Kultur". In Hans Haferkamp (ed.), *Sozialstruktur und Kultur*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Turner, G.
1992 *British Cultural Studies: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Volosinov, V.N.
1975 *Marxismus und Sprachphilosophie*. Berlin: Ulstein.
- Williams, R.
1980 "Goffman's sociology of talk". In Ditton, J. (ed.), *The View from Goffman*. London XXX. 210–232.
- Wuthnow, R.
1992 *Rediscovering the Sacred*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
- Wuthnow, R. and M. Winen
1988 "New Directions in the Study of Culture". *Annual Review of Sociology* 14. 49–67.
- Zimmerman, D. and D. Boden
1991 "Structure in action: An introduction". In D. Zimmerman and D. Boden (eds), *Talk and Social Structure. Studies in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–22.

Contextualization and Ideology in Intercultural Communication

John J. Gumperz

University of California, Berkeley and Santa Barbara

1. Introduction

How and to what effect does language enter into intercultural communication? Or, to put it somewhat more precisely, how does culture through language¹ affect the way we think and communicate with others of different background? Although my primary concern in this paper is basically with the first of these questions, I want to argue that any answer that we can give ultimately depends on how we define the key terms in the second and on how we approach the relationships among them.

In the nineteenth century when Wilhelm von Humboldt, working within the context of the then dominant rising nationalisms, argued that language is the “formative organ” of thought and turned to comparative grammatical analysis to categorize and classify what at the time was known about “the variability in human language and mental development”, the basic assumption was that mankind comes divided into discrete peoples or — in Humboldt’s words — “nations”, each with their own language which embodies a people’s innermost spirit. The systematic fieldwork of Franz Boas, who along with his students laid the foundations for our current traditions of ethnographic and linguistic fieldwork, demonstrated that the evolutionary perspective that, since Humboldt, has dominated linguistic research has no basis in empirical fact. Attention now turned away from “mental development” as a unilinear progression from primitivity to civilization, to focus on linguistic and cultural relativity. With the rise of structuralism in the nineteen thirties and forties, research on relativity came to rely on comparisons among abstracted systems

of relationally defined grammatical units on the one hand and cultural units on the other, on the assumption that it is structure that most readily captures what is regular and significant about human action. Yet in most of the work that has followed, Humboldt's view of variability as applying to distinctions among specific taken for granted population units (tribes, ethnic groups, or classes) and the grammatical systems of the languages they speak continued to be accepted without question.

I first became interested in questions of linguistic relativity during the nineteen sixties, when it appeared that throughout the urban United States as well as elsewhere, many minority populations whose language background was distinct from that of the surrounding majority, regularly seemed to perform less well in school than their majority group neighbours. Educators and administrators along with other members of the general public tended to explain the phenomena by arguing that, by virtue of the circumstances in which they lived, the minority group members in question had not come up to the majority norm in cognitive (c.f. Humboldt's "mental") development and that therefore they could be said to be linguistically and culturally deprived.

Linguists and anthropologists for whom evolutionary explanations of language development had long ceased to have any scientific validity readily realized that the issue could not be one of linguistic competence. The communicative issues that arise in minority/majority group contacts have much in common with what is commonly termed linguistic relativity. But they differ in a number of significant respects: (a) the populations in question tend not to live together in geographically bounded regions; (b) they are by no means communicative isolates. On the contrary, as residents of urban centers they depend on the surrounding community for their everyday necessities; (c) utterance level contrastive analysis of linguistic form, focusing on grammar, phonology or phonetics, cannot account for what is at issue, nor can established methods of discourse and conversational analysis by themselves lead to a solution.

If linguistic variability is a matter of relativity among distinct structurally equivalent systems and not of mental development, why should the fact that people use language differently as such lead to communicative or learning difficulties. A common answer to such a question is that intercultural contact is fraught with problems because of the pervasiveness of pejorative attitudes and values, that have their root in the inequalities of power and economic resources characteristic of today's societies. But this by itself simply begs the question: How and in what ways does the fact that speakers rely on verbal

strategies acquired in the course of previous communicative experience by itself lead to pejorative stereotyping. In this paper I argue that to deal with such issues we cannot simply rely on comparative analyses that yield lists of differences between two codes, be it at the level of phonological, morpho-syntactic or semantic structure, and then compare these to differences at the level of culture. We need to begin by reexamining the basic assumptions that for the last decades have led us to essentialize languages and cultures as separate unitary, homogeneous entities, by focusing on the discursive practices that actors employ in the pursuit of communicative ends and in negotiating shared understandings in the course of their everyday lives.²

The key concept in terms of which I analyze these practices is the notion of conversational inference (Gumperz 1982), defined as the situated assessments by which participants in an encounter interpret what is intended at any one point in an exchange and on which they depend in planning their responses. Although what is interpreted via these assessments is largely talk, we cannot deal with interpretation by postulating a code-like word-to-world relationship, as formal semanticists tend to do. What talk does is to impose more or less determinate constraints on possible interpretations, that is it sets the framework in terms of which interpretive assessments are made. Inferences that lead to interpretations are always affected by a variety of additional input factors. Among the most important of these is participants' perception of what activities they are engaged in at any one time. This in turn is in part a matter of a priori extra-textual knowledge, stereotypes and attitudes but it is also to a large extent constructed through talk. A second significant factor is what has recently come to be called linguistic ideology, the consciously held beliefs and values in terms of which participants in an interaction and others who share their background evaluate talk.

Many other factors can be listed. What I would like to point out here is that the main concern in my own earlier work on intercultural communication was with how contextualization-based signaling at the level of turn by turn exchanges interacts with propositional content to constrain interpretation of what transpires at any one time. More recently I have also begun to be concerned with the role of linguistic ideology and I would now argue that only by considering ideology in relation to subconsciously internalized background knowledge and linguistic signaling processes can we account for the basic issues of hegemony or symbolic domination, that are so important in intercultural communication.

2. The Cultural Defense

In what follows I will attempt to illustrate one way in which ideology enters into interpretation by describing how we went about constructing a defense argument in a court case involving intercultural communication. In this case, although there was clear evidence of prejudicial attitudes against a minority group, no first hand records of verbal exchanges between the defendant and majority group members were available and it was initially not at all evident that miscommunication or for that matter cultural differences had played a role. The case involves as defendant, a young Northern Californian American Indian, of part Karuk and part Shasta ancestry, one of a large number of Native Americans in the region, whose parents or grandparents had been forcibly removed from their reservations in the early nineteen twenties, and are now living as urban minority groups in a small Northern California town. I will argue that the historical, ethnographic and sociolinguistic evidence, when interpreted in the light of ideology and discursive practice, enabled us to show that the defendants were in fact culturally American Indians, even though they were born and had spent most of their lives surrounded largely by monolingual white English speakers. The Indians³ no longer spoke any of the traditional Native American languages, and were accused by their neighbors of having “lost their culture” and therefore being no different from “urban trash”. Nevertheless, based on historical records and interview data, we succeeded in reconstructing a set of culturally plausible presuppositions in terms of which the defendants’ actions made sense and were justifiably not criminal.

Patrick Croy, a young Northern Californian Native American, had been convicted in 1979 in Placer County, California of first degree murder and assault with special circumstances, attempted murder, robbery, and conspiracy in the 1978 shooting death of a policeman in Siskiyou County. In 1985 the convictions for murder, attempted murder and robbery were overturned by the California State Supreme Court based on faulty jury instructions and a new trial was ordered. The conspiracy to commit murder and assault convictions were upheld. The defendant was retried and acquitted on the first three charges from December 1989 through April 1990, in San Francisco. In both trials, the prosecution’s case was based largely on evidence involving certain utterances attributed to the defendant and on his silence in response to comments made by others with whom he was associated. In this context, the use of sociolinguistic methods to analyze both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic commu-

nication became highly relevant in raising questions about the prosecution's premises in building its case. Similarly, the defendant's cultural background and personal history also became relevant in regard to certain actions and situations in which Croy was a participant.

The facts at issue can be summarized as follows. A group of Native Americans — Patrick Croy, his sister Norma Jeanne Croy and their cousin Darrel Jones — participated in what the prosecution termed a weekend long 'party', held in connection with a local festival in a public park. During the weekend the gathering changed locations several times. The participants were said to have been drinking and smoking marijuana throughout this period. By Sunday evening the gathering came to be centered in an apartment and housing complex and in the adjoining parking lot. Some white residents of the apartment complex, complaining about noise, had called the police twice to come and quiet the party down. After the second police visit, a group of five Native Americans including the defendant along with his sister and cousin left the party, got into a car, picked up a twenty-two caliber rifle in another apartment in town and drove to a convenience store located on the main street to buy ammunition. At the store there was an argument over change which turned into a scuffle between the clerk and the defendant's sister. The clerk summoned the police claiming that his store was being robbed. The Native Americans returned to their car and drove out of town with the Police following them. At one point in the car, according to one of the car's passengers, Norma Jeanne Croy allegedly shouted that she wanted to "get some cops" or "kill some cops." The statement met with silence from the others in the car. At another point in the chase, the police claimed that they heard a shot fired at them whereupon they summoned help.

The defendant's car turned up a dirt road which dead-ended at his grandmother's cabin. Twenty-seven law enforcement officers arrived with spotlights, assault rifles, shotguns, and pistols. Croy, his sister and his cousin ran up the hillside behind the cabin. The remaining two were taken into custody immediately and handcuffed to a tree, where they remained during the following shoot-out. The three stayed on the hillside and exchanged shots with the police, using their one twenty-two rifle. Evidence given at the trial showed that they fired a total of twenty rounds as compared with more than two hundred fired by the police.

The exchange of gunfire continued for several hours as Mr. Croy and his cousin passed the rifle back and forth between them. During this period one

police officer was wounded in the hand and Mr. Croy's sister and friend were both wounded by police fire. Finally between three thirty and four a.m. Croy was observed sneaking down the slope toward his grandmother's cabin. Two officers went to intercept him, one going around each side of the cabin. An exchange of gunfire between Mr. Croy and one of the officers left the officer dead with one bullet from the twenty-two rifle in the heart and Mr. Croy wounded with several bullets in his back.

The prosecution's main theory was that the Native Americans had formed a conspiracy to kill the police at the party in the parking lot and in their car and that there was a chain of causation that led from the formation of the conspiracy to the officer's death five or six hours later. In support of this claim the prosecution relied on local white residents' testimony that (1) the Native Americans had been engaged in a prolonged noisy drinking bout, that (2) when the police reprimanded them for disturbing the peace, they began plotting out loud to take revenge by means of such expressions as "shoot the sheriff" and "tear up Yreka", (3) that the defendant had been in the parking lot among the group of alleged plotters, and that (4) according to the testimony of one of the native Americans, when the defendant's sister had called for revenge with shouts like "kill the cops" her suggestion was met with silence by all concerned. According to the California State Code of Evidence, therefore, the defendant and his companions could be said to have consented in the conspiracy.

In the original trial, the defense accepted the prosecution's basic premises and pleaded diminished capacity due to intoxication. Following considerable pretrial publicity in Yreka, the trial venue had been moved to Auburn, California, where in 1979, Patrick Croy was convicted of robbery, conspiracy, assault, and murder. He received the death sentence. Croy appealed the decision and in 1985, the California State Supreme Court, ruling on the issue of faulty jury instructions, responded by overturning the convictions for robbery and murder, while validating those for conspiracy and assault. These circumstances left the way open for a retrial. The defense team for the new trial, aware of the locally prevalent prejudice against Native Americans and of the perceptions of local Native Americans as an urban underclass, decided to challenge the basic premises of the prosecution's arguments by means of a cultural defense. The new defense argument was that the facts in the case could only be correctly understood on the basis of more detailed knowledge of local history, culture and interethnic relations. Historians, anthropologists, and educators were consulted. An investigator was employed to compile

newspaper reports on interethnic relations in the region, with particular emphasis on the ways in which local publications had covered the earlier trial. Archival resources and other available published materials on Native Americans in the area were also collected.

The initial investigation documented a long history of racial and cultural persecution, beginning with the systematic killings of the late nineteenth century, when white settlers had at times hunted down and shot Indians like animals and going on to the early part of the twentieth century when some of the remaining Indians were forcibly removed from their territories and compelled to live in reservations or rancherias as they are called in California. Others were settled at the outskirts of small towns like Yreka, where they led an economically marginal existence living as an underclass in substandard housing, and subsisting for the most part on government support and casual labor for much of the last decades. In the course of this time they have, except for relatively few older individuals, lost their language as well as most overt signs of Karuk and Shasta culture which according to anthropological reports was known for the richness of its myths and the complexity of its ceremonials. The Native Americans in the present case are English speaking descendants of this latter urban group.

Early on in the investigation Richard Perry, a Ph.D. candidate in anthropology and law school student, was enlisted as a consultant. Perry read the transcript of the original trial and visited the area with the investigator who had carried out the library research and with a member of the defense team. Among other things Perry measured distances and background noise in the apartment complex parking lot to assess the likelihood that non-participant residents of the apartment complex who had testified for the prosecution could have understood what was said at the party. He also talked with both local whites and Indians to get a sense of ethnic differences in speech behavior and consulted locally available library resources and newspaper archives on history. This information served to supplement the defense team's own files. Perry's initial investigation indicated that there were significant problems of background noise and distance which could have interfered with the prosecution witness's ability to understand much of what they claimed to have heard. There were also some indications that the local Native Americans spoke a variety of English that was discernibly different from that of the local whites.

Gumperz was then enlisted as a sociolinguistic expert to evaluate the available cultural information and the prosecution's evidence on overheard

utterances and on silence. With respect to the former, Native American participants in the gathering had already denied that anyone could have spoken the words “shoot the sheriff”. They pointed out that the policemen who had issued the warning were members of the city force, who were personally known to the Indians. Furthermore, there was no sheriff’s office in the immediate area. It is unlikely therefore that the Indians would have used the term sheriff to refer to these officers. The Indians suggested that what had most probably been said was, “Let’s go shoot some poofitch”. “Poofitch” is the Karuk word for deer or venison, and the expression “shoot some poofitch” is commonly used in the local Native American community as meaning to go out into the green to relax or to let off steam to get away the pressures of life among the white majority.

It seemed therefore that there was sufficient doubt about both what witnesses could have heard at the parking lot site and what Croy’s words and silence might have signified, that it was worth pursuing further investigations into these matters. Gumperz and Perry arranged for a second trip to Yreka. There, with the help of a local Karuk linguist teaching at nearby Humboldt State University, they organized an informal group discussion in a local Native American home. Six members of the local American Indian community all of whom were of the defendant’s approximate age cohort participated in the discussion. The purpose of the meeting was to explore several points pertinent to a cultural oriented defense of Patrick Croy. A main consideration, of course, was to seek more detailed and conclusive background information on the area and on the local American Indian community and their relation to the larger Yreka community from the Native Americans own perspective.

Another important goal of the discussions was to investigate more thoroughly the English speech style spoken by the local Indian people, to assess the ways in which it differs from the speech of local white residents, and determine the extent to which those differences might lead to interpretive problems or other comprehension difficulties that could have affected the accuracy of witness’s reports of the talk they overheard in the Pine Gardens parking lot. Two key questions were: the likelihood of Croy’s having actually made such statements as, “Let’s shoot the sheriff,” “Shoot him,” and “Tear Yreka up;” and the likelihood that witnesses at the site could have understood what he was saying, given the distances and background noise involved. The question of the significance of Croy’s silence in response to his sister’s alleged remarks about wanting “to get some cops.” was also dealt with in some detail.

In preparation for these group discussions, the relevant anthropological and sociolinguistic literature on American Indian speech was consulted. Ethnographic research on American Indian oral narrative by Hymes (1974), Sherzer (1981), and others provided the theoretical basis for raising questions about northern California Native Americans' speech style. Also consulted was a summary of the ethnographic literature on cultural differences in behavioral etiquette between American Indians and mainstream North Americans. Of central importance also in this context was the work of Scollon and Scollon (1981) on Athabaskan oral narrative style in Alaska. The Scollons focus on a number of discourse strategies and patterns imported from Athabaskan languages that are used by Native American English speakers in the area. Such practices involve the timing, tempo, and pace of speech, as well as the pragmatic use of silence that often lead to miscommunication when Indians speak with Standard American English speakers. Even those Indians who do not necessarily speak Athabaskan themselves grow up within a speech community using this variety of native American English, and often employing the non-standard forms in their everyday talk. American English speakers familiar with Alaskan conditions as well as some linguists confirm this point when they claim that the Indian way of speaking often seems confusing or redundant.

Basso's (1986) research on the communicative role of silence among Western Apaches (whose language, incidentally, is also of the Athabaskan language group), and Philips' (1982) research on the use of silence on the Warm Springs Indian reservation, were also relevant to the case, in that these studies indicated that silence serves a specific, and culturally quite distinctive, function in the discourse of these American Indians. Conversations are often punctuated with relatively long pauses and silences. In informal gatherings, Indian people may sit or stand quietly, without speaking. If addressed, they may look away and remain silent for a relatively long time (at least from the perspective of mainstream Americans) before responding. When a person is asked a question and she has no new information to provide, nothing new to say, she is likely to give no answer. In all such cases, American Indian themselves interpret the silence as a sign of respect, a positive indication, showing that the other's remarks or questions are being given full consideration that is their due. Among American Indians, in short, to speak unnecessarily signifies an unwarranted intrusion into others' personal space; it is seen as a sign of rudeness and immaturity. At the same time, loud or otherwise inappropriate behavior is not directly or verbally sanctioned.

Other earlier anthropological studies argue that the Indian attitude toward silence in this regard is part of a larger complex of cultural norms or preferences for “non-interference”. According to ethnographers Wax and Thomas (1961) it has to do with respect for the interests, inclinations, and responsibilities of others. It springs from early socialization practices, in which Indian children are taught not to interrupt adults’ conversations, not to address people who are occupied with other tasks, not to seek to monopolize conversation — in brief, they are taught to observe a symmetric interactional pattern of non-interference. In this context, Jaime de Angulo, an anthropologist who worked with California Indians in the early part of this century, wrote,

I have heard Indians say; “That’s not right what he’s doing, that fellow.”
 “What d’you mean it’s not right?” “Well you ain’t suppose to do things that
 way....There’ll be trouble.” “Then why don’t you stop him?” “Stop him?
 How can I stop him? It’s his way”

(de Angulo 1948, in Wax and Thomas 1961).

Although, taken altogether, the available ethnography of communication literature on American Indians is relatively sparse when compared to the many studies focusing on the grammars and historical origin of specific languages, the evidence we have so far shows significant culturally based differences between English spoken by American Indians and that spoken by mainstream North American whites. There are also some indications that, in law cases when Native Americans take the witness stand such speech differences can lead and often have led to significant misunderstandings (Underwood 1990). But the above cited studies however, largely rely on data collected from individuals living on Native American reservations in Alaska and the Southwestern United States who spend most of their lives among their own peers. Similar work has not yet been done among northern California Indians. For this reason, the applicability of these findings to Indian people in the Yreka area, especially to long time urban residence like Patrick Croy needed to be investigated.

The discussion group sessions with members of Croy’s cohort seemed an appropriate context for accomplishing this task within a limited time frame. As was pointed out above many Karuk and Shasta people have been away from their rancherias (or reservations) for several decades. They have by now lost their native language and have lived for years among white people in a relatively small community of approximately 6000 inhabitants. Patrick and his peers had attended local elementary, middle, and high schools in Yreka — the

same schools attended by whites. In fact several of the police officers involved in the 1978 shoot-out had been among their school mates. Given these facts there was reasonable doubt that what we know about reservation Indians elsewhere directly applies to the current situation in Yreka. When we asked linguists who had worked on the grammar of Karuk and neighboring Native American languages they stated that they had not observed any systematic differences between the English of local Native Americans and that of their white neighbors. It was by no means certain, then, that the English speech patterns reported in the ethnography of communication literature would exist as well among these Karuk and Shasta people.

In this connection then the recorded samples of the informal everyday speech of local Indians talking among themselves and the interactional sociolinguistic methods used to test for the presence or absence of culturally based discursive practices took on special importance. The elicitation strategies and analytical methods used have been discussed at length elsewhere (Blom and Gumperz 1972; Gumperz 1982). Rather than simply relying on established interview techniques, and seeking answers to specific questions, investigators sought to engage the local group in an informal discussion on issues that they knew to be of great concern to the group and that when brought up would evoke spontaneous in-group exchanges. Topics covered included matters of interethnic relations, education, relations with the police and other law enforcement authorities, perceived differences between their own speech and that spoken by the white community in Yreka, and group members' own recollections of the circumstances leading up to the events of July 18, 1978. Whenever possible, the investigators refrained from asking direct questions; instead, they framed the exchanges in such a way as to allow the group members to shape the course of the discussion on their own. As the tape recordings indicate, much of what was said by participants in the group discussion was offered in response to their peers rather than to the investigators.

It became clear in the course of the discussion that issues of culture and relations with the larger mainstream community were of great interest to all present. A great deal of time was spent talking about Karuk ceremonial traditions and practices. Members commented that although knowledge of the Karuk language — and of Karuk myth, ritual practices, dances, and songs, as well — has been in large part lost, many informal aspects of tribal organization persist in that family groups led by clan elders who are respected for their continuing knowledge of the ancestral Karuk traditions play an important role

in local politics. For example the term “our elders” recurred throughout the discussion. Many Indian teenage youths in the area now regularly participate in informal study groups, where the Karuk language and traditional ceremonies are discussed. We were given tape recordings of one such group led by the author of a Karuk grammar and dictionary where the discussion focussed on Karuk terms for local flora and fauna and the myths associated with them. One of the participants, a young community organizer in charge of the local housing association, confirmed the continued importance when she commented that shortly after she first began her work in the region she had found that local residents rarely responded to written notices of meetings. But when information was passed on orally via the clan leaders, attendance increased greatly. Furthermore informal, kin-based clan groups meet from time to time for special gatherings. Anthony Garcia, a Native American anthropologist who did field work in the region reports that such gatherings tend to be held out in the open, in order to allow participants to be spiritually close to their natural surroundings. Participants are typically grouped in such a way that elders position themselves in the center of the assembly and deal with matters of local interest, while younger people stay on the outside. Efforts at cultural revival have intensified since the mid 1970s, in part as the result of a growth in political awareness following the Indian occupation of Alcatraz and the nationally publicized trial of Dennis Banks, in the famous Wounded Knee case. There have been persistent and systematic efforts at cultural revival among Indian people in the Yreka area, as in other parts of northern California. As the anthropological literature suggests, such ceremonies typically last through the night and often continue for two or three days and nights. They are sometimes associated with the consumption of mind-altering substances, particularly on the part of the young people.

The practice, either periodic or situational, of venturing out into the wilderness, for the purpose of getting back in touch with the powers of the natural world is also well known among North American Indians. In contemporary times, this practice is generally perceived as a way of achieving a sense of release from the inescapable stresses of living in a mainstream white community. Often these excursions are associated with hunting for deer, according to the group discussions participants, and there are a number of conventional expressions in the local American Indian English vernacular for engaging in this kind of activity. Phrases such as going “to go cruising,” “to get some [deer] meat,” or “to kill some poofitch” by now have come to function as

formulaic expressions to indicate that an individual is tired of the white world around him and needs to get away in order to re-orient himself in the ways of the natural, and by implication the Karuk, world.

Such expressions, of course, carry implications for the difficult relations between American Indian and mainstream people in the Yreka area, a notably heated, focal topic of the group discussion. Although there is no specific data on the socioeconomic position of American Indians or on inter-group relations in the Yreka area, it is apparent from the group discussion that friendship relations do not ordinarily extend across ethnic boundaries and that the local Indian people have remained both socially and culturally separate (as indicated further by the marked linguistic differences between the Indian and white populations, that will be discussed below). In fact, none of the discussion participants (whose ages ranged from about thirty to about forty years old) recalled ever having had any close friends in the mainstream white community. In school, they said, Indians and whites kept strictly to themselves. The impression was that local white people looked upon Indians as unresponsive and mean. One woman told the story that when she first entered high school, several white students reacting to her continued use of silence and pausing asked her, “why do you go around with ‘them’?” “why are you so mean?” and “why don’t you become a cheerleader?” When she continued associating with her Indian friends, the white students stopped being friendly toward her. The discussion group also told several anecdotes about white parents forbidding their children from associating with Indian children. On the whole, the view was that although Indians were perceived as good athletes and encouraged to participate in organized school sports, they did not — and were not invited to — enter into the mainstream of school social life.

Outside of school, the relations of the local Indian people with the white community in general and with the law enforcement authorities in particular followed a similar pattern. In this context, one point was especially emphasized: police harassment. Members of the group contended that there has been a long standing pattern on the part of local police of being particularly hard on local Indians. A number of specific incidents in which Indians were pulled out of their cars and searched for minor traffic violations, or stopped on the street and challenged for no apparent reason were cited. In connection with reports of burglaries, Indian people are often the first to be questioned or summarily arrested, they stated. They also suggested that in cases in which Indians are harassed by whites, it is generally the Indians whom the police accuse and

sometimes beat as the parties responsible for the situation. Those taking part in the discussion agreed that, in general, young men and teenage boys are especially subject to, if not in fact singled out for, harassment and are frequently put under special surveillance as potential trouble makers. This is especially true for individuals who have been active in the current efforts at cultural revival. This may in fact have been the case with Patrick Croy who was commonly referred to by the nickname "Hooty". Croy was said to be a natural leader who often acted as the spokesperson for his companions and who, it was argued, was singled out for punishment on a number of occasions.

The main purpose of the discussion group was to focus on matters specifically related to the Croy case. In connection with the so-called party at the Pine Gardens apartment complex, members argued that they thought of it as one of a series of three such gatherings that had been organized to get the support of local clan leaders for their efforts at cultural revival and political consciousness raising. The fact that the gathering lasted through the night and went on for several days is reflective of the cultural pattern for traditional ceremonial events mentioned above. Moreover, the discussants maintained, it is highly unlikely that Patrick Croy would have made the statement, "let's go kill the Sheriff" attributed to him by witnesses at the apartment complex site. They argued, that, after all, it was the police, not the Sheriff, who had twice come to the Pine Gardens parking lot and issued the warning to the Indians congregated there to quiet down and disperse. If the Indians (and Patrick Croy, specifically) had afterward been plotting revenge, it seemed unlikely that they would have focused on the Sheriff as the target of their vengeance. The policemen were local people and personally known to the Indians who were normally referred to by their own proper names rather than by a general term. Moreover the officer who was killed was in fact well-liked by the Indians as fair and not likely to engage in the kind of harassment practices others commonly engaged in. Discussion members spontaneously mentioned that they had heard several of those present call out "let's shoot some Poofitch" and that this phrase must have been mistaken for "shoot the sheriff" by white residents unfamiliar with native American practices.

Patrick Croy's silence in response to his sister's remarks about "getting some cops" during their flight into the country was also intelligible to the discussion group. They stated that in the context of their own way of communicating and contrary to the conventional mainstream notion that silence means consent, such a response should in no way be interpreted as indicating

agreement or assent to Norma Jeanne Croy's words. In referring to their own way of speaking, the discussants used language which has a great deal of similarity to that employed by Basso (1986), Philips (1982), Wax and Thomas (1961), and others in the literature on American Indian communication and other things. They argued that an admonition or overtly negative response by Patrick Croy to his sister would have been highly inappropriate, perhaps unthinkable. In fact, they suggested that Patrick Croy's silence in this situation most probably has been interpreted as disapproval at what his sister had said. Since it is unlikely that the discussants have read the ethnographic literature, we must assume that they are simply reporting on local practices similar to those prevalent in other American Indian communities.

Transcripts of the discussion tapes demonstrate that the in-group speech of the American Indians living in the Yreka area share many of the rhythmic features and rhetorical principles reported in the literature referred to above. Significant for the present argument is that the informal English spoken by these local Indians, particularly the speech used in the context of in-group situations, has remained perceptibly distinct from that of other residents. In the tapes we noticed that speakers regularly 'code switched' between two types of rhythmic patterns. Remarks addressed largely to the investigators or dealing with official government policies basically show the rhythm of English monolinguals. But in-group talk has its own rhythmic pattern, and also exhibits features of pronunciation and specific formulaic phrases and idioms including words adopted from the Karuk and Shasta languages, that are culturally distinctive. While these kinds of systematic speech patterns may not always be sufficiently distinct to render comprehension impossible — especially when it comes to comprehension of short, simple sentences in everyday situations — they do suggest, by inference from the literature, that communication between American Indians and the mainstream Yreka locals may be at best problematic. It is well known from sociolinguistic studies all over the world that linguistic and rhetorical practices of the kind we observed can only be learned through participation in informal friendship or peer group associations. One can thus infer that the maintenance of distinctions such as these constitutes *prima facie* evidence for the fact that the groups have remained culturally separate even though it may appear on the surface over the years that there was considerable inter-group contact (Gumperz 1982).

We can conclude therefore that linguistically and culturally the position of Native Americans in our Northern California area is much like that of

oppressed minorities elsewhere in the United States. Cultural distinctness in their case has become associated with and has in part been shaped by a systematic pattern of discrimination and at times outright persecution.

Altogether the ethnographic background information presented here amounts to a scenario that provides culturally realistic explanations to counter most of the prosecution evidence in support of the murder and conspiracy charges. To begin with, the above discussion suggests that the Yreka Karuk and Shasta are in fact culturally distinct from the majority population among whom they live. When seen in local Native American perspective the incident that led up to the shooting was not a prolonged drinking bout but rather one of a series of periodic meetings similar to others organized by Indian populations throughout Northern California in the years following the Alcatraz occupation. Along with attempts to reintroduce traditional ritual practices and revive the ancestral language, the aim of these events was to promote cultural and political revival. In such meetings the traditional "clan elders", (a term the Indians frequently employed in the informal discussions) took a major role. To be sure some participants in the meeting drank extensively and consumed mind altering substances but this is also common for similar meetings elsewhere in Northern California. Secondly the tension between local Native Americans and the surrounding white communities and especially their feelings towards the police has a long history that began with the removal of Native Americans from their home lands and the persecution they suffered in the new urban environment. In many ways their situation is similar to that of inner-city populations in large urban environments. Given the publicity that minority group resistance has received in the general press, it is not at all unreasonable to argue that epithets like "kill the cops", "tear up Yreka" which the prosecution cited as evidence in support of the conspiracy charge, must be interpreted as a form of hyperbole that could have been borrowed from widely publicised expressions cited in media reports of urban minority group protests. With respect to silence, sociolinguistic data from around the world shows that, contrary to the California Code of Evidence, which assumes that silence in response to a statement or suggestion constitutes assent, meanings of silence vary greatly with culture and context. As members of the discussion group argued, Croy's and his friends' silence and the fact that they did not join in with Norma Jeanne's exclamations would be interpreted by their local peers as suggesting disapproval of what she was doing and not assent. There is thus no credible evidence that the group was engaged in conspiracy either in the car or

at the preceding gathering. As to the murder charge, the defense argued that under the circumstances the shooting was most likely a case of self-defense since Croy was reacting to the fact that he was attacked from two sides. The jury accepted the self-defense plea and the murder charge was dismissed. But the trial did not cover the conspiracy charge. In consideration of the time already spent in jail he was given probation on this latter charge.

3. Conclusion

Apart from the court case as such, it is important to point out that the cultural environment in Yreka is by no means unique. Greg Sarris, a well known Native American author and scholar, writes about the Kashaya Pomo in the general region of Santa Rosa, about 150 miles to the South, among whom he grew up. He points out that most of the local Pomo attended school in various urban centers. They live among members of the white majority and no longer speak the ancestral language. But he then goes on to argue on the basis of a study of recent Pomo history that to accuse them of having ‘lost their culture’ is to overlook the culturally specific ways in which they accommodate and resist other cultural influences in given social and political contexts. In support of his claims Sarris argues that the Kashaya have discursive practices of their own marked by narrative strategies of repetition and pausing quite similar to those used by the Yreka Native Americans.

To go further afield, the Yreka situation is not too different from that of other minority populations in other parts of the world: South Asians in Britain, Turkish guest workers in Germany and other parts of Europe, Aborigines in Australia. All of these peoples have or are in the process of giving up their ancestral languages while at the same time developing English or German discursive strategies that retain significant elements of the native language rhetorical patterns. Such practices arise and are perpetuated through person to person contact within the context of family and peer relations. For those who are familiar with them they often serve to index deep seated and cherished aesthetic values and to evoke and reshape shared cultural memories. But in public sphere discussions with outsiders unfamiliar with the relevant conventions and the values attached to them, their use may lead to serious ideology driven pejorative stereotyping. Sociolinguistic discourse analysis focusing on such practices can give us empirical, *prima facie* evidence of the existence of

heretofore unrecognised types of cultural diversity and in fact provide new insights into the workings of diversity in post industrial communicative environments.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Charles Underwood for editing the report on the facts of the case incorporated in this paper.
2. See Gumperz and Levinson 1996 for a detailed explanation of what is at issue.
3. I will use the terms Indians and Native Americans interchangeably since both terms are regularly used locally.

References

- Basso, K.
1986 *Conversations with the Whiteman*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Blom, J. and Gumperz, J. J.
1972 "Social meaning in linguistic structures: code-switching in Norway". In *Direction in Sociolinguistics*. John J. Gumperz and Dell H. Hymes (eds). New York: Holt Reinhardt and Winston BrightWilliam.
- Gumperz, J. J.
1982 *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gumperz, J. J. and Levinson, S.
1996 *Rethinking Linguistic Relativity*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Humboldt, W. von
1988 [1836–39] *On Language*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hymes, D.
1974 *Foundations in Sociolinguistics*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
1981 *In Vain I Tried to Tell You*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Phillips, S.
1982 *Invisible Cultures: Classrooms and community on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation*. New York: Longmans.

- Sarris, G.
1993 "Keeping Slug Woman Alive: the Challenge of Reading in a Reservation Classroom". In *The Ethnography of Reading*. Jonathan Boyarin (ed.). Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 239–269.
- Scollon, R. and Suzanne, B.K.
1981 *Narrative Literacy and Face in Inter-ethnic Communication*. Norwood NJ: Ablex.
- Sherzer, J.
1983 *Kuna Ways of Speaking*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Underwood, C.
1990 *The Native American as Witness*. Ph.D. dissertation Dept of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley.
- Wax, R.H. and Th. Robert K.
1961 *American Indians and White People*. *Phylon*, XXII pp. 305–317.

Asymmetries of Knowledge in Intercultural Communication

The relevance of cultural repertoires of
communicative genres

Susanne Günthner and Thomas Luckmann
University of Konstanz

1. Asymmetries of knowledge in communication

1.1. *The reciprocity of perspectives and asymmetries of knowledge*

What is intercultural communication or, more accurately, since cultures do not communicate with each other except in a vaguely metaphorical sense, what is communication between members of different cultures? Does it differ radically from communication between members of the same culture? Does it differ generically or is it a species of one genus of human communication?

Consider the following transcript of a brief communicative episode which occurred during a longer sequence of social interaction. Consider it carefully. Such episodes are so familiar to us that we hardly ever give them a thought. But if we stop and think for a moment, we see that, trivial as they are, they exemplify fundamental principles of human interaction just as well as episodes in which weightier matters are decided.

(1) Dinner at Bao's and Guo's

(Kurt and Uli were invited by their friends, a Chinese couple, to have dinner at their home. Guo, the husband, had lived in Germany for several years before he was joined there a few months ago by his wife Bao).

((Bao stellt einen weiteren Teller mit chinesischen Essen auf den Tisch.))

((Bao places another Chinese dish on the table.))

- 1Bao: *eß- essen Sie!*
ea- eat!
- 2Kurt: *hh' nein. hh' danke. ich bin sch' schon VÖLL.IG. SATT.*
hh' no. hh' thanks. I am completely full.
- 3Bao: *ja. nehm- nehmen Sie.*
well. tak- take some.
- 4Guo: *du MUßT nicht I:MMER SAGEN. eh.*
you don't have to keep on saying this. eh.
- 5 *das NICHT notwendig bei DEUTSCHEN. ja?*
this is not necessary when you are with Germans. right?
- 6Kurt&Uli:hihihihi
- 7Uli: *eh: nein. VIE:LEN Dank. wir habn ECHT' (-) sind ECHT SATT.*
eh: no. thanks a lot. we really had (-) we really have had enough.
- 8 *aber s'hat ganz TOLL GESCHMECKT.=*
but it was quite delicious.=
- 9Kurt: = *WIRKLICH.*
= very.
- 10Guo ((zu Bao)): *die DEUTSCHEN soll man n'nicht so DRÄNG?*
you shouldn't insist?
- 11 *DRÄNGELN ja. sie NEHMEN wann sie wollen. ja.*
push the Germans. yes. they help themselves. whenever they like.
yes
- 12 *macht mal keine SO:RGE.*
don't worry about it.
- 13Bao:hihihihi
- 14Kurt: *jaja. ich NEHM dann schon.*
yes.yes. I will help myself.
- 15Guo: *die Deutschen ja. (-) sind so nicht so sehr ja BESCHEI:DEN.*
the Germans well. (-) are not all that shy
- 16 *hahahah. SO. IST DAS. hihhi[hihi]*
hahahah. that's the way it is. hihhi [hihi]
- 17Kurt:[hihi]hihi.

The small problem of appropriate etiquette at table arose because Bao assumed that what was required by Chinese good manners — urging one's guests to eat — was proper behaviour everywhere. Her husband, however, had been living in Germany long enough to know that this was not the case. He therefore instructed his wife in the German version of table manners, thematizing the difference in terms of national character. We will not analyse the management of the interaction sequence any further. Our interest in this episode is to show that two closely related principles underlying human action are at work.

The first of the two principles, called by Alfred Schütz the general thesis

of the reciprocity of perspectives, is a fundamental, though tacit, assumption built into the human perception of reality. It guides human action in the social world. Normal people assume that other people, if they are not apes or dogs, are basically like themselves. Under the same circumstances and all other things being equal, the assumption goes, other people would feel, think, and act like they do.

The second principle has a different status from the first. It is not a second tacit assumption added to the first. It takes the form of specific and explicit knowledge which modifies the concrete operation of the first principle. One soon learns that circumstances are rarely the same and that other things are hardly ever equal. This knowledge is marked by different degrees of explicitness, specificity and accuracy. It restricts the indiscriminate working of the first principle by defining the conditions under which it can be applied. Although adults are like children in many ways, they are different in others. Men are both like and unlike women. Americans and Chinese have certain things in common but not others.

The first principle constitutes an elementary moral dimension of all social interaction; its adjustments by the second define the reach of the concrete versions of morality in different historical societies. Without modification, if such an extreme case were possible, the first principle would result in an inability to see in others anything but oneself. The much, and sometimes justly, maligned varieties of anthropocentrism and ethnocentrism represent less extreme collective varieties of such radical egocentrism. On the other hand, complete neglect of the first principle would blank out the perception of the common humanity of children and adults, men and women, Chinese and Americans. In its most extreme consequence it would lead to a soulless world for a solitary ego. The two extreme cases are rare, although they do occur in the pathology of the human mind. The “normal” (and the “moral”) case consists in seeing differences where differences count while maintaining the basic assumptions of a common humanity.

The social stock of knowledge of various societies differs significantly in the degrees to which the first principle is modified by the second. They differ in the selection of differences to which weight is attached and those which are considered negligible. Clearly, what a person knows about what is significantly the same and what is significantly different in the social world is drawn only in small part from direct experience. The main part of such knowledge is derived from the social stock of knowledge of the society into which the

individual is born and in which the person grows up. Some elements of this knowledge are transmitted early in life by parents and peers, and others later by teachers and the mass media. Such knowledge is brought *into* the situation, helps to *define* the situation, and, if the inclination to resist change is overcome, may be modified by experience drawn *from* the situation.

By definition, no interaction problems could arise in a closed society with a perfectly equal distribution of knowledge from disparities in knowledge among its members, whatever other causes might lead to them. Nor could specifically communicative problems arise in such a society because all knowledge pertinent to communication would be shared by everybody. Needless to say, such a society has never existed and, sociologically, could not exist. But in imagining it, one might also continue to think not only of a single closed society but of an encompassing world society in which all knowledge would be equally distributed. At the end of this rainbow, there would be no problems of either “intracultural” or “intercultural” communication.

However, despite certain globalization trends at some levels and some areas of socio-economic organization, there not only used to be many societies but there are and will continue to be many societies. Moreover, these societies are and will continue to be marked by a relatively high degree of inequality in the distribution of the social stock of knowledge. At best, one may postulate that since no society can exist without a common core of knowledge, including knowledge pertinent to communication and shared by everybody, in societies of the same general type, such as modern industrial ones, there will be a common core of knowledge; this core may also be of knowledge pertinent to “intercultural” communication, shared by the members of these societies.

However, although a certain amount of general and specifically communicative knowledge must be shared by everybody in any society, the amount of that knowledge may differ significantly not only between one type of society and another, e.g., from nomadic-pastoral to modern industrial, but even within the same general type, e.g., Japan and the USA. Even more significant than the differences in the amount of common knowledge is the variation in the extent to which specialized knowledge has evolved in different societies — and this holds, although to a lesser degree, even for societies of the same general type. The unequal access to specialized knowledge and the corresponding lack or possession of it need not have serious consequences in all areas of institutionalized or informal social interaction. But it does give rise to a variety of general interaction and specifically communicative problems in

some areas of social life, as, for example, in professional-client relations, bureaucrat-citizen interaction, etc. Such problems may be compounded in the case of “intercultural” communication.

In sum, social interaction in general and communication in particular require a definable (as to type and level) amount of shared knowledge. Much of that knowledge is derived from the same social stock of (unequally distributed) knowledge or, in the case of “intercultural” communication from different (but in some areas possibly similar) social stocks of knowledge. The *kinds* of disparities and the *degree* of disparity in knowledge pertinent to social interaction in general and to communication in particular determine the structural context of social interaction and communication. They are at the root of many problems of social interaction and of most problems of communication. Clearly, there are not only structural inequalities of knowledge. Participants in interaction and communication also have some knowledge of varying degrees of accuracy and symmetry about the relevant disparities. Social interaction and communication not only require a minimum amount of shared knowledge, but also a minimum amount of what is significantly the same and what is significantly different among the participants. “Anticipatory interaction planning” (Goody 1978) and “recipient design” in “intra- and intercultural” communication presuppose some symmetrical knowledge about the asymmetries of knowledge and the extent to which these may become relevant.

The line separating general interactional knowledge, e.g., table manners, from specific communicative knowledge, e.g., the meaning of words or the rules regulating their employment in different communicative situations cannot be sharply drawn. Both kinds of knowledge provide the “context” necessary to understand the “text”. Gumperz called such knowledge “knowledge about the conventions of contextualization”. Very often the two kinds of knowledge are incorporated into what we call communicative genres.

1.2. *When joking is not funny*

The following episode occurred during the latter part of an informal dinner to which Anna and Klaus were invited by their Chinese friend Hong. Hu, a friend of Hong’s, was also present. Conversation was lively, mostly in a jocular mode. Hu was the “life and soul of the party”, telling one joke after another and contributing witty observations to the general conversation. The episode transcribed below was preceded by a series of jokes, told by Hu and Hong in

turn, about Li Peng in which he was described as “stupid” and “simple minded”. After a few joshing remarks about Anna recording the conversation, there was a shift to the topic of psychology and psychiatry which, in turn, led Klaus to the initial statement below about the location of the local psychiatric hospital. Hu takes it up from there.

(2) *Geistig behindert* (Mentally retarded)

- 1Klaus: *die Klinik liegt eh aufm Weg nach Ahstadt.*
the hospital is eh on the way to Astadt.
- 2Hu: *ah: ja. (0.5) ich bin einmal zuFÄLLIG in dieses Gebiet geRA:TEN,*
I see. (0.5) once I found myself in that area by accident,
3 *dann hat mich ge↑SCHOCKT.*
then I was very shocked.
- 4 *vie((hi))le Leute kucken mich SO: ↑KO((hi))MISCH hihhi an. hihhi*
ma((hi))ny people stared at me in such a wei((hi))rd way
hihhihihi.
- 5 (1.0)
- 6Hong: ↑hihhihihihi>
- 7 (1.5)
- 8Hu: *bin hihhi SOFORT abgeHAUN. [hihi]*
I legged it out of there. [hihi]
- 9Hong:[hihi]hihihi
- 10 (2.0)
- 11Hu: *weißt du ich HABE noch NIE so: eh also eh?*
you know I ‘ve never before seen such eh well eh?
12 *so MA:SSENHAFT eh g- geistig Behindert gesehn.*
such a large bunch of eh m- mentally retarded people.
- 13Anna:hm.
- 14 (0.5)
- 15Hu: *eh: ja GUT. hh' der Minister-*
eh: yes well. hh' I don't know the prime-
16 *Ministerpräsident Li PENG kenne ich nicht hihhihihi*
prime minister Li Peng in person hihhihihi
- 17A&K:hihi[hihhihihihi]
- 18Hu:[hahahahaha]
- 19Hong:[hahahahaha]
- 20Anna: *in China sieht man DIE nich so (-) oder?*
in China you don't see them very often (-) do you?

Hu marks the beginning of a story prosodically as well as by the formulaic “once I found myself ...” (line 2); first he gives the setting and then (line 4) signals via a series of giggles that the story to come is of the amusing, jocular kind. The lack of response for a full second, followed by a belated giggle by Hong (line 6) and a one and a half second pause, augurs ill for the reception of

the story in the intended mode. Nonetheless, Hu continues with his story but only Hong acknowledges its presumed comic character. After an even lengthier pause Hu begins to repair the situation with the explanation of his behaviour at the time (11–12). Anna barely acknowledges the attempt (line 13). Hu's situational wit, making use of the established butt of dim-wit jokes, Li Peng (15–16), is more successful and Anna and Kurt join in the laughter. He somehow "saves" the situation. However, Anna not only returns to the topic of mentally retarded people (referring to them by the pronoun "die" (*them*)), but also leaves the jocular modality: a "serious" sequence about mentally retarded institutions in China starts.

The episode illustrates the observation that the line between interactional and specifically communicative problems is often blurred. There may be areas of knowledge pertaining to interaction in which the lack of shared knowledge leads to problems that have little or nothing to do with communication. And there are areas of communication in which the lack of shared knowledge (of the meaning of words, of grammar) may lead to communicative problems in the narrowest sense of the term. But the above episode shows that what is likely to be a frequent and often more than merely embarrassing problem is the asymmetry of relevant knowledge. It is the complex "ethnotheoretical" knowledge about "language in use", knowledge about *communicative genres*, styles of their use and situational modalizations.

Communicative genres are historically and culturally specific, fixed solutions to recurrent communicative problems. On the one hand, they guide the interactants' expectations about what is to be said (and done) in pre-defined types of situations. On the other hand, they are the sediments of socially relevant communicative processes. Only those processes which are of some relevance to the social actors are likely to congeal into genres (Luckmann 1986; Bergmann 1987; Günthner and Knoblauch 1994).

Knowledge about communicative genres not only includes the knowledge of elements constitutive of a particular genre, but also knowledge about the appropriate use of *genres*, i.e. when to use or not to use what genre.¹

...the use of genres is normally linked to clearly defined types of social situations. A given genre may never appear in one type of communicative situation, rarely in another, frequently in still another, and always in some. From the point of view of the actor's knowledge there may be situations in which he is *forced* to use a particular communicative genre, others in which the matter is optional and he is merely *likely* to do so, and still others in which he will rigorously avoid its use. (Luckmann 1989: 11)

Thus, whenever genres are employed, the production and interpretation of interactive sequences are not only constrained by the local linguistic organization of the utterance and the general etiquette of communication but are also prepatterned by the generic model.²

As historical and cultural products, communicative genres are, however, open to change and cultural variation.³ If we take communicative genres as socially constructed solutions which organize, routinize, and standardize dealings with particular communicative problems, it seems quite obvious that different cultures may construct different solutions for specific communicative problems. Moreover, whereas in one culture there may be generic ways of handling particular communicative activities, in another culture interactants may use spontaneous forms. Thus, the repertoire of communicative genres varies from culture to culture.⁴

In situations in which members of different cultures communicate with one another, they “start” with different but possibly partly similar repertoires of communicative genres. They also enter the situation with knowledge about such differences and similarities, and that knowledge may be more or less accurate depending on the extent to which the basic principle of the reciprocity of perspectives has been modified by adequate and pertinent experience. The “Dinner at Bao’s and Guo’s” example showed both an unmodified and a modified element of interactional knowledge. The “mentally retarded” example shows that even when two different cultural repertoires share, in general terms, the same element (the jocular story genre), they may differ with regard to some of the rules of employment of the genre — or more accurately, of some of its sub-genres.

More generally: a given communicative problem (e.g., lamenting for the dead) may be “institutionalized” as a communicative genre in some societies but not in others.⁵ Lack of knowledge about such differences may lead to problems in some situations. A good deal more treacherous, however, are situations into which the participants enter with repertoires of similar genres (scholarly discussions, sermons, jocular stories) or minor forms (greetings) with inadequate knowledge about the differences in the mode of employment of the genre, stylistic variations and subgenres, etc.

2. Asymmetries of knowledge in communication between members of different cultures

2.1. *Asymmetries in general knowledge*

It bears repeating that asymmetries of knowledge are characteristic of all communication. Different kinds and levels of knowledge are involved. Beyond the amount of shared knowledge which is a minimal condition for any communication, there is asymmetry both in the general knowledge that may become interactively relevant, and in specifically communicative knowledge. Furthermore, communication would be difficult or impossible if the participants did not have some knowledge of these asymmetries, a knowledge which also tends to be asymmetrical. This cannot but add to the problems of communicative interaction caused by general basic asymmetries in general and specifically communicative knowledge.

These observations apply to communication between members of the same society. Does it need to be said that they apply, a fortiori, to communication between people of different cultures? First of all, basic asymmetries are more pronounced. (One may postulate different combinations: e.g., good knowledge and command of the “foreign” language and little general knowledge of the society and culture; many similarities between the two societies and cultures and correspondingly weak asymmetries in knowledge, but poor knowledge of the language and the use of language). Secondly, knowledge *about* these asymmetries is likely to be (even) less adequate than in “intracultural” communication. In sum, most of the problems arising from the asymmetries in the two kinds and levels of knowledge in “intracultural” communication will be generally more severe in “intercultural” communication.

Our subject here is not the general one of all asymmetries of knowledge affecting communication between members of different societies and cultures. The focus of our interest is the nature of the problems which arise in “intercultural” communication because the persons engaging in it do not share the same repertoire of communicative genres, and because their knowledge of similarities and differences in genre use is much less adequate than is generally the case among members of the same society. It will be helpful, however, to begin with a few brief observations on simpler asymmetries in “intercultural” communication. These may help to prepare the ground for discussion of the more complex topic of communicative genres.

Until evidence to the contrary appears, members of the same society who engage in communicative interaction with one another tacitly assume that others share the requisite core of specifically communicative knowledge as well as a certain amount of general knowledge about physical and social reality, both of which may become interactively relevant. Usually they are able to give a rough estimate of the amount, aided by their awareness of the social distribution of knowledge in their society and of the typical social positions and social biographies associated with that distribution. "Reading" the social position of the persons with whom one interacts is thus an important part of the "contextual" knowledge which forms the unproblematic background of communication between members of the same society. The reciprocal "recipient designs" employed by them are more often than not adequate for the purpose at hand and are corroborated as interaction progresses. Should they turn out to be inadequate they can usually be modified by the "repair procedures" available in their communicative culture and therefore shared with others, albeit unequally.⁶

In "intercultural" communication, however, the participants know far less well how to modify the general principle of the reciprocity of perspectives, which underlies the assumption of shared knowledge, correctly. Their "recipient designs" must be even more tentative than in situations in which they could unproblematically assume that background knowledge is shared to a sufficient extent. If they at first naively presuppose that table manners which are proper in China are proper everywhere and that jokes that are funny at home will be funny in other places, they are soon shown the error of their ways. They cannot help but recognize that they are foreigners.⁷

Moreover, not only must "recipient designs" be more tentative in "intercultural" situations, they cannot become automatic as they do at home in routine communicative situations. A further circumstance adds to the difficulties. People engaging in communication with others who do not belong to the same society and culture are usually less likely to perceive that difficulties arising as interaction progresses may be due to their own "recipient design" and more likely to attribute them to other causes. (Stereotypes for such attributions are easily available in the respective "home" cultures). But even if they do recognize faults in the "recipient design", they are less likely to have the resources to modify them successfully. "Repair procedures" may differ from one culture to another.

As in "intracultural" communication, one of the main sources of faulty

“recipient designs” is over- or underestimating the amount of knowledge shared with the recipient. In “intracultural” communication there is a preference for overestimating, probably because underestimating usually gives the appearance of “talking down” to the addressee. We do not know whether such a tendency also exists in “intercultural” communication. If the addressee registers a lack of understanding, a “teaching” sequence is initiated.⁸ This form of “repair” is of course also available in “intercultural” communication. (An example is given in the transcript BU 12). As for underestimation of shared knowledge, it may be plausible to assume that it is more often used unwittingly in “intercultural” communication; it may even be a form of modesty to assume that foreigners need not know much about one’s own society. The recipient, however, may nonetheless perceive the performance according to the standards of his own communicative culture as an instance of “talking down”. (Consider the example presented in the transcript QIN 1 below):

(3) BU 12

- 1A: *ja, Wang Meng hat das auch gesagt.*
yes, Wang Meng also said so.
- 2B: *wer? WANG wer?*
who? WANG who?
- 3A: *WANG MENG, ein ganz bekannter Schriftsteller in China.*
WANG MENG, a very famous writer in China.
- 4 *er ist jetzt auch der Vorsitzende des chinesischen*
Schriftstellerverbands.
he is also the president of the Chinese Writers’ Association.
- 5B: *ahja.*
I see.

(4) QIN 1

- 14Qin: *wirtschaftliche Reform, die politische Reformen auch die kulturelle*
Reform,
economic reform, political reforms and also cultural reform,
15 *auch die Studienreform.*
also reform at the university.
- 16M:mhm.
- 17Qin: *ich glaube vor der Kulturrevolution’*
I think before the Cultural Revolution’
- 18 *=ja=Sie=wissen=sicher=die=Kulturrevolution’*
=yes=you=surely=heard=about=the=Cultural=Revolution’
- 19M: *haha[ha ein weit ((HI)) verbreitetes ((HI)) Thema ((HI))]*
haha [ha very ((HI)) common ((HI)) topic ((HI))]

- 20Q:[hi hahahahahahahahahhhhhaha]
 21M&Q:hahaahahahahahahhhahahahahah
 22M:[*wenn man*]
 [if you]
 23Qin:[*ja vor*] *der Kulturrevolution ja*,
 [yes before] the Cultural Revolution yeah,
 24 *dann werden ja auch die Absolventen aus der MittelSCHULE*
 then also the graduates from middle school
 25 *ja direkt (-) zur Universität schick- eh GESCHICKT.*
 yeah were sen- sent directly (-) to university.

2.2. *Asymmetries in genre-related knowledge*

2.2.1. *The internal structure of communicative genres*

Some preliminary remarks on communicative genres in relation to asymmetries of knowledge in “intercultural” communication were made at the end of the first section. For present purposes it is not necessary to expand these remarks beyond the observation that asymmetries characterize knowledge on all three of the levels which constitute the structure of communicative genres. The internal structure of communicative genres consists of:

overall patterns of diverse elements, such as words and phrases, registers, formulas and formulaic blocs, rhetorical figures and tropes, stylistic devices (metre, rhyme, lists, oppositions), prosodic melodies, specific regulations of dialogicity, repair strategies and prescriptions for topics and topical areas. (Luckmann 1992: 39)

Asymmetries of knowledge concerning elements of the internal structure often lead to misunderstandings. An example of how differences in *prosodic features* may lead to different interpretations, and thus result in miscommunication, is discussed by Gumperz (1982). Indian and Pakistani women working at a British airport were perceived as surly and uncooperative by British speakers of English. This interpretation was based on the Indian intonation patterns used by these women. When customers in the cafeteria had chosen meat, they were asked whether they wanted gravy. A British employee would utter “gravy?” using rising intonation, whereas the Indian employees used falling intonation: “gravy.” This prosodic difference turned out to be relevant for the inferences drawn by the British customers. “Gravy” with a falling intonation contour was “not interpreted as an offer but rather as a statement, which in the context seems redundant and consequently rude”. (Gumperz 1982: 173). However, for the Indian speakers, this falling intonation was their

conventional way of asking questions in that situation and did not imply any rudeness or indifference.

Differences in the use of communicative genres and patterns at the level of internal structure also include *lexico-semantic elements*,⁹ *phonological devices*,¹⁰ *syntactic patterning*¹¹ as well as the selection of specific *linguistic varieties*¹² and *elements of facial expression and gesture*.¹³ For example, Gumperz and Roberts' (1987) study of counselling sessions between British and Indian counsellors and clients in British neighborhood centers offers an example of culturally different use of gaze. Whereas Indian speakers "use gaze to monitor interlocutor's reactions, to determine possible turn transition points or to ask for the floor and call attention to new information", British speakers "seek to meet the interlocutor's gaze when they are addressing them or listening to what they are saying". These nonverbal differences regularly led to irritations between clients and social workers in the analyzed interactions.

Asymmetries of knowledge concerning *rhetoric figures* in communicative genres may also create problems: Gumperz' (1982) study of political speeches reveals striking differences in rhetorical strategies used by Black and White speakers. Typical Afro-American rhetorical strategies, such as the metaphoric use of "to kill someone" for "destroying someone's political influence", may lead to serious disagreement about the interpretation of what is said.

Apart from prosodic and verbal elements, there may be differences in *minor forms* such as *stereotypes*, *idioms*, *commonplaces*, *proverbs*, *formulas*, *riddles and inscriptions*, especially differences in the rules governing their incorporation in larger communicative genres.

In argumentative sequences, Chinese speakers frequently refer to *proverbial sayings* (*chengyu*) in order to back up their arguments. Studies of Chinese rhetoric report that proverbial sayings are traditionally used to support one's argument, as the power to convince traditionally relies on analogies and on citations of recognized authorities, anecdotes and sayings (Granet 1985; Günthner 1991). By employing these communicative forms, speakers not only present their own assertions as being part of traditional and still valid collective wisdom but also demonstrate their good education and show their strong links with traditional norms and forms of wisdom. Instead of expressing individual opinions, they quote socially approved ideas. The use of proverbs is not restricted to oral genres. Chinese writers of, for example, academic texts often support their arguments by referring to traditional wisdom in the form of

a proverbial saying (Günthner 1988).

Seemingly similar communicative genres may vary in their *discursive organization*. As a number of studies have shown, unfamiliarity of co-participants with generic conventions often results in misinterpretations and inadequate attributions of motive. Kirkpatrick's (1991) analysis of "information sequencing in Mandarin letters of request" reveals that Chinese letters of request show a preference for providing reasons first, before the main point (the request) is stated. The Chinese genre of request letters generally conforms to the following schema: salutation, preamble (facework), reasons, and then the request itself. Thus, in contrast to English request letters, Chinese not only produce extended facework which forms an integral part of the request, but they also tend to place the reasons before the request itself.

This appears to be a formalized way of framing requests. That is to say, native speakers are able to identify these requests as well-written, normal, and polite long before they come to the requests themselves, because they are familiar with the structure of requests and the sequence in which the parts of a request are ordered. Changing the order, by moving the request to the beginning, results in a letter or request being marked as direct and possibly impolite." (Kirkpatrick 1991: 198).

Tyler and Davies' (1990) study of interactions between Korean teaching assistants and American students shows what they call *stylistic differences in the organizational pattern* of argumentation. When American students approached Korean teaching assistants by asking "How come I got such a low grade?", the assistants used an "inductive/collaborative approach". They did not start by providing an overall statement but listed various errors, beginning with relatively minor procedural points. This strategy is considered by the Korean participants to be "less threatening and more face-saving" to the student. The American students, however, expecting a general statement of the problem, interpreted the strategy as a sign of incompetence. As Tyler and Davies (1990: 402) point out:

what from the Korean Teaching Assistant's perspective is a less confrontational discourse strategy, in this particular context, provides the framework for increased confrontation. The interlocutors appear to be operating from two different sets of expectations as to how the argument should progress. Each of the participants experiences the other's responses as jarring and irritating. As the exchange progresses, the discordant strategies, in concert with other mismatches, contribute to a reciprocal sense of non-cooperation.

A further example of cultural differences in the *discursive organization* of particular genres stems from Gumperz' (1986) investigation of *interactive style* in the courtroom testimony of American Indians: in answering the attorney's question, the Indian witnesses generally produce a narrative "which begins with a reference to how the knowledge was acquired and by whom the witness was told, as if the speaker needed to cite authority for each statement. Those parts of the answer that contain material relevant to the question that was asked are embedded in the narrative, as if responsibility for the answer were not the individual's but the group's." (1988: 6). As Gumperz (1988: 7) points out, narrative forms here serve as a verbal strategy to conform to native American norms in producing statements that reflect the authority of the group. The speaker foregrounds the fact that what is said reflects the tribe's position not any one person's belief or opinion.

Thematic features also represent elements of the internal structure of communicative genres. As our "mentally retarded" transcript demonstrated, there may be cultural differences concerning topics adequate for jokes and jocular stories. Kotthoff's (1991: 251–253) analysis of "toasts" in Caucasian Georgia shows that they involve a thematic canon: "peace, the guests, the parents, the dead, the children, friendship, love, the women whose beauty embellishes the table". Foreigners unaware of canonic themes may cause embarrassment by choosing inadequate subjects for their toasts.

2.2.2. *Asymmetries on the situative level of genres in use*

This level consists of those elements which are part of the *ongoing interaction*, i.e. the *interactive organization of conversations*, including *patterns of turn-taking*, *preference organizations*, *strategies for longer stretches of conversation* and the *participation framework*.¹⁴

In her study of dinner conversations between New Yorkers and Californians, Tannen (1984) shows that misunderstandings arise as a result of different modes of turn-taking management. The New Yorkers have different *turn-taking rules* and conventions for showing conversational involvement: they use a great deal of overlap and latching, a fast rate of speech and avoid internal pauses. The result is that the East Coast speakers continuously take the floor with the West Coast participants waiting in vain for a pause they deem long enough for them to start talking. Whereas the "fast" speakers think that the others have nothing to say, the "slow" ones feel that they are not given a chance to talk.

Various studies of intercultural encounters demonstrate differences in the *signalling of attentive listening*.¹⁵ Research into the organization of “back-channel” activities in different cultures¹⁶ shows that recipients’ reactions differ in at least two respects: the frequency of producing “backchannel” signals and the types of verbal elements employed in specific communicative genres. Erickson and Shultz’ (1982) analysis of interactive strategies used by Black and White students and counsellors in counselling sessions in American colleges also demonstrates culture-specific ways of showing that one is listening attentively. White speakers employ specific syntactic and prosodic means to signal “listening-response relevant-moments” and thereby demonstrate that they expect recipient reactions. Their White co-participants understand these contextualization cues and produce the expected recipient reactions at the “right” moments. Black speakers, however, who are not familiar with the White speaking style, do not understand these cues and refrain from producing recipient signals. The absence of expected reactions leads the White speakers to reformulate and recycle their utterances, give hyperexplanations and “talk down”. (Erickson and Shultz 1982: 132). White recipients also tend to show more explicitly than Black recipients that they are listening attentively by applying verbal and non-verbal cues. Consequently, White speakers do not notice the subtle signals of Black recipients and provide further explications, repetitions etc.

As regards *preference organization* in communicative genres, various cultural differences are observed. Schiffrin’s (1984) analysis of Philadelphian Jewish argumentative styles demonstrates that there is a preference for the production of disagreement. In German argumentation, direct disagreement also seems to be preferred (Knoblauch 1991; Günthner 1993; Kotthoff 1993b). In intercultural argumentation, however, different preference systems may lead to irritation. As Naotsuka and Sakamoto et al. (1981: 173–174) remark, direct confrontation is avoided in Japanese in favor of communicative harmony. Europeans’ way of showing direct opposition is considered “rude”.¹⁷ In informal argumentation between German and Chinese students, different preference systems concerning direct oppositional moves clash (Günthner 1993): whereas German participants signal their disagreement directly by using dissent-formats (with the utterance containing the disagreement repeating parts of the prior utterance and either negating it or substituting central elements through contradictory devices), Chinese participants tend to temporarily signal formal consent and in the subsequent turn indicate a discordant position without

formally marking it as a disagreement. Thus, instead of signalling dissent directly by an explicit opposition to the prior turn, Chinese participants often use additive conjunctions (“and”) which formally signal a concordant continuation of the argument but in the following utterance they provide a semantically discordant statement. Direct confrontation and explicit antagonistic argumentative strategies are thus avoided. The German participants who take the formal signalling of concordance at face value are confused when a disagreement follows.

Culturally different *preference structures* may also show up in reactions to compliments. As Pomerantz (1984) remarks, — in observation of the principle that self-praise is to be avoided — reactions to compliments usually down-grade the compliment, shift the referent, return the compliment or use appreciation tokens (i.e. “thanks a lot”). Thus, the response to a compliment for an excellent dinner may contain downgrading (e.g. “The vegetables were overcooked”), a referent shift (e.g. “It’s a recipe John gave me”) or an appreciation (e.g. “Thank you”). In the Chinese context, however, accepting a compliment with *feichang xie xie* ‘thanks a lot’ would be considered inappropriate and be interpreted as a sign of arrogance. Instead, the receiver of a compliment for a meal is expected to downgrade the assessment extensively, e.g. by denying the excellence of the food or by refuting his or her capacity to cook (*wo zuo cai, zuo de bu hao, qing yuanliang*) (Günthner 1993). Thus, in intercultural contexts, asymmetries of knowledge concerning the preference organization of communicative forms may lead to misinterpretation.

Philips’ (1972) analysis of *participation structures* in classroom interactions in Warm Springs (Oregon) reveals striking differences between Indian and White children. Non-Indian teachers continually complain that Indian children show a great deal of reluctance to talk and participate in various verbal activities in the classroom. As Philips points out, this “failure to participate” is based on the “social condition for participation” which exists in the class situation and which Indian children are not accustomed to. In traditional Indian learning contexts, the use of speech is notably minimal. One observes others and starts with private self-testing before one demonstrates one’s skills. In Western classroom interactions, however, the prevailing assumption is that one learns more effectively by practising even if it involves making mistakes. As Indian children are neither accustomed to such public “exhibition” nor to the fact that they cannot choose the proper time for demonstrating their skills, they refrain from participating. A further reason for

the absence of participation is that Indian children are not used to interactive structures in which one person (such as the teacher) overtly controls the activity of other people in the interacting group.¹⁸

2.2.3. *Asymmetries on the level of the external structure of communicative genres and patterns*

The external structure of genres consists of definitions of *communicative milieus*, *communicative situations*, the *selection of types of actors* (according to gender, age, status etc.), *the relationship between the actors*, and the *institutional distribution of genres*.

Asymmetries of knowledge about *communicative milieus* and *communicative situations* in which established communicative forms and genres are appropriately used or avoided may lead to serious communicative and interactional problems.¹⁹ These problems tend to be particularly severe in institutional contexts. In Chinese-German interaction, for example, Chinese speakers make significantly more frequent use of proverbs. They do so not only in informal communication but also in academic discourse such as lectures, essays, theses etc. In China this is a mark of the well-educated person possessing good rhetorical skills. As Bao (cf. "Dinner at Bao's and Guo's") originally did with Chinese table manners, Chinese scholars tend to apply their genre-linked knowledge to communication with strangers and to communication in the foreign language. When writing German, for example, they begin German lectures and written contributions with German proverbs (in many Chinese universities the teaching of foreign languages includes teaching of proverbs in the respective languages) such as "the first step is always the most difficult" (Aller Anfang ist schwer), "you can't teach an old dog new tricks" (Was Hänschen nicht lernt, lernt Hans nimmermehr). (Günthner 1988).

Asymmetries may also exist in knowledge of the *gender-determined rules* of genre-use. In Caucasian Georgia "toasting" is an important, ritualized male genre; its competent use is a mark of masculinity. Men who lack rhetorical abilities in toasting "are considered unmanly". If a foreigner refuses to offer a toast or if his toast appears "too modest", his "masculinity" is questioned. In informal situations, women may also occasionally take over the role of toast-masters. In formal situations, however, the toast-master is invariably a man. In intercultural encounters, when foreign women are invited to formal dinner-parties, they embarrass their hosts by assuming that toasting is expected from all guests and "usurp" the role of toast-master (Kotthoff 1991).

Asymmetries may also exist in the less easily definable knowledge of *communicative styles*²⁰ and *modalizations*²¹ of *genres*. An example given by von Helmolt (1994) shows the differences between French and German engineers participating in a joint working session. French participants repeatedly shifted from a serious task-oriented mode of discourse to a light-hearted jocular one (marked both non-verbally by facial expressions, gestures, laughter and by allusion to shared background knowledge, teasing etc.). For the French this was a phatic activity, “un clin d’oeil complice”, for the Germans a sign of disinterest or misplaced frivolity.

Miller (1994) describes intercultural problems arising between Japanese and American business people as a result of cultural differences in the *institutional organization of communicative forms and genres*. For American business people meetings are “thought to be the appropriate place in which to persuade people or try to change their minds” (Miller 1994: 224). They expect decision-making and the resolution of conflict in the meeting. This contrasts sharply with the Japanese understanding of business meetings. Consensus is achieved before the formal meeting. The participants meet in bars, cafes etc., where they argue and try to iron out differences of opinion before the actual meeting. The formal meeting itself is to bestow ritual approval on what went on before it. This kind of pre-meeting activity called “nemawashi” (spadework) does not have negative connotations in Japan. As Miller (1994: 226) points out,

interactants often assume that the problem relates to fundamental differences in national character. As a case in point, we are constantly reminded of a difference between Japanese and Americans which is uncritically accepted and habitually repeated: Japanese, we are told, are always indirect and ambiguous, while Americans are presumably unable to be anything but direct and pushy (...).

Misunderstandings and misapprehensions which result from asymmetries in specifically communicative knowledge, especially in knowledge relating to communicative genres, tend to have particularly serious consequences when they occur in “gate-keeping” situations in institutions. Access to education, occupation and health are affected by decisions in such situations. Substantial asymmetries of knowledge, when combined with maximal inequalities of power may become — to put it somewhat dramatically — a matter of life and death (Gumperz in this volume).

Scollon and Scollon (1981: 180ff.) report that in Alaskan state courts, for

certain classes of offences — with gravity of offence and prior record being kept constant — jail sentences were consistently longer for Alaskan Natives than for Whites. On examining pre-sentence reports, the authors found that the Natives reports showed an absence of any plans for the future. White Americans, in contrast, regularly stressed their intention to return to a job (or to school) and expressed their desire to improve themselves. This culturally approved way of “putting your best foot forward” most likely influenced the White American legal professional assessment of the accused.

These examples, among others, illustrate the proposition made earlier that asymmetries of knowledge of various kinds and on various levels, although constitutive of all communication, give rise to a variety of problems and that most of these problems will be more severe in “intercultural” than in “intracultural” communication. When members of different societies and cultures communicate with one another they usually, at least at first, proceed on the assumption of shared knowledge — an instance of the general principle of the reciprocity of perspectives. If they have no difficulty perceiving that a foreign language is a foreign language in words and grammar, they have difficulty *not* extrapolating their knowledge of the rules of language-in-use and, especially of communicative genres, to the situation. For misunderstandings and misapprehensions and failures of communication, most if not all cultures offer stereotypical blame (e.g., in terms of national character) rather than structural explanations (e.g. in terms of asymmetries of knowledge).²²

3. Asymmetries of knowledge concerning style and genre

When members of different cultures come to communicate with one another, they hardly ever do so without at least minimal knowledge of varying degrees of accuracy about the other culture and society and its features, including the (supposed) peculiarities of its rules of behavior and the etiquette of language use. They may know something about these features; but just as often they merely think that they do. Some of their knowledge may have been acquired in previous experiences with members of the other culture. Other things (such as the resistance of stereotypes to correction) being equal, the more experience they have had of reasonable competent members of the culture, the better their knowledge of it will be. Some of their knowledge may have been acquired from other members of their own culture, and should they have no first-hand

knowledge themselves, their knowledge will be just as reliable as that of their sources. Some of their knowledge may even have been acquired in “official” instruction, which, as our next example will show, is no guarantee of its accuracy. Finally, a great deal of “knowledge” may have been picked up from hearsay.

In communicating with members of other cultures, one typically expects them to act in a number of significantly different ways, and that they will expect others to act accordingly. If one wishes to accommodate such expectations, which is usually the case in ordinary communicative situations, the accuracy of one’s knowledge of the relevant features of the other culture will determine success or failure. Here one might say that “a little knowledge is a dangerous thing!” Stereotypes of another culture tend to exaggerate (if not invent) certain features of other cultures and take them out of context. If accommodation in concrete communicative processes is based merely on such stereotypes and is not checked by experience or accurate information, it results in what may be called interactive hypercorrection. Hypercorrection may of course also pertain to the simpler features of communication, but it most significantly affects higher stylistic and generic levels. Our first example amusingly illustrates how systematic misinstruction leads to hypercorrection at the level of style and genre. In China, students are taught that Germans are very “direct” and that they prefer “directness” in others. They are not told, however, what constitutes this peculiar German “directness” nor when it is to be used. In initial contacts with Germans many Chinese act upon this piece of “knowledge” in order to meet what they assume to be the expectations of the German addressees. They leave the safe ground of their own conventions and venture upon the thin ice of German “directness”. No wonder that they often break through and are considered impertinent by the Germans to whom their communications are addressed. This was amply demonstrated by a perusal of letters written by Chinese students and scholars to German professors. Hypercorrection prevailed and produced something whose structural features were neither a German nor a Chinese genre, nor a pidginized hybrid — but a kind of aborted genre whose regular structure bears the mark of an attempted solution to a communicative problem.

As expected, these letters begin with an address. No problem there yet. This is followed by an apology for “imposing” upon the addressee. So far, so good. But this is followed abruptly by a list of requests and demands. A typical example:

*Sehr geehrter Herr Prof. Dr. Schmidt!*²³

Verzeihen Sie, daß ich Sie mit meinem Anliegen störe! Mein Name ist Liu Xiaobing. Ich arbeite als Dozent für Physik an der Hochschule in Nanjing. Ich möchte gerne bei Ihnen arbeiten. Ich brauche deshalb einen Laborplatz bei Ihnen. Können Sie ihn mir zur Verfügung stellen. Leider dauert mein Stipendium von der chinesischen Regierung nur ein Jahr. Doch ich möchte meine Doktorarbeit bei Ihnen schreiben. Bitte seien Sie so höflich und besorgen Sie mir ein Stipendium für die Doktorarbeit. Auch wichtige Forschungsliteratur ist in China nur schwierig zu bekommen. Deshalb brauche ich neuere Literatur von Ihnen. Schicken Sie die Bücher an meine Adresse in Nanjing. Entschuldigen Sie meine Belästigung.

Dear Prof. Dr. Schmidt,

Excuse me for troubling you with my problem. My name is Liu Xiaobing. I am working at the university in Nanjing as a physics teacher. I would like to work for you. Therefore I need a position in your laboratory. Would you be able to provide this for me. Unfortunately, my scholarship from the Chinese government only lasts for one year. But I would like to write my dissertation with you. Please be so kind as to arrange a scholarship for my dissertation. Important research material is difficult to come by in China. Therefore I need to get some literature from you. Please send the books to my private address in Nanjing. Excuse me for my disturbance.

A somewhat different problem of style and genre in intercultural communications is illustrated by the next example. As can be seen, this is not a matter of communicative style in any general sense. Nor is it a matter of knowledge concerning the internal structure of the genre. The problem here is a strong asymmetry in knowledge of the proper use of genres. The example is taken from a transcript of table talk. The participants are two Germans, Anna and Bernd, and Bernd's Chinese girl-friend Zhao. Anna mentions a friend who is about to visit China and who was advised by Chinese acquaintances of his to get himself vaccinated against cholera.

(5) Cholera in China

- 1 Anna: *und sie wurden auch geIMPFT,*
and they were also vaccinated,
2 *und HÄTTEN jetzt also ihm geraten*
and would have also advised him
3 *wenn=er=nach=Kina=geht==*
that when he goes to China
4 *er soll sich-IMPfEN lassen.*
that he should get a vaccination.
- 5 Zhao:mhm.
6 Anna: *die KÜSTE entlang,*
along the coast,
7 *also von Xiamen, Shanghai hoch sei [CHOLERA]*
that is from Xiamen, to Shanghai there's supposed to be [cholera]
- 8 Zhao:[hm. hm.]
9 Zhao: *das könnte ich mir vorstellen.*
I can believe that
10 *weil wir (-) weil Schina eben ja in diesem JAHR ziemlich viele*
because we (-) because China has in this year rather a lot of
11 *Überschwemmungen (.) HATTE,*
flooding.
12 *im NORden und SÜden,*
in the North and South,
13 *und man sagt normalerweise schon seit JahrTAUSENDE*
and it's said that normally already for thousands of years
14 *hatten wir NUR(.) entweder im SÜDEN (-)*
we only had (.) either flooding in the South (-)
15 *Überschwemmungen und im NORden dann Trok- DÜRRE.*
and then in the North drought.
- 16 Anna:mh[m]
17 Zhao: *[o]der im Norden Ü'Überschwemmungen und im Süden ja*
or in the North-flooding and in the South yeah
18 Bernd: *ja:h.*
yes
19 Zhao: *und diesmal haben wir im (-) im Nor-*
and this time we have in the (-) in the Nor-
20 *sowohl im Süden als auch im Norden.*
in the South as well as in the North.
21 Anna: *und dann meinst du daß dann?=
and then do you think that?=
22 Zhao: =es WIRD was passIEREN nach dem (-) e [hm]
=something will happen according to the (-) ehm*
- 23 Anna:[mhm]
24 Zhao: *nach dem chinesischen Horos[kop]*
according to the Chinese horos[cope]

- 25Bernd:[HAHAHAHA] [HAHAHAHAHAHAHA]
- 26Anna:[HAHAHAHAHAHAHA]
- 27Anna:((lachend))<so was *ÄHNLICHES* dacht ich mir jetzt schon
(laughing) <I was just thinking something like that >
- 28Bernd:[hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha]
- 29Anna:[wie sie das erzählt hat hahahahahahahahahahaha]
how she said that hahahahahahahahahahaha
- 30Bernd:[hahahahahahahahaha]
- 31Bernd: ((lachend))<(für mich) ich hab immer noch geglaubt>
(laughing) <(for myself) I was still assuming >
- 32 ((lachend))<es kommt [rationalen nachvollzieh- (...)]>
(laughing) <there's a [rational reconstructable- (...)]>
- 33Anna:[(.....)]
- 34Bernd:((lachend))<[es kommt ein rational >]
(laughing) <there's a rational reconstructable >
- 35Zhao:[(.....)]
- 36Bernd: nachvollziehbarer Zusammenhang [(.....)]
connection coming
- 37Anna:[(.....)]
- 38Zhao:[man hat]
they have
- 39Zhao: sogar gesagt [man hat sogar VORHER]
they even said they even forecast
- 40Bernd:[aber NEIN. NEIN.]
but no no
- 41Zhao: schon vorausgesagt, jetzt wird eben (.) der eh (-)
it ahead of time now it will (.) the ehm (-)
- 42 Ende des Jahres auf=jeden=Fall (-)
the end of the year in any case (-)
- 43 wird dann (-) eben (.) dann Persönlichkeiten sterben [die]
then some (-) well (.) then some personalities will die [who]
- 44Anna: [ahja]
really
- 45Zhao: die Weltpolitik oder die Welt (-) die Welt eben =
primarily have a strong influence
- 46Anna:=mhm
- 47Zhao: vor allem (-) stark beeinflussen.
on world politics or the world (-) well on the world
- 48Anna: naja Deng wär ja jetzt dran.
well it would be Deng's turn by now.

Zhao offers a possible explanation for the outbreak of cholera by referring to the recent floods (lines 9–12): “das könnte ich mir vorstellen. weil wir (-) weil Schina eben ja in diesem JAHR ziemlich viele Überschwemmungen (.) HATTE, im NORDEN und SÜDEN” (*I can believe that because we (-) because China has*

in this year rather a lot of flooding. in the North and South.) The ubiquitousness of the floods is unusual (13). Anna cuts in to ask what the consequences might be (21). Zhao's answer ("es WIRD was PASSIEREN nach dem (-) ehm nach dem chinesischen Horoskop" (*something will happen according to the (-) ehm according to the Chinese horoscope*)) provokes loud laughter from the two Germans. Whereas Anna situates her laughter as an appropriate (appropriately superior?) response to the "irrational" folk beliefs expressed in the prophecy (in the form of a Chinese *ziran guilü* ; i.e. a 'rule of nature') and/or to Zhao's use of such a proverbial prophecy (where a "reasonable" answer was to be expected?), Bernd does pretty much the same by the opposite method. He did at first expect, or so he says, a "rational" answer. But Zhao does not surrender. She does not thematize the unkind reception nor does she defend her position explicitly. She simply continues. But everything that follows the original breach of expectation (a natural phenomenon such as floods and an epidemiological problem require a "rational" answer) and possibly of "intercultural etiquette" (not very severe among friends) is of no further interest here. Folk proverbial prophecies are known to Germans as well as to Chinese. But whereas they are reasonable candidates for the explanation of cosmic (natural as well as political) affairs, they belong to the realm of superstition in most contemporary German milieus.

Knowledge of genres and of their proper use is central to the knowledge required for competent communicative interaction. All sorts of asymmetries in relevant knowledge can be "locally" repaired if and when they are perceived as such. This is true of *intra-* as well as *intercultural* communication — in principle. For obvious reasons, asymmetries are both more pronounced and more frequent in intercultural communication. Where asymmetries are pronounced and where there is little willingness to perceive them as a consequence of "structural difference", they are taken to reflect individual incompetence or malice.

Such things are of passing interest in informal individual encounters. They may have grave consequences, however, when they appear in institutions in which decisions about access to social resources are made on the basis of communicative skills and the effectiveness of self-presentation.²⁴ Disturbances, breaches of expectation and the like in communicative interaction are often objectively attributable to "structural differences", but are in fact almost as often attributed individually to the member of the other culture who appears as client, petitioner etc. in an institutional context.

Notes

1. Cf. also Hymes (1972) on the relevance of “genres” within speech communities.
2. Cf. also Hanks (1987; 1996) and Paltridge (1997).
3. Cf. Hanks (1987).
4. Cf. the works on genre by Hanks (1987; 1996) and Briggs (1992).
5. Cf. Feld (1990) on ritual lamenting among the Kaluli, Caraveli-Chaves (1980) among Greek women, Urban (1988) and Briggs (1992) among Warao women, Sherzer (1987) among the Kunas, and Kotthoff (1993a) among Georgian women in the Caucasus.
6. Cf. Hinnenkamp (1989; and this volume); Pallotti (this volume).
7. “. the cultural pattern of the approached group is to the stranger not a shelter but a field of adventure, not a matter of course but a questionable topic of investigation, not an instrument for disentangling problematic situations but a problematic situation itself and one hard to master.” (Schütz 1944: 104)
8. Cf. Keppler and Luckmann (1991).
9. Cf. Gumperz (1982) on differences in Black and White political speech styles; and Gumperz, Aulakh and Kaltman (1982) on the different use of particles in Indian and British English. Cf. also Gumperz in this volume.
10. Cf. Gumperz (1982) on phonological differences in Black and White American English and in Indian and British English.
11. Cf. Günthner (1993) on syntactic features used by Chinese and German participants in intercultural argumentations.
12. Cf. Gumperz (1982; and this volume) and Auer/Kern (this volume).
13. Cf. Rehbein this volume.
14. Cf. Luckmann (1992) and Günthner and Knoblauch (1994) on the “intermediate structure” of communicative genres.
15. Cf. Erickson and Shultz (1982) on differences in White and Black American English; Maynard (1986) on differences in Japanese and American ways of backchannelling; Tao and Thompson (1991) on Japanese, Chinese and American differences; and Günthner (1993) on Chinese-German differences.
16. For cross-cultural differences in recipient reactions see Günthner (1994).
17. The same holds for argumentations in Thai culture (Richards and Sukwiwat 1983).
18. Cf. Erickson and Mohatt (1982) for similar findings on cultural organization of participation structures in classroom situations with Indian and white teachers.
19. Cf. Auer (1994; and Auer/Kern this volume) on West and East German conventions in handling job interviews.
20. Cf. Sandig and Selting (1997) on communicative styles.

21. Cf. Kallmeyer (1979) on “interaction modalities”.
22. For stereotyping in intercultural encounters cf. Nazarkiewicz (1997).
23. All names are changed.
24. Cf. Gumperz (this volume). See also Hinnenkamp (1989, 1995), Blommaert and Verschueren (1991), Koole and Ten Thije (1994) and Ehlich (1996).

References

- Auer, P.
1994 “Broken discourses: Cultural and intercultural aspects of East German job interviews“. Paper presented at the *Sociolinguistics Colloquium* at Lancaster, GB.
- Bergmann, J.
1987 *Klatsch. Zur Sozialform der diskreten Indiskretion*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Bergmann, J. and T. Luckmann
1995 “Reconstructive genres of everyday communication“. In Uta M. Quasthoff (ed.), *Aspects of Oral Communication*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 289–304.
- Blommaert, J. and J. Verschueren (eds)
1991 *The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication*. Place: John Benjamins.
- Briggs, Ch.L.
1992 “‘Since I am a woman, I will chastise my relatives’: Gender, reported speech, and the (re)production of social relations in Warao ritual wailing“. *American Ethnologist* 19(2): 337–361.
- Caraveli-Chaves, A.
1980 “Bridges between worlds: the Greek women’s ritual lament as communicative event“. *Journal of American Folklore* 95: 129–158.
- Ehlich, K.
1996 “Interkulturelle Kommunikation“. In U. Ammon, N. Dittmar, and K. Mattheier (Hrsg.), *Sociolinguistics/Soziolinguistik*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 920–931.
- Erickson, Fred and G. Mohatt
1982 “Cultural organization of participation structures in two classrooms of Indian students“. In G. Spindler (ed.), *Doing the Ethnography of Schooling*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 133–174.
- Erickson, Fred and Jeffrey J. Schultz
1982 *The Counselor as Gatekeeper: social and cultural organization of communication in counselling interviews*. New York: Academic Press.
- Feld, S.
1990 “Wept thoughts: The voicing of Kaluli memories“. *Oral Tradition*, 5 (2/3): 241–266.

- Goody, E.
1978 "Introduction". In Esther Goody (ed.), *Questions and Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–17.
- Granet, M.
1985 *Das chinesische Denken*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Gumperz, J.J., T.C. Jupp and C. Roberts
1979 *Crosstalk. A study of cross-cultural communication*. Southall: NCILT.
- Gumperz, J.J.
1982 *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1988 "Language instruction and crosscultural awareness". Paper delivered at the conference *Language Study and Liberal Education*. University of Chicago. Chicago.
- Gumperz, J.J. and Jenny Cook-Gumperz (eds)
1982 *Language and Social Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gumperz, J.J., G. Aulakh, et al.
1982 "Thematic structure and progression in discourse". In J. J. Gumperz (ed.), *Language and Social Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22–56.
- Gumperz, J.J. and C. Roberts
1987 *Understanding in Intercultural Encounters*. Manuscript.
- Günthner, S.
1988 "Interkulturelle Aspekte von Schreibstilen: Zur Verwendung von Sprichwörtern und Routineformeln in Deutschaufsätzen chinesischer Deutschlerner/innen". In M. Lieber, Maria and J. Posset (Hg.), *Texte Schreiben im Germanistik-Studium*. München: iudicium, 145–159.
1991 "A language with taste: Uses of proverbial sayings in intercultural communication". *Text*, 3: 399–418.
1993 *Diskursstrategien in der Interkulturellen Kommunikation. Analysen deutsch-chinesischer Gespräche*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
1994 "Cultural differences in recipient activities". In H. Pürschel, et al. (eds.) *Intercultural Communication*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 481–502.
- Günthner, S. and H. Knoblauch
1994 "'Forms are the food of faith'. Gattungen als Muster kommunikativen Handelns". In *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 4: 693–723.
- Hanks, W. F.
1987 "Discourse genres in a theory of practice". *American Ethnologist*, 14 (4): 668–692.
1996 *Language and Communicative Practices*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Helmolt, von K.
1994 "Kommunikation in internationalen Arbeitsgruppen". Dissertation. Katholische Universität Eichstätt.
- Hinnenkamp, V.
1989 *Interaktionale Soziolinguistik und Interkulturelle Kommunikation: Gesprächsmanagement zwischen Deutschen und Türken*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

- 1995 "Intercultural Communication". In J. Verschueren, J.-O. Östman, and J. Blommaert (Hrsg.), *Handbook of Pragmatics*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins. 1–20.
- Hymes, D.
1972 "Models of the interaction of language and social life". In J.J. Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds.), *Directions in Sociolinguistics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 35–71.
- Kallmeyer, W.
1979 "Kritische Momente. Zur Konversationsanalyse von Interaktionsstörungen". In W. Frier, H. Labrousse (Hrsg.), *Grundfragen der Textwissenschaft*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 59–110.
- Keppler, A. and T. Luckmann
1991 "Teaching: Conversational transmission of knowledge". In I. Markova and K. Foppa (eds), *Asymmetries in Dialogue*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 143–165.
1992 "Lebensweisheiten im Gespräch". In H.G. Petzold and R. Kühn (eds.), *Psychotherapie und Philosophie. Philosophie als Psychotherapie?* (Reihe: Innovative Psychotherapie und Humanwissenschaften, Bd. 50). Paderborn: Jungfermann, 201–222.
- Kirkpatrick, A.
1991 "Information sequencing in Mandarin letters of request", *Anthropological Linguistics*, 33(2): 183–203.
- Knoblauch, H.
1991 "The taming of foes. The avoidance of asymmetry in informal discussions". In I. Markova and K. Foppa (eds.), *Asymmetries in Dialogue*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 166–194.
- Koole, T. and J. D. Ten Thije
1994 *The Construction of Intercultural Discourse*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Kotthoff, H.
1991 "Der Tamada gibt bei Tisch den Ton an. Tafelsitten, Trinksprüche und Geschlechterrollen im kaukasischen Georgien". In S.Günthner and H. Kotthoff (eds.), *Von fremden Stimmen: Weibliches und männliches Sprechen im Kulturvergleich*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 229–260.
1993a "Weibliche Lamento-Kunst in Ostgeorgien". *Georgica, Zeitschrift für Kultur, Sprache und Geschichte Georgiens und Kaukasiens* 93: 21–31.
1993b "Disagreement and cohesion in disputes: On the context sensitivity and preference structures". *Language in Society*, 22: 193–216.
1995 "The social semiotics of Georgian toast performances". *Journal of Pragmatics*, 24: 353–380.
- Linell, P. and T. Luckmann
1991 "Asymmetries in dialogue: some conceptual preliminaries". In I. Markova and K. Foppa (eds.): *Asymmetries in Dialogue*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1–20.
- Luckmann, T.
1986 "Grundformen der gesellschaftlichen Vermittlung des Wissens: Kommuni-

- kative Gattungen". *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 27*: 191–211.
- 1987 "Kanon und Konversion". In A. Assmann and J. Assmann (eds.), *Kanon und Zensur*. München: Fink, 38–46.
- 1988 "Kommunikative Gattungen im kommunikativen 'Haushalt' einer Gesellschaft". In G. Smolka-Koerdt et al. (eds), *Der Ursprung der Literatur*, München: Fink, 279–288.
- 1989 "On the communicative adjustment of perspectives, dialogue, and communicative genres". Manuscript.
- 1992 "Einleitung zu 'Rekonstruktive Gattungen'". Manuskript. Konstanz.
- Maynard, S.
1986 "On back-channel behavior in Japanese and English casual conversation". *Linguistics*, 24: 1079–1108.
- Miller, L.
1994 "Japanese and American meetings and what goes on before them: A case study of co-worker misunderstanding". *Pragmatics*, Vol. 4(2): 221–238.
- Nazarkiewicz, K.
1997 "Moralisieren über Ethnien. Die Reflexivität der Stereotypenkommunikation". *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 3: 181–201.
- Naotsuka, R., N. Sakamoto et al.
1981 *Mutual Understanding of Different Cultures*. Osaka: Taishukan.
- Paltridge, B.
1997 *Genres, Frames and Writing in Research Settings*. Amsterdam: John Bejamins.
- Philips, S.
1972 "Participant structures and communicative competence: Warm Springs children in community and classroom". In C. Cazden, D. Hymes and V. John (eds), *Functions of Language in the Classroom*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Pomerantz, A.
1984 "Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: some features of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes". In J. M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds), *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 57–101.
- Richards, J.C.M. and M. Sukwiat
1983 "Language transfer and conversational competence". *Applied Linguistics* 4(2): 113–125.
- Sandig, B. and M. Selting (Hrsg).
1997 *Sprech- und Gesprächsstile*. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Scollon, R. and S. Scollon
1981 *Narrative Literacy and Face in Interethnic Communication*. Norwood: Ablex.
- Schiffrin, D.
1984 "Jewish argument as sociability". *Language in Society* 13: 311–335.

- Schütz, A.
1944 "The stranger: An essay in social psychology". *The American Journal of Sociology*. Vol. XLIX: 499–512.
- Sherzer, J.
1987 "A diversity of voices: Men's and women's speech in ethnographic perspective". In Susan U. Philips et al. (eds), *Language, gender and sex in comparative perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 95–120.
- Tannen, D.
1984 *Conversational Style. Analyzing Talk among Friends*. Norwood: Ablex.
- Tao, H. and S. Thompson
1991 "English backchannels in Mandarin conversations: A case study of superstratum pragmatic 'inference'". *Journal of Pragmatics* 16: 209–223.
- Tyler, A. and C. Davies
1990 "Cross-linguistic communication missteps". *Text* 10(4): 385–411.
- Urban, G.
1988 "Ritual wailing in Amerindian Brazil". *American Anthropologist* 90 (2): 385–400.
- Young, Linda W.L.
1994 *Crosstalk and Culture in Sino-American Communication*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Section II

Case Studies of Intercultural Encounters

Three Ways of Analysing Communication between East and West Germans as Intercultural Communication

Peter Auer and Friederike Kern
University of Freiburg, University of Dortmund

1. Introduction

This paper investigates the possibilities of applying the concepts of interculturality and intercultural communication to the situation in Germany after unification. In particular, we will consider three different notions of interculturality and investigate their usability in/for the analysis of one particular communicative genre, namely the job interview, focusing on those interviews in which East German applicants and West German interviewers are involved.

Our discussion is set against the following theoretical background. During the past decade, we have witnessed “intercultural communication analysis” flourish in social psychology, communication studies, and linguistics. The way intercultural communication is viewed in many of its dominant theoretical conceptualizations and practical applications is based on the following assumptions (some explicit, others implicit): (a) intercultural communication occurs whenever two or more persons ‘belonging to at least two different cultures’ interact; (b) ‘culture’ means a list of prescriptions of what is or is not to be done in a given society, prescriptions which hold and which may be identified in a decontextualized way; (c) members of different cultures, when interacting, expect each other to behave in the same way as they do themselves; at the same time, they are unable to adjust their own behaviour to that of the other-culture co-participant; as a consequence of (b) and (c), intercultural communication is bound to fail; (d) however, successful intercul-

tural communication may be trained by teaching what is part of the other culture, and will be successful as soon as this knowledge is put into practice.

These assumptions have been criticised by several anthropologists and linguists (cf., e.g., Gumperz 1990; Gumperz and Roberts 1991; Hinnenkamp 1987, 1989; Roberts and Sarangi 1993; Günthner 1993; Streeck 1985; Blommaert 1991; Sarangi 1994; Sharrock and Anderson 1980) who argue (a) that the notion of intercultural communication outlined above builds on a monolithic instead of a "multi-voiced" conception of 'their' and 'our' culture in which commonalities are understressed and differences are overstressed; (b) that it conceptualises culture independent of the action and interaction taking place within intercultural *and* intracultural communication, locating culture outside practice; (c) that it wrongly presupposes that mutual understanding is indeed the primary aim of communication (and not, for instance, the wish to maintain group identity); (d) that it is based upon a lay usage of the term culture as an ideological concept employed to account for interactional *failure*, rather than as a resource made use of in the interaction itself, in which such a failure may occur; (e) that, contrary to this notion of intercultural communication, interactants of different backgrounds do not expect each other to adjust perfectly to their own culturally based norms or expectations, and that adjusting in such a way would not make the encounter unproblematic (but, on the contrary, even create misunderstandings of its own); (f) that it is in itself culturally prejudiced and eurocentric, since it takes for granted that training may prepare the western, but not the non-western, participant to adjust and thereby perform successfully in intercultural communication, presupposing the superiority of this culture in terms of flexibility and dynamics (while the other, e.g. Asian, is taken to be passive and non-adaptive).

With this critique of a 'naive' approach to intercultural communication (which we share) in mind, we now turn to East/West German job interviews.

2. Cultural categorisation in discourse

Our first way of approaching our materials as intercultural follows a constructivist approach to context (cf., for example, Auer and Di Luzio eds. 1992). As implied by the critique of intercultural communication outlined in the preceding section, an external definition of a situation as intercultural needs to be replaced by an analytic reconstruction of the ways in which participants

construe a situation as intercultural: intercultural communication is not what happens when two people of different cultural-biographical backgrounds meet, but rather, it is a brought-about (Hinnenkamp 1987: 144, following Giddens) feature of an encounter. While a similar argument has been made with reference to participants from widely diverging biographical backgrounds by Meeuwis (1994), we want to approach it here by focusing on encounters in which participants rely on a comparatively similar background of knowledge and experiences, accumulated through life histories in East Germany (interviewees) and West Germany (personnel managers). Nevertheless, participants may choose to categorise one another as members of two different cultures, thus “talking each other into” cultural differences (cf. Zimmermann and Boden 1991).

Accordingly, we will first explore the relevance of ‘East’ and ‘West’ as cultural concepts in job interviews by investigating some of the speakers’ activities through which they establish the relevance of these social categories.¹ The study is based on authentic job interviews with West German interviewers and East- and West German applicants (cf. for details Kern 2000, Birkner 2001).

2.1 *East/West translations*

In our materials, we observed on the part of both interviewer and applicant conversational strategies which seem to aim at compensating for anticipated deficits of culturally bound knowledge of the Eastern and Western life-worlds before the *Wende*. However, a closer inspection reveals that their primary pragmatic function is not so much related to referential ambiguities or misunderstandings as to an underlining of the (former) existence of two separate social and cultural worlds. One of the most explicit activities by which participants display their orientation towards the categories East and West are therefore translations of East German into West German terms, as in extracts (1)–(3).

*Example 1*² [I = Interviewer, B = Applicant]

I:okEE. SCHULbildung; aber sie HAM (-) abitur.=ne?
 B:ja
 I:= eh oh ES. [ne?]
 B:[mhm;]
 I:mhm,
 B:ja=GUT. DAmals eh nannte sich [das erWE]terte oberschule;
 I:[oder

B: und=und hier eh (-) [mittler _____] weile heisst das gymNASium.
 I: [<acc>e=oh=ES; _____ ne?]

I: *okay. education; but you got your abitur, didnt you*

B: *yes*

I: *e: o: es, wasnt it?*

B: *mh*

I: *mh*

B: *well=right. then it was called erweiterte oberschule ((extended secondary school)) and and here eh (-) in the meantime it is called gymnasium.*

The interviewer mentions the GDR-specific term *EOS* in connection with the candidate's educational career. By using the term, he displays some knowledge of the East German school system. (The *EOS* was a type of secondary school; like the West German *Gymnasium*, it led to the *Abitur*.) Nevertheless, the applicant translates the term *EOS* into its West German equivalent *Gymnasium* in his next turn. Since the interviewer has already shown his understanding of the *EOS*, the reason for the candidate's translation cannot be to compensate for knowledge deficits on the part of the interviewer. Rather, through their respective activities, both participants display their orientation towards the categories 'East' and 'West'. Notice also how the candidate creates two distinct social reference systems (East and West Germany) using the temporal and local adverbs *damals* ('then') — referring to the former GDR — and *hier* ('here'). As the interview took place in East Germany, *here* cannot relate to the situation at hand. Rather, the speaker metaphorically locates the current interview within the new — Western — reference system. We found this to be a common strategy: speakers use spatio-temporal deictics to actively construe two distinct life-worlds (cf. Liebscher 1997 for similar results).

In extract (2), an East German applicant again translates a GDR-specific term into its Western equivalent:

Example 2

B:e: h (-) mei=MANN is dann zur arMEE jegang, also (-) hier heißt (das [ja wohl]) BUND?

I3:[mhm]

B: *eh (-) my husband then joined the army, well i think it is called the services here?*

Once more, the speaker's intent is not so much to clarify the GDR-specific term *Armee* ('army') by translating it into its Western counterpart; after all, *Armee* is understood perfectly by West Germans as well. Rather, by using the

colloquial expression *Bund*, she proves her knowledge of the West but equally signals her distance from the West German speech community by hedging her translation (cf. the use of the particle *wohl*).

Finally, in extract (3), the interviewee is telling an autobiographical story which is set in the former GDR. Again, the East German applicant uses the indexical temporal expression *früher* ('then') in order to locate the word *Kaderabteilung* ('personnel office') within the reference system of GDR society:

Example 3

B: und ich komm da in=ne KAderabteilung <<rall>hieß das da früher un:d (.) sie sagte zu mir (.) eh (-) die war=ne> SCHULfreundin meine ehemalige <<acc>SCHULfreu=mit der ich inne SCHULE jegang=bin> .h sie SASS da DRIN; ja, und und [hatt] ich GLÜCK daß [ich]

I1:[mhm,]

[KAder.]

(-) heißt persoNALabteilung; ne.

B: ja, jetzt persoNALabteilung; ja:, un:d e:h (.) ich hab wirklich den I' (.) letzten ARbeitsplatz bekomm.

B: and I walk into the *cadre department* it was called then and she said to me eh (-) she was a school friend my former school friend who i went to school with (-) she sat in there, and and [i was] lucky that [i]

I: [hm] [*cadre*] (-) means *personnel department*, doesnt it

B: yes, *now personnel department*; yes and eh (.) i really did get the last job.

When she uses the East German word *Kaderabteilung*, the interviewee adds a comment about the cultural boundedness of the term ('as it was called then'). She thus constructs it as an outdated term. The interviewer nevertheless interrupts with a clarification request bringing the semantic equivalence of *Kaderabteilung* and *Personalabteilung* into play. This is done not only to display competence in the East German reference system but also to instruct the Eastern interviewee about the "legitimate" (cf. Bourdieu 1982) expression. Notice the absence of indexical features in his turn: the utterance is not located in time or place (through deictic expressions such as *here* and *now*) but appears universally valid:³ the Western expression is contextualized as the doxical (standard) form.⁴

Thus, what at first sight seems to prove participants' orientation towards

potential knowledge deficits of their (Eastern or Western) recipients and to be an attempt to compensate for them by translation turns out to index knowledge about the ‘other’ social worlds. Translations are thus activities of inclusion and exclusion: although equivalence is produced on the surface, a contrast is established at the same time by pairing two expressions which function as symbols for the two divergent frames of reference (East and West). Such utterances can be understood to produce interculturality by reflecting speakers’ perception of their interlocutors’ Western or Eastern identities, respectively.

2.2 *Cultural expansions in biographical narratives*

We now turn to more complex ways of dealing with (putatively) diverging background knowledge between East German applicants and West German interviewers. Our examples are taken from the biographical narratives which usually occur in the early parts of job interviews. Most interviewers start the ‘interview proper’ by asking the applicants to give a short account of their curriculum vitae. In biographical narratives, speakers always construct and claim a social identity (cf. Linde 1980, 1986); in job interviews, however, these identity claims are at least partly co-ordinated with genre-specific goals (cf. Adelswärd 1988). Accordingly, many applicants restrict themselves to a more or less straightforward description of their professional career constructed in terms of causal coherence and consistency. However, when compared to West German speakers’ verbal construction of curriculum vitae, East Germans employ a set of different structural devices to construe their narratives. These differences — which might be regarded as evidence for cultural variance in genre performance; cf. below, Section 3.2. — can also be explained as the result of a specific cross-cultural recipient design oriented to knowledge compensation between East and West.

Example 4

- I:(2) <f> oKEE. (-) JA.> frau TOEPfer. dann? (-) schau=wir=mal? dann:
 [(-) eh (-)] FANgen wir einfach mal an?
 B:[mhm?]
 I:indem SIE uns=n bisschen erzählen was sie so bislank; (-) eh
 geMACHT haben? (-) [.h eh: (-)] das ist ja
 I2:[((clears throat))]
 I:noch NICHT so (.) ganz FÜRCHterlich viel, (-) aber
 TROTZ[dem;] <<acc>sie können sicherlich schon=ne ganze menge
 B:[ja]
 I: erZÄHlen übers STUdium.>

- ((...))
- I: <<f>JA.> fangen sie einfach mal AN. (-)
 [legen sie einfach LOS.]
- B: [ja; (-) vielleicht ab [] dem ZEITpunkt; ab dem es für MICH relevant wird
dass ich mich für eine beRUFSausbildung entscheide? (-) die beRUFSwahl
 fängt in der neunten KLASse an, daß HEISST also für mich dass ([]);
für mich stand FEST dass ich das abiTUR ablegen (-) WOLlte? (-) das lernen
 fällt mir LEICHT, (-) ich lern sehr GERne, und (-) so wollte ich also auch noch
 (.) WEIter lernen;
- I: <<p>mhm,>
- B: es reichte mir nicht AUS, nur die REIFprüfung abzulegen, (-) sondern
ich wollte von der MÖGlichkeit gebrauch machen die es gab;
 (-) beRUFSausbildung und abiTURausbildung zu koppeln;
 (2)
- B: in den achtziger JAHren kam so die LÖsung auf; mikroelekTRONik
 das ist die ZUKunft; (-) und beSONders (-) die MÄDchen wurden
 in diesem bereich geFÖRdert; (-) das interesse MEInerseits (-) war
 vorHANden, (1) EInerseits (.) ehm=da ich meine FREIzeit viel mit
 meinem drei jahre älteren bruder verBRACHte? und zum ANderen;
 wurde man (.) in der SCHUle schon (-) auf (-) die TÄtigkeit im
 beTRIEB vorbereitet. durch das FACH produktive ARBEit.
 (2)
- B: die: (-) beRUFSausbildung fand in X-stadt statt? das beDEUdete dass
 ich die WOche über im interNAT untergebracht war;
 ((...))
- B: bereits im ersten LEHRjahr? mussten wir für [eine STUdiumrichtung
 I: [(clears throat)]]
- B: entscheiden. und ich wollte informaTIONStechnik studIERen.
- I: (2) okee. (-) yes. miss toepfer. then? (-) lets have a look? then [eh]
- B: [mhm]
- I: we will make a start by you telling us a little bit about what you have done
 so far? (-) [h eh: (-)] that has ah
- B: [(clears throat)]]
- I: not been an awful lot so far, (-) however you can surely tell us a lot about
 your studies
 ((...))
- I: yup. Why dont you just make a start. (-)
 [off you go]
- B: [yes; (-) maybe from] the moment when it becomes relevant for me to decide
 to do professional training? (-) choosing a profession starts in ninth grade,
 that means for me that (); i was sure i wanted to take the abitur (-) i'm
 good at learning, (-) i like learning very much, and (-) so i wanted to
 continue learning.
- I: mhm

B: *it was not enough for me to just take the abitur, (-) i wanted to make use of the opportunity that existed; (-) to combine training for a career and studying for the abitur;*

(2)

B: *in the eighties the slogan had come up microelectronics (-) that's the future; (-) and particularly (-) the girls were encouraged in this area (-) there was interest on my part, (1) in part (.) ehm because i spent plenty of my spare time with my older brother? and partly; in school they had already prepared us for company work (-) in the subject productive work.*

(2)

B: *the professional training took place in x-city? this meant i lived in a boarding school during the week;*

((...))

B: *already in the first year of training? we had to [decide on a course.]*

I: *[((clearing his throat))]*

B: *and i wanted to study computer science.*

From the very beginning of her autobiographical narrative, the candidate stresses the perspectives of *decision-making* and *wanting* which run through it like a theme. As a result, the biographical events (*Abitur*, *studies* etc.) appear as mere results of the candidate's own decision-making processes. This may reflect the applicant's orientation to genre-specific constraints; in job interviews, applicants should present themselves as determined and goal-oriented. Especially when applying for leading positions, the ability to make a decision is regarded as one of the key qualities (cf. Adelswärd 1988).

But another issue is involved: it is a commonly held opinion among West Germans that there had been no room for individual decision-making in the GDR because everything was taken care of by the state. The perspective chosen may reflect the applicants' indirect orientation to this stereotype: since she may assume that the interviewer shares this prejudice, her focus on decision-making may accordingly be an attempt to work against this prejudice. The exchange thereby takes on an intercultural dimension.

While this interpretation may be somewhat speculative, interculturality is certainly achieved in another way. Notice the long orientational expansions on GDR-specific sociocultural background knowledge with which the presentation is interspersed, such as 'in the eighties the slogan had come up microelectronics — that's the future' or 'in school they already prepared us for company work in the subject productive work'. Structurally, the expansions function as comments on and reasons for single biographical moves and link them together. The speaker establishes causal connections between external facts and

personal biographical changes, and thereby achieves biographical continuity and consistency, something which, as a consequence of the cultural cleavage between East and West Germany, is in no way taken for granted. In job interviews with West German applicants, expansions referring to cultural facts and circumstances are hardly ever produced; thematic coherence is achieved differently, since potential culturally bound knowledge deficits do not have to be compensated for. The West German candidates' presupposition of a shared cultural background is reflected in sequential structure which in turn is the result of a specific monocultural recipient design.⁵

In sum, we have described two conversational practices in this section — translations and a particular type of expansion — which *inter alia* are used by participants in our job interviews to construct East/West categorisations and thereby turn the meeting into an intercultural one. Since these practices occur quite frequently, we can conclude that in terms of an interactionally produced orientation towards the cultural categories 'East' and 'West', our data are intercultural data.

3. Cultural differences due to diverging frame knowledge

It would clearly be inadequate to restrict the notion of interculturality to more or less explicit orientations towards cultural categories. In fact, the most prototypical cases of intercultural misunderstandings described in the linguistic and anthropological literature are based on the very opposite assumption, *i.e.*, that speakers are unaware of the culturally constrained ways in which they speak, and that they may not orient themselves at all (and definitely not explicitly) to their co-participants' divergent cultural background. It follows from this that explicit or implicit reference to membership categories such as 'East German' and 'West German' is not a necessary condition for establishing an encounter's intercultural dimension.⁶ Culturality can also be more implicitly produced on the level of the participants' diverging performances and their interlocutors' interpretations of them. Gumperz in particular has shown in various publications (*e.g.*, Gumperz, Jupp & Roberts 1979; Gumperz 1982b) how constellations of culturally specific linguistic features operate as contextualization cues signalling utterances' meaning and contextual presuppositions, and how misunderstandings between interlocutors from different cultural backgrounds may occur if contextualization conventions are not

shared. As an example, consider Gumperz' analysis of the Croy trial (in this volume) in which he argues that "epithets [by the defendant, a native American Indian in California; p.a.] like 'kill some cops', 'tear Yreka up' which the prosecution cited as evidence in support of the conspiracy charge, must be interpreted as a form of hyperbole patterned on expressions commonly used in minority group protests" (this volume, p. 42). Here, the police who interpreted the defendants' words according to their own cultural assumptions were unaware of the different meaning they may have when native American Indian contextualization cues are fallen into consideration.

We will now turn to some examples of this kind of interculturality in our East/West German job interview data.⁷

3.1 *Lexical change from an intercultural perspective*

Linguistic research on post-unification Germany has to a large extent concentrated on lexical change (for an overview, see Auer and Hausendorf, 2000). Indeed, massive word shifts have occurred in connection with the disappearance of many GDR-specific social and economic structures and their replacement by Western ones. However, what has not been investigated in sufficient detail is the fact that when replacing East German vocabulary with West German words, East German speakers may not transfer the full range of usage subtleties attached to them in the West. Thus, transfer of words and transfer of usage rules may not coincide. This may in turn become problematic in intercultural contexts (cf., e.g., Rost-Roth 1994).

One example (of many) is the West German word *Team* which has replaced East German *Kollektiv*. Analysis of the Eastern and Western role-played job interviews⁸ shows that although many East and West German speakers use the same word (*Team*), they may express different ideas with it. We first look at some uses of *Team* by West Germans:

Example 5

B:h=ja; ich möchte also (.) gern in ihrem (.) unterNEHMen als gleichberechtigte PARTnerin, zum SCHLUSS, eh im team MITarbeiten?
 (1) und ich weiss natürlich dass das ein bisschen ZEIT dauert? man muss (.) viel LERNen?=und (-) ich DENke aber dass: (.) dass ich das: im LAUfe der zeit schon (LERne) und da hätte ich sehr viel LUST zu.

B: so i would like to work in the team in the end as an equal partner
 (1) and of course i know that that will take some time? one has to learn

a lot and (-) but i think that (.) that i will learn that in the course of time and i would very much like to do that.

Example 6

B:ich DENke mir dass es SICherlich GANZ wichtig is für diese positioN ein (.) geSUNdes äh eine gesunde BASIS sprich=n gutes FACHwissen zu haben, ,h äh dann sollte da SICherlich au:ch der KAUFmännische beREICH=also das KOSTenbewusstsein sollte da sein; <<f>=UND> (.) GANZ wichtig noch (.) äh=n bestimmtes DURCHsetzungsvermögen; weil wir ja mit MITarbeitern zu tun haben,<<dim>=also sprich mit=ner ganz senSiblen maTERie;>

I:und wir (.) äh (2) <<faster>(ham natürlich hier auch)>

(-) das (moDERne) noch recht stark auf TEAM (-) TEAMarbeit;

B:ja:

I: EINgestellt;=so dass ein (.) ABSolutes DURCHsetzungsvermögen <<p>natürlich nicht> UNbedingt (-) NÖtig iss=weil wir das doch geWOHNT sind ((clears throat)) im KREIse die (.) äh entSCHEIDungen gemMEINsam zu treffen,

B: *i believe that it is definitely very important for this position to have a (.) sound ehm a sound basis that means a good professional knowledge, ,h ehm then obviously the commercial side I mean knowledge of cost effectiveness should be there; AND (.) VERY important ehm some kind of ability to assert oneself; because we are dealing with employees, that means very sensitive matter;*

I: *and we (.) ehm (2.0) (of course here we have) (-) the (modern) very much built on team (-) team work;*

B: *yeah,*

I: *so that an absolute ability to assert oneself of course isnt really necessary because we are used to ((clears throat)) making decisions together in a group*

In both segments, the speakers use *Team* in contexts in which they want to stress the idea of co-operation within a group of people. In example (5), the candidate declares that it is her ultimate goal to work with others in a team and have equal rights. In example (6) the interviewer contradicts the interviewee's contention that for the particular job in question the ability to assert oneself would be an asset, and stresses the idea of a team-based enterprise in which decisions are made together. Other examples also show that the term *Team* is closely connected to notions of co-operation and partnership in the West.

In contrast, the following examples demonstrate how the word *Team* is used by East Germans in our data:

Example 7

B:in: meiner VORherigen anstellung, als produktIONSleiter, (-) war ich diREKT unterstellt dem beTRIEBSStelleiter? (-) dessen STELLvertreter ich gewesen bin? (-) und in der funktiON als produktIONSleiter war ich verANTwortlich für ein TEAM von insgesamt .hh zweiunddreissig MITarbeitern? (-) die ich ANzuleiten hatte, (-) deren tätigkeiten ich zu koordiNIeren hatte? ((etc.))

B: *in my previous job as a director of production, (-) i was directly responsible to the deputy director of the company? (-) whose substitute i was? (-) in the function of a director of production i was responsible for a team of thirty two employees altogether? (-) whom i had to direct, (-) whose activities i had to coordinate? ((etc.))*

Example 8

B: AUSBildung von: (-) jungen WEHRpflichtigen? (1) eh: FÜHrung von' (-) kollekt'(-) eh (-) TEAMS? (-) ja.: und diese TEAMS, =zum erFOLG führen, das ist eigentlich die; (-) aufgabe der arMEE.

B: *education of (-) young conscripts? (1) eh leadership of (-) collect' (-) eh (-) teams? (-) ye:s and leading these teams to success, this is really the (-) task of the army.*

These speakers do not talk about co-operation and partnership when they use the term *Team*, but about how to direct and co-ordinate people and lead them to success. In the first example, the applicant describes his previous job, particularly his responsibilities as the leader of a group of workers, and in the second case the interviewee speaks about his former position as an officer in the army and the duties connected to it. Contrary to West German usage, speakers do not use the word *Team* to refer to a group of people with equal rights or at least shared responsibilities, but rather when referring to themselves as the leaders of a group.

Note that in the second example, the applicant uses the word *Team* in connection with the armed forces, a context in which the word is inappropriate in West German usage. Since East German *Kollektiv* was indeed commonly used in the military context, the speaker seems to overgeneralize the term following the East German model: the *signifiant* of *Kollektiv* is replaced by that of *Team*, while the *signifié* remains the same. In addition, *Team* is produced in such a way as to mark its ad hoc substitutional character: the speaker self-interrupts in the course of the production of *Kollektiv* in order to replace it with *Team*.

The examples discussed so far show that the East German participants are well aware of the symbolic value of using *Kollektiv* or *Team*, but use the latter as a mere synonym of the former. In intercultural contexts this can lead to problems, as the following example from an authentic interview shows (West German interviewer, I2, and East German applicant, B). In this particular case, we are in the analytically fortunate position that a third party (interviewer I1) intervenes in a sequential context which is becoming highly awkward for both I2 and B due to the different meaning attached to the word *Team*, and directly links this awkwardness to the categories ‘West’ and ‘East’ (by a translation of the kind discussed in more detail in Section 2.1 above):

Example 9

- I2:(1) was verBINden sie mi=m TEAMgedanken zum beispiel. (-) was (.) was HEISST das für sie. (-) wenn=se=n kolLEgen haben;
 (2)
 ham=se FRÜher kollegen gehabt?
 (1)
 B:naTÜRlich; (und das is auch)]
 I2:[naTÜRlich; und (.) was ham=se] an denen geSCHÄTZT?
 (2.5)
 wie is das geLAufen?
 B:<<p, hoch> GUT eigentlich ja;>
 I2:und waRUM is das gut gelaufen? WAS is gut gelaufen?
 (7)
 B:ko(m)=ich=(in)s STOLpern (ja/grad) (hh[h] he he he)]
 I2:[<<f>WAS=denn?]>
 B:h <<laughing>jetzt komm ich ins STOLpern>; he [he he]
 I2: [reassuring> n:ee:.]
 B:() [(das war)]
 I1:[(das würd ich nicht] sagen)
 I2:nee;
 I1: das war kein TEAM, war=n kollektiv. (-) [ne,]
 B:[(k)] (-) ja:
 I1:da HAM sie-
 B: das war sowieSO wie eine faMILie muss ich sagen; wir ham IMmer zusammen (-)
 I2:j a
 I1: viel zusammen geMACHT? priVAT?
 B:(1) mh: mh (1) privat NICH.
 I1:mhm,
 B:glaub ich' (.) nee (.) privat NICH;
 I1:mhm,
 I2?:im bü[ro;]
 B:[auf] ARbeit (.) ham wir alle zusammen(.) gehalten;

- I2: (1.0) *for instance what does the notion of a team mean to you. (-)*
what (.) what does it mean for you. (-) when you have colleagues;
 (2.0)
have you had colleagues before?
 (1.0)
- B: *of [course; (and this is)*
- I2: *[of course; and (.) what did you appreciate in them?*
 (2.5)
how did it work?
- B: *quite well, i guess;*
- I2: *and why did it work well? what went well?*
 (7.0)
- B: *(there i'm) messing up (well) he [he he he*
- I2: *[what?*
- B: *.h <<laughing> now i'm messing up>; he [he he*
- I2: *[no::*
- B: () *[(it was)*
- I1: *[(i wouldnt) say (that)*
- I2: *no;*
- I1: *it wasnt a team, it was a collective. (-) [wasnt it,*
- B: *[(k) (-) yes:*
- I1: *there you*
- B: *in any case it was like a family i'd have to say; we always used to (-)*
- I2: *yeah*
- I1: *do a lot together? privately?*
- B: *(1.0) ehm ehm (1.0) no not privately.*
- I1: *mhm,*
- B: *i think (.) no (.) privately no;*
- I1: *mhm,*
- I2?: *in the of [fice?*
- B: *[at work (.) we all (.) stuck together;*

The second interviewer wants to talk about the notion of teamwork and what it means to the applicant. As she hesitates to answer, he rephrases his question several times ('have you had colleagues before?', 'what did you appreciate in them?', 'how did that work?', 'what went well?'). Yet the applicant does not seem to be able to make sense of the question; for her, the Western connotation of cooperation is not included in the word *Team*, nor is the idea that teams may work more or less efficiently depending on their internal structure which may make co-operation more or less difficult. In order to help, the first interviewer suggests that at the time the applicant was not working in a *Team* (in which it would make sense to ask questions such as the ones the second interviewer has asked) but in a *Kollektiv*.

Note the difference in the East German speakers' usage in the two examples: the two terms are construed by the first interviewer as standing in fundamental opposition, i.e. as being completely incompatible. The applicant agrees to this with some hesitation (cf. the elongation on *ja:*), but continues by reproducing a common East German stereotype about the socialist economic sphere, i.e. that the *Kollektiv* was like a 'family' (a stereotype which refers to the solidarity dimension of the *Kollektiv*, cf. the applicant's 'we always used to do a lot together'). The interviewer eagerly completes the syntactic frame opened by her ('we always used to...') by suggesting that the collective also extended into the private sphere ('...do a lot together? privately?'), an interpretation which is rejected by the East German, however. Again, the semantics of *Kollektiv* do not seem to be exactly the same for I1 and B: for the West German interviewer, the *Kollektiv* is a private *and* economic institution which has nothing to do with goal-oriented co-operation in a *Team*, whereas for the East German interviewee, it is an institution which provides social security and solidarity.

So even a relatively simple pair of words — one associated with the West, the other with the East — reveals cultural processes of lexical acquisition; while both the East and the West Germans have acquired the corresponding word from the opposite social system, neither of the two parties seem to use it in the same way in which it was used in pre-*Wende* times. The different meaning attached to words such as these surely needs to be explained in cultural terms.

3.2 *The structure of complex turns in job descriptions*

We now turn to another difference between the interviewees in our data which may be linked to differences of cultural background. This difference is not at the level of vocabulary, but at that of genre knowledge (or lack of it)⁹ and performance in complex turns at talk. We will argue that in and underlying the performance of the genre investigated, structural patterns, discursive strategies, and normative expectations may be identified, which are part of two different (communication) cultures — one of the East, one of the West — and which come together in the situation at hand.

In the course of job interviews, applicants are regularly asked to describe their previous job(s). Such sequences are of vital importance to both interviewer and candidate. While the interviewer can check whether the candidate

meets the demands of the job in question, the applicant is given extensive access to the floor to present his or her professional competence.

The following examples come from interviews in the construction trade and represent two prototypical answers to such questions. The company advertised two vacancies, one for a building site manager and one for a project leader. It is of central importance for the interviewers to learn exactly what the applicant has done in his previous job, particularly since the meaning of the terms *Bauleiter* ('building site manager') and *Projektleiter* ('project leader'), as they appear in the applicants' written CVs, are vague and can include the same activities.

Example 10

I1: und sie habn (-) für hoch tief als ge uh (0.7) WAS dort gemacht;

B:=eh:

I1:=proJEKtleitung? (-) BAU[leitung], (.) oder?

B:[eh:]

B:die proJEKtleitung=eh (-) mit dementsprechenden proJEKtsitzungen?

(-) die koordiNIERUNG (.) der (-) eh: eh: (.) der (-) eh (.) einzelnen geWERke (-) sowieSO,

I1: j a

B:im bereich der beSPREChungn? (0.7) aber (-) auch (.) die:=eh (0.8) interne koordinierung (-) m:it STEIgenberger SELBST, das heisst also (-) mit (.) dem: eh () über AUSstattungsmerkmale und alles was daZU gehört, (.) und DEMentsprechende . h terminierung (-) von (0.6) KÜChn ((etc.))

I1: and you did (-) for hochtief as a GU¹⁰ (0.7) what?

B: ehm

I1: project leading? site [managing? or what?

B: [ehm

B: project leading=ehm (-) with the various project meetings? (-) coordination of ehm ehm the ehm the particular jobs of course,

I1: yeah

B: in the area of meetings? (0.7) but (-) also (.) the=ehm (0.8) internal coordination (-) with steigenberger himself, which means (-) with the: ehm () about fittings and everything in that field, and the relevant time scheduling (-) for (0.6) kitchens ((etc.))

With his question, the interviewer introduces the two vacancies as the relevant topic ('leading the project' vs. 'managing the site') The candidate picks up the syntactic format of the interviewer's utterance and continues with a list of his previous tasks and duties which becomes more and more detailed. He thus

produces his utterance in syntactic and thematic accordance with the interviewer's question. The chosen list format focuses on the mere facts; the candidate contextualizes his utterance as primarily information-giving.

Compare this with the following sequence from another interview for the same vacancies:

Example 11

I1:un: d (-) wenn sie (.) SAgn, (.) sie ham da also (-) BAUleitung gemacht, vom
erstn SPATnstich, (1) eh (-) vom erstn SPATnstich an, (-) gehörte dann (-)
zu ihrer aufgabe (-) die arbeit vor (.) ORT? (.) die überWACHung (.) der
bauarbeitn? (-) einschliesslich (-) EINtaktn, (-) organisatiON, (-)
SUBunternehmer, (-) terminplanEINHaltung,

(1)

<<rall>oder WAS (-) war da (-) ihr>

B:ja (-) ja [eh der eh] wir hattn (-) eh (muss' wolln) ma

I1:[(clears throat)]

B:SO sagn (-) vielleicht; eh

(2)

B:des (.) des (-) proGRAMM nannte sich KOSTngünstiges BAUen. (-)

I1:j a

B:das war so mehr oder weniger auf (-) TYpn ausgerichtet?

(2)

B:und=eh (-) für (.) für diese (-) speziellen TYpn=eh (-) gab=es denn noch
nen computerprogramm vom be ah' (.) ABlauf (-) her, (-) also nen
bauablaufplan im prinZIP? (-) den man uff de baustelle (-) RAUSjekriecht hat?
(1) von=der arbeitsVORbereitung; (-) die: (-) die firmen (-) eh (-) beNANNT
jekriecht hat, die termine warn im bauablauf denn DA, (1) praktisch die
ganze koordiNierung, (-) terMINkontrolle, (-) qualiTÄTSkontrolle,
(-) EINschliesslich denn nachher der gesamtN ABrechnung.

I1:m hm

B:des des jehörte eben zum. (-)

I1:[(clears throat)]

B:abnahmen und und was eben so kam <<dim> zur (.) AUFgabe.>

*I1: and (-) when you say, you led (-) the project, from the first cut, (1.0) ehm (-)
from the first cut of the spade, (-) was part of your job (-) the work on-site?
(.) supervising (.) the construction activities? (-) including timing,
(-) organisation, (-) tendering, (-) time scheduling*

(1.0)

I: what (-) was (-) your

B: yes (-) yes [ehm the ehm we had (-) (must lets) put it like this

I1: [(clears throat)]

B: (-) maybe; ehm

(2.0)

- B:* the (,) the (-) programme was called bargain construction. (-)
II: yeah
B: it was more or less aimed at (-) types?
 (2.0)
B: and=ehm (-) for (,) for each (-) type=ehm (-) there was a computer programme for the d (,) construction process, (-) in principle a sequential construction plan? (-) which you got given on the construction site? (1.0) by the job preparation; (-) which (-) was given the names of the companies, the timing was then already fixed regarding the sequence of construction, (1.0) practically the whole coordination, (-) scheduling, (-) quality control, (-) including afterwards all the invoicing.
II: mhm
B: that was part of the (-)
II: ((clears throat))
B: the inspection and and whatever else there was to the (,) job.

Like the previous example, the interviewer's question has the format of an unfinished list. But unlike example (10), the applicant does not answer the question directly, let alone pick up the interviewer's syntactic frame. He acknowledges the question with a simple *yes* and then starts anew: after a prefatory remark ('let's put it like this'), he engages in a long explanation of the building programme in which he participated in his previous job, the general characteristics of which are described without specifying his own duties within it. The information given in this section is "relevant setting information" (Polanyi 1985: 191) which a teller may produce in order to locate a narrative in time and space. Only afterwards does this applicant pick up the interviewer's list format to describe his own work within the setting previously established ('the whole co-ordination, scheduling, quality control, including afterwards all the invoicing...').

The first example is typical of a West German applicant, the second example typical of an East German one. The structural differences in the answers' internal construction are striking. Whereas the West German applicant produces a list of jobs immediately following the interviewer's answer, the East German speaker first offers general information on the professional setting and only then produces the answer itself. As a consequence, turns become more complex. Generally speaking, West Germans in our data often choose lists as a format for producing an answer to questions on professional experience. East Germans, on the other hand, prototypically give relevant setting information first before they locate and describe their own job within this area.

However, the shift of focus from the presentation of the mere facts of previous occupational tasks to a broader description of the professional environment can result in communicative difficulty. In the following extract, it leads to a clarification request on the part of the interviewer.

Example 12

- I: was is denn IHre aufgabe da.
 B:(-) .h (1.5) im GROSSteil sinds (1) CE programme; die auf den: geSCHÄFTSstellen der ((name)) zum EINSatz (kommen.) (-) auf jeder geSCHÄFTSstelle ham wir auch noch=n (em ix) dreiHUNdert, (1) die ham ihre eigene DATenbank, und ihren KUNdenstamm, (-) berLIN; berLIner raum un und so [WEIter-
 I:[mhm,
 B: .h (-) un:d (-) ja; (-) dann werden die <<rall>KUNden: ebend> (-) ANgeschrieben, die jetzt <<rall>grade: neu:> EIN(geschrieben werden;) dann werden die aus der datenbank RAUSselektiert,
 I:((clicks tongue)) .h müssen SIE das machen.
 (2)
 B: die proGRAMme schreiben, JA.
 I:(-) ach SO.

- I: *what do you do there.*
 A: *well (1.5) mainly it is the programmes that are activated in the offices (-) in every office we additionally have a (em ex) three hundred (1) they have their own data bank, and their customers (-) berlin; berlin area and so [on*
 I: *[mhm*
 A: *.h (-) and (-) well (-) then the clients are informed that have just registered; then they are selected from the data bank,*
 I: *((clicking his tongue)) thats what YOU have to do?*
 (2)
 A: *write the programmes, (-) yes.*
 I: *I see.*

Again, the East German candidate produces detailed information about the professional setting without explicitly identifying his own area of work within this environment. The interviewer interrupts to demand clarification. Only then does the candidate produce the required information. The comprehension problem on the part of the interviewer is due to the candidate's failure to focus verbally on his previous work experience.

In this section we have shown that cultural differences may be involved in cases where no reference to cultural labels such as 'East German' or 'West German' is made. Two examples — one on the lexical level, one on the level of turn construction — have been given in which we can be relatively certain

that speakers with a West German background prototypically follow different patterns from those we find among East German speakers.¹¹ The interculturality of these patterns resides in culturally diverging frame knowledge, connotations of words (as shown in examples 7–9), and suitability of communicative styles to usage (as shown in examples 11–12). It is the analyst's task to reconstruct them and, in addition, to show that they come into conflict, leading to misinterpretations, misunderstandings or other conversational problems.

4. Intercultural discourse without intercultural communication

The third way of conceptualising interculturality (or rather, polyculturality) challenges the traditional view that in intercultural communication, each of the partners represents a monocultural, i.e. culturally homogeneous person. In cases of rapid or even abrupt cultural change (as in East Germany), this assumption — which is inherent in the first of the features of the orthodox view of 'intercultural communication' mentioned in the first section of this paper — is quite clearly false. It seems that the association of one participant with one culture, as commonly found in research on intercultural communication, is at best modelled on a restricted case. In fact, interculturality takes place within the speaker as well.

This is particularly obvious in the role-played job interviews we recorded shortly after the collapse of the GDR, among participants who were little acquainted with the job interview (in its Western form) as a communicative genre. What we found in the Eastern participants' communicative behaviour in these interviews reflects a clash — or rather, incongruity — between the demands of the genre (being part of the communicative culture of the West), partly known or presumed to be known on the basis of post-unification experiences, and the communicative resources available qua membership of the East German (communicative) culture.

Although both interviewers and interviewees in the role-plays were East German, we want to claim that their way of staging a job interview produced an *intercultural* text, i.e. one which indexes elements from the West in addition to those from the East. It is possible to locate this interculturality at various levels of analysis. First of all, the situation was not really monocultural despite the fact that the primary interactants (the interviewers and applicants in the role play) were East Germans. Rather, a West German trainer (as well as

a West German university team) participated as on-lookers and (in the first case) critical commentators.¹¹² However, even if neither the trainer nor the researcher had been West German, ‘the West’ would still have been present. In the first place, this is so because of the inherent tension between the Western communicative genre on the one hand, with its specific structures, tasks and demands, and the Eastern stylistic resources employed, which cannot be separated from their cultural-ideological values. Western genre and Eastern communicative style(s) are at odds:

- because one encourages explicit and implicit displays of one’s abilities and prior experiences, while the other encourages modesty and concealment of one’s abilities;
- because one builds on active contributions by the applicant and the other on avoidance of the agent-subject;
- because one is based on a superficial ideology of equality beneath which power relations are hidden, while the other exposes and underlines these power relations through formality and submission;
- because one is supposed to take place in a superficial atmosphere of informality, while the other requires formality;
- because one (at least superficially) requires and values frankness, while the other requires indirectness and vagueness; etc.¹³

This clash between the speech activity and the resources at hand brought stylistic elements from various (Eastern and Western) sources into play. As was to be expected, this was most obvious at the lexical level, where old and new words stood side by side. Participants frequently quoted words and idiomatic expressions from the East German state-and-party vocabulary, particularly when administrative matters were discussed; some examples are:

Kollektiv (see above)¹⁴

Brigade (‘brigade’, more or less the same as *Kollektiv*, as in *die Brigade der Betriebshandwerker*, ‘the brigade of company workers’)¹⁵

Kader (‘cadre’, a group of qualified personnel, more often a person occupying a leading position)

Körperkultur (lit. ‘physical culture’, in the sense of ‘physical education’)

Reproduktion, sich reproduzieren (lit. ‘reproduction’, ‘to reproduce oneself’, in the sense of ‘recreation’)

Territorium (‘territory’, in the sense of ‘region’)¹⁶

Aufbaustab (‘founding staff’).

However, the 'Eastern' stylistic resources found in the interviews were not restricted to the lexicon. They also included a number of idioms and routines typical of GDR official language (such as *Ausführungen machen* 'make statements' or *aus kaderpolitischen Gründen* 'for reasons of cadre politics'), very depersonalised language (mainly due to the avoidance of personal pronouns as grammatical subjects with agentive function in a main clause), a high degree of nominalization, and generally a very formal style of speech (in the sense of displaying a degree of syntactic complexity which is unusual for spoken language), long turns with little backchannelling, a slow prosodic mode of delivery and a certain degree of indirectness and even vagueness.¹⁷

In addition to GDR official vocabulary and style, we found elements of an (Eastern) modesty-and-deference style, which was marked by a high degree of negative politeness.

On the other hand, very large number of new, West German words were used as well. As a blatant example of the resulting East/West mix, consider extract (13), in which the overall style is Eastern and is interspersed with the new Western vocabulary (*Kundengespräche, Arbeitsorganisation, Bankgeschäfte, Filialleitung*):

Example 13

I: also mit welchen erWARTungshAltungen, .hh GEhen sie an eine eventuelle ANStellung (1.0) (in unserer firma).

B: ich gehe GRUNDSätzlich an die erwartungshaltung (·) DIESbezüglich ran dass ich sage ich möchte in meiner position gefÖrdert UND gefOrdert werden? das heisst also AUFbauend auf den fähigkeiten und KENNTnissen die ich beSITze, die (nun auch) vorliegen das heisst KUNDengespräche:, ARbeitsorganisation:, (1.0) BANKgeschäfte (·), (-) (·), dass ich DAhingehend (-) die unterstützung habe, (-) DURCH, (-) die filialLEitung? (-) beziehungsweise (den bankdirektor) beziehungsweise den filiALLEiter, .hh dass dort möglichkeiten geSCHAFfen werden der (-) WElterbildung.

I: *with what expectations do you approach a possible appointment (1.0) in our company*

B: *i basically anticipate an attitude, .hh (-) relating to that i say i want to be helped and challenged in my position? this means building on the skills and knowledge which I have, which (·) are already present that means dealing with the customers, labour organisation, (1.0) bank transactions (·), that i get support in this sense, from the management? (-) or (the director of the bank) or the manager, .hh that possibilites are created for in-service training.*

A more complex example of the same process of mixing is the juxtaposition of Western and Eastern topics and topoi — the way in which Western and Eastern communicative cultures prescribe and prestructure what can or should be talked about, and how. A recurrent phenomenon in our data was that Western topoi such as ‘economic expansion’, ‘on-the-job training’, ‘after-sales service’, ‘contented customers’ mixed with Eastern topoi regarding, e.g., the social care East German companies used to extend to their employees and their families, such as ‘kindergartens’, ‘holidays’, even ‘family planning’. At times, this resulted in sequences which sounded problematic, at least to Western ears. In the following example (14), the applicant answers the question regarding his family as if it was an innocent question; in the Eastern framework, this is possible since the question invokes the topos of ‘social care for employees’. In the Western frame of a job interview, however, the question clearly aims at testing the candidate’s ability and willingness to work abroad for a longer period of time. This possible innuendo, however, seems not to have been understood by the applicant, who answers by giving the facts only (and indeed, in the present context, it may not even have been intended by the East German interviewer):

Example 14

B: das würde (-) eigentlich meinen wünschen (-) sehr entgegenkommen (0.5) auch im AUSSendienst zu arbeiten.

I: sind Sie eigentlich verHEiratet?

B: ich bin verHEiratet? (0.5) habe zwei TÖchter? meine frau ist LEHrerin? (-) meine beiden töchter sind ZWÖLF (0.5) und achtzehn JAHre, das heisst beide gehen noch zur SCHULE.

(3.0)

I: ich hab nochmal eine ganz speziELLE frage,
((continues on a different topic))

B: actually (-) this would come (-) very close to my aims (0.5) to work outside the office too.

I: are you married?

B: i am married? (-) have two daughters? my wife is a teacher? (-) my two daughters are twelve (0.5) and eighteen, which means that both of them still go to school.

(3.0)

I: now i have a very different question ((continues on different topic))

All these examples of cultural heterogeneity *within* speakers of an East German biographical background question the basic assumption of the usual

approach to intercultural communication, i.e. that participants in such communication must be acquainted with, responsible for and invested with cultural background each in order for an intercultural event to emerge. There is a fundamental problem in assuming, in any given case, that a participant ‘belongs to a (one) culture’, for ‘belonging to a culture’ (or should we say ‘taking part in it’?) is surely a matter of degree — and even of situational adequacy. What is at stake in the data investigated here is not a clash between two cultures impersonated in two participants, but rather the local selection of elements from different cultural frames which are at least fragmentarily available to all participants. Cultures come into contact within participants and within interactive episodes; but often they do not “belong” to one or the other participant.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have discussed three approaches to interculturality and applied them to East/West German communication after unification. Each of them encapsulates different phenomena. In the first case, cultural categorisation by participants themselves is at issue: it is discursively produced via the participants’ specific intercultural or monocultural recipient design. In the second case, the lack of underlying shared knowledge (which, however, is usually not openly oriented to by participants) reveals itself in diverging patterns of communicative style and leads to communicative difficulties; and in the third case, interculturality is located within a participant, who on the basis of his or her biographical background would seem to be completely ‘monocultural’. All three approaches have some justification and are useful for highlighting some aspects of the complex processes of cultural adaptation and delimitation by East Germans currently taking place in Germany.

Notes

1. The speakers’ orientation towards ‘East’ and ‘West’ is shown in their utterances’ recipient design. As Schmitt and Keim (1995) point out, the notion of *recipient design* offers a way of grasping the interactional relevance of culture in ongoing talk. According to Sacks et al. 1978, the concept is intended to collect a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed and designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are co-participants.

2. Transcription conventions follow GAT (see Selting et al. 1998). English translations are simplified.
3. See Kallmeyer and Keim (1986) for a thorough analysis of forms and features of utterances with universal validity.
4. The fact that Western terms are never translated into their Eastern equivalents also demonstrates the dominance of the Western standard of reference over the Eastern.
5. For examples, cf. Kern (1998).
6. Cf. Schegloff (1997: 182) for an elaboration of this argument with respect to the category 'gender'.
7. Other differences have been investigated, e.g. the conversational styles of agreement/disagreement and perspectivisation (cf. Birkner and Kern (forthc.) and the use of *topoi* in job interviews (cf. Auer, Birkner and Kern 1997).
8. For details of the role play materials, see Auer (1998). Both interviewers and interviewees were role-played by West or East Germans respectively.
9. Cf. Günthner and Luckmann in this volume.
10. GU= *geschäftsführender Unternehmer* (manager in charge)
11. The list could of course be continued; see Birkner and Kern (2000) for further examples.
12. Discussions after the role-play interviews revealed that participants oriented to the presence of the group, and to a lesser degree to that of the trainer. The researcher's presence was not particularly commented on, but may also have played a part.
13. For details on these points, cf. Auer (1998).
14. "Feste Gemeinschaft, Gruppe von Menschen, die sich zu gemeinschaftlicher Tätigkeit, bes. zur soz[ialistischen] Gemeinschaftsarbeit zusammengeschlossen hat und in der sich jedes einzelne Mitglied allseitig entwickeln kann" (*Handwörterbuch der deutschen Gegenwartssprache*, 1984 edition).
15. "Kollektiv von Werktätigen, das zur Lösung gemeinsamer Aufgaben in soz[ialistischen] Betrieben aller Wirtschaftsbereiche gebildet wird" (*Handwörterbuch der deutschen Gegenwartssprache*, 1984 edition).
16. The West German term *Territorium* means 'state territory'.
17. See Auer (1998) for details.

References

- Adelswärd, V.
1988 *Styles of Success*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Linköping.
- Auer, P.
1998 "Learning how to play the game: An investigation of role-played job interviews in East Germany". *Text*, 18(1), 7–38.

- Auer, P. and Hausendorf, H.
2000 "10 Jahre Wiedervereinigung. Hauptrichtungen linguistischer Untersuchungen zum sprachlichen und gesellschaftlichen Wandel in den neuen Bundesländern". In Auer, P. and Hausendorf, H. (eds), *Kommunikation in gesellschaftlichen Umbruchsituationen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, pp. 3–20.
- Auer, P., Birkner, K., and Kern, F.
1997 "Wörter — Formeln — Argumente. Was in Bewerbungsgesprächen "Spas" macht". In Barz, I. and Fix, U. (eds), *Deutsch-deutsche Kommunikations-erfahrungen im arbeitsweltlichen Alltag*. Heidelberg: C. Winter, pp. 213–231.
- Auer, P. and Di Luzio, A. (eds)
1992 *The Contextualization of Language*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Birkner, K.
2001 *Bewerbungsgespräche mit Ost- und Westdeutschen. Eine kommunikative Gattung in Zeiten gesellschaftlichen Wandels*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Birkner, K. and Kern, F.
2000 "Impression management in East and West German job interviews". In Spencer-Oatey, H. (ed), *Culturally Speaking*. London: Continuum.
- Blommaert, J.
1991 "How much culture is there in intercultural communication?" In Verschueren, J. and Blommaert, J. (eds), *The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication*. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 13–31.
- Bourdieu, P.
1982 *Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft*. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
- Gumperz, J. (ed)
1982a *Language and Social Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gumperz, J.
1982b *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gumperz, J.
1990 "The conversational analysis of interethnic communication". In Scarcella, R.C., Andersen, E.S. and Krashen, S.D. (eds), *Developing Communicative Competence in a Second Language*. New York: Newbury House, 223–238.
- Gumperz, J.
this volume Contextualization and ideology in intercultural communication.
- Gumperz, J., Jupp, T. and Roberts, C.
1979 *Crosstalk. A Study of Cross-Cultural Communication*. Southall: National Centre for Industrial Language Training.
- Gumperz, J. and Roberts, C.
1991 "Understanding in intercultural encounters". In Verschueren, J. and Blommaert, J. (eds), *The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication*. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 51–90.
- Günthner, S.
1993 *Diskursstrategien in der interkulturellen Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

- Hinnenkamp, V.
1987 "Foreigner talk, code-switching and the concept of trouble". In Knapp, K., Enninger, W. and Knapp-Potthoff, A. (eds), *Analyzing Intercultural Communication*. Berlin: Mouton/de Gruyter, 137–180.
- Hinnenkamp, V.
1989 *Interaktionale Soziolinguistik und Interkulturelle Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Kallmeyer, W. and Keim, I.
1986 "Formulierungshinweise. Kontextualisierung und soziale Identität". *Zeitschrift für Linguistik und Literaturwissenschaft* 16(64), 98–126.
- Kern, F.
1998 "'Kultur im Gespräch' — Lebensläufe in Bewerbungsgesprächen". In Apfelbaum, B. and Müller, H. (eds), *Fremde im Gespräch. Gesprächsanalytische Untersuchungen zu Dolmetschinteraktionen, interkultureller Kommunikation und institutionalisierten Interaktionsformen*. Frankfurt: IKO, 219–240.
- Kern, F.
2000 *Kulturen der Selbstdarstellung Ost- und Westdeutsche in Bewerbungsgesprächen*. Wiesbaden: DUV.
- Liebscher, G.
1997 "Unified Germany (?): Processes of identifying, redefining and negotiating in interactions between East and West Germans". In A. Chu et al. (eds), *SABA IV. Proc. 4th Ann. Symposium about Language and Society*. =TLF 37, 77–87.
- Linde, C.
1980 "The life story: A temporarily discontinuous discourse type". In *Structural Semantics: Palo Alto, CA* (Mimeo).
- Linde, C.
1986 "Private stories in public discourse. Narrative analysis in the social sciences". *Poetics* 15, 183–202.
- Meeuwis, M.
1994 "Leniency and testiness in intercultural communication: Remarks on ideology and context in interactional sociolinguistics". *Pragmatics* 4(3), 391–408.
- Polanyi, L.
1985 "Conversational storytelling". In v. Dijk, T. (ed.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. Vol 3: Discourse and Dialogue. London: Academic Press, 183–201.
- Roberts, C. and Sarangi, S.
1993 "'Culture' revisited in intercultural communication". In Boswood, T. et al. (eds), *Perspectives on English for Professional Communication*. Hong Kong: City Polytechnic, 97–114.
- Rost-Roth, M.
1994 "Verständigungsprobleme in der interkulturellen Kommunikation". *Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik* 24(93), 9–45.

- Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. and Jefferson, G.
1978 "A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation". In Schenkein, J. (ed), *Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction*. New York: Academic Press, 7–55.
- Sarangi, S.
1994 "Accounting for mismatches in intercultural selection interviews". *Multilingua* 13(1/2), 163–194.
- Schegloff, E.
1997 "Whose text? Whose context?" *Discourse & Society* 8(2), 165–187.
- Schmitt, R. and Keim, I.
1995 "Das Problem der subsumptionslogischen Konstruktion von Interkulturalität". In Czyzewski, M. et al. (eds), *Nationale Selbst- und Fremdbilder im Gespräch*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 413–429.
- Selting, M. et al.
1998 "Gesprächsanalytisches Transkriptionssystem (GAT)." *Linguistische Berichte* 173, 91–122.
- Sharrock, W.W. and Anderson, R.J.
1980 "On the demise of the native: Some observations on and a proposal for ethnography". *Occasional Paper No 5*, Manchester University, Dept. of Sociology.
- Streeck, J.
1985 "Kulturelle Kodes und ethnische Grenzen. Drei Theorien über Fehlschläge in der interethnischen Kommunikation". In Rehbein, J. (ed), *Interkulturelle Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Narr, 103–120.
- Zimmerman, D. and Boden, D.
1991 "Structure-in-action: An introduction". In Zimmerman, D. and Boden, D. (eds), *Talk and Social Structure*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 4–21.

Cooperation, Collaboration and Pleasure in Work

Issues for intercultural communication at work

Jenny Cook-Gumperz

University of California, Santa Barbara

The objective discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and “without regard for person”... the peculiarity of modern culture and specifically of its technical and economic basis, demands this very ‘calculability of results’.

(Max Weber “Bureaucracy” from *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* pt iii in H. Gerth and C.W. Mills “From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology”, 1946: 215).

In contemporary society almost everyone has service transaction, everyday. Whatever the ultimate significance of these dealings for recipients, it is clear that how they are treated in these contexts is likely to flavor their sense of place in the wider community.

(E. Goffman “The Interaction Order” 1983: 14)

The condition of contemporary Western society is variously described by sociologists as post-industrial, post-traditional, post-modern or even high modern. All agree however that late modernity, to use Giddens’ term, has brought about fundamental shifts in the organization of economic, institutional and personal life (Giddens 1988). Globalization of social activities has made some real differences in both perceptions and practices of human relations. As a result of population movements, societies previously perceived as culturally homogeneous are coming to be seen as multicultural and pluralistic. Multiculturalism is beginning to be recognized as a permanent condition of contemporary life. This is particularly the case in complex societies where the bureaucratic organization which helped to begin the modern age has

started to exert extensive political and corporate control over ordinary lives.

In this late modern situation, work relationships are being transformed not just as a consequence of changing economic practices in a global economy dominated by the internationalization of the division of labor, but also by recent technological changes associated with computerization. These are resulting in new organizational designs of work (Zuboff 1988; Shaiken 1985). The earlier traditional view of work production was based on a Weberian framework in which abstract labor and resources were combined to produce activities resulting in calculable outcomes. The assumption was that nothing more was expected from workers but labor energy. It is within such a paradigm — viewing society as balance of conflict of interests — that intercultural communication in workplaces has mostly been addressed. If, as is now the case, contemporary workplaces are changing in both their practices and social relationships, then these changes have a relevance for how we formulate the questions of intercultural communication at work.

Recent writings on the new computer-based ways of organizing work tasks suggest that a new type of workplace is gradually emerging where work designs emphasize active worker participation in the production process through workplace teams and “quality control circles”. Discussions about the process and output of work become part of the everyday production process so that work becomes more and more a matter of interpersonal collaboration. Competence at work is an attribute to be demonstrated and communicated daily by workers to each other. It is not just assured by one time initial interview or single demonstration. Each worker must take on personal responsibility for demonstrating her/his expertise through individual effort and yet collaboration between workers must be seen to remain as an integral part of the work process (Galegher, Kraut and Egidio 1990).

In the earlier paradigm that governed work relations in the 1970's & 1980's, the assumption was that where multiculturalism exists in workplaces, conflict of interest and miscommunication are likely to occur. It was thought that programmatic changes were possible by readjusting communication strategies at the level of worker-management relations rather than in making this the personal responsibility of each worker and that more satisfactory working conditions would result from these changes (Jupp, Roberts and Cook-Gumperz 1982).

Under current conditions, however, shifts in work design now challenge workers to bring personal skills into daily use in the conduct of work tasks and

so to be accountable for all manner of aspects of tasks previously seen as irrelevant (Erikson and Vallis 1990). Thus, workplaces are seen to be governed by a new controlling metaphor of work where work becomes defined as a *pleasurable* exercise, not the painful expenditure of labor and energy (Donzelot 1991).

In sum, collaboration of workers with each other and with the (mostly) machine-guided tasks (e.g. Heath and Luff 1996) reshape the communication needs of workplaces and multiculturalism becomes cast as one aspect of the multiple perspectives that bring a complexity into work organizations. How cultural variation becomes a part of the changing definitions of work enterprise and how this is made possible by the new computer production conditions of the late modern age will be explored in this paper.

1. Goffman in the late modern age: Service encounters and the interaction order

The globalization and dislocation of experience, characteristic of the late modern age, presents a constant and growing threat to the more established community-rooted practices of traditional social organizations.

Changing social environments offer both new personal experiences and possibilities in a plurality of life worlds. Yet with these multiple choices go the attendant personal perceptions of risk, anxiety and uncertainty which characterize many contemporary social activities (Giddens 1991). Goffman's explorations of the public world of daily life has provided a new perspective on many of these concerns. In his published presidential address to the American Sociological Association, Goffman (1983) summarized his work's enterprise as focusing on the *Interaction Order* associated with different forms of social organization and groupings. Far from rejecting the other categorical orderings of society, those often referred to as macro order, in favour of studying only face to face encounters, as he has sometimes been accused of doing, he proposed that we focus upon the intersections of the interaction order with institutionally ordered social relationships. Goffman proposes that we treat the interaction order as a separate level of analysis (Knoblauch 1996, and in this volume), at which the placements of individuals as social beings described in traditional sociology as the basic statuses of gender, age grade, race and class interlock with the local character of situated interaction. This process of

interlocking can thus be studied empirically within various geographic, institutional and interpersonal environments. It is through this analytical perspective that we are able to see how the intersection of social relationships becomes a situated and embodied social order.

One critical site for such study are the service transactions characteristic of all contemporary, bureaucratic and market societies. Service encounters as Goffman (1983: 14) describes them reveal the following:

Our placement with respect to all four attributes is evident by virtue of the markers our bodies bring with them into all our social situations, no prior information about us being required. Whether we can be individually identified or not in a particular situation, we can almost always be categorically identified in one of these four ways of entrance.

These comments illustrate how the public world of interpersonal relationships that characterize the late modern society can potentially place individual participants within a social framework. While the relationships in service encounters are transitory and brief, they are nevertheless laden with information. The interaction order generated is demonstrably available to all participants and treats all as if their mere presence in the scene qualifies them for equal treatment within the public domain. Goffman's discussion of the principles of service encounters thus recasts the Weberian premise of the bureaucratic principles of calculability within a late modern world context as the principles of equality of treatment and politeness/courtesy of service delivery.

In almost all contemporary service transactions, a basic understanding seems to prevail: that all candidates for service will be treated "the same" or "equally" none being favored or disfavored over others. One doesn't need to look to democratic philosophy to account for the institutionalization of this arrangement: all things considered, this ethic provides a very effective formula for the routinization and processing of services. Goffman (1983: 12)

If we relate these Goffmanian conditions to the original Weberian formulation in the quotation above, we can see how the latter inform the former.

For example: (1) In most service encounters any person is treated according to the rule of "first come first served" that is everyone is apparently treated as "without favour as to person" (as Weber said) that is by the "objective exercise of the rule" of equality of treatment. The resulting interaction proceeds in such a way that the outcome of each service encounter can be seen as calculably reaching the same conclusion. (2) With respect to politeness everyone is dealt an equally courteous service. This politeness principle further

endorses the first, equal treatment injunction. It additionally assures as much as possible that the same courteous customer/client treatment reaches in each case a similar, “calculably” successful conclusion. Service encounters are thus archetypal situations of the post-modern world, where a large amount of social and culturally coded information must be processed by participants very rapidly, that is literally, at a glance, and where the consequence of failure to make the ‘right’ conclusions may cause disruptions in the public conduct of all participants, and thus endangers their sense of social orderliness and their perception of social space. To quote Goffman (1984: 14) again:

Whatever the ultimate significance of these dealings for recipients, it is clear that how they are treated in these contexts is likely to flavor their sense of place in the wider community.

I will illustrate these principles of service encounters by examining the workings of an American fast food restaurant, which provides some of the best organizational settings of intercultural exchanges.

2. Service encounters: Collaboration by design

In a recent ethnographic study, Robin Leidner (1993) recounts first-hand experiences of both training practices and on-line work at a site which typifies not only the design and routinization of service work but its globalization: MacDonald’s hamburgers. Fast food service as presented here has become the icon of the managed environment, where worker and customer and environment are brought together in the efficient, prompt provision of food. Leidner’s study is of interest here because it shows how the Goffmanian recast of the Weberian principles of calculability, when applied to service encounters, as “equality of treatment and courtesy” become incorporated into management principles. These principles determine the interactional strategies which animate the physical and interpersonal, managed fast food environment.

Stores are planned in such a way that on entry each customer is physically positioned to make a selection among service choices by the structural features of the building’s interior design. Furthermore, the customer and service worker meet in a scripted encounter that proceeds according to specific rules. These rules, called “steps”, are taught to all workers by the McDonald’s methods of training.

These are, in Leidner's words, the "six steps of counter service":

"Interactions with customers, we were taught, are governed by the Six Steps of Window Service: (1) greet the customer, (2) take the order, (3) assemble the order, (4) present the order, (5) receive payment, and (6) thank the customer and ask for repeat business. The videotape provided sample sentences for greeting the customers and asking for repeat business, but encouraged the window crew to vary these phrases.

According to a trainer at Hamburger University, management permits this discretion not to make the window crew's work less constraining but to minimize the customers' sense of depersonalization:

"We don't want to create the atmosphere of an assembly line," Jack says. They want the crew people to provide a varied, personable greeting — "the thing that's standard is the smile." They prefer the greetings to be varied so that, for instance, the third person in line won't get the exact same greeting that he's just heard the two people in front of him receive". (Leidner 1993: 68)

The steps control the interaction and suggest frames for an appropriate talk exchange. Making the exchange courteous and scripted provides for equal treatment for all. The steps proceed by (a) naming the interactants i.e. the customers are always "guests" (b) providing a script for the talk routine; (c) training workers on how to make the script work; (d) suggesting how individuals can vary it within allowable limits to make the situation appear "less of an assembly line" process in the words of one of the crew trainers.

It is of interest for the argument of this paper that the "six rules" for counter service are seen as being as much a central part of the process of production as are the standards for hamburger buns and packaging.

Moreover Leidner's study showed that, while the script provides restrictions on degrees of freedom in the exchange, neither the customer nor the worker seem concerned that both are brought into a controlled exchange. Workers seem to find the script useful as they do not personally feel compelled to assess the nature of the exchange. The frame they are given is also supportive and facilitates the interaction at low cost to themselves.

Leidner describes how the six steps work:

At the franchise where I worked, Charlene set limits on the variations permitted. She would not allow window workers to say "Next!" or "Is that all?" because she considered both phrases brusque and impolite. She also thought that "Can I help someone?" sounded disrespectful and insisted that workers ask, "May I help you, sir?" or "May I help you, ma'am?" She advised, "If you can't tell *what* a person is, then say. "May I help you, please?" (Leidner 1993: 138)

Yet another characteristic of the McDonald's routines is that many of the workers feel able to add a small personal touch to the discourse of the scripted exchange by varying their performance of it, that is by physical markers such as a smile, glance or eye contact, mode of delivery and tone of voice.

Again quoting Leidner:

Virtually all of the workers I interviewed said in response to a direct question that the Six Steps of Window Service, their basic routine, were effective and that they felt comfortable using them. For example, Luella replied: "Yes, they work well. You ask them and then they ask you (for what they want. You say) "Just a moment please." They do help. They wouldn't want you to say (harshly), "Just come over here. Whatchu want?" That's not very polite. This works well."

Several workers mentioned that they were able to personalize the routine, thus exercising some discretion, albeit minor. Madeline said:

I think (the routine for dealing with guests) is perfect... It's really nice. Because then you can use the six steps in your own way. Its not like you have to say, "Hi, welcome to McDonald's." You can say, "Hi, how you doing?" or "Good morning," "Good afternoon," "Good evening," things like that. But its real nice."

In contrast, Edward especially appreciated not having to make decisions: What I like most about working here is when everything is going right. Its like... in any activity, if you can hit a groove... it's a kind of high. Because you hit that groove, and you're not really having to think about it anymore, things are just happening and its going very smoothly. I think that's what I like the most. (1993: 190)

As these comments show, workers like not having to make personal judgment calls about how to behave to each individual customer. A focal issue in service work is the risk that the need to assess the customer entails for the worker. With possession of a script most situational risks are neutralized or made safe, so allowing workers to do their job by merely keeping to the script itself. The result is that the built-in politeness tokens create a completely routinized interactional environment where the exchange design assures both equal treatment for the customer and also provides for the customers managed compliance in cooperating with the worker. Workers find that politeness eases their own vulnerability to personal exposure. Thus, politeness routines solve a structural problem of service encounters by creating an interactional 'safe zone' in which worker and customer come together in a clearly defined situation with a goal (Cook-Gumperz 1991). It is this which explains their readiness to adhere to the script although it only permits minimal personalized variations.

However Leidner also points to a downside to the pleasantness of exchanges:

The problem from the workers' point of view was that the more the workers were themselves on the job and the greater their efforts to make the interactions pleasant, the more painful or infuriating it was when customers were unresponsive or mean: "I am pleased when people are responsive to my cheery greeting and feel annoyed if they don't smile or say thank you" Tracy tells me, "if a customer's nice, O.K. I smile. I don't smile unless something makes me laugh or somebody's just nice." (1993:138)

While the script creates an interpersonal communicative exchange between customer and worker within the institutionalized environment of the workplace, the exchange remains short and repetitive. Yet the politeness tokens in the script produce positive feelings which can become generalized to other work activities. For example they also seep into talk among the workers themselves who find this makes the workplace less tension-charged and more enjoyable, as shown by this comment:

In part the courtesy and cooperation that were the norm among the crew people in this MacDonald's were built into the routines they were taught. In the windows training class, new workers were told that the proper phrasing for giving an order to a grill person was, for example, "Two Big Breakfasts, please." to which the grill person would respond: "Thank you" to indicate that he had heard the message. This courteous protocol was used consistently. Also, window workers were taught that they should use any spare time to backup other workers by, for instance, assembling an order for a second worker while she set up and handled a money transaction. (Leidner 1993: 137)

The politeness of the work atmosphere is thus partly attributed by participants to the semi-scripted exchanges. Sociologists tend to take a critical approach to the routinization of service work seeing the managed environment as an example of the exercise of manipulative control which robs individuals of the chance to use initiative or express any genuine feelings (Hochschild 1983). The evidence of Leidner's study suggests that although the McDonalds operation is clearly somewhat exploitative of young workers and subject to all the constraints of a highly routinized and mechanical managed task structure, many participants see the communicative environment, established as part of the routinization, as creating a positive work context. The script does its work by solving some of the structural problems common to all service work, such as the vulnerability of repeated encounters with unknown others and the strains of the need for speed in a repetitive task within a work crew.

Leidner's fieldwork endorses the impression that work in a MacDonald's franchise appears to have a truly Goffmanian character, where in spite of routines there still exists a backstage/front stage division between the "corporate worker" in a McDonald's uniform and the private person who dons this uniform (Goffman 1957). Sometimes the two flow together as when workers comment that as off duty staff they like to "hangout with friends at work" as part of their social life. Sometimes others keep their routinized job separate from their own personal outside-work self, in which case the scripted exchanges provide a buffer zone of routinization so that the worker can practice a little "role distance" from the job and keep from getting too personally involved. In these instances politeness serves to move the activity efficiently but without the worker needing to give any especially "personal" input beyond the script. By harnessing politeness to efficiency the designed workplace makes work into a collaborative endeavor involving both customer and worker. This places the worker and customer within a common communicative space without need for any particular personal effort on the part of the workers themselves.

Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this paper, the McDonalds examples highlights the importance of communicative environments as a factor in multicultural societies. Leidner's study shows how such a scripted environment provides an ideal site to bring together a culturally diverse workforce of counter workers, crew trainers and shift manager as well as, of course, franchise owners. The scripted communicative work environment makes a good learning context for interactional exchange. As Leidner points out in commenting on the social characteristics of the shift in the franchise she studied, it could be seen as typical of urban MacDonalds and their multicultural workforce:

The store had "five salaried managers, all male, three white and two black. The owner's son, another white, also worked as a shift manager as well as crew trainers (all female; three black, one white, one Native American). During my fieldwork, two crew people, a black woman and an Asian man were promoted to the level of management" (Leidner 1993: 61).

To summarize the argument so far: the consequences of the McDonalds' study for exploration of the communicative characteristics of multicultural society are several. The focus on service exchange and its implicit communicative collaboration between customer and service worker is quite different from the older conflict of interest paradigm of labor relations. While tightly routinized

interpersonal design and scripted exchanges leave little room for difference, they make intercultural workforces easier to bring together. Although the workplace and work activity design controls action, it seems to provide a productive environment for a very limited personalizing of the script that can encourage the young workers to be involved while providing a structured and therefore safe learning environment in which the limited routines can give rise to a wider communicative culture. In fact the scripting draws attention away from cultural differences. The managed communicative environment creates an interactive space where differences become a matter of personal style not a structural feature of performance. MacDonalds provides a communicative and interactional environment where the script is laid down and the designed environment takes most of the degrees of interpersonal freedom from the communicative exchange. Yet while the actual talk becomes a routinized element in an overall interactional design, the performance of the talk exchange remains potentially variable and the communicative environment becomes interpenetrated by the politeness rituals that provide a social space for easing the tensions of highly routinized work and cultural difference.

Leidner comments that the surprise of the actual fieldwork encounters was discovering the enthusiasm that so many young workers felt for their job:

Despite the specificity of their script and the brevity of most encounters with customers, the service interactions were not all alike and were not necessarily devoid of personal involvement. For example, Steve answered the question, ‘What do you enjoy about working with the public?’ with great enthusiasm “It’s just fun!... They make my day. They really do. I mean, sometimes I can come to work like yesterday, I wasn’t really happy. I was somewhat in the middle. This guy came in, he was talking real low, and his friend said, ‘Why don’t you talk up... I told him to turn up his volume (I laugh), and he said something...and I started smiling. Ever since then, I’ve been happy...The guests out here... they’re friendly and fun. I just loved to meet them, you know? I mean, its nice working for them, its nice serving them. Some, you know well, I’d say one out of ten guests will probably try to give you a bad time. But the rest of them just make my day.”

Steve’s comments on the “fun” aspects of working with the public are echoed in these remarks by another crew worker:

“Well I enjoy working with the public ‘cause they’re fun to be with. Some of them are a trip. So I enjoy it, find it very amusing” (1993: 136)

In all the comments above from the McDonald’s fieldwork, the Goffmanian themes of avoidance of threats to self demeanor and management of risk through politeness stand out most clearly, but the theme of pleasure at work as

a realization of the new workplace and its talk also begins to emerge.

3. Service and pleasure exchanged: enthusiasm and emotional involvement within the new service environments

Pleasurable experience in work may be one of the most salient features of a new and different type of service situation in late modern societies. It is one in which the relationship between customer and service worker is not scripted nor is it constrained by many of the conventional formalities of traditional middle class service encounters. The recent shift to informality and friendliness in service encounters which take place within the designed spaces of the new boutique stores and restaurants such as those in the smart shopping malls of the United States, constitutes a site for these new pleasurable encounters (Morris 1993; Shields 1994). The new workplace encounter takes place within a designed spatial environment, albeit one less instrumentally arranged than MacDonal'd's, rather one which is heavily symbolic of the particular service being offered. Within this space as workplace, worker and customer come together for what appears to be a mutually pleasurable meeting, often laden with positive affect, carefully planned music and even with positive odors added to the scene.

A significant characteristic of these stores and other public spaces is that while for some they act as workplaces, at the same time they also present visible, publicly available, inviting, emotionally positive and cheerful environments which are demonstrably open to all for pleasurable recreation. In short, an ultimate democratic, late capitalistic experience.

Moreover, like McDonald's, the stores are part of an increasingly global network and can be found in the same forms in many urban places nationally and internationally; as such they present an instantly recognizable style and form, e.g. Laura Ashley, The Gap, Benetton.

These social spaces symbolize a potential availability of pleasurable experience both as a physically designed and as an interactional environment. While the service exchange between customer and retail worker can be limited or brief, it is often made to appear as part of a longer period of acquaintance by its informality and mutual concern for shared goals. Although worker and client/customer are not engaged in the same task, they construct a communicative exchange *as if* they were in similar positions in the encounter. Donzelot, in

his 1991 paper suggests, that the personalizing of work has become a new and much more insidious means of control in which the worker must internalize the norms of control as personal responsibility for their own performance and expertise. The external appearance of these new controls appear under the guise of personal expressions of pleasure in work, enthusiasm and commitment to the activities of the corporate workplace. Hochschild (1983) has developed somewhat similar arguments about the new “commercialized” expression of feeling within service encounters through personalized comments or public expressions of care and concern. She refers to these phenomena as expressions of the *emotional labor* that service encounters require. These are indicative of a new relationship between the server and the *served*, where the structured environment provides a symbolic context but not a direct extensive communicative framing for the service encounter. The weight of interaction rests on the contextually-created communicative exchange. Although the talk in these new situations is unscripted, it constitutes the critical part of the exchange of service. In advancing the notion of emotional labor Hochschild leans on Goffman’s concept of ceremonial labor that has to be accomplished in many public encounters where the personal self has to be brought into the encounter yet protected from any possible harm or affront. Goffman here suggests that this is achieved through a balance of deference given to and demanded from the other. At the same time both participants in an exchange are responsible for managing their own demeanor image. (Goffman 1956/67)

When the service encounter is not a scripted exchange the communicative task presents some very different possibilities.

In the following examples communicative strategies observed during fieldwork in shopping exchanges between customer and service personnel are described:

1. Making the corporate style part of the exchange

Retail personnel in the “new mall boutique” (Shields 1994) are encouraged to make up their own, idiosyncratic script as an essential part of the task of personalizing the sales exchange. By using the plural first person pronoun — the editorial “we” — personnel take on a corporate role identity and so build the corporate endeavor into their talk. For example, a salesperson at a new store selling cosmetic products when asked about other similar stores in the area says in answer to the customer query: “Yes *we* ’ve just opened in Languna Hills, its wonderful.’ Or on another occasion “I’ve been to *our store* in Newport Beach, its not nearly as lovely as this one”. In these examples the

corporate ideology becomes part of the salesperson's personal linguistic identity in that they pronominalize their relationship to the organization.

2. Expressing pleasure as a display of competence at work.

The principle of pleasure also makes the requirement to express pleasure and enthusiasm for your tasks into a necessary condition of doing the job properly (Donzelot 1991). Both customer and service worker may enter into these exchanges as in Donzelot's example of an enthusiastic discussion of new raincoats which begins between two customers and is joined in on by several store personnel who talk about the wonders of "our raincoats" compared with ones of other manufacture. The retail personnel's competence is shown by the degree of enthusiasm they display along with their explicit knowledge about raincoats.

3. Displaying positive emotionality in service exchanges.

For both parties to the exchange, the need to expose a personal self can be part of the risk that the server and, to some extent, the person being served, has to take in order to make the exchange effective. For the recipient of a service the usual contribution required is a smile or some brief exchange of pleasantries or gossip. Hochschild (1983) has suggested that the tasks of service personnel in contemporary service industries needs to be accompanied by additional expressions of positive emotion. Such expressions of positive affect within a limited communicative exchange makes the event into one of apparent personalized labor, yet one which being so ritualized, ultimately protects service personnel from further risk.

Examples of "emotional labor" can be performed in several ways;

- a. by using a formulaic expression of concern: Airline cabin staff at the end of a flight saying: "Thank you for flying with... X ...airlines.. It's been our pleasure to serve you..."
- b. Appearing to expose the personal self to customer through talk that relies on the worker's own interactional style in unscripted exchanges. "Waiter in a smart S.F restaurant: "Thank you for being such nice customers, it's been a pleasure meeting you".

In this example there is an unexpected reversal of the expected customer-waiter interaction where it would be normal for the customer to thank the waiter in some manner; here, the opposite occurs. This event acts rather like a Garfinkelian breach experiment (Garfinkel 1967).

- c. By moving from routine enquiry or politeness in a service exchange into

informal, personal talk. Such a strategy places the customer in a socially exposed position in the exchange. The service worker while offering some tokens of personalized concern, also sets up the expectation of a similar personalized exchange. For example, consider the following exchange: a middle age customer with her husband is considering buying a sweater jacket in one of the new mall boutiques, the sales person is searching through a small stock of jackets looking for the correct size and she makes conversation while doing so: "How long have you two been married...." Such unscripted talk can cause customers some surprise, yet within the overall designed symbolic environment of the new retail boutiques the unexpected and, to some, inappropriate informality becomes interpreted as part of an exchange made "in good faith". However, within this environment, cultural difference in talk and appearance becomes transformed into a matter of stylistic variety.

Significant for the issues of intercultural exchange that this paper addresses is the fact that in the settings I have described, ethnic and cultural differences in the multicultural workforce are no longer treated as innate differences but become matters of personal style. In these settings each individual worker becomes responsible for his/her own personal script and for his/her own strategies for preserving self demeanor and engaging others in the "ceremonial labor" of the service exchange. Therefore, cultural difference becomes a personal aspect of each worker's communicative resource. The unscripted communicative exchange must fit into the designed environment, which provides a situation to contextualize the talk and provide a situated frame to guide talk, inference and interpretation. The designed environment encourages the assumption of good faith on the part of both interactants to the exchange and generates an overall positive emotional and interpretive tone. In the new smart dress boutiques such as the American "Ann Taylor" stores, the informality of the customer and worker exchange constitutes part of the atmosphere of camaraderie and metaphorically suggests that both, customer and retail assistant, are "Ann Taylor women". Thus the communicative exchange confers a sense of community in conjunction with the interpretive signals given by the environmental design. Together the designed environment and the talk become one semiotic resource.

All of these features of the situated talk suggest that we have a new communicative genre developing within the service encounter. The managed yet unscripted exchanges of the new service encounters are conducted in an air

of informality, which gives the impression of “pseudo” equality or parity of concerns. The service worker appears to care personally about the customer and treats the customer as a friend, while the customer is a mostly willing and cooperative partner in these exchanges, whose enthusiasm and concern helps to create a shared common activity.

However the service exchange is only a transient collaboration with very limited goals. The rules of retail exchanges differ from those of other service encounters in that the customer need not buy, while the worker needs to sell. Neither shares the other’s perspective within the scene. There remains a power differential which makes for asymmetry. It is at this juncture that the structural problem in service encounters can be recognized and the unscripted talk can be seen as an attempt at solving this asymmetry via the new communicative genre that serves to solve these inherent problems (Günthner and Knoblauch 1995).

4. Cooperation and asymmetry at work: The structural problem of service encounters identified

If a performance is to be effective it will be likely that the extent and character of the cooperation that makes this possible will be concealed and kept secret. (E. Goffman *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. 1959: 104)

The suggestion made in *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, above is reiterated in Goffman’s 1983 paper, in which he again reminds us that service relations are a matter of tacit cooperation between asymmetries that must remain unmarked. In spite of the collaboration of the new workplace activities, there remains an essential tension or asymmetry between worker and customer/client or between workers in different positions and contexts of work. The social work that the participants must do requires them to cooperate in concealing the existence of this asymmetry for the purpose of preserved order. When differentials are recognized, repair work has to be part of the encounter. Goffman suggests that to preserve the interaction order persons need to act *as if* the principle of symmetry was in place. The person receiving the service must assume that:

“the notion of equality or fair treatment must not be understood simplistically. One can hardly say that some sort of objectively based equal treatment ever occurs, except where the server is eliminated and a dispensing machine is

employed instead. One can only say that participant's settled sense of equal treatment is not disturbed by what occurs.... [all] of this is evident from what has been said about the acceptable ways in which a personal relationship can be given recognition in service encounters. (Goffman 1983: 15)

Most studies of collaborative practical activity assume that proximity in collaborative endeavors between workers in similar task environments must indicate that participants share a point of view or have common goals. The challenge of contemporary detailed studies of practical activity and of mutual collaboration in workplaces has been to describe the details of human interactions in the high risk environments where it can be acknowledged that asymmetry exists (Heath 1993) and where the usual social science assumption of cognitive consensus as the basis for any analysis of social ordering can be challenged. (Heath and Luff 1996; Goodwin and Goodwin 1996).

Given this asymmetry, how does work get done? How does the worker provide for or become co-opted into the concealment of the difference in goals and aims of the apparent mutually beneficial collaboration that most contemporary service encounters are communicatively constructed to appear to be? The need to cooperate in the concealment of asymmetry between workers' tasks and customers' positions suggests that we must reconsider the notion of emotional labor, politeness routines and unscripted personalized informal talk of service encounters as all having a purpose more serious than has previously been realized. While these were previously regarded as formulaic exchanges, separate from the business of the main activity, we can now see that they are an essential part of the cooperation between interactants and the concealment of the basic asymmetry and risk that exists as part of any service exchange (Cook-Gumperz 1991).

5. Cooperation, concealment and exchange: Getting service work done

I have suggested that the need for workers and customers/clients, the servers and the served, to collaborate in performance that gets certain tasks accomplished requires that both come together and cooperate in concealing the continued existence of their essentially different points of view within the task. Thus, the talk that is part of the exchange in its continued repeated existence within similar environments can provide the conditions for a com-

municative genre to develop as outlined by Günthner and Luckmann (this volume).

In the following briefly sketched accounts of work activities based on my own fieldwork, I am going to give some examples of worker training in a bank. The studies are made on-site during training in work settings, because at the level of actual practice, practitioners reveal to each other what it is that has to be done to make a particular activity effective.

6. Recognizing the risk of perspectival asymmetry

In a training course for potential bank clerks in a community college, students from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds are being prepared to qualify for initial entry into a bank training program. The tutor is an African-American ex-bank personnel executive, and drawing on his own personal experience, he gives the students a commentary on the official training procedures. He instructs the students that they must be careful and correct in all entries into the daily tally sheet that each bank clerk must keep in an American bank. Any errors result in the whole counter ‘work team’ being kept late to search for the cause of the error. However, as the students practice their “counter routine” he stops them and explains that the routine talk and pleasantries that pass between customer and clerk must not overshadow the real work of being correct in all entries. He says “Once the customer walks away...you (the clerk) are responsible”. He goes on to point out that the emphasis of bank training will be to encourage the clerk to achieve customer rapport in order to sell additional bank services. Recognition of the responsibility of the worker to be accurate, which each worker shares with the team, will not be a direct focus of training. The asymmetry between customer and service worker will be a tacit but unmentioned part of the training.

7. Creating the goodwill to work within a visible space: Exchanges within the person-machine collaboration

While the first example was from an initial training session where trainees are using calculators to complete transactions, at the real bank site workers must learn to manage both the bank’s computer system and their relations with the

customer. During the triangulation that occurs between the worker, the computer and the customer, the worker must find time both to be accurate and to promote other financial services that the bank offers. The initial need is for the bank clerk to establish the tone of the exchange through routine politeness and talk. These exchanges are subject to monitoring by branch assessors and typically need to be conducted in less than two minutes.

Clerk: "How are you today" Customer: "Fine thanks. I'd like to..."

In a routine person to person banking transaction the customer is always greeted by a brief routine politeness formula such as "How are you today" and by eye contact between clerk and customer. The exchange is usually made one or even twice and can include some pleasantries about potentially personal affairs; these are unscripted and may involve recall of previous visits to the same bank clerk. At the same time as the customer is describing the business of the day, the clerk must enter any new deposits or check balances into the computer by making a slight movement away from centering on a direct body alignment with the customer. The exchange of politeness routines allows the counter clerk to establish cordial relations with the customer which will allow for the subsequent shift of concentration away from the interaction in order to achieve both time and space to get the job of computer entry and till work done. While keys for each transaction are clearly marked on the computer, correct figure entry and correct tallies for all transactions are essential. Any mistakes will result in all the counter crew staying late to find errors, as we described above, and the final daily tally is made collaboratively by exchanging each other's debit and credit slips for the day's transactions. Additionally counter clerks can potentially be observed by the shift counter supervisor who notices if any transactions take more than a "normative time" for the number of items being accomplished. During any review of bank procedures these transactions will be timed by assessors from the regional operations centers. In addition counter clerks must sell bank financial services and a part of their job performance rating depends on their selling success. An interactional key to the entire endeavor is that the successful job performance relies on the cooperation of the customer in the concealment of the two or so minutes that the clerk looks away to do the essential core transaction of recording and calculating. That is, the customer at this stage, during the time that the clerk focuses her/his attentions on the computer and its output, must not feel that the clerk has withdrawn from the relationship and is ignoring them. If the cus-

customer appears to feel this and to react to this withdrawal of attention, it will appear as if a truly personal service has not been delivered. In this situation the customer and the bank sales manager have a different set of expectations and demands that impinge on the activities of the clerk. Yet the clerk must subsume all these demands into an appearance of delivering an easy, polite exchange, equal for each person who comes to be served, and while the exchange must begin politely and pleasantly, it must be fast, accurate and end minimally with a quick expression of completion: "Thanks..." "You're welcome". Together both customer and clerk must conspire to conceal the demands of the daily practice of counter work.

8. Conclusion. The changing service encounter: Implications for intercultural communication

Each individual is responsible for the demeanor of him(her)self and the deference image of others, so that for a complete (person) to be expressed, individuals must hold hands in a chain of ceremony, each giving deferentially with proper demeanor to the one of the right what will be received deferentially from the one on the left. While it may be true that the individual has a unique self, all his/her own, evidence of this possession is thoroughly a product of joint ceremonial labor, the part expressed through the individual's demeanor being no more significant than the part conveyed by others through their deferential behavior toward him/her.
(Goffman 1956/1967: 84–5)

Goffman's suggestion above is that the balance of deference and demeanor must appear to be preserved to protect the fragility of the self and to keep the interaction order in good standing. There are several ways, as this paper has pointed out, that service encounters enable service personnel and customers to perform this act for each other. One, the designed work environment provides an interactional situation which channels the action into certain paths. The designed environment, as a built spatial context, situates interactional and conversational exchanges of service work. The designed environment is more than a backdrop to the action, it is an essential semiotic resource that provides an interpretive frame which contextualizes the talk.

Secondly, the creation of a more or less tight script for many service exchanges provides an interactional space where those who follow the simple rules can interact without incurring risks to their person. Service personnel

maintain their demeanor in daily encounters where contexts and goals have to be negotiated through verbal interaction, but where the script and the interactional environment are controlled options and are minimized. Perhaps this is why a young and multicultural workforce are among the more successful members of the McDonald's teams because very minor variations to the set script can bring them an opportunity to feel creative and successful.

Thirdly, the idea of *emotional labor*, first suggested by Hochschild, goes beyond Goffman's original notion of joint ceremonial labor because it evokes more than a mutual arrangement of damage control for self-image. Emotional labor requires that the worker must take risks in putting into the service relationship a small part of the self as a personal offering in expectations of a reciprocal offering from the other participant in the exchange. Service encounters thus reflect the typical late modern problem of how to protect the self in a world where self projection and communication must take place, yet where shared background assumptions, which in traditional societies framed such exchanges, can no longer be taken for granted. Contrary to what has been argued in earlier writings on intercultural communication and illustrated in the Crosstalk film (Gumperz, Jupp and Roberts 1979), with its "Bank Scene" in which customer and clerk become visibly annoyed over a minor miscommunication, the contemporary social situation leaves less room for expressions of annoyance because the possibility always exists that any negative emotion can throw the interaction order out of balance and result in lack of social control or lead to even more dire social consequences.

It can be shown that the actual practice of emotional labor as a communicative genre gives rise to strategies that avoid both structural problems and the inherent dangers in the interactional exchanges of service situations. Pleasure in work and worker accountability makes pluralism of cultural expression into a matter of personal style that can be harnessed to job performance and occupational position. By looking at the talk as a scripted or partly scripted exchange, the work situation is made safe for a limited expression of cultural difference, because some conditions for mutual understanding are already built into the designed and scripted environment. The conduct of the encounter is taken out of the realm of personal feeling order. We show that, in order to maintain this balance, the requirements of the situation override evidence of cultural difference. Through such features as accent, choices of politeness and address formulae, language choices come to be seen as matters of personal style not as direct reflections of deeply held beliefs and values, rather how

these verbal signs are interpreted is a matter of the designed environmental context which, as we have argued above, can be seen as providing a positive framing to most interpretive constructions.

Thus the ethnicity or cultural difference of the worker and the customers are stylistic features of the interactional exchange but not structural of the determinants of the outcome. For example, when a young assistant in a smart, shoe store addresses the middle aged customer by her first name as she enters the store, asks how she is and whether she wants to try on any shoes, the European response would be amazement followed most likely by withdrawal from the scene as soon as possible, perhaps accompanied by a brief comment such as a hastily muttered "No thank you". Such informality and failure to use correct address terms for a mature woman could only be seen as a breach and as a personal affront, threatening the interaction order. The appropriate Californian response is quite different. The customer responds to the address form by commenting on this season's new styles. Thus treating the informality of address form within the context of the store and its wares as nothing more than an initial greeting routine, based on the fact that since she has an account, the store assistant could easily access her first name on the computer. If this address routine took place outside of the store, then the customer could likely regard a similar exchange as a breach of appropriate conduct.

This paper has attempted to illustrate how the apparent positive image and lack of conflict that has become the dominant concern of late modern society, requires a great deal of work on the part of participants. Since by its very nature this work must remain concealed, the cooperative social actions that constitute it may go unrecognized. In the traditional conflict model of social relations, issues of social exchange were brought into the open and made available for repair. However the managed, designed environment leaves the interpersonal interaction subject to control by forces that, while they appear visible and overt, are actually managed outside of the local situation. The participants remain unaware of the extent and nature of this control. Breakdown when it occurs therefore becomes far more serious, partly because it erupts unexpectedly. Intercultural differences exist as unmarked parts of managed, interpersonal exchanges and it is not until breakdown occurs that cultural differences are regarded as having any special significance. Perhaps it is not a mere coincidence that in the 19th century, at the beginning of the modern age, machines were attacked by workers fearful of losing control of their production capabilities. Now, in the late modern age,

service establishments marked as cheerful, managed environments can in extreme circumstances become the sites of violence to the person. Yet when this happens it is not an expression of class conflict but a dangerous outburst of personal frustration.

References

- Cook-Gumperz, J.
 1991 “‘Now you have a nice day’: the serious business of service work”. Paper given at the RATP conference *A quoi servent les usagers? la modernisation du secteur public et la relation de service*. Paris.
- Donzelot, J.
 1991 “Pleasure in work”. Trans. by C. Gordon in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in governmentality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Erikson, K., Vallis, S.
 1990 *The Nature of Work: Sociological Perspectives*. American Sociological Association presentational series. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Galegher, J., Kraut, R. and Egido, C.
 1990 *Intellectual Teamwork: Social and technological foundations of cooperative work*. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale.
- Garfinkel, H.
 1967 *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. New York: Prentice Hall.
- Giddens, A.
 1988 *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford Ca.: Stanford University Press.
 1991 *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. Stanford Ca.: Stanford University Press.
- Goffman, E.
 1956/1967 “The Nature of Deference and Demeanor”, *American Anthropologist* vol. 58: 473–503. Reprinted in *Interaction Ritual: Essays in face-to-face behavior*. New York: Pantheon Books.
 1957 *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Anchor Doubleday Books.
 1983 “The Interaction Order”. *American Sociological Review*, vol.48: 1–17.
- Goodwin, C. and Goodwin M.H.
 1996 *Professional Vision in Cognition and Communicative at Work*. Y. Engestrom and D. Middleton (eds). New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gumperz, J.J., Jupp, T., and Roberts, C.
 1979 *Cross-Talk: A study of cross-cultural communication*. London: National center for Industrial Language Training in association with the BBC London.
- Günthner, S., and Knoblauch, H.
 1995 “Culturally patterned speaking practices — the analysis of communicative

- genres". *Pragmatics* 5 (1): 1–32.
- Heath, C., and Luff, P.
1996 "Crisis and Control: work in the London Underground". In Y. Engestrom and D. Middleton (eds), *Cognition and Communication at Work*. New York/ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heath, C.
1993. *Animate Readings: Selective renditions of stories in an international news agency* (manuscript).
- Hochschild, A.
1983 *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jupp, T., Roberts, C. and Cook-Gumperz, J.
1982 "Language and disadvantage: The hidden process." In J.J. Gumperz (ed.), *Language and Social Identity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Knoblauch, H.
1996 *Erving Goffman: Interaktion und Geschlecht*. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag.
- Leidner, R.
1993 *Fast Food, Fast talk: Service work and the routinization of everyday life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Morris, M.
1993 *Things to do with Shopping Centres in the Cultural Studies Reader*. Ed. Simon During. London/ New York: Routledge.
- Shaiken, H.
1985 *Work Transformed: Work and automation in the age of the computer*. New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston.
- Shields, R.
1994 *Life Style Shopping*. London/ New York: Routledge.
- Weber, M.
1946 *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology*. Selected and translated by H. Gerth and CW. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Zuboff, S.
1988 *In the Age of the Smart Machine: The future of work and power*. New York: Basic Books.

The Making of a Witness

On the beheading of rabbits

Marco Jacquemet

Barnard College, Columbia University

This chapter explores narrative performances in a cross-cultural, institutional environment. My data come from a controversial criminal trial that took place in Naples, Italy, between 1983 and 1986. Narrative performances in institutional settings constitute one of the most efficient instruments for the construction of dominant representations of the social order.

1. Narrative performances: Claiming truth-building legitimacy through storytelling

If we assume that the capacity of discourse to denote and to represent the social world is fundamentally implicated in relations of domination, we must then concede that discourse practices control the institutional process of government. Discourse practices rationalize decisions fitting the needs of the dominant groups and authenticate the legitimacy of these decisions through representations of the social order as “natural” (Voloshinov 1973[1929]; Bourdieu 1977a; Fowler 1985; Woolard 1989; Gal 1989). These representations in fact do not necessarily depict the world, rather they dictate the world, being the product of tactics of social interactions and strategies of social asymmetries. Thus, the basic mechanism in governmentality (Foucault 1990[1978]) is not an ideal truth, but rather a representational one based on hegemony over communicative processes in the public context of institutional interactions.

Among such discourse practices, narrative performances in bureaucratic settings constitute one of the more efficient instruments for the construction of dominant representations of the social order. These performances are social practices entrusted with the double task of producing representations of the social world in accord with a given ideology and of persuading others to comply with these representations (Bauman and Briggs 1990). The main thrust of such narrative performances consists of three parts: the decontextualization of an event from its occurrence in a particular space and time, its entextualization into a discourse with a more controllable set of truth-values, and the recontextualization of this discourse within a communicative frame set up to legitimize it.

This legitimacy is socially constructed: narrative performances are negotiated processes where all participants play an active role in the shaping of the internal structure of the story and its development. As is now quite clear, audiences are shaped by discourse in accordance with the differential involvement of members in what is said and enacted, while any specific audience interactively prompts the performer to follow a particular narrative instead of another, to skip uninteresting (to the audience) details, and to indulge in likeable motives (C. Goodwin 1981; M. Goodwin 1990; Haviland 1986; Bauman and Briggs 1990; Kuipers 1990). A narrative performance, i.e. a "story," is thus an interactively negotiated and managed discourse which uses the resources available in its relevant sociopolitical environment (be this a council meeting, a talk show, or a courtroom trial).

If we look at courtroom environments, we find that witnesses' performances are joint productions achieved through multi-party interactions focussed, in the Anglo-American system, on the witness/counsel relationship or, in the Continental system, on witness/judge. In this paper I will analyze the narrative strategies deployed in the Italian prosecution system by documenting the cross-cultural witness/judge relationship and the impact that a new kind of government witness had on the structure of courtroom testimony in criminal trials. I will first discuss the nature and dynamics of the courtroom communication within the Italian legal system and the cross-cultural role played by government witnesses in its proceedings. I will then introduce a particular courtroom event in which a government witness' testimony and participants' responses were contextualized through strikingly out-of-place narrative details, the relevance of which was authenticated by the presiding judge. The conclusion will explore the role that explicit contextualization

techniques play in the construction of an authoritative discourse in a cross-cultural environment.

2. The cross-cultural nature of the judge/pentito relationship

Until October 25, 1989, the legal system in force in Italy was an inquisitorial system based on penal codes enacted in 1930 under Mussolini. For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to note that it differed mainly from the Anglo-American adversarial system in that in questioning a defendant or a witness, both the prosecutor and the defense counsel had to rely on the presiding judge who, in the role of sole interrogator, related and reformulated all questions to the person on the stand. As a result of this mediation, Italian legal proceedings greatly reflected the judge's personal agreement or disagreement with the arguments on the floor. Proceedings were much more dependent on the judge's communicative resources and on his own understandings and determinations of the social interaction taking place in the courtroom than they are in an adversarial system.

Under this inquisitorial system, intrinsically biased against the defense, prosecution and defense struggled for the floor (and the record) through the intercession of the presiding judge. This struggle was acted out through a relentless communicative skirmish in which both parties tried to gain the bigger portion of these highly regulated proceedings. When the two parties were represented only by courtroom professionals (i.e. judges, attorneys, and clerks), the struggle was conducted in an orderly and regulated manner. After all, these insiders were from the same social class, and their common understanding of social and legal rules made it possible to run the legal discourse as a smooth routine.

In 1985, this interactional routine underwent a radical transformation. In that year and for the first time in its recent struggle against organized crime, the Justice Department introduced into the courtroom a new kind of government witness, the *pentiti di camorra*. This label was applied to individuals who had allegedly belonged to the Camorra (the term used to designate the Neapolitan community involved in illegal activities) but had decided to "repent." American equivalents are Mafia "turncoats" or "stoolies." Pentiti were jailed individuals who had allegedly broken the Camorra's code of silence (*omertà*), turned against their former friends and collaborated with the Justice

Department. Through their collaboration the Justice Department was able to prosecute, among others, the *Nuova Camorra Organizzata* (“Newly Organized Camorra,” or NCO, a cartel of different gangs from rural areas around Naples — for a discussion of this cartel see Jacquemet 1992 and 1996), to arrest more than a thousand people on a charge of belonging to this organization, and to set up the biggest trial ever of a single criminal organization in the Neapolitan area (it came to be known as the *maxi-processo* or “maxi-trial”).

Since the prosecution’s case rested mainly on pentiti’s confessions, they were called government witnesses. Once the trial began, it immediately became apparent that the credibility of these witnesses would depend on their ability to be perceived as “truthful.” In order to convey credibility in the courtroom, the pentiti had to perform a *true discourse*, or a discourse producing a truth meaning-effect. That is, a discourse contextualized in a way that “rang true.”

But in constructing their discourse and establishing their credibility, the pentiti, impaired by their limited command of potential stylistic resources, relied on the communicative strategies acquired over the years in the streets of the tightly-knit community of the Neapolitan underclass. This community, as in many other closed networks, depended greatly on situational context and implicit, local understanding among speakers to produce an elliptical and formulaic “street” behavior and set clear boundaries between who was “in” and who was “out.” In their everyday life the pentiti had utilized these local communicative patterns, and they brought them into the courtroom. In an unfamiliar role and under the stress of being scrutinized, they executed these communicative strategies based on local communal values, such as the code of honor, the importance of having/giving respect, the dependence upon patronage ties. In a community where a man of honor was a man of truth, they claimed that their word — and communicative behavior — was a word of honor. In this way they intended to have the Justice Department acknowledge their respectability and thus their credibility.

Consequently, the pentiti clashed with the environment of courtroom interactions: their presence in the courtroom broke the judicial routine, and everybody, especially the presiding judge, had to readjust and renegotiate his role (since all pentiti and all judges were male, I use the masculine form to refer to them). A curious “pas-de-deux” developed between the judge and the pentito, in which the latter’s credibility depended on how a particular judge perceived him, on his ability to negotiate the judge’s expectations of his

performance, and on the degree of rapport between individual judges and individual pentiti. These unique interactions between judge and pentito produced a new kind of legal proceeding, in which different sets of truth “made sense” only within the framework of this rapport.

The judges involved in the initial stages of the 1983–1985 maxi-trial (preliminary hearings and first set of trials), under pressure from an Italian government which feared that Southern Italy was on the verge of social chaos, placed excessive reliance on the pentiti’s communicative style and allowed considerable latitude in their testimony, accepting their claims uncritically. These judges and the pentiti were able to renegotiate a common ground on which government witnesses could comfortably perform. As a result, pentiti’s testimonies were relaxed and smooth and pentiti were thus more likely to be perceived as reliable witnesses. This perception was then translated into various judgments that construed the pentiti’s testimonies as truthful, even in the absence of corroborating evidence.

In cases when the standard short form of the questioning routine proved insufficient to secure a strong case against a particular defendant, they allowed the pentito to provide more information about the defendant under examination. This was usually done if the pentito was hesitant in his answers or when the presiding judge wanted a better case against a particular defendant. In such a case the pentito was given the floor so that he could provide whatever information he had about the defendant. This yielding of the floor to the pentito could already be seen as an instance of voluntary, partial transfer from the judge to the pentito of control over evidence presentation, which in itself boosted the pentito’s claim to be reliable and credible.

Most of the time, particularly at the beginning of the trial when the pentito was eager to establish his credibility vis-a-vis the presiding judge and the multifaceted audience of the court, he seized the opportunity of being allowed an unobstructed narration to try to establish himself as a “man of knowledge” the first step in being recognized as a “man of truth.” This impression management had to be constructed in the course of a performance which would convert the courtroom ritual into a discourse of knowledge. The courtroom, normally conceived as the locus of a democratic ritual of openness and publicity, became, during the unobstructed narration of the pentito, a territory raided by the disruptive communicative mechanisms of organized crime that had produced the trial in the first place.

To explore in detail how the pentito’s credibility was achieved, let us now

turn to one of the most effective courtroom raiders involved in the maxi-trial against the NCO: Giovanni Pandico.

3. From underwriter to godfather

Giovanni Pandico's decision to become a pentito came as a big surprise to law-enforcement agencies. Although he had spent the last 12 years in jail, they never suspected him of belonging to this particular criminal organization. Pandico was born on June 24, 1944, in Sassari, Sardinia, where his father was a lieutenant in the artillery. Leaving Sassari shortly after the war, his mother brought him to Liveri, another small town on the outskirts of Naples where his Greek grandfather had first taken up residence.¹ At 15 he was already familiar with Juvenile Hall, having spent some years inside the Filangieri, the Neapolitan juvenile detention center. At 19, arrested for attempting to bomb the barracks of the Carabinieri (the Italian military police), he met Raffaele Cutolo, the undisputed leader of the NCO, in the prison of Poggioreale. According to his later testimony in the courtroom, he was initiated into the Camorra by Cutolo on December 8, 1963, by the classical ritual of the blood baptism: a small cut on the base of the index finger of the right hand. Later, in a letter to his godfather, Pandico remembered the event as: "our first camorristic dawn with all its delicate splendor."²

Acquitted of the bombing charges, he survived on odd, marginal jobs, and was occasionally sent back to Poggioreale for minor offenses. During one of these stays, he was reunited with Giorgio Della Pietra, another native of Liveri. After spending some time with Della Pietra, Pandico came to the conclusion that his own father and mother, together with the mayor of Liveri, Nicola Nappi, and his brother Salvatore, had conspired to have Giorgio Della Pietra convicted of the murder of another brother of the mayor of Liveri, Michele Nappi, on April 3, 1956. Pandico decided to take revenge on the people responsible for having his friend locked up in Poggioreale for 24 years. Two days after he was released from Poggioreale — on June 18, 1970 — he went to City Hall in Liveri intending to kill the mayor, Nicola Nappi. In his rampage through the corridors of City Hall, he first killed Giuseppe Gaetano, a city supervisor who tried to block him, then he shot and killed Guido Adrianopoli, a clerk who had appeared in the corridor to see what was going on, and finally he shot and wounded the mayor and an employee, Pasquale

Scola, who had both tried to find some protection under the mayor's desk. Arrested the following day, he confessed that he wanted to get even with the mayor, the mayor's brother Salvatore, and his own father and mother, who had testified for the prosecution in the criminal trial against his friend Giorgio Della Pietra. However, he later changed his mind and declared that Mayor Nappi had put a contract on Giuseppe Gaetano, who was blackmailing the mayor, and arranged to be wounded in order to confuse the reconstruction of the crime and distance himself from the murder. After a psychiatric examination which cleared Pandico to stand trial — he was defined as a “pure paranoid individual, able however to understand perfectly well his own situation” (*La Voce* in CDR 1985: 88) — the judges of the Corte d'Assise in Naples convicted him of multiple murder, multiple attempted murder, and lying with malice. He was sentenced to a 30-year term of imprisonment.

In jail he nurtured his knowledge by voraciously reading up written documents, particularly legal papers, and little by little he started helping other inmates in their dealings with the law. In the illiterate world of the jail, Pandico had a prodigious “career:” transferred to the prison of Porto Azzurro, he was hired by the prison administration to help other inmates write personal letters, appeals to judges, and other bureaucratic papers. Later, after a new transfer, he arrived at Ascoli Piceno, the kingdom of Cutolo, and after a few months, he became the personal writer of the NCO leader. He was moved to a cell next to Cutolo, and he followed the boss in his daily routine: he made coffee for him, he served him, but above all he wrote letters on Cutolo's behalf, using a stamp with Cutolo's signature. This close contact with the boss boosted Pandico's respect inside the organization, and he greatly appreciated this new status of *scrivano* (“writer”) for the Camorra. Pandico was now a “man of honor,” but he was increasingly at odds with the younger, more violent and determined new members of the NCO who did not like his arrogance and his desire to always be “in the know.” Only Cutolo's vested interest prevented any violence against Pandico. However, when, following the scandal of the Cirillo Affair,³ the presiding judge of the Republic, Sandro Pertini, personally intervened to have Cutolo transferred to the high-security prison on the island of Asinara, Sardinia, Pandico realized that the young leaders of the NCO would never pay him the respect that he wanted. After unsuccessfully trying to improve his position by meeting with the leadership of the NCO, he asked the jail administration to put him in isolation. Two days later, on March 21, 1983, he summoned the warden and announced his desire

to defect from the NCO. A week later a helicopter took him to the Neapolitan Operative Center of the Carabinieri, where prosecuting judges Di Pietro and Di Persia were waiting for him. After more than a week of interrogation and three hundred pages of deposition, Pandico was certified as a “true” pentito. His deposition was released to the press two months later, at the time of the crackdown against the NCO, as the most significant evidence behind the arrest of more than two hundred individuals.

Among the names he had indicated to the police was that of his former cellmate, Alfredo Guarneri. What follows is Pandico’s recollection of Guarneri’s role within the NCO.

4. The myth of the rabbits

This story was told by Pandico on April 11, 1985, during his second day on the witness stand, at a time when he was trying to secure the trust of the judges; he had already started to gain this trust the day before through his impressive recollection of minute details. After his first testimony, he had come to be perceived as the most reliable of the pentiti by both the press and law-enforcement agencies. The Italian newspapers, comparing his memory to that of a super-computer, were scrambling to cover and verify the new wealth of information that he had produced “ex-novo” in the courtroom — all of this despite Pandico’s two previous convictions for perjury and a recent statement by the prosecuting magistrate from the Justice Department of Salerno (a town 30 miles from Naples, where Pandico had been called as a witness in a separate trial) that Pandico’s repentance was “one of his many opportunities to show off his histrionic personality made up of mystifications, ample but void gestures, bickering accusations and lies” (*La Voce* in CDR 1985: 88).

On this second day of Pandico’s testimony, the judges in Naples were trying to decide if he was really the godfather that he claimed to be, and they gave him the floor in an attempt to elicit more information about his role within the NCO. Pandico promptly grabbed the occasion for a performance that lasted the entire day (and continued for the following four days). During an unchallenged recollection of events, Pandico reminisced about the actions of one of his own camorristic “godsons,” Alfredo Guarneri. Pandico testified that during the time when he and Guarneri shared the same cell, the latter asked to be admitted into the NCO. According to pentiti, prior to an incorpora-

tion, the adept has to prove his courage by executing a violent action. Thus, as part of his “education,” Guarnieri had to pass some qualifying exams, including the *sgarro* (a test of personal violence needed by any new member in order to become a full camorrista). Pandico agreed to this initiation by providing Guarnieri with the first test: the murder of Pandico’s own sister-in-law, guilty of not having respected the family’s honor after the death of her husband. Pandico wanted the woman killed and beheaded, and the severed head placed on the grave of his late brother. Moreover, the head had to be cut off in a precise way, almost surgically, in order to create a cover-up. Guarnieri, however, did not possess the necessary skill for the operation. Pandico decided to teach him how to decapitate a person by showing him how to behead rabbits.

(PAN IId85–C)

- | | |
|---|---|
| 01 <i>quindi al guantieri lo misi a conoscenza,</i> | 01 then I put Guarnieri in the know |
| 02 <i>di tanta particolare,</i> | 02 on all the details |
| 03 <i>sino al punto tale che/ (..)</i> | 03 up to the point that |
| 04 <i>quando il nello mi parlò/</i> | 04 when Nello talked to me |
| 05 <i>di questa mia cognata,</i> | 05 about this sister-in-law of mine |
| 06 <i>parlò con una certa::delicatezza::(...)</i> | 06 he spoke with a kind of discretion |
| 07 <i>si tratteneva:: (..)</i> | 07 he restrained himself, |
| 08 <i>cercava di essere generico,</i> | 08 he tried to be general, |
| 09 <i>di essere:: -marginale</i> | 09 to be vague, |
| 10 <i>dissi nello parlami chiaro ma</i> | 10 I said to him: “Nello talk straight but |
| 11 <i>di che si tratta bruno/</i> | 11 what is all this about, Bruno? |
| 12 <i>è inutile che facimme sti barzellette,</i> | 12 We don’t have to fool ourselves.” |
| 13 <i>disse guarda la tua cognata,</i> | 13 He said: “look, your sister-in-law |
| 14 <i>si mantiene a uno</i> | 14 is keeping a guy |
| 15 <i>cossi cossi cossi cossi\ (...)</i> | 15 like this and this and this” |
| 16 <i>e ADDIRITTURA</i> | 16 but EVEN MORE |
| 17 <i>addirittura mi pare che mi ^disse,</i> | 17 even more, I think, he told me |
| 18 <i>che era uno della nuova famiglia/(...)</i> | 18 that this guy was from the Nuova
Famiglia |
| 19 <i>dissi vabbene chiuso.</i> | 19 I said: “all right, that’s it.” |
| 20 <i>(...) ora che accade</i> | 20 ...now, what happened |
| 21 <i>in questo frattempo, (...)</i> | 21 during this time |
| 22 <i>tornando dalla-</i> | 22 I was coming back from |
| 23 <i>perché ora passiamo/</i> | 23 because now we are |
| 24 <i>nel mese di -settembre — ottobre</i> | 24 in September, October, |
| 25 <i>quando il nello mi dice questo, (...)</i> | 25 when Nello told me this,... |
| 26 <i>mi accerto col telegramma che la</i> | 26 I make sure by telegram that the |
| <i>cognata sta</i> | sister-in-law is |
| 27 <i>mia cognata stava a via del convento/</i> | 27 my sister-in-law still lived on Convento
Street |

- 28 *incomincio a chiamare a guarnieri* 28 I start calling Guarnieri
 29 *e gli dico guarda,* 29 and I say to him: look,
 30 *poiché tu ci tieni tanto,* 30 seeing that you are eager to do it,
 31 *poiché tu devi dare le dovute prove* 31 seeing that you must pass the right tests,
 32 *poiché tu hai detto/* 32 seeing that you said
 33 *sei pronto e dare la vita e tutto,* 33 that you are ready to give your life
 and all
 34 *tu/ devi fare questi favori. (...)* 34 you must do these favors....
 35 *la prima cosa/* 35 first thing,
 36 *devi staccare la testa alla mia cognata,* 36 you must cut off my sister-in-law's
 head
 37 *e la devi mettere/* 37 and you must put it
 38 *sulla fossa del cimitero dove sta* 38 on the grave of the cemetery where
seppellito
 39 *mio fratello.* 39 my brother is buried."
 40 *dissi però non devi staccare la testa* 40 I said: "but you shouldn't cut off
così her head like this
 41 *(..) no,* 41 ...right,
 42 *la devi staccare in ~ modo* 42 you must cut it off in such a way
 43 *che devi creare un depistamento che/* 43 that you create a cover-up so that
 44 *quando sarà trovata devono* 44 when it is found they must
 45 *non devono capire se è stata fatta/* 45 they must not know whether it was
 done
 46 *da uno che ne capiva in medicina o me-* 46 by somebody who knows surgery
 47 *un fatto del genere.* 47 or something like that."
 48 *e quello mi dice ma come faccio io,* 48 And he says to me: "but how can I
 do it?"
 49 *e dissi vabbene,* 49 and I said: "all right,"
 50 *e comprai in quel periodo,* 50 and I then bought
 51 *che si può anche constatare,* 51 this is certifiable
 52 *perché un pò* 52 because a little
 53 *un giorno/* 53 one day
 54 *il maresciallo mi canzonò un pò/* 54 the warrant-officer teased me a little
 55 *su questi conigli,* 55 about these rabbits
 56 *comprai eeu::* 56 I bought, uh,
 57 *si può dire un quindici venti conigli,* 57 we can say fifteen, twenty rabbits,
 58 *e ogni qualvolta gli facevo vedere,* 58 and every so often I showed him
 59 *con la lametta/* 59 with a blade,
 60 *con un temperino/* 60 with a pocket-knife
 61 *vedi che la testa va tagliata così/* 61 "See, the head must be cut off like this
 62 *vabbene (...)* 62 all right...
 63 *lu- fammi vedere,* 63 no, show me."
 64 *comprai un altro pò di-* 64 I bought some more rabbits:
 65 *no/ vai male,* 65 "No, you're doing it wrong.
 66 *a questo punto devi fare così/* 66 Here, you must do like this

67 <i>non devi stracciare devi-</i>	67 you must not tear it apart, you must—
68 <i>(..) dopo che il guarnieri fu all'altezza,</i>	68 ...when Guarnieri was ready
69 <i>di capire che le teste dei conigli eué/</i>	69 to understand that the heads of the rabbits
70 <i>dissi allora lo puoi fare.</i>	70 I said to him: "Now you can do it."

This story of beheaded rabbits is an Ionesco-like piece reminiscent of the Theater of the Absurd, a moral tale of honor and shame, a narrative recollection of a rite of passage. The story has three levels of organization and will be analyzed accordingly. I will first reconstruct the semio-narrative structure of the story, then discuss the semantic level, built around the anthropologically relevant meanings of the different figures employed by Pandico in the narration, and finally examine the syntactic, surface level of the discourse.

4.1 *Story*

On the semio-narrative level we are in the presence of a folktale, the textual movement of which matches the formal structure of one of the many folktales analyzed by Propp (1968). As in all tales, there is here a sender (Pandico) — both at the existential level (providing tasks) as well as at the cognitive level (providing skills) — assisted by an informer charged with setting the story in motion (Nello). There is the young and inexperienced novice — or hero — who has to undergo his rite of passage and his trial (Guarnieri). The Anti-hero that he has to fight in this initiation is pictured as an opponent of the sender (the sister-in-law). Her death, which is both a punishment and a sacrifice, allows the hero to obtain an object of use (the severed head) which will in turn allow him to be conjoined with his final object of value (membership in the NCO). Finally, the hero has to go through different trials in order to accomplish his task: in this case he must acquire the (surgical) competence necessary for the beheading. Structurally the story can be divided into three parts: a *preface* (the acquisition of the knowledge about the sister-in-law's behavior), the main *narrative program* (the decision to invest the hero with the mission to kill), and the *secondary* narrative program (the acquisition of competence).

As in all tales, the time of the preface is uncertain, some time ago in the penitentiary of Pianosa. Pandico's narrative role too is uncertain, but can be loosely glossed into a "godfather" role in charge of the incorporation of his young "godson" into the NCO. He must therefore provide the latter with a necessary understanding of the NCO's dealings (lines 1–2: "then I put Guarnieri

in the know on all the details”) in order to fit him into its structure. By a surprising series of chance events, Pandico had found out through Bruno Nello — a member of the NCO already found guilty of belonging to this organization — that his sister-in-law was not respecting the honor of her late husband, Pandico’s brother. Gathering this intelligence had not been easy. As we learn at the beginning of the text, Nello had been a recalcitrant source. He had tried to be vague, to be diplomatic, but when Pandico resorted to appealing to their common membership, he finally broke down and shared his news with him. The sister-in-law, far from mourning her loss and maintaining her honor and that of her husband’s family (thus Pandico’s), had taken a new lover. Moreover, she not only supported him (line 14: “(she) is keeping a guy like this and this and this”), but she had found him in the enemy camp (line 18: “this guy was from the Nuova Famiglia”). Pandico decided to redeem his family’s honor.

The main narrative program is then put in motion. First, he had to double check the location of the woman. He obtained this information by sending a telegram to her last address (line 26–27: “I make sure by telegram that the sister-in-law is/ my sister-in-law still lived on Convent Street”). A somewhat rational explanation for this action was that if she had moved to a new residence the telegram would have been immediately returned to the “sender” (this constitutes a new narrative position within the colony of Pandico’s selves, the cognitive sender of mythical proportions becoming here a practical sender for mailing purposes). Thus Pandico would have been notified in the fastest possible way of any change. But Pandico could easily have asked the well-informed Nello for his sister-in-law’s address. Pandico in fact did not talk of sending *a* determinate telegram, i.e. a wire message, but he talked of *the* telegram in general, i.e. the means of communication (line 26: “I make sure by telegram that the sister-in-law is”). By calling upon the semantic implications of this means of communication instead of a specific message, Pandico wanted to convey an impression of *reliability* (telegrams usually arrive at their destination), *urgency* (they arrive quickly) *accountability* (somewhere there is a written record of this message), and *luxury* (telegrams are expensive). These traits of modernity associated with telegrams are signs of a 19th-century world of wire services, pneumatic mail, and railway transportation that is still very much part of the contemporary landscape of Italian prisoners. Denied access to the telephone, or a fax machine, the telegram was and still is the fastest means of communication at their everyday disposal and the most expensive. By foregrounding his use of it, Pandico was showing off both his wealth as a

camorra boss and his dedication to solving questions of honor.

After sending the telegram, Pandico was finally ready to turn his attention to Guarnieri. He summoned him and asked Guarnieri to perform some actions on behalf of the NCO through a reported dialogue performed as an incantation:

“seeing that you are eager to do it, seeing that you must pass the right tests, seeing that you said that you are ready to give your life and all, you must do these favors.” (lines 30–34)

The orders were delivered in a three-part sequence which clearly signaled the sacred character of this investiture. This reconstructed ceremony had two modalities: the *will* of the hero to become a member and his *duty* as a NCO member to promptly execute orders from his superiors. The first sentence focuses on the hero’s will: Guarnieri wanted to become a member above all else. The second stressed the duty that this incorporation entails: Guarnieri had to pass the necessary tests. Finally, the third sentence returned to the hero’s commitment, reminding the new adept that he had given his word, up to the point of dying and giving everything for the organization.

The reference to the possible death of the initiate prompted the order to kill the sister-in-law. Pandico never mentioned the murder of his sister-in-law. From the very beginning it was something else: a ritual of purification, a detailed ceremony of bodily separation, a head-hunting quest for a trophy (line 36: “you must cut off my sister-in-law’s head”). Pandico, taking the murder for granted — an unfaithful woman must be killed, *ça va de soi* — specifically asked for the beheading of his sister-in-law. However, the decapitation alone would not satisfy Pandico’s thirst for revenge: the decapitated head had to be placed on the tombstone of Pandico’s brother, thus transforming it into a funerary urn (lines 37–39).⁴ The decapitation had an additional twist: Guarnieri was to create a diversion (line 43: “create a cover-up”) by severing the head as if it were a skillful exercise in anatomy. In this way, when the head was eventually discovered on the grave, “they” would be dumbfounded and misled into thinking that a surgeon was responsible for the murder (lines 43–47). Pandico left the reference about these “they” rather ambiguous. Obviously it is not the local community familiar with the immoral behavior of the sister-in-law. It is not the people from the Nuova Famiglia, friends of the lovers, because they too would know — and likely approve — his handling of the matter. “They” must be, in a tradition dating back to the unification of Italy, the Italian state and its law-enforcement agencies. By making this

murder not only a ritual of revenge and purification and a test for Guarnieri's rite of passage, but also a highly skilled anatomical *tour de force*, Pandico wanted to display both his ability to handle from afar a family's business and his camorristic skills in escaping and deceiving the Justice Department. This latter point was crucial to his testimony, because, as we know, prior to his repentance Pandico was not known as a camorrista, even less as a reputed godfather. In his testimony he insisted that this was due to his ability to hide his identity from the Justice Department by skillful tactics of concealment; tactics that he now took great care to reveal to the judges.

Regarding Guarnieri, Pandico represented him as a tough youngster not worried about the killing of the sister-in-law or even the decapitation; only doubtful of his ability to execute the deed in the skillful manner desired by Pandico. The magnanimous and understanding godfather acknowledged the limitations of his new pupil and decided to give him some lessons in anatomy.

In the final movement of the story (lines 50–70), Pandico wore the clothes of the cognitive sender in charge of the transmission of knowledge to the new adept. He set up a program to teach Guarnieri how to sever a head, prompting the introduction of the rabbits into his narration. In this sequence he also introduced a new actor, the warrant-officer (line 54), who serves as a personal deixis, evoked in the discourse to provide additional veridical elements to Pandico's story. By calling upon a governmental officer as witness, Pandico tried to inject his narration with truth-building strategies. He also produced a sympathetic character, one who can have fun with Pandico's rabbits. What is the reason for this mockery? Is it because of the number of the rabbits or perhaps because of the symbolic value of rabbit meat in prison? By drawing upon our understanding of the sequentiality of the narration, we can see that Pandico was anticipating the surprise of his audience. He prepared them for the revelation about the rabbits by offering a character supposed to represent the responses of the judicial body, which, as we will see, were precisely made up of a mixture of surprise, mockery, and disbelief.

Humans and rabbits belong, after all, to the same animal kingdom; they have almost the same anatomical structure. As soon as the warrant-officer turned his bemused eyes away, Pandico gave Guarnieri some lessons in anatomy and surgery. Using a blade (line 59), or at other times a pocket knife (line 60), Pandico led Guarnieri in the only test, if we decide to believe Pandico's story, that the latter would actually perform for the NCO: the decapitation of some twenty rabbits. Pandico showed him how to do it and

then monitored his somewhat inept novice, guiding him with directives (line 63: “no — show me.”). He had to buy more rabbits, their number again left unspecified (line 64: “I bought some more rabbits”), and repeatedly scolded his pupil until Guarnieri finally acquired the necessary skills. At this point Pandico happily gave Guarnieri his final blessing (line 70: “I said to him: ‘you can do it’”). Pandico’s role in this sequence is symmetrical to the formulaic middle passage in which he directed Guarnieri’s intention toward a NCO-related commitment. Once again the sender’s position marked by the investment of the initiate’s duty: it is only by obeying Pandico’s orders that Guarnieri can really be admitted into the NCO, and it is through his ability to direct Guarnieri that Pandico asserts his position as sender/godfather.

4.2 *Symbols*

At the semantic level, Pandico plays with a sophisticated system of cultural values which are supposed to mark his social identity as a “man of honor.” The first semantic element concerns the position of his sister-in-law. By forgetting to mourn her dead husband and to maintain her honor, she had violated the cultural rules of the Neapolitan community which proscribe the establishment of a new relationship shortly after the death of one’s husband. Pandico captures the social violations of this affair in broad strokes: the husband’s memory betrayed, the family’s and the group’s honor sullied, residential rules broken, the relationship role of marital support reversed. Moreover, not only had she taken and kept a new lover, but she was supporting a member of the enemy group. Her accomplice in the violation of Pandico’s family honor belonged to the rival cartel of the Nuova Famiglia. This multiplies the violation: not only was Pandico’s family honor threatened, but the entire honor of the NCO was at stake. The adultery implicated the entire social group since “blood spreads” (literally, *la sanguinità cammina*), that is, an offense to one’s honor becomes an offense to the corporate group as a whole (Di Bella 1987). A violation of the code of honor stains the kindred for generations to come, since the offense affects the good name of the group. Only a decisive act — usually an act of violence — can restore the group’s honor. Such an act is obviously the only road available to Pandico.

Second, the seducer came from an enemy tribe with which the NCO was in open warfare and with which the NCO did not want obligations. Pandico’s response inversely substantiates Lévi-Strauss’ (1969) claim that the exchange

of women seals an alliance between conflicting groups. By her behavior, the sister-in-law had initiated an alliance that Pandico and the NCO could not possibly accept.

A third noteworthy element is Pandico's characterization of the disruptive power of the sister-in-law within the kinship structure of the Mediterranean family. The break in social harmony was caused by the shameless behavior of an individual who was already in the weakest structural position within the kinship system of Mediterranean Europe and customarily a target and scapegoat for family tension (Campbell 1964; Hammel 1979).

Pandico selects for himself the role of depositary of the *doxa*, and he portrays himself as the keeper of the kinship rules of his group including the rule of the "marital replacement" between self and brother in the event of the latter's death (Hammel 1979). He had to take care of his sister-in-law, even if this meant harsh punishment for her violation of the cultural rules regarding proper and modest behavior. Something had to be done to re-establish the moral order within Pandico's community, and he had to take care of it (line 19: "I said: 'all right, that's it.'").

However, if Pandico operates with kinship rules in mind, on the other hand Guarnieri's social position can be seen to fall within the anthropological framework of social networks and patronage practices. He must do some "favors" (line 34). This highly loaded word immediately evokes a world of patrons and clients based upon the establishment of social relationships through the generalized exchange of prestations (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Blok 1975). In appealing to this cultural pattern, Pandico is cueing his performance as the undisputed godfather, able to command respect by his position as a power-broker. Pandico never discussed the other "favors." In his testimony he ended his performance after the first favor, a very powerful one indeed: the beheading of his sister-in-law. This favor provided an ideal combination of interests: in Pandico's logic the re-establishment of his honor would strengthen the social structure of the NCO, an enemy would suffer from this action, the in-law would be punished, an enemy would be left without companionship, and through this brutal act everybody who needed to know would know that the NCO was still responsible for maintaining the moral order of the community. An organization which creates spiritual affinal ties among its members is here, according to Pandico, engaged in sanctioning against improper behavior at the individual level.

4.3 *Speech Markers*

At the syntactic level, some of Pandico's linguistic moves are crucial in discussing the construction of "reality" within the courtroom. Throughout the text, the impression of referentiality is achieved by the use of a battery of different tools: reported speech, spatial and temporal deicticals, directives, vague qualifiers, and tensive aspects.

Reported speech. In studies of legal communication, reported speech has been viewed until recently as a functional mechanism used to highlight the story and hold listeners' attention through a shifting of perspective (O'Barr and Conley 1985). Reported speech seems, however, to have a much more significant role in institutional settings than simple entertainment: it constructs a possible world where the proposition being reported or its implicated meaning holds truth value. The quotation enacts a persona who acts and speaks in a credible manner to produce authority and legitimacy for the speaker, who in turn can claim the veridical value of the proposition. The reported situation thus produces an effect of referentiality, which brings people to assume that the entire story actually took place in the "real world." In the courtroom performances of the pentiti, code choice operates simultaneously as an indexical marker of social identity and as a particular symbolic representation of the referential world.

In his rendition of the event, Pandico evokes different personae to mark different sub-texts. First there is Pandico as "the godfather," both discussing with Nello and giving orders to Guarnieri. Then there is Pandico as Nello, the "certified" camorrista, the voice of the community, sharing the gossip necessary for maintaining social control. Finally, there is Pandico as Guarnieri, called upon to show his perplexity at the mission.

Pandico's reporting of his own speech is used as a way to segment the story. He uses it to introduce the evidence (line 10: "I said to him: 'Nello talk straight but'"), to close this preface (line 19: "I said: 'all right, that's it.'"), to introduce Guarnieri's responsibilities (line 29: "and I say to him: look,"), to guide Guarnieri (line 40: "I said: 'but you shouldn't cut off the head carelessly'"), to mark Guarnieri's incompetence in fully executing his order, opening the additional program of the acquisition of the competence (line 49: "and I said: 'all right'") and finally to close the event (line 70: "I said to him: 'Now you can do it.'"). Note also the role of the adverb *vabbene*, "all right", as a left-bracket delimiter for segmentary purposes. We find it both in the closing

of the preface (line 19) as well as in the closing of the main sequence (line 49).

Moreover, the three voices of the reported speech are rendered in the “restricted code” of the Neapolitan lower classes. In two instances Pandico resorts to code-switching to report his own speech. This happens in the sequence in which Pandico is probing a somewhat reluctant Nello. As he reports their exchange, Pandico switches to the Neapolitan dialect (line 12: “we don’t have to fool ourselves”). This makes Nello break down and share his news with Pandico. This kind of code-switching move gives an impression of referentiality, helping Pandico in his construction of reliable testimony and adding a touch of the “real world” to it. However, this transition from regional Italian to dialect is not solely played at the level of the propositional content of the sentence. Pandico is also reconstructing the interactional relationship between himself and Nello as two closed social actors. By resorting to code-switching, Pandico is signaling to his audience that Nello and he belong to the same criminal community. Since Nello had already been certified as a camorrista, this alleged relationship with Pandico affirms his own involvement in the organization.

4.3.1 *Spatial and temporal deixis*

The main portion of the story (lines 20–49) — marked by the undefined present “zero-time” of the story — is anchored through two forms of deixis: a temporal one (line 24: “in September, October”) is followed immediately by a spatial deixis providing the address of the sister-in-law (line 27). These deictical positions are strategically deployed to give the referential impression of reality, but at the same time are left as undefined as possible. The month is unclear, September or October, and the residence marker, “Convento Street,” is given as a relative indicator without a civic number or even the name of a town. Through the manner of their disclosure, Pandico is nevertheless able to establish a cognitive relationship with his audience, despite the fuzzy empirical reality of these indicators. Everybody can relate to two existing months and an address which is likely to exist in almost all Italian cities. Then, instead of clearly providing a geographical marker for the location of the graveyard (lines 38–39), Pandico gives its position in relation to a dependent factor: the presence of Pandico’s brother in it. Pandico again pursues a tactic of volunteering information which can not be validated by itself, but requires additional information (in this case identification of the town where the brother was buried).

4.3.2 *Directives*

The entire text is full of the imperative tense. In his ritual of initiation, Pandico guides Guarnieri by using directives. The main sequence of the planned murder and the secondary sequence of the rabbits are entirely marked by the imperative of duty. Particularly in the last sequence (lines 50–70), Pandico’s role as the godfather is highlighted by the prolific use of directives (seven in the last eight lines). This overabundance is symmetrical to the formulaic main program about Guarnieri’s assignment, composed of eight directives of which six are instances of “must” (lines 28–47). By resorting to the imperative tense, Pandico is again signaling his role as a powerful godfather, respected and obeyed.

4.3.3 *Referential vagueness*

Throughout the text Pandico resorts to unspecified spatial and temporal deixis, but this vagueness is also found in numerous other details. For instance, all the players’ names, except those of the three camorristi (P, G, N), are left unspecified: the sister-in-law, the lover, the warrant-officer, and the mysterious characters who have to be misled are not identified as people with real names, who could eventually be called upon to testify. The sequence about the rabbits is also characterized by a marked vagueness. The rabbits are first referred to with a demonstrative adjective (line 55: “about these rabbits”). This vagueness is then fully deployed in line 56: first he uses an elongated segment (“I bought uh”), then he hedges (line 57: “we can say”), and finally he gives an unspecified number, “fifteen, twenty rabbits.” Here the vagueness is somewhat attenuated by the combination of elongation of the phoneme and the hedge, which gives the impression of a witness trying to remember, and maybe silently counting, the exact number of rabbits. Later again, when he has to buy some more rabbits, this quantity is left wholly unspecified (line 64: “I bought some more rabbits”), marking a clear pattern of vagueness which matches Pandico’s attempt to leave the entire episode as unspecified as possible, for fear of stringent cross-examination by the defense.

4.3.4 *Tensive sequences*

In perhaps his most skillful move as a performer, Pandico creates, throughout the entire text, moments of narrative tension designed to intensify audience reception. For instance, in his own reported speech in which he addresses Guarnieri for the first time, Pandico delivers a three-part formulaic sequence

(lines 30–33: “seeing that (etc.)”). Pandico’s voice falls in a sing-song delivery that clearly tries to match the incantatory tone of a ritual. Later on, Pandico’s attempt to create a narrative intensification is particularly palpable in the “training” sequence. The organizational structuring of these twelve lines (50–62) is achieved through a suspenseful mechanism of disclosure and retraction. First he declares that he was actively involved in the training (line 50: “and I then bought”), then he stops, leaving the sentence incomplete in order to introduce, for the judge’s sake, an element of truthfulness by directly stating that he can document his assertion (line 51: “this is certifiable”). Again he interrupts himself to introduce a new actor (the warrant-officer) to provide referentiality for the topic (line 55: “about these rabbits”). Finally he manages to give a full sentence, in which the object of value is lexicalized in the twenty or so rabbits (lines 57–58: “I bought, uh, we can say a fifteen, twenty rabbits”). The creation of narrative suspense is achieved through the interruption and reversal of the synchronic deployment of the narration. Like a beaver busily putting logs in a river stream, Pandico is placing tensive breaks and gaps in the syntactical flow, creating a build-up of tension which he can then release, like the breaking of a dam, by reverting to a smooth, sequential narrative style.

5. Truth and fiction

In the introduction we looked at performances as social practices entrusted with the double task of producing representations of the social world in accord with a given ideology and of persuading others to comply with these representations. To do so, such narrative performances decontextualize an event from its occurrence in a particular space and time and entextualize it in new surroundings within a more controllable set of truth-values. By extracting a discourse from particular social events and exploring its relationship to, and its utility within, an institutional setting, these performances provide a communicative frame for the allocation of truth-building legitimacy.

Pandico, however, went even further. In this performance, constructed through a bundle of semiotic strategies (from the semio-narrative structuring of the story to the discourse moves employed at the surface level), he was able to recycle one of the most recurrent folk motifs of Southern Italian folklore: the beheading as punishment for adultery, incest or seduction (the first evidence of this motif is found in the 15th-century Italian novella; see Rotunda

1973). In constructing a complex built around an incredible number of folk themes — adultery, violation of taboo, honor and deception, animal abuse — Pandico not only decontextualizes an event out of the penitentiary world, but also directly taps into the collective imagination of sedimented folklore to provide the framework. At the same time, Pandico is able to tell a folktale without arousing any suspicion from courtroom participants: he makes the connection between his story and this very ancient folk motif inconspicuous by skillfully injecting many aspects of modern life into it. This allows the folktale's recontextualization into national culture to be viewed as contemporary and accurate.

6. Commentaries on the myth

The immediate response to Pandico's story was quite subdued, both inside the courtroom and outside, in the media and public opinion. Pandico was at the time perceived as one of the most reliable witnesses at the disposal of the Justice Department, an impression he reinforced while on the stand through his interaction with the judge. This story came to be viewed more as true evidence of the backward and animalistic practices of an extremely bloody local culture than as the courtroom rendition of a well-known tale of honor and betrayal.

While the bench refrained from directly assessing the story, the defense tried to find its internal inconsistencies and weakness. However, cross-examination by the defense did not focus on the alleged betrayal, on the identity of the lover, on the role played by the informer Bruno Nello, or on any other details of the main story. Instead it almost exclusively focussed on the rabbits. The social imagination of the courtroom participants had in fact been excited by the role played in the story by these animals.

Moreover, the presence in the story of the rabbits was perceived as a vulnerable spot, in theory easily verified through a check of prison regulations regarding meat purchases. Nothing however came easily in this courtroom. The initial enquiry revolved around the pure referentiality of the vital status of the rabbits: a lawyer wanted to know if they were delivered alive or dead.

01	JP1	<i>allora/</i>	01	JP1	then,
02		<i>mi diceva:: un avvocato,</i>	02		a lawyer asked me-
03		<i>voleva sapere se i conigli/</i>	03		he wanted to know if the rabbits,
04		<i>che lei portava in carcere</i>	04		that you'd delivered in prison
05		<i>che faceva vedere al Guarnieri/</i>	05		that you used with Guarnieri
06		<i>e- e- indicando come si faceva</i>	06		to let him know how to do
07		<i>a tagliare la testa eccetera/</i>	07		to sever the head and so on,
08		<i>se erano vivi o morti.</i>	08		If they were alive or dead.
09	Pan	<i>morti,</i>	09	Pan	dead
010		<i>vivi non li davano.=</i>	10		it was impossible to get them alive
011	JP1	<i>= vabbene.</i>	11	JP1	all right

The judge is relaying an attorney's question about whether the rabbits were dead or alive at the time of the delivery. This somewhat neutral question is seized upon by the judge as a good opportunity to go through the main points of the story in a matter-of-fact tone, thus giving it official backing and clearly signaling his alignment with the witness. When Pandico certifies the d.o.a. character of the animals, the judge quickly (see the latching on line 11) produces an evaluative third move, casting a positive light on Pandico's conduct.

The defense then moved on to question the nature of the deliveries. A different defense attorney, one of the most prestigious *principi del foro* (or prince of the courtroom), quickly moved into a more antagonistic stance vis-a-vis the prosecution and the judge:

01	JP1	<i>prego/</i>	01	JP1	go ahead counsel
02		<i>mi faccia la domanda avvocato=.</i>	02		what's your question?
03	Avv	<i>poiché l'imputato ha detto=</i>	03	Law	since the defendant (Pan) said
04	JP1	<i>= no no/</i>	04	JP1	no, no
05		<i>solo la domanda.</i>	05		just the question,
06		<i>perché oramai sappiamo tutti/</i>	06		by now we all know
07		<i>che cosa ha detto, avvocato.</i>	07		what he said, counsel.
08	Avv	<i>poiché l'imputato ha detto/</i>	08	Law	since the defendant said
09		<i>che i conigli li riceveva morti/</i>	09		that he got the rabbits dead
010	JP1	<i>= eh.</i>	010	JP1	right
011	Avv	<i>= in quali condizioni li riceveva/</i>	011	Law	in what condition did he get
					them
012		<i>e come li riceveva</i>	012		and how did he get them,
013		<i>che cosa faceva per poter avere</i>	013		what did he do to get
014		<i>questi conigli. =</i>	014		these rabbits,
015	JP1	<i>=come faceva ad ottenere i</i>	015	JP1	How did you get the rabbits?
		<i>conigli?</i>			
016	Pan	<i>beh/</i>	016	Pan	well,

017	<i>ad ottenere i conigli/</i>	017	to get the rabbits
018	<i>si faceva una ~ domandina</i>	018	one had to file a small request
019	<i>il direttore mi diceva di si::</i>	019	the director had to approve it
020	<i>poi li incartavano nella certa oleata::</i>	020	then they wrapped them in wax paper,
021	<i>poi ci mettevano un'altra [carta intorno]</i>	021	then they put them in a paper bag...
022	JP1 <i>[basta basta]</i>	022	JP1 all right, all right,
023	<i>vabbene.</i>	023	That's enough.
024	Pan <i>eh eh</i>	024	Pan ah ah (laughs)

The evidence that we are in the presence of a more antagonistic confrontation is provided early on by the communicative behavior of the judge. When the defense opens by trying to incorporate Pandico's speech into his own question, the judge promptly cuts him off (line 4), afraid that the defense's attempt to reinterpret the pentito's words could cast potentially damaging light on that testimony. This defense attorney, however, is not easily intimidated and challenges the judge's intervention by repeating his initial turn in its entirety (lines 8–9), enquiring about the “condition” of the rabbits at the time of the delivery (“condition” here referring to whether the dead rabbits were chopped or whole — a significant issue for the defense) and the means of delivery (lines 11–12).

Although the judge elects to let the attorney's challenge go unnoticed, barely acknowledging the repetition with a disgruntled interjection (line 10), his way of getting even is to edit this compound question and to relay to the pentito a question which avoids the issue of how the rabbits were prepared by the butcher. Instead he asks Pandico about the means of delivery, which the latter is quite able to address. Pandico even exploits this opportunity in order to recite — in a sing-song intonation heavy with sarcasm — all the different phases of this operation down to the double wrapping (lines 16–22, note the use of lengthened vowels to carry the prosodic contour). The judge is quick to respond to Pandico's sarcasm and to declare the answer sufficiently exhaustive. A relaxed Pandico can then burst into laughter to show his ability to withstand cross-examination.

The condition of the rabbits at the time of delivery (chopped or whole) was one of the few points that could be disputed in order to attack the pentito. If the rabbits had been supplied in small pieces, Pandico could not have demonstrated his skill as a “surgeon.” The defense explored this possibility in all its detail. A third lawyer again attempted to get the judge to put this

question to the pentito. His strategy was to compare Pandico's knowledge of prison food preparation with that of the defendants. According to the defendants, the rabbits were in fact delivered chopped into small pieces. The lawyer asked the judge to confront the pentito with this contrasting piece of evidence:

01	JP1	<i>allora avvocato dieci/ prego.</i>	01	JP1	then, counsel Dieci, go ahead
02	Avv	<i>per la gabbia diciotto/</i>	02	Law	on behalf of the defendants in cage 18
03	JP1	<i>sì sì</i>	03	JP1	all right
04	Avv	<i>francisi ed [altri]</i>	04	Law	Francisi and company
05	JP1	<i>[vabbè]ne=</i>	05	JP1	all right
6	Avv	<i>=che io assisto, uhm</i>	06	Law	whom I represent, well,
7		<i>In sostituzione degli avvocati assenti=</i>	07		replacing their absent lawyers
8	JP1	<i>=e peccio ho chiesto a lei.</i>	08	JP1	that's why I gave you the floor
9	Avv	<i>Vorrei sapere da pandico/</i>	09	Law	I would like to know from pandico
10		<i>giacché la volta scorsa/</i>	10		since yesterday
11		<i>ci raccontò che in cella/</i>	11		he told us that in jail
12		<i>dava lezioni di chirurgia,</i>	12		he used to give surgery lessons
13		<i>è vero?</i>	13		right?
14		<i>sui conigli per poter poi/</i>	14		practising on rabbits in order to
15		<i>eseguire fuori</i>	15		do it later outside prison
16		<i>ai detenuti della gabbia diciotto risulta/</i>	16		According to the defendants in cage 18
17		<i>che i :conigli non venivano/</i>	17		the rabbits were not
18		<i>dati/</i>	18		given whole
19		<i>ai detenuti- inTERI</i>	19		to the prisoners
20		<i>per poterli este- poter-</i>	20		so that they could, they could
21		<i>poter fare l'autopsia,</i>	21		be used for their autopsies
22		<i>venivano dati tagliati/</i>	22		they were given chopped,
23		<i>a pezzi/</i>	23		in small pieces,
24		<i>e senza testa,</i>	24		and headless
25		<i>vorrei chiedere al pandico/</i>	25		Now I'd like to ask Pandico
26		<i>è esatto oppure non è esatto?</i>	26		is this correct or incorrect?
27	JP1	<i>ha sentito pandico/</i>	27	JP1	did you hear, Pandico?
28		<i>di che si tratta,</i>	28		the matter is-,
29		<i>dice che i conigli/</i>	29		he says that the rabbits
30		<i>non le venivano dati interi=</i>	30		weren't given whole
31	Pan	<i>=non è vero,</i>	31	Pan	that's not true
32		<i>si può guardare dai registri/=</i>	32		you can check the prison records
33	JP1	<i>=eh/</i>	33	JP1	all right,
34		<i>ma senza testa?= =</i>	34		but also headless?

35	Pan	= <i>no no anzi il coniglio resta sospetto!</i>	35	Pan	no, no, a headless rabbit is suspect
36		<i>quando uno lo compra senza testa=</i>	36		when you buy it without a head
37	JPl	- <i>eh può essere gatto. -</i>	37	JPl	right, it could even be a cat
38	Pan	- <i>non è mai accaduta u-na cosa genere=</i>	38	Pan	such a thing never happened
39	Avv	= <i>non ho sentito</i>	39	Law	I did not hear
40	PM1	= <i>il coniglio senza testa è sospetto=</i>	40	PM1	a headless rabbit is suspect
41	JPl	= <i>è sospetto è=</i>	41	JPl	it's suspect
42	PM1	= <i>potrebbe essere anche gatto o peggio.</i>	42	PM1	it could be a cat or even worse
43		(...)	43		(...)
44	JPl	<i>allora,</i>	44	JPl	then,
45		<i>ma erano già spaccati/</i>	45		but they were already broken,
46		<i>erano già::=</i>	46		were they-
47	Pan	<i>se uno ne compra mettiamo un quarto/</i>	47	Pan	if you buy let's say a quarter
48		<i>Ne portano un quarto,</i>	48		they bring a quarter (of rabbit)
49		<i>ma se uno compra un coniglio intero interi/</i>	49		but if you buy a whole rabbit
50		<i>(...) potete guardare dalle richieste/</i>	50		(...) you could check the orders
51		<i>del carcere. =</i>	51		from prison
52	Avv	= <i>non veniva dato in pezzi? =</i>	52	Law	the rabbit wasn't given in pieces?
53	PM1	= <i>no intero.=</i>	53	PM1	no, whole.
54	Pan	= <i>no. no.=</i>	54	Pan	no, no
55	JPl	= <i>vabbene=</i>	55	JPl	all right
56		(...)	56		(...)
57	Avv	<i>vabbé</i>	57	Law	well,
58		<i>e::é/ questo-</i>	58		this, this
59		<i>questo lo possiamo anche accertare,</i>	59		this can be easily verified,
60		<i>eventualmente.</i>	60		if necessary

Pandico's previous sarcasm is here matched by the attorney's irony, one of the few forms of commentary available to the defense. Pandico's instructions for Guarneri are here labelled "surgery lessons" (line 12) and "autopsies" (line 21), a highly sarcastic comment comparing Pandico's educational background to that of a surgeon.

Then, mounting an attack, the defense clearly states that, according to other defendants, the rabbits were supplied chopped in pieces and headless,

denying the possibility that they could be used as anatomical models. The judge must relay the disputed fact to Pandico, but this time he prefaces it with a clear form of address (line 27), a metalinguistic evaluation (line 28), and reported speech (line 29). By foregrounding the question in such an explicit way (compare line 15 of the previous case), the judge warns Pandico about the treacherousness of this line of questioning and the importance of directly refuting it. Pandico promptly does so (line 31), appealing once again to the prison records as a source of authenticity (see line 51 of the main story). When the judge, dissatisfied with Pandico's formulaic denial, presses on, Pandico volunteers a new rationale: a headless rabbit is suspect (lines 35–36). This explanation is immediately picked up by the judge, who accepts it at face value and offers the additional explanation that without the presence of the head, cat meat could be substituted for rabbit (line 37).

When a somewhat surprised defense asks for a repetition of Pandico's answer, a well-timed prosecutorial collective is immediately built around this new development of the story: the answer is thus collectively produced by the judge and the prosecuting magistrate (PM1), until then unusually quiet. Pandico's characterization of the headless rabbit as "suspect" is repeated by the prosecuting magistrate (line 40) and immediately after by the judge (line 41). Then the judge's contribution of the cat meat scenario is recycled by the prosecutor — it could be cat or "even worse" (line 42, where this "worse" in the context of Italian urban legends can only be interpreted as a reference to a rat).

To conclude, the judge once again returns to the problem of a chopped animal. Pandico initially makes a distinction between ordering a portion of rabbit or a whole one, then goes on to state that in the latter case the rabbit comes unchopped, backing this claim with a predictable appeal to the prison records (line 50). A somewhat subdued defense, weakened by this prosecutorial show of support for the pentito, feebly recycles his question about the "chopped rabbits" which again is met with a barrage of denials: first the prosecuting magistrate denies it (line 53), then Pandico (line 54), and finally all this is approved by the judge who quickly moves to end the questioning (line 55). After a long pause the defense attorney can only reply from an even weaker position that the prison deliveries can easily be checked (lines 57–60). To my knowledge such a check never occurred and Pandico's extravagant story was finally laid to rest. The voice of a locally constituted judicial collective spoke and its truth was entered into the legal record.

7. Contextualization and cross-cultural legitimacy

Communicative contexts are not only dictated by the physical or social environment of everyday life but emerge in negotiations centered around the criteria necessary to define the context of reference. This ongoing contextualization process can be discerned by attending to linguistic cues (known in the literature as contextualization cues; see Gumperz 1982) that signal which features of the settings are to be used by interactants to produce interpretive frameworks, what the activity is, and how content must be understood. When all participants understand and attend to the relevant cues, interpretation is taken for granted and goes unnoticed. When, however, they are not shared — for instance in cross-cultural encounters or when a clear power differential among participants prevents the establishment of shared knowledge — communication becomes more problematic.

This article shows that when such interpretations are constructed in a cross-cultural environment (the national culture of the justices and the local knowledge of the government witnesses), participants achieve legitimacy for problematic representations through control of the contextualization strategies necessary to produce veridical discourses. Among these strategies, I have pointed out the narrative ability to decontextualize from a referential universe the features deemed vital for the success of the dominant agenda, to entextualize them into a new performance, and to recontextualize this performance in accordance with a dominant representation of reality, achieved through the collective communicative behavior of a winning coalition of participants.

The political economy of talk within Neapolitan courtrooms in the 1980's had produced an environment in which the prosecution (including the pentiti) was clearly in control of the means and resources for constructing judicial evidence. As the performance (and responses to it) examined above shows, the prosecutorial collective (the pentito, prosecuting magistrate, and especially the presiding judge) was able to take hold of the single most important aspect of interactional control — the ability to contextualize into their performance other people, events, social meanings, and frames — and to draw from this a representation that had to be accepted as “true”.

In Pandico's case, we have seen that even a centuries-old folktale can be recontextualized as a “true story.” As such, it was particularly appreciated by the court. In their final report on the trial, the judges admitted that Pandico had

sometimes “enriched with his own suppositions some evidence he did not have direct knowledge of, sometimes expanding them to proportions hardly acceptable” (a reference, I hope, to the rabbits), yet they nevertheless concluded that he “demonstrated a deep devotion to justice, which he embraced with passion and without ambiguities. He has always played a consistent role, devoid of any criminal intent.” (Tribunale di Napoli 1985a: 1186). Pandico and the other pentiti had been, overall, believed. For the defendants, the large majority of whom were charged solely on the basis of the pentiti’s testimonies, this meant harsh sentences of up to 10 years in prison.⁵

As for Guarnieri, the court ascertained that he never had a chance to test the “surgical” skills supposedly acquired from Pandico. Contrary to Pandico’s expectations, Guarnieri was never released from prison, never met Pandico’s sister-in-law, and never performed any decapitations. Nevertheless, the story of the training was utilized, among other evidence, to reach a judgment against Guarnieri on the grounds that he belonged to the NCO. He was sentenced to five years and two months in prison (Tribunale di Napoli 1985a).

Notes

1. During one of his first days on the witness stand, Pandico commented on his Greek roots: “My family has Greek origins, and in Greek *Pandico* (sic) means the just man.” (Tribunale di Napoli, April 4, 1985)
2. According to one of my informants, this allusion to a night spent together must be understood more as an intimate event with homosexual undertones than as a ritual of initiation. The NCO would not take shape for another 10 years.
3. The Cirillo Affair happened in 1982 when Ciro Cirillo, a local administrator of the Christian Democrats, was kidnapped by the Red Brigades. In order to regain Cirillo’s freedom, some national leaders of the Christian Democrats, then the main party of a ruling coalition which was against any dealings with the terrorists, a position known as *la linea della fermezza*, negotiated a secret deal with the Red Brigades through the intercession of the NCO. Cirillo was freed in exchange for a ransom of 3 billion lire (approx. 1.2 million dollars) to be divided between the NCO and the Red Brigades. When the role of the NCO became known, the socialist Sandro Pertini, then president of the republic, seized the opportunity to eliminate the potentate created by Cutolo at Ascoli Piceno.
4. Modern traces of this ritual beheading for crimes of honor can be found in the memoirs of a British secret service official stationed in Naples shortly after the Allies took control of Southern Italy in 1944. He reports the case of five soldiers of the Moroccan contingent murdered in the area of Afragola, a rural town stormed by Moroccan troops who inflicted many crimes against the local population, including gang rapes against the women (and some men). As a form of vengeance, “Five moors were enticed into a house with an offer

of women, and then given food or wine containing a paralysing poison. While fully conscious they were castrated, and then beheaded. The decapitation was entrusted to pubescent boys to prove their worth, but the boys lacked both the skill and strength to carry out the task in a speedy and effective manner. The bodies were buried under cabbages, which were first dug up and then replanted over them in several village gardens, and there has been an undercurrent of sinister merriment in the Zona di Camorra about the prospects of fine vegetable crops in the coming year. These facts were passed to me by reliable contacts in Afragola.” (Lewis 1978: 147–148)

5. The Appeal evolved in a completely different way. A full year after the conclusion of the first trial, the balance between the need for security and protection of individual legal rights tipped in favor of the latter, setting up the sociopolitical conditions for a harsher re-examination of state witnesses’ performance, which resulted in a reversal of previous opinions about their credibility. The majority of the people who had been accused solely on the basis of these witnesses’ testimony were acquitted, causing popular uproar with massive consequences for Italian legal policies. Overall, out of the initial 1013 defendants, only 162 were found guilty of belonging to the NCO: a successful conviction rate of a mere 15.9 percent (Rubino 1988).

References

- Alvarez-Caccamo, C.
 1991 *The Institutionalization of Galician: Linguistic Practices, Power, and Ideology in Public Discourse*. Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, Berkeley.
- Bakhtin, M.
 1981 *The Dialogic Imagination*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Bauman, R.
 1974 “Speaking in the light: The role of the Quaker minister.” In R. Bauman and J. Sherzer (eds), *Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 1975 “Verbal art as performance.” *American Anthropology* 77: 290–311.
 1983 *Let Your Words Be Few: symbolism of speaking and silence among seventeenth-century Quakers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 1986 *Story Performance, and Event: Contextual Studies of Oral Narrative*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bauman, R., and Briggs, C.
 1990 “Poetics and Performance as critical perspectives on language and social life.” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 19: 59–88.
- Blok, A.
 1975 *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860–1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs*. New York: Harper and Row.
 1981 “Rams and Billy-Goats: A key to Mediterranean Code of Honor.” *Man* 16: 427–440.

- Bourdieu, P.
 1977a "The economics of linguistic exchanges." *Social Science Information* 16(6): 645–668.
 1977b *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 1979 "The Sense of Honor." In *Algeria 1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 1990 *In Other Words*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Campbell, J.K.
 1964 *Honor, family and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Centro di Documentazione (CDR).
 1985 *Rassegna Stampa sulla Camorra*. Napoli.
- Cohen, E.N.
 1971 "Who Stole the Rabbits? Crime, Dispute and Social Control in an Italian Village." In Bailey (ed), *Gifts and Poison*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Conley, J., and O'Barr, W.
 1990 "Rules versus relationships in small claim disputes." In A. Grimshaw (ed), *Conflict Talk*. Cambridge University Press.
- Deleuze, G.
 1986 *Foucault*. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.
- Di Bella, M.P.
 1987 "La vendetta dei vivi e dei morti." *Versus* 47–48: 203–233.
- Duranti, A.
 1986 "The audience as co-author: an introduction." *Text* 6(3): 239–247.
 1991 "Intentionality and Truth: An Ethnographic Critique." *Cultural Anthropology* 8(2): 214–245.
- Eisenstadt, S.N., and Roniger, L.
 1984 *Patrons, Clients and Friends*. Cambridge University Press.
- Foucault, M.
 1980 *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. New York: Pantheon.
 1990[1978] "Governmentality". In Burchell, Gordon and Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Chicago University Press.
- Fowler, R.
 1985 "Power." In *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. London: Academic Press.
- Gal, S.
 1989 "Language and political economy." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18: 345–367.
- Goodwin, C.
 1981 *Conversational Organization*. New York: Academic Press.
- Goodwin, M.C.
 1982 "'Instigating': Storytelling as social process." *American Ethnologist* 9(4): 779–819.
 1990 *He-said-she-said: Conversational Practices in Urban Black Children*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Greimas, A.J.
1982 *Semiotics and Language: an Analytical Dictionary*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Gumperz, J.
1982 *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hammel, E.
1979 *Alternative Social Structures and Ritual Relations in the Balkans*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Haviland, J.
1986 "‘Con Bueno Chilas’, Talk, Targets and Teasing in Zinacantan." *TEXT* 6(3): 121–148.
- Jacquemet, M.
1992 "Namechasers." *American Ethnologist* 19(4): 733–748
1996 *Credibility in Court: Communicative Practices in the Camorra Trials*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuipers, J.
1990 *The Power of Performance: The Creation of Textual Authority in Weyéwa Ritual Speech*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Lévi-Strauss, C.
1966 *The Savage Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1969 *Elementary Structure of Kinship*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Lewis, N.
1978 *Naples '44*. New York: Pantheon.
- O’Barr, W., and Conley, J.
1985 "Litigant satisfaction versus legal adequacy in small claim court narratives." *Law and Society Review* 19(4): 661–701.
- Propp, V.
1968 *Morphology of the Folktale*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Rotunda, D.
1973[1942] *Folkmotives of the Italian Novella*. New York: Haskell House Publishers.
- Rubino, B.
1988 *Tortora: I Mille Giorni*. Naples: Edizioni Dick Peerson.
- Tribunale di Napoli
1983 *Ordinanza di rinvio a giudizio contro Abagnale+712*. Napoli: Procura della Repubblica.
1985a *Sentenza di Primo Grado del processo Abagnale+712, a.k.a. Processo Tortora*. Napoli: Procura della Repubblica.
- Voloshinov, V.
1973[1929] *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Woolard, K.
1989 *Double Talk. Bilingualism and the Politics of Ethnicity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Intercultural Negotiation¹

Jochen Rehbein
University of Hamburg

To Erwin Hendiks from Tilburg University,
who died at the very young age of 30.

1. Rencontre

Intercultural communication seems to be characterized by ‘misunderstandings’. It was John Gumperz who brought the concept of misunderstanding into the discussion of what he called at the time ‘interethnic communication’ (Gumperz 1978, 1982). Dozens of studies since have revealed many kinds and/or types of misunderstandings — and of understandings (see Gumperz & Roberts 1991). Misunderstandings — or phenomena of miscommunication in an extended field of research — have been analyzed according to the respective linguistic theories preferred by scholars and according to their different conceptions of language. But the problems which arise in intercultural communication cannot be fully described, either phenomenologically or theoretically, as ‘failures’, even when pragmatically specified concepts of failure are being used (Austin 1962; Streeck 1985; Hinnenkamp 1985; Rehbein 1985). I will bring two arguments to support this claim.

On the one hand, actors pursue pre-formed paths of action, but on the other they can only act together — irrespective of whether their aims are identical or contrary — if hearers are able to follow, as co-actors, the speakers’ actions. Without basic cooperation of this kind, intercultural communication is indeed doomed to failure. Accordingly, interaction is less likely to be guaranteed by principles of cooperation in Grice’s format (cf. here the criticisms by Sarengi & Slembrouck 1992) than by the reception of illocutionary and propositional acts. Beside these, additional mechanisms of cooperation

are used by speaker and hearer (both copresent in the speech situation) in order to synchronize their parts of the discourse.²

In an article on medical discourse I analyzed constellations of an institutional type, in which German doctors gave non-German patients instructions which they accepted or adopted with differing degrees of willingness (Rehbein 1994). Despite (or because of?) doctors' repeated attempts, the patients began to develop a resistance to communication, which was not, however, always displayed openly. Actions which ought to have taken place as a result of the doctor's speech actions were blocked by the patients in *mental* dimensions of their sequential action position. This led, step by step, to a *cooperative opposition*, which did not erupt into an open quarrel but was not resolved either; the ambivalence of this position is perhaps best described by the French word '*rencontre*' (meeting in a friendly and/or hostile sense). I have used the German term 'Widerstreit' ('conflict') to describe this type of discourse. A *rencontre* is not a failure of communication or a miscommunication, nor is it a misunderstanding, nor even an isolated clash. On the contrary, communicative structures are activated which 'manage' the discourse over long stretches. They cannot therefore be analyzed as 'local' features. These activated structures are 'patterns of action' (Ehlich & Rehbein 1979) of the opposition type. If the actors (from different cultural backgrounds) make use of forms familiar to them, there follows either a culture-specific communicative realisation of pattern positions or new patterns of intercultural communication are constructed by means of which speech actions are subsumed under a common purpose.³

2. Negotiation — an auxiliary device

This paper will focus on business communication, which is a type of *cooperative opposition* based on an institutional type of communication. The oppositional structure of business communication is at least partially due to the fact that the seller wants to sell a commodity (or in current usage, a product) for the best price to a buyer who wants to buy it for the best price. The decision to buy is often preceded by repeated rounds of *offering* by the seller and *bidding* by the buyer — actions which belong to the traditional *pattern of buying and selling*. The mechanism, or rather, the *device* by which the repetitiveness of the rounds is triggered in discourse is '*negotiation*'. Negotiation, then, is a

device which is an auxiliary communicative gadget to the selling-buying pattern, in short an '*auxiliary device*'⁴ for processing the pattern in a way which is successful for participants.

Since the auxiliary device of a pattern is the background to the present argument, we need to determine more precisely what the auxiliary device of a pattern⁵ is. We cannot speak of functional analysis, i.e. an interpretation of data, until we cease to assign linguistic surface data 1:1 to pattern positions and start to make use of reconstructive categories that mediate between surface and deep structures (e.g. auxiliary devices).

An auxiliary device has the following characteristics:

1. Speech actions are being performed in a pattern in which one of the actors feels a need (in connection with the purpose of the pattern) the fulfilment of which is bound to the control field⁶ of the other actor and which cannot be realised by performing the next normal position in the pattern. The need can be reciprocal, being felt by the second actor and bound to the control field of the first actor.

Wagner, who views these conditions as essential to the definition of "negotiation encounter", is working along very similar lines with his category of the varying goals of the actors and their reciprocal control (Wagner 1995, p. 12), although the category "need" used here is not identical with that of the "goal". The difference between Wagner's 1995 paper and the present paper is that here communication is regarded as pre-structured, and negotiating as taking communicative dynamism from its purpose in processing (quite different) patterns of action.

2. The purpose of the pattern can only be realised through cooperation between both actors, e.g. a definite decision by a buyer to purchase goods at a certain price or by a seller to sell them at a certain price (purchase decision) or, working in the appointment-making pattern (Rehbein, Kameyama & Maleck 1994), agreeing a date for a meeting. The subject matter in this paper is the submission of a book manuscript to a publisher.

1. and 2. may be termed the constellation (or "setting") for the auxiliary device inside a pattern. Let us now turn to the device itself:

3. The auxiliary device begins during the interaction in which the need of one actor is made the subject matter ("topic") and/or the need is rejected by the controlling actor. The need cannot be satisfied in the normal course of events

when working through the pattern (explicit or anticipated rejection, prior binding of fulfilment etc.). Instead the actor with the need makes a mental retreat to the previous pattern position. Fulfilment is absolutely essential if the purpose of the pattern is to be achieved.

4. A sequenced series of pattern positions is repeated several times so that the communication goes round in circles. Before each repetition, subsequent pattern positions are often anticipated and there may even be further anticipation of the subsequent course (= reflection on the consequences of a possible compromise), sometimes leading to “verbalised thinking” or exothetic speaking (see Hohenstein & Kameyama 1997).

5. During these repetitions, speakers add to each other’s discourse knowledge (sometimes with differing phase divisions caused by cultural differences when processing the subject; see Rehbein 1995). For example various ratios between product and price are verbalised by the speakers in varying propositional contents which are then rejected, or accepted and stored to form the common discourse knowledge.

6. Differing and partly conflicting preferences become apparent; these are frequently verbalised in matrix constructions, the use of modality or similar devices:

- confrontational (achieving own preferences) or cooperational (aiming for compromise);
- concessional vs. utilitarian (own interest) vs. institutional (interests of the company) attitudes (variations in consideration of the other speaker);
- differences (= due to cultural variations) in standards which can also be applied to the opposite number are utilised;
- varying assessments.

7. A common form of movement for the need evolves through repetition: at the same time the restriction of the need and/or a relaxation of its binding to the control field effects a movement towards (9) and thus a settlement of (1) in respect of (7): compromise or unilateral loss or gain; if this does not occur, the device is broken off and the pattern left.

8. One effect of the compromise is the relief felt by both actors which is expressed, for example, in joint or individual laughter.⁷

9. Continuation of the pattern (to achieve the prime purpose) in place of (3),

for which linguistic continuance realisers are frequently used.

These essential aspects of an *auxiliary device* may be summarised as follows:

- i. within a pattern there arises a need, the fulfilment of which lies in the control field of the other actor (often reciprocally) and which cannot be realised within the normal course of the pattern;
- ii. the purpose of the pattern is specific cooperation between the actors;
- iii. entrance: a need is made the subject matter, mental retreat of the actor with the need to a previous pattern position;
- iv. repetition of pattern sequence;
- v. mutual complementing of discourse knowledge (phasing the processing of the subject);
- vi. (partly conflicting) preferences of actors are coordinated;
- vii. compromise by actors by creating a common form of movement for the need by
 - (a) restricting the need and/or
 - (b) relaxation of its binding to the control field and alteration:
 - i. effect of the compromise; relief;
 - ii. continuance of communication within the pattern.

3. The constellation

The following is an excerpt from discussions between a buyer and seller of two different nationalities: an American woman, Professor for Communication Research (Strothers), is offering the German representative of a Swiss publishing house (Passmann) a manuscript which has been planned but not yet completed. The publishing house is eager to break into the American book market and is therefore keenly interested in the manuscript.⁸

The American professor appears in the role of seller, the German representative in the role of buyer in this conversation. If we look more closely, however, the publishing house representative is also a seller, i.e. he is market-oriented and acts in anticipation of his subsequent role as seller. The professor, on the other hand, is also a potential client of the publishing house. Both persons therefore find themselves playing split roles.

The German agent and the American author are in agreement that the meeting should be seen as preliminary talks to allow both parties to sound out

the conditions for a publishing contract. Admittedly, it would be hard to renege on concessions, since the conversation was to be recorded and any promises made documented. The talk is not simulated role-play, but *authentic*.⁹

When they were interviewed after the meeting, both Passmann and Strothers agreed that the critical point of the entire conversation was the part in which the royalties were being negotiated. Presumably we are also dealing here with an intercultural clash of ideas. From the point of view of European publishers, the American professor's demands are not normal practice in the trade; indeed they might even be called outrageous, especially since the Professor has not even produced a manuscript yet. In the American market however, royalties are normal and negotiable.

4. Sales Talk in the transcript

The discourse as a whole is a sales/purchase talk and by and large follows a complex pattern.¹⁰ There are roughly 64 communicative utterances (segments) in its structure. We shall examine verbal communication first and then non-verbal communication.

4.1. *The auxiliary device in the sections under review*

After a long 4-second pause, it is the professor who clearly divides segment 10 from the previous discourse with "Now, since we're dealing with details, I think one of the things we have to ask about is, is how you handle royalties" and thus broaches the subject¹¹ which both speakers described in the post-meeting interview as the most delicate point of the talks. In segments 10 and 12 she makes the sale of her manuscript dependent upon the payment of an undefined amount of royalties, thereby realising the position of *offering* in the pattern.

Subsequently a concrete ratio between the product (= manuscript) and the price (royalties) is negotiated, which is not the same for both speakers at this point in the discourse: the American authoress introduces her ratio as a pre-discourse presupposition, which initially seems unacceptable to the German publishers' agent.

In the selling/buying pattern, the buyer's immediate acceptance of the

price demanded for the product being offered by the seller is by no means usual. If the publisher were to concede the desired royalties at once and if the authoress, after stipulating certain special conditions such as publication date, size of edition, advertising etc., were in agreement, the selling/buying pattern would have successfully realised its purpose. This is not the case here, however. The publishers' agent is obviously surprised by the demand for royalties but he makes her an offer (bidding) which she rejects; the second, higher bid is also rejected; the third bid is finally accepted by the authoress.

Both actors thus pass through certain positions in the pattern three times (*considering – agreeing in general – bidding – evaluating – modifying the offer – considering – agreeing in general – bidding* etc.); a closer look reveals that this is not mere repetition, for the speakers are being drawn closer together. Although the positions in the pattern of communication are circular, the speakers are in fact continually narrowing the gap between them. The product-price ratio is gradually adapted to the needs of the opposite number until the decision is processed and the product-price ratio accepted by both. Because the circular movement is based on the familiar selling/buying pattern it uses the communicative potential of the pattern in order to generate forms of movement for conflicting needs, namely an auxiliary device. The argument is therefore that “negotiating” is not a communicative pattern (as argued by Wagner and Petersen 1991) but a repeated and intensifying progression through a sequentially structured part of the pattern.

If, however, one tries to view the present example of sales talk from the perspective of conversational analysis, there would be severe methodological difficulties. The usual procedure for analysing the transcript of a discourse as a fragment of conversation would be to paraphrase it along the lines of its linear surface. However this method fails to pick up the communicative function in the linguistic surface structure and so misses both the repetitiveness of the pattern positions and the qualitative mental rapprochement of the speakers achieved by the circularity. Auxiliary devices, on the other hand, are characterised by circularity which generates a communicative form of movement of opposites, despite their apparent linearity and repetitiveness. This characteristic develops particularly within those communicative action patterns which are marked by a potential opposition of needs. The actual opposing needs are acted out and resolved into a cooperative communicative structure without one speaker having a sense that his or her needs are being repressed. If the auxiliary device is completed, a mutual feeling of relief, often

laughter, may be observed.

Let us now examine the transcript on the assumption that it realises parts of a selling/buying pattern that is familiar to the actors. To this end we shall divide it into larger *sections* (I-IV) in which one progression, or to be more precise, one round of the ‘negotiating’ auxiliary device is completed. In the transcript there are three rounds, characterised by the duality of offer (by Passmann) and *rejection* (instead of *modifying the offer*)¹² or *acceptance* (by Strothers).

- I. Segments 15–17–18–19–20 (*bidding* by Passmann)//22–24 (*rejection* by Strothers)
- II. Segments 43–44–47–48–50–51–52–54–55 (*bidding* by Passmann)//56–62–68 (*rejection* by Strothers)
- III. Segments 73–74–75–77–78 (*bidding* by Passmann)//79 (*acceptance* by Strothers)
- IV. Coda: *confirmation of the results* of negotiating (end of auxiliary device with *relief*): segments 80–81–82 (Passmann)//85 (Strothers)/85 (Passmann)/86 (Strothers).

The segments will now be subjected to a turn-by-turn analysis.¹³ Since the intercultural differences are also of interest here, we shall analyse the turns of Passmann and Strothers separately.

4.2. Passmann’s applicational and parenthetical speech

Passmann’s offer is structured in a specific manner by use of connectives:

- (1)
- | | | |
|-------|---|--|
| (17) | P | Generally . we: . . . do not pay royalties . . . erm: with projects that are entirely financed by the publisher. |
| (18) | | . . . At least not . . . for the first two hundred copies. |
| (19a) | | . . . We could agree, depending on how <u>many</u> . authors are involved |
| (19b) | | -if there’s only one author, there’s no problem, if we have six, seven, . . . eight . contributors, that’s a different matter |
| (19c) | | We could agree on let’s say: |
| (19d) | | ((2s)) -this is very preliminary now, and er: I wouldn’t commit myself at this stage . to a final setting of <u>royalties</u> , of course- |
| (19e) | | but generally. from . let’s say: the um two hundred-first copy . they would be ten percent . . . of the gross receipts, |
| (19f) | | not the net receipts but the gross receipts. |
| (20) | | ((5S)) Does that grab you? |

The marked connectives clearly reveal a rhetorical *>no-but<* strategy: it is true that “royalties” are “not” “generally” paid by the publishers; however, the word “generally” presupposes that Strothers’ case will be seen as an exception. Passmann makes a first retraction of the general statement with the words “at least not for the first two hundred copies”. The second retraction is couched in a complex structure (segment 19) with parenthetical phrases ((19b) and (19d)). In the main clause elements — (19a)(19c)(19e) and (19f) — Passmann appears to be mentally checking through the list of his company’s usual regulations: in the parentheses (19b) and (19d) he is making comments directly addressed to his hearer and the parenthetical subordination is marked non-verbally by his explicit turning towards his listener. Following the rejective propositional elements in (17) and (18) he continues with (19a) and (19e) (a stressed “we could”) to “but generally” (19e) and thus to an offer whose percentage figure is already unusually high for his publisher; even the formal aspect of “but generally” contradicts the general statement rejecting “royalties”. The use of “but” appears to be a transfer of the German “aber” since it is not a negation of the proposition immediately preceding it (as in the English use of “but”) but an argument that Passmann is considering in his own mind and his listener is not aware of. Seen as a whole, the linking of arguments is subordinating and undirected¹⁴ and probably appears unnecessarily complicated to the American in view of the results expressed in (19e) and (19f).

It is noticeable that Passmann speaks in a very halting manner, partitioning his utterances into sub-segments and even individual phrases which are separated from each other by short pauses for thought (see Chafe 1988). Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that he does not partly swallow the weak syllables and often clearly accentuates them, so that his utterances obviously sound “overtone” to Anglo-Saxon ears and give an impression of “well-taught English”.¹⁵ The highly segmented manner of his speech is clearly an indication that Passmann is conducting a discourse not only with Strothers but also with himself (inner dialogue), in which he mentally checks certain sales regulations and their pre-selected texts. This manner of speaking, reminiscent of the linguistic style of administrative bodies, may be termed a(n) (text-) *applicational mode* of discourse (see Rehbein 1998 regarding this term).

Let us now look at Passmann’s next contribution, after Strothers has rejected his initial offer:

- (2)
- (43) P That depends on the: the: actual market price .
that the book will have: . at the very end.
- (44) And that is . certainly . er a fact we cannot talk about
right now because we don't/ we know neither about the
possibilities of funding . we know . nothing about: . ahm
the actual size of the book and we have of course on our
side to calculate . ahm: . . the prospect of getting . a certain
amount of copies sold (with our) market facilities.
- (47) So . erm: . We could . talk. about . rough figures as far as
royalties are concerned . at the moment
- (48a) Erm: . But . in Europe . it is:
- (48b) -and this is . then your very very specific American background-
- (48c) in Europe, even if you are doing, . well . let's say a text edition
of a: . well-established author, . . let's take an eighteenth century
satirist like Jonathan Swift,
- (48d) erm: if you do this at let's say OUP . . er or: Cambridge
University perhaps, you can be sure you won't get royalty for
the first hundred/ first four hundred copies.
- (50) Starting from four-o-one, you would get: I think about seven percent.
- (51) So: with that in mind, with that background in mind, I think that
our: . . offer would be: . fair and . reasonable.
- (52) We can talk about:/ certainly we can talk about::erm a royalty
from copy one, if we know . more about . the: very specific data.
- (54) I think it would simply be too early to, to, to, to make things: s . fast
at the moment
- (55) Ah:m:...

Passmann opens his second offer with a general reflection on the uncertainties of price calculations, which usually arise before a manuscript is submitted (43–47) and continues with a short lecture on the royalty practices of competing European publishers (48a–50); some of segment (48) is also partitioned into parenthetical sub-segments. Here too the word “but” (segment 48a) is doubtless a transfer of the German usage, since “but” does not negate an immediately preceding proposition but rather the continuing demand for royalties which is still in the speaker’s mind and which was the subject matter of a much earlier part of the discourse. The verbalisation of what is being negated is tacked on in the parenthesis (48b), thus “rescuing” the transfer.

At (51) the new offer is introduced with the word “so”. This offer differs in one crucial aspect from the previous one in that royalties are now conceded from the first copy onwards. “So” (which is also a transfer, since it is used in a para-operative manner and not as aspectual deixis as in English) only appears

to be introducing a conclusion. In reality it introduces a mental break — an offer, made in an abrupt fashion, that would have been hard to infer from the introductory argument and which he has, so to speak, pulled out of thin air. This disjunction shows once again that Passmann is holding a mental dialogue with himself, or rather with the terms of his publishing house, which he is checking out whilst answering the American authoress.

Let us turn to the third modification of his offer, which is accepted by the author. Passmann can foresee this acceptance himself, inasmuch as he is granting the American the product-price ratio she desires:

- (3)
- (73) P ((6s)) [1 Erm: [2 what about...
 (74) I mean, . we could, we could agree on let's say six . .
 or even eight percent [3 from copy one . .
 [4 per author. if that you agree.
[1 breathes in [2 loud expulsion of breath [3 flicks pen clip
[4 flicks pen clip
 (75a) Depending again
 (75b) -and. that is . very very preliminary-
 (75c) depending on . our calculation, depending on the size of edition
and on the actual sales price.
 (77) But that would be something we could agree on: . . about. eight
 percent. for both you and the co-author.
 (78) From copy one.
 (79) Scratch nil.

The decisive part of this turn is Passmann's unusually extended six-second pause for thought before he makes the new offer, in which the complex web of references being processed by Passmann is manifest. He cuts short his first utterance (segment 73), starts on a matrix construction to give himself time to reflect ("I mean we could"; 74) and then makes his offer, again chopped into portions. Once again there is a pseudo-restriction in (75a/75c) and the parenthesis (75b) followed by a three-part specification of the offer, each in its own partition: "about . eight percent . for both you and the co-author" (77). "From copy one" (78) and "Scratch nil" (79) are predicates with their own illocutionary force, each of them an improvement on the offer, a verbalised crescendo to a climax of epitheses.

All these utterances seem to be based on the application of a mental plan which is drawn upon several times but is not formed there and then (Rehbein 1977).

In (77) the connective “but” is once again used to introduce the more precise details, namely the improvement of the offer. This “but” is a transfer from German, since it refers to the speaker’s objections and not to an explicitly stated proposition which is to be negated (as the English usage of “but” would imply).

Summarising, one might say that the ‘negotiation’ auxiliary device leads to a one-sided compromise in favour of the American seller. Passmann submits in a quasi-voluntary manner to her demands by acting out two roles in his “inner discourse” in which he puts forward both his own arguments and those of the American. One could therefore call the submission a self-adaptation through argument.

4.3 *Membership categorization device and hedging*

This section will examine the means employed by the American authoress. Strothers’ argumentation serves the purpose of a very complex mechanism of membership categorization. This is the basic intercultural procedure of her verbal communication.

She starts with a metaphor: “whether it’s [“financing of the book”] feasible from our side of the fence, too.” (segment 12). The wording is impersonal and is to be seen as a polite construction. The metaphor is, however, embedded in the personal matrix construction “we have to know”.

Passmann’s first offer is rejected in the following way:

(4)

- (20) P ((5s)) Does that grab you?
 (21) S Ah ((chuckles)) it grabs me, but probably not in the way you’d like for it to.
 (23) E from:, f/ from: my experience at least, y’know, the idea of. first/ not getting royalty from the very first copy. is a brand new one.
 (27) . Because that, that is just . one of those givens, y’know, that, that royalties start . when the first copy is sold
 (30) if you go to that level of effort to produce something . of this quality, the payoff should at least be there.
 (34) Ahm especially if the work’s been done well and the market’s already been established.
 (38) So I think that’s, that’s certainly the first issue . that would need to be addressed.
 (41) Ahm the other thing is if you’re talking about ten percent royalty to be divided between two people, . . . that seems::on the low side

The proposition “not getting royalty from the very first copy” (23) proceeds through various stages of evaluation by the American; she attributes her surprise at the idea to her own “experience at least” (23), which only superficially appears to relativize the characterisation of the proposition as a “brand new one”, since “brand new” stands for the label “not customary practice”. Basically she takes her experiences as deriving from a standard (“those givens”, 27) which she presupposes to be of ubiquitous validity. The words “something of this quality” (30) also show that it is her assumption that her work deserves the royalties requested. Her final argument (segment 41) closes with the words “that seems on the low side”. The impersonal construction is metaphoric but the expressed evaluation all the stronger for it.

During this contribution a contrast is constructed between a standard that transcends individuals and the German’s offer, which seems totally inadequate by comparison. Not one of the utterances in this turn, despite the strong evaluations they make, expresses a speaker-oriented and subjective assessment. The speaker claims instead to be using a generalised standard of evaluation. In the context of intercultural discourse — such is the inference — the speaker is a self-appointed spokeswoman for the American standard of evaluation, a standard she chooses to apply to both herself and her German listener. This high standard, and by implication her own achievement, are, as it were, done an outrageous injustice by the low offer (“on the low side”). In this manner she labels Passmann as a member of an uninitiated group and she herself as belonging to the group that satisfies the standard. In so doing she is using a procedure that Sacks has called a “membership categorization device” (Sacks 1972). Here categorization is mainly achieved through presuppositions.

Strothers also rejects Mr. Passmann’s second offer, even forcing him to stop altogether:

(5)

(55) P Ahm...

(56) S Well, I think, as you said. Right at the beginning of our conversation. this is obviously information-gathering on, . on both sides.

(62) ((2s)) But I do think part of the information has to be: . . . at least a realistic framework ((chuckles)) to know where we’re going to.

(68) and so I think that’s, that’s one of the things that would . Ahm . At least need to be framed in a little bit for us to, to know whether that next step . will be taken or not.

In this segment a state of tension exists between the matrix constructions (hedgings) and the propositional contents; in the underlined part of segment (56) the speaker's use of "I think" and the hearer deixis "you" serve to firmly anchor the proposition in the joint speech situation and, with her use of "obviously" and "on both sides", she applies the generalised standard mentioned already to the propositional content. In segment (62) we find a similar structure: the "but" negates the immediately preceding presupposition, namely that "information gathering" has taken part "on both sides" and although the phrase "I do think" anchors the utterance in the speech situation and characterizes what follows as a subjective opinion, she nonetheless repeats her categorization of herself as a member of the community of standard upholders. The standard itself is worded as such in the propositional content ("has to be realistic framework"), which is mitigated by the "at least". We thus see a contrast between a subjective and situational pointillism and the setting of a standard, which appears all the more incontrovertible because the German negotiator does not know it. It is a membership categorization of her own subjectivity according to the standard and at the same time an exclusion of the German co-actor from membership.

Finally the American's L-1 mastery of English, as opposed to the German's L-2 competence, serves as a membership categorization device, a circumstance which both actors are doubtless always aware of.

Only when Passmann has granted all her demands does she say with a grin:

(6)

- | | | |
|------|---|--|
| (80) | S | [That's at least getting a little more realistic.] [<i>chuckles</i>] |
| (81) | P | Okay, fine. |
| (82) | | ((laughs)) |

As she accepts Passmann's offer, his utterance ("that") is portrayed as one that has finally achieved the standard ("realistic"), in other words an appropriate balance between price and product. Passmann is thus admitted to membership of the group of standard possessors (which obviously pleases him) and the relief, an effect of the auxiliary device, has led him to relinquish his own position in exchange for his new membership of the club of American market standards.

4.4 *Intercultural deference*

Intercultural aspects are to be found in the manner of linguistic framing to which the positive (accepting) or negative (rejecting) propositional contents of

the utterances are subjected and in the differences in the use of connectives to link the propositional contents to form an argument. In addition there is the interactive processing of operative procedures of the syntactic constructions.

On the American side, the following characteristics of intercultural communication may be noted:

- anchoring in the speech situation: own position
- syntactic construction: goal-directed speaking
- claiming a standard (a generalised standard)
- membership categorization of one's own position according to the standard speaks as representative of the North American standard
- excludes the opposite party from the standard until said party submits to her own needs
- speech mode of generalisations when embedding the propositional content
- connectives used in linear manner.

On the German side the following characteristics of intercultural communication may be noted:

- anchoring in the speech situation: own position taken as absolute
- “inner dialogue” in which the legitimacy of the opposite position is recognized
- applicational speech mode (partitioning as far as single phrases), speaks as representative of an institution (publishing agent)
- syntactic construction: parenthetic words addressed to hearer, to which the negative propositional content is submitted
- connectives: pseudo-rejection, from which the full concession is processed.

With reference to Fant's work (1989, 1992), it should be noted that one of the major intercultural differences in the present case is the way in which the conflict is handled. There is no really satisfactory explanation of why the German publishers' agent gives in so rapidly and finally satisfies all of the American authoress's demands. The American authoress for her part insists stubbornly and purposefully on her needs. One comes closer to an explanation when one takes into account the fact that the German agent's turns can be divided into two parts; in the first the American's demands are checked and rejected in a kind of conditioned reflex. However, as the present analysis shows, this is only a pseudo-rejection. In the subsequent second part, despite

rejection, the concessions are made one at a time. By virtue of the fact that Passmann uses no connectives when passing from one proposition to its opposite, one may reasonably conclude that he had calculated on making the concessions right from the start and that the first part of each of his turns is only a preparation for granting the royalties, which are conceded bit by bit up to the full amount. Whereas the German actor processes the gradual movement towards the needs of his co-actor that is characteristic of the auxiliary device, the American woman simply perseveres in maintaining one position in the pattern. This all leads the reader to a surprising conclusion, in which all the other results of the analysis converge: only the German actor uses the “negotiation” auxiliary device, while the American never really enters into it; she never negotiates. The American plays her part through complex checking processes which are apparent in the constructions. Whereas the American never modifies her position but only repeats the one offer (to deliver the manuscript for a pre-determined royalty), the German undertakes three unilateral runs through the device. I term this type of communicative processing of a pattern and an auxiliary device ‘*virtual processing*’.

What causes the German actor to have so little readiness to act out the real conflicts? Why does he strive so hard for harmony? One cannot of course rule out the possibility that the German agent, with the permission of his company, was prepared to make any concessions in the hope of gaining a foothold in the English language market with the manuscript. However, a different explanation can be found in an idea of Gramsci: when the German actor submits a priori to the demands of the co-actor, he seems to be practising “cultural hegemony” of a North American standard (see Gramsci 1983), thus entering into a frequent German-American intercultural relationship. In this sense Passmann’s virtual processing is guided by a conception, or rather by a *system of conceptions*, which, from a discourse analysis viewpoint, is to be considered part of the German ‘cultural apparatus’¹⁶ with respect to the USA and which flows into his mental processing of the pattern. Passmann, with his communicative actions governed by his concepts, may be said to be acting at an intercultural level. The resulting *mode* of his action and speech may be summarized by a notion taken from the domain of politeness: intercultural deference. (The deference is emphatically supported by his trunk behaviour). By contrast, the goal-directed insistence of Strothers and her non-stop perseverance with a single position in the pattern is unlikely to be a tactic adopted

especially for the German interaction partner and based on special conceptions about Germany. Therefore no intercultural communication is being practised on her part.

Nevertheless, her actions are culturally performed. Let us now examine whether or not the actors' non-verbal communication supports the above analysis of verbal communication.

5. Non-verbal communication in negotiating

5.1 *An outline of different types of non-verbal communication*

Non-verbal communication differs from verbal communication in both system and function. The first distinction to be made is between *independent* and *concomitant* non-verbal communication.¹⁷

Whereas *independent* non-verbal communication has a quality all of its own and thus requires analysis as a discrete unit of action, the *concomitant form* of non-verbal communication is not seen without a verbal act to which it is functionally related. In this category we can make a distinction between *neutral concomitant* non-verbal communication, which is the usual (standardized and communicatively expected) accompaniment to verbalization (such as *turning one's head to the hearer when speaking*)¹⁸ and *self-evident concomitant* non-verbal communication. The *self-evident concomitant* type of non-verbal communication takes on a meaning of its own, in relation to and as a complement of the verbal action (example: *shaking one's head while saying "no"*).

Where the non-verbal form becomes detached from verbal communication, the former is said to be *independent*; here, too, we can distinguish between *presentational* non-verbal communication (pointing without speaking as a reply to the question "where?" — in conjunction with the word "there" pointing would be an example of self-evident concomitant non-verbal communication) and *ostensive* non-verbal communication, which is a hyperbolic form (e.g. *slamming the door* (with rage)).

These differences are summarized in a chart:




Figure 1. from Ehlich & Rehbein (1982: 10)

Let us examine the consequences these differences have for the analysis of certain aspects of intercultural communication. The numbers refer to the score areas of the transcript.

5.2 *Sectional cesura in the discourse*

In score areas [3/4] Strother's non-verbal utterances reveal the switch from agreement and acceptance to a backward-looking orientation for the preparation of a demand in reply to the buyer's offer.

Initially [5–7], after she has voiced her demand, she lowers her head to face Passmann and shows him a friendly expectant smile; this then fades to a lengthy gaze [7/8]. During the first part of her utterance (10) Passmann chuckles but his expression changes immediately she verbalises the “royalties” topic.

5.3 *Passmann's first bid*

If we look at Passmann's facial expressions during the verbalization of his first bid (segments (17)–(20)), we see a complex non-verbal procedure: upcast eyes, then closing of the eyelids, leaning the head back, then lowering it and opening the mouth to say something with a simultaneous opening of the hands (score areas [11–18]).

During Passmann's long speaking turn (area [7–18]), the *only verbal* hearer action of Strothers is “Hm” [9]. Her facial expression and gestures then alter completely as if she is announcing the termination of the whole negotiation (although she laughs with Passmann in score areas [18/19]), while she appears to be keeping her temper with great difficulty in order to present her arguments. At this point her facial expression and gestures switch from *concomitant neutral hearer action* to *concomitant-self-evident hearer action*.

5.4 *Strothers' demand for a modification of the bid*

Her arguments, presented with a sparing use of facial expression, gestures (initially speaking very fast and forcefully, indicating annoyance) and gaze signal a communicational “stand-by”. The very fact that they are used sparingly reveals the function of expression and gesture here. Her expression becomes one of “lying in wait”. Through the hearer-control of the communicative apparatus the illocution of her verbal actions turns into *threat*. The *non-rising intonation of her hearer-signals* indicates non-acceptance to Passmann (in score areas [21,22, 25]).

After Strothers has repeated her demand (which does mean non-acceptance of Passmann’s first offer) (score areas [19–29]), as hearer of Passmann’s turn (in score areas [29–47]) she then undertakes speaker-control by facing Passmann and omitting any expression; this means *zero realization of any hearer signals*: the continuing omission of the hearer’s (i.e. Strothers’) facial expression and gesture of a long stretch of the speaker’s discourse may be interpreted as a threat to Passmann, the speaker, or at the very least an attempt to intimidate. Functionally speaking, facial expression as a form of speaker-control switches to *presentational* non-verbal communication.

Again, she makes very few *verbal* hearer utterances: 4 interjections over a long stretch of discourse of 18 score areas (segments (45), (46), (49) and (53) in score areas [28–45]). Strothers’ short reaction (an affirmative “hmhm” with a confirmatory nod in score area [38]) shows that she has registered his efforts at model behaviour, but that it has no bearing on the subject at hand.

That Strothers is still not prepared to accept is revealed by her rapid and irritated speech in reply.

5.5 *Rejection of the modified offer by pointing to the standard “realistic framework”*

A change in the function of nonverbal communication on the part of Strothers occurs, especially in score areas [47–51] from *concomitant* (presentational) nonverbal communication to nonverbal communication. This change works (at least partly) *independently* of the verbal line of action and through different channels (eye, hand, trunk, head; multichannel communication). It is the decisive moment in Strothers’ presentation.

Passmann’s offer is rejected; the rejection is a threat to cancel the agree-

ment reached thus far and to break off negotiations altogether. The gestures in score areas [49–51] make it quite clear that for Strothers there are “no holds barred” on the way to making the negotiating partner pliable.

Passmann’s verbal hearer actions are affirmative and, in quantitative respects, are decidedly different from those of Strothers: in 6 score areas [46–51], he manifests 15 affirmative interjections (“hm”, “yep”) signalling the adoption of her argument.

Strothers continues to steer Passmann’s new offer by means of a *permanent stare* at him (from score area [51] onwards), with a slight nodding movement meaning approval (up to score area [57]).

Then (score areas [57/58]) she slowly breaks into a smile; she switches from the threat of terminating the communication to the re-establishment of common ground and a correspondingly happy smile from him. From the phenomenological point of view, the difference between the *incipient smile* and the *relieved laugh* is interesting.

5.6 *Movement*

Compared with the American, the German moves his upper body in exaggerated fashion. There is also a distinction between his non-verbal communication when speaking and when listening. When *speaking*, he often leans his upper body forwards, so that his head lies along an upward pointing axis with her head. At the same time he fidgets around with three different objects; with a biro, with his pipe, which he picks up from the table and puts back on another spot of the table when speaking and smokes when listening, and with his papers. Whereas the latter supports the above analysis of speech formed by applying texts, fingering the objects shows a certain degree of helplessness. His *listening* is often accompanied by movement away from her, either sideways or backwards. To summarize, he occupies a lot of space with the movements of his upper body around vertical and lateral axes and frequently changes the distance between himself and the American; it most probably confirms an analysis showing a rapid progression from one pattern position to another in the communicative deep structure.

Strothers, by contrast with her German interlocutor, needs little space in which to *gesture*. Particularly in the way she moves hands and arms she reveals — as the negotiation progresses — two types of *reception*: at first there is attentive listening, during which she rests her chin on her folded

hands, elbows on the table [area 8-15]. However, when the first refusal is voiced by Passmann, she slowly takes her hands from under her chin and places them in front of her on the table top, where they lie motionless [area 15-28]. This gesture, which is probably best interpreted as a rejectionist act on the part of the hearer remains unaltered until [area 61] balance is restored; only then does she move her folded hands back towards her chin, probably a signal that she is ready to cooperate. Even when she takes the *speaker's role*, her hands remain folded on the table in front of her, only for emphasis and when dealing with important subjects does she cock the fingers of one closed hand in Passmann's direction.

6. Communicative apparatus, non-verbal communication, intercultural communication

In a discourse the speaker continuously checks the hearer's reception of his or her speech actions and carries out additional processing during the utterance. Conversely, the hearer continually steers the speaker's speech actions (see Rehbein 1977). As mentioned at the outset, Functional Pragmatics (which is based on the linguistic concept of the difference between speaker and hearer) uses the term "communicative apparatus" to embrace the mutual controls exercised by speaker and hearer (see Rehbein 1979). A major purpose of this apparatus is to synchronise the speech actions of the parties, to relate the mental dimensions of speaker and hearer to each other and thereby to adjust the discourse to the current status of interaction, the mental processes and the actions of the participants. As apparatus it represents one order of mediation in a complex communicative area of purpose. It is essential for its use that speaker and hearer are co-present in one action space (when producing a written text an author cannot therefore rely on this apparatus). The communicative apparatus is a different category of communicative action from speech patterns. Both categories are, as it were, crosswise to each other.

The communicative apparatus is a mechanism that organises specific communicative means for the purposes of speaker-hearer control and places them in a systematic relationship. The means are selected according to their formal quality so that they permit the hearer to intervene directly during the speech of the speaker without interrupting him or her and permit the speaker to influence the hearer directly as he or she speaks, without breaking off the utterance.

In the arsenal of communicative means, the most important linguistic means are those which contain expeditive procedures (Ehlich 1986) that directly affect the speaker's acts without having a propositional content. These means are largely non-verbal (they have not yet been examined in great detail) and some of them have been named above. Generally, non-verbal means are used in different areas of expression (lips, eyes, head, trunk, hands, arms etc.) (see Ehlich & Rehbein 1982) so that there can also be conflicting effects between verbal and non-verbal forms of expression.

The above examples serve to show that communicative apparatus, both verbal and non-verbal, differs in character from language to language and may therefore have consequences for the intercultural context. Let us summarize these relations.

The last scene clearly reveals that in intercultural communication the American woman has from the start assumed a position of unquestioned dominance, with the German publishing house representative becoming increasingly obsequious.

Passmann repeatedly quotes action fragments to demonstrate his familiarity with Anglo-American matters only to find himself increasingly subservient to the consistent action authenticity of the American; perhaps it is this contrast which makes him ready to accede to the unusually high royalty demands, which are also presented with unusual insistence.

From the American's point of view the negotiation of royalties seems to be a quarrel about nothing, about "peanuts". She clearly demonstrates in *concomitant self-evident* or *presentational* action her feeling that the European publisher is trying to limit her rights on a large scale, indeed that she is about to be "taken for a ride". Her smile, which often fades and slowly returns, is often merely a sign of a departure from and return to normal negotiating relations and is therefore to be understood merely as a sign of politeness that prevents her threatening attitude from turning into open aggression.

The dimensions of non-verbal communication develop between Strothers and Passmann within the framework of action processes. This is above all due to the cultural differences in using the communicative apparatus of speaker and hearer-control as an instrument by which the discourse is steered: both (speaker and hearer) use it in turn for the purpose of processing the basic action patterns and their movement in an *auxiliary device* called "negotiating". In this sense the communicative apparatus of speaker and hearer control continues to promote the cooperative opposition of this intercultural rencontre.

Notes

1. Thanks are due to the participants at the "Intercultural Communication" colloquium at Villa Vigoni for their sceptical reception of the theories. Thanks too to Jennifer Hartog for her additional interpretation.
2. See §7 below.
3. With this idea, I follow Koole and ten Thijie 1993.
4. For an analysis of negotiation as an auxiliary device within the pattern of buying and selling, see Rehbein 1995. The same device emerges within the pattern of time scheduling when actors negotiate a certain date (see Rehbein, Kameyama & Maleck 1994). The result of using auxiliary devices for negotiating prices, specific conditions etc. is a contract between the parties.
5. Luckmann (1986) revives the concept of "genre" introduced by Bachtin and attempts to make it more explicit using the term "total pattern" (Gesamtmuster). However, it is barely operable for an empirical discourse analysis which is based on transcripts (for a comparison of the concept "genre" and "pattern" see Hartog 1996, 38 ff; on the theory of speech patterns see Ehlich and Rehbein 1979, 1986; Rehbein 1977).
6. See Rehbein 1977, Section 1, for this term.
7. See Fant 1995 on cultural variations in forms of laughter.
8. I am grateful to Jan Hendriks (†) and P. van der Wijst (University of Tilburg) for preparing the video-recording and leaving it to me for analysis. The transcription was carried out in the HIAT-format (Ehlich & Rehbein 1976) using the computer program syncWRITER. For a manual of methods for computer-assisted transcriptions, see Rehbein e.a. 1993.
9. For this term, see Griefhaber 1986.
10. The pattern was analysed in detail by Rehbein 1995.
11. The wording of segment 10 is a rhetorical introduction to the subject: "one of the things we have to ask about is how", together with padding words, modals and relatives it announces the controversial nature of the subject. In 1995 Marriott made different methods for treating the subject matter of negotiations the basis of her analysis.
12. In the selling/buying pattern the positions offering, modifying the offer etc. always include the offer of goods for a certain price (product-price ratio). If only one is made the subject matter of the discourse, the other is presupposed.
13. In Rehbein, Kameyama & Maleck 1996 the structure of a turn in a discourse which realises a pattern is described thus:

"A turn (contribution)... is often divided into two portions:

 - (i) the first portion of the turn, in which the speaker refers in the hearer role directly to the previous utterance of the previous speaker (e.g. with simple affirmations, negation, interjection etc.)
 - (ii) the second portion of the turn, in which the speaker takes the speaker role to implement his own plan.

This internal structure of the turn obviously has a lot to do with forming and implementing a plan in a speech act: portion (i) of the turn may be left out, if the speaker takes the initiative in the speaker role with the verbalisation of his plan, or portion (i) may be integrated, in the form of preceding speech action arguments, into an utterance, which, taken as a whole, has the characteristics of the second portion of a turn." (Rehbein, Kameyama & Maleck 1996, p. 35–36). These remarks also apply here.

14. A "need" may be implemented in a directed or undirected manner in each individual case; therefore in the definition of "auxiliary device" (Section 2 above) the term "need" and not "aim" was chosen as basic category. The concept of "directedness" would also appear to be culturally determined.
15. I am grateful to Jenny Cook-Gumperz and Elisabeth Couper-Kuhlen for this suggestion at the Villa Vigoni colloquium.
16. See Redder & Rehbein 1987 on this term, 15ff.
17. The conceptual framework of the analysis is taken from Ehlich & Rehbein 1982, p. 8ss.
18. The *omission* of a standardized (i.e. expected) concomitant act is a zero realisation, which may intensify the work of verbal communication up to ostension. The effect of transforming verbal elements by means of mimetic/gestural zero realisation will come across in the material at hand, too. I will return to it later.

References

- Austin, J.L.
1962 *How to do Things with Words*. Oxford: University Press.
- Bachtin, M.M.
1976 "The problem of speech genres." In C. Emerson and M. Holquist (eds), *Bachtin, Michael M., Genres and other late essays*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 10–102.
- Chafe, W.L.
1988 "Linking intonation units in spoken English." In J. Haiman and Sandra A Thompson (eds), *Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse*. Amsterdam etc.: Benjamins, 1–27.
- Ehlich, K.
1976 *Interjektionen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Ehlich, K., and J. Rehbein
1979 "Sprachliche Handlungsmuster." In Hans-Georg Soeffner (Hg.), *Interpretative Verfahren in den Text- und Sozialwissenschaften*. Stuttgart: Metzler, 243–274.
1982 *Augenkommunikation. Methodenreflexion und Beispielanalyse*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Fant, L.
1989 "Cultural mismatch in conversation: Spanish and Scandinavian communicative behaviour in negotiation settings." *Hermes* 3, 247–265.

- 1992 "Analyzing negotiation talk — Authentic data vs. role play." In A. Grindsted and J. Wagner (eds), *Communication for Specific Purposes/ Fachsprachliche Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Narr.
- 1995 "Negotiation discourse and interaction in a cross-cultural perspective: The case of Sweden and Spain." In K. Ehlich and J. Wagner (eds), *The Discourse of Business Negotiation*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 177–201.
- Firth, A.
1995 *The Discourse of Negotiation: Studies of language in the workplace*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Francis, D.W.
1986 "Some structures of negotiation talk." *Language in Society* 15, 53–80.
- Gramsci, A.
1983 *Marxismus und Kultur. Ideologie, Alltag, Literatur. Herausgeg. und übers. aus dem Italienischen v. Sabine Kebir*. Hamburg: VSA.
- Griebhaber, W.
1986 *Einstellungsgespräche. Authentisches und zitierendes Handeln*. Vol. I. Tübingen: Narr.
- Gumperz, J.J.
1978 "The conversational analysis of interethnic communication." In E.L. Ross. (ed), *Interethnic Communication*. Athens: University Press, 13–31.
1982 *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge: University Press.
- Gumperz, John J., and C. Roberts
1991 "Understanding in intercultural encounters." In J. Blommaert and J. Verschueren (eds), *The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication*. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 51–90.
- Hartog, J.
1996 *Das genetische Beratungsgespräch. Institutionalisierte Kommunikation zwischen Experten und Nicht-Experten*. Tübingen: Narr.
- Hinnenkamp, V.
1985 "Zwangskommunikative Interaktion zwischen Gasterbeitern und deutscher Behörde." In J. Rehbein (Hg.), *Interkulturelle Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Narr, 276–298.
- Hohenstein, C. and S. Kameyama
1997 "Exothesen." In J. Rehbein and S. Kameyama (eds), *Bausteine diskursanalytischen Wissens* (in prep.).
- Koole, T., and J.D. ten Thije
1994 *The Construction of Intercultural Discourse. Team discussions and educational advising*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Luckmann, T.
1986 "Grundformen der gesellschaftlichen Vermittlung von Wissen: kommunikative Gattungen." *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 27 "Kultur und Gesellschaft"*, 191–213.
- Marriot, H.
1995 "The management of discourse in international seller-buyer negotiations." In K. Ehlich and J. Wagner (eds), *The Discourse of Business Negotiation*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 103–126.

- Mulholland, J.
1991 *The Language of Negotiation*. London: Routledge.
- Redder, A., and J. Rehbein
1987 "Zum Begriff der Kultur." In A. Redder and J. Rehbein (Hgg.), *Arbeiten zur interkulturellen Kommunikation*. Osnabrück: Osnabrücker Beiträge zur Sprachtheorie (OBST) 38, 7–21.
- Rehbein, J.
1977 *Komplexes Handeln. Elemente zur Handlungstheorie der Sprache*. Stuttgart: Metzler.
1979 "Sprechhandlungsaugmente. Zur Organisation der Hörersteuerung." In H. Weydt (Hg.), *Die Partikeln der deutschen Sprache*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 58–74.
1985 "Einführung in die interkulturelle Kommunikation." In ders. (Hg.), *Interkulturelle Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Narr, 7–39.
1985a "Medizinische Beratung türkischer Eltern." In J. Rehbein (Hg.), *Interkulturelle Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Narr, 349–419.
1993 "Widerstreit. Probleme semiprofessioneller Rede in der interkulturellen Arzt-Patienten-Kommunikation." *Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik* 24, 93, 123–151.
1994 "Rejective Proposals." *Multilingua — Journal of Cross-Cultural and Interlanguage Communication* (Special Issue on Intercultural Communication in the Professions) 13(1/2), 83–130.
1995 "International sales talk." In K. Ehlich and J. Wagner (eds.), *The Discourse of Business Negotiation*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 67–102.
1996 "Verkehrssprache." In D. Hennig and J. Meier (Hgg.), *Varietäten der deutschen Sprache*. Frankfurt, Bern: Lang, 143–159.
1998 "Die Verwendung von Institutionensprache in Ämtern und Behörden." Artikel 67 in L. Hoffmann, H. Kalverkämper and E. H. Wiegand (Hrsg.), *Fachsprachen. Ein internationales Handbuch zur Fachsprachenforschung und Terminologiewissenschaft*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 660–675.
- Rehbein, J., W. Griebhaber, P. Löning, M. Hartung and K. Bühlig
1993 *MANUAL für das computergestützte Transkribieren mit dem Programm Sync-WRITER nach dem Verfahren der Halbinterpretativen Arbeitstranskriptionen* (HIAT). Universität Hamburg: Germanisches Seminar.
- Rehbein, J., S. Kameyama and I. Maleck
1994 *Das reziproke Muster der Terminabsprache. Zur Modularität von Diskursen und Dialogen. Memo 23 des Verbundvorhabens Verbmobil*. Universität Hamburg: Germanisches Seminar.
- Sacks, H.
1972 "On the analyzability of stories by children." In John J. Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds), *Directions in Sociolinguistics. The Ethnography of Communication*. New York etc: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 325–345.
- Sarangi, S.K. and S. Slembrouck
1992 "Non-cooperation in communication: A reassessment of Gricean pragmatics." *Journal of Pragmatics* 17, 117–154.

- Streeck, J.
1985 "Kulturelle Kodes und ethnische Grenzen. Drei Theorien über Fehlschläge in der interethnischen Kommunikation." In J. Rehbein (Hg.), *Interkulturelle Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Narr, 103–120.
- Tsudà, A.
1984 *Sales Talk in Japan and the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Ulijn, J.M. and T.R. Gorter
1989 "Language, culture and technical-commercial negotiating." In H. Coleman (ed.), *Working with Language: A multidisciplinary consideration of language use in work contexts*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 479–506.
- Wagner, J.
1995 "What makes a discourse a negotiation?" In K. Ehlich and J. Wagner (eds), *The Discourse of Business Negotiation*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 9–36.
- Wagner, J. and K.H. Petersen
1991 "Zur Definition von Verhandeln unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Geschäftsverhandlungen." In B.-D. Müller (ed.), *Wirtschaft und Sprache*. München: Iudicium, 261–276.

Transcript Negotiating

1990/ICBC/book case /Passmore-G vs. Strothers -USA/Erwin C. Hendriks /Tilburg

April-May 1991/Schwerin/1:40/PanasonicNV-8200/SyncWriter/36/532-43/635

contr. 1993/Rehbein/1:50/

[score areas 1ss of this example = score areas 533ss of the original complete transcript]

- 1 Mrs S_{VK} ^{/1} The number that we had come up with as a rough estimate was . somewhere
Mr P_{VK} ^{/2} Hm̄ ^{/3} Hm̄ ^{/4} Yeah
- 2 Mrs S_{VK} between two hundred and two hundred fifty. That's what we were . were ^{/5}
- 3 hr. of v.frame 51:12
Mrs S_{VK} thinking in terms of. So we're kind of at the upper end of that range we were ^{/7}
Mr P_{VK} ^{/6} Yes ^{/8} Hm̄ hm̄
- 4 hr. of v.frame 51:19 51:23 51:23
Mrs S_{VK} talking about. ^{/10} ((4s)) Now, since we're dealing with details,. I
Mrs S_{NVK} % looks in her notes o - crosses hands- o - o- - -
Mr P_{VK} ^{/9} ((2s)) Okây, fine.
- 5 hr. of v.frame 51:24 51:25 51:26
Mrs S_{VK} think one of the things we have to ask about is, is how you handle . rōyaltiés. _
Mrs S_{NVK} o - - -with bent head addressing Mr Passmann - - - - -
Mrs S_{NVK} - - - - - hands crossed - - - - -
Mr P_{VK} ^{/11} Hm̄
- 6 hr. of v.frame 51:28
Mrs S_{VK} ^{/12} You mentioned ah financing . of the book from your side and we, ah we have
Mrs S_{NVK} - - - - - with bent head addressing Mr Passmann - - - - -
Mrs S_{NVK} - - - - - hands crossed - - - - -
Mrs S_{NVK} %some fingers directed to Passmann
Mr P_{VK} ^{/13} Hm̄
- 7 hr. of v.frame 51:33 51:34 51:35 51:36
Mrs S_{VK} to know whether it's feasible from our side of the fence too.
Mrs S_{NVK} - - - - - with bent head addressing Mr Passmann- - - - - o - - - - -
Mrs S_{NVK} - - - - - o - - - - - o - - - - -
Mrs S_{NVK} o - - leans hs. back - - o
Mr P_{VK} ^{/14} Hm̄ ^{/15} [Well, erm: . .
Mr P_{NVK} % turns his trunk
[audible intake of

8 Mrs S NVK ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann ----- o
 Mrs S NVK ----- chin resting on both fists ---
 Mr P VK the question, or the matter of royalties is, as with all publishers, a very delicate
 Mr P NVK aside
breath

9 nr. of v.frame 51:4251:47
 Mrs S VK /16
 Hm̄
 Mrs S NVK o-- chuckles--- -o o----- gazes at Mr.Passmann ----- gazes at
 Mrs S NVK ----- chin resting on both fists ----- chin
 Mr P VK matter, . . to say that in the first place. Generally . we: . . do nốt pày ròyalties .
 /17

10 Mrs S NVK Mr.Passmann ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann -----
 Mrs S NVK resting on both fists ----- chin resting on both fists -----
 Mr P VK . erm: with projects that are entirely financed by the publisher. . . At least not .
 /18

11 Mrs S NVK --- gazes at Mr.Passmann ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann -----
 Mrs S NVK ----- chin resting on both fists ----- chin resting on both fists -----
 Mr P VK . for the first two hundred copies. . . We could agree, depending on how many
 /19a

12 nr. of v.frame 52:10
 Mrs S NVK ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann ---
 Mrs S NVK ----- chin resting on both fists ----- o
 Mrs S NVK % hardly perceptible nod
 Mr P VK . authors are invólved -if there's only one author, there's no problem, . if we
 /19b

13 nr. of v.frame 52:11
 Mrs S NVK ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann ----- gazes at
 Mrs S NVK o----- hands crossed under chin -----
 Mr P VK have six, seven, . eight . contributors, that's a different matter- we could agree
 /19c

14 nr. of v.frame 52 :18 52:22
 Mrs S NVK Mr.Passmann ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann -----
 Mrs S NVK -- hands crossed under chin ----- hands crossed under chin ---
 Mrs S NVK % hardly perceptible nodding
 Mr P VK on let's say: ((2s)) -this is very preliminary nòw, and er: I wouldn't commit
 /19d

15 nr. of v.frame 52 : 26 52:27 52:29
 Mrs S NVK --- gazes at Mr.Passmann ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann -----
 Mrs S NVK ----- hands crossed under chin ----- o o -----
 Mrs S NVK % noddingo - cocked head - - o
 Mr P VK myself at this stage . to a final setting of royalties, of course- but generally .
 /19e

16 Mrs S NVK ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann ----- gazes at Mr.Passmann -----
 Mrs S NVK ----- hands crossed on the table ----- hands crossed on the
 Mr P VK from . let's say: the um two hundred-first copy . they would be ten percent . .

- 17
- | | | | |
|----------------------|--|----------------------------|--------|
| nr. of v. frame | | 52:42 | 52:44 |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | ----- | gazes at Mr.Passmann --- o | o----- |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | table----- | ----- | o----- |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | | | o----- |
| | /19f | | |
| Mr P _{VK} | of the gross receipts, not the nett receipts but the gross receipts. ((----- | 5s----- | |
- 18
- | | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| nr. of v. frame | 52:45 | 52:46 | |
| Mrs S _{VK} | | /21
Ah | it grabs me, but probably not in the way |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | deliberately closed eyes ----- | oo - chuckles----- | chuckles----- |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | ----- | spreads hands ----- | o |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | opens mouth-- o | | |
| | /20 | | |
| Mr P _{VK} |)) Does that grab you? | | |
| Mr P _{NVK} | | o --- laughs----- | laughs-----laughs- |
| Mr P _{NVK} | | % gets up and down suddenly | |
- 19
- | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------------|---|
| nr. of v. frame | | 52:51 | |
| Mrs S _{VK} | | /23 | you'd like for it to. E from:, f/ from: <u>my</u> experience at least, y'know, <u>the</u> idea of |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | - chuckles ----- | o | |
| | /22 | /24 | |
| Mr P _{VK} | Yep | Yep | |
| Mr P _{NVK} | --- o | | |
| Mr P _{NVK} | | o- starts to lean back | |
- 20
- | | | | |
|----------------------|---|---------------------|-----|
| nr. of v. frame | | 52:57 | |
| Mrs S _{VK} | . first/ <u>not</u> getting royalty from the very first copy. is a brand new one. . | | |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | o----- | furtive glance----- | |
| | | /25 | /26 |
| Mr P _{VK} | | Hm̄ | Hm̄ |
- 21
- | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|--|
| nr. of v. frame | 53:00 | 53:05 | |
| Mrs S _{VK} | /27 | | Because that, that is just . one of those <u>givens</u> , y'know, that, that royalties start . |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | ----- | furtive glance----- | furtive |
| | | /28 | |
| Mr P _{VK} | [| Hm̄ | |
| | <i>[sound of lighter being lit</i> | | |
- 22
- | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------------------|--|
| nr. of v. frame | 53:0853:09 | 53:10 | 53:11 |
| Mrs S _{VK} | /30 | | when the first copy is sold. If you go to that level of effort to <u>produce</u> some- |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | glance----- | ----- | o |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | | | o----- |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | | %slight gestural deixis | |
| | /29 | | |
| Mr P _{VK} | Hm̄ | | |

23 nr. of v.frame 53:14 53:16 53:17
 Mrs S_{VK} thing . of this quality, the payoff should at least be there. /34 Ahm especially
 Mrs S_{NVK} ----- slight assertive nodding ----- o
 Mr P_{VK} /31 Yeah /32 Yeah /33 Hmhñ

24 nr. of v.frame 53:20
 Mrs S_{VK} if the work's been done well and the market's already been established.
 Mrs S_{NVK} % assertive nodding
 Mr P_{VK} /35 /36 /37 Hñ Hñ Hñ

25 nr. of v.frame 53:22
 Mrs S_{VK} /38 So I think that's, that's certainly the first issue . that would need to be addressed
 Mr P_{VK} /39 Hm hñ

26 nr. of v.frame 53:28
 Mrs S_{VK} /41 . Ahm the other thing is if you're talking about ten percent royalty to be divided
 Mr P_{VK} /40 Yep
 Mr P_{NVK} o- - straightens up at the desk

27 nr. of v.frame 53:33 53:35 53:36 53:38 53:39
 Mrs S_{VK} between two people, . . that seems:: on the low side.
 Mrs S_{NVK} o- - - fixes her gaze on Passmann - - o o- -----
 Mrs S_{NVK} o- - - slightly shakes head - - - o o- -----
 Mrs S_{NVK} o- - - slightly shakes head - - - o o- -----
 Mr P_{VK} /42 Hñ /43 That depends on the:[the:
[clinking

28 Mrs S_{NVK} ----- furtive glance -----
 Mrs S_{NVK} ----- hardly perceptible nodding -----
 Mr P_{VK} /44 actual market price . that the book . wíll hàve: . at the very ênd. An:d that is .
sound of pipe against table

29 Mrs S_{NVK} ----- furtive glance -----
 Mrs S_{NVK} ----- hardly perceptible nodding -----
 Mr P_{VK} certainly . er a fact we cannot talk about right now because we don't/ we know

30 /45
 Mrs S_{VK} Hñhm
 Mrs S_{NVK} ----- furtive glance -----
 Mrs S_{NVK} ----- hardly perceptible nodding -----
 Mr P_{VK} neither about the possibilities of funding, we know . nothing about: . ahm the

31 Mrs S_{NVK} ----- furtive glance -----
 Mrs S_{NVK} -- hardly perceptible nodding - -
 Mr P_{VK} actual size of the book and we have, of course, on our side to calculate . ahm: .

- 32 Mrs S NVK --- furtive glance ----- o
Mrs S NVK hardly perceptible nodding - ----- o
Mr P VK . the prospect of getting . a certain amount of copies sold (with our) market fa-
- 33 nr. of v.frame 54:11 54:11 54:12
/46
Mrs S VK Hmhm
Mrs S NVK o ----- furtive glance -----
Mrs S NVK o- cocks head to her side - - o
/47
Mr P VK cilities. So . erm: . we could . talk about . rough figures as far as royalties
- 34 nr. of v.frame 54:20
Mrs S NVK ----- furtive glance -----
/48a /48b
Mr P VK are concerned . at the moment. Erm: . but . in Europe . it i:s -and this is . then
- 35 Mrs S NVK ----- furtive glance -----
/48c
Mr P VK your very very specific American background- in Europe, even if you are
- 36 Mrs S NVK ----- furtive glance -----
Mr P VK doing , well, let's say a text edition o:f a: . well-established author, . . let's take
- 37 /49
Mrs S VK Hmhm
Mrs S NVK ----- furtive glance -----
/48d
Mr P VK an eighteenth century satirist like Jonathan Swift, erm: if you do this at
- 38 Mrs S NVK ----- furtive glance ----- furtive
Mr P VK let's say OUP . . er or: Cámbridge University perhaps, you can be sure you
- 39 Mrs S NVK glance ----- furtive
/50
Mr P VK won't get royalty for the first hundred/ first four hundred cópiès . Starting
- 40 Mrs S NVK glance ----- furtive
/51
Mr P VK from four-o-ône, you would get: I think about seven percent. So: with that in
- 41 Mrs S NVK glance ----- furtive glance -----
Mr P VK mind, with that background in mind, I think that our: . . offer would be: . fair
- 42 Mrs S NVK ----- furtive glance -----
/52
Mr P VK and . reasonable. We can talk about:/ certainly we can talk about: . erm a royal-
- 43 /53
Mrs S VK Hm̄
Mrs S NVK ----- furtive glance -----
/54
Mr P VK ty from copy one, if we know . more about . the: very specific data. I think it
- 44 nr. of v.frame 55:19
Mrs S NVK ----- furtive glance ----- o
/55
Mr P VK would simply be too early to, to, to, to make thing:s . fast at the moment. Ah:m

45	nr. of v.frame	55:2055:21	55:21	55:22	55:23
	Mrs S _{VK}	^{/66} Well, I think, as you said . right at the beginning of our conversation, this			
	Mrs S _{NVK}	o----- looks down----- o		o-----	stares at
	Mrs S _{NVK}	% spreads, closes hands			
	Mrs S _{NVK}	%[opens m.% raises head			
	Mr P _{VK}	::::...		^{/67} Yep	^{/68} Yep
	Mr P _{NVK}	o- starts to lean back again			

/breathes in

46	nr. of v.frame	55:25	55:26	55:27	55:28
	Mrs S _{VK}	is obviously information-gathering on, . on both sides. ((2s)) But I <u>do</u> think		^{/62}	
	Mrs S _{NVK}	Passmann -----	stares at Passmann-----	o o-----	looks down-
	Mrs S _{NVK}	% spreads, closes hands			
	Mrs S _{NVK}		% assertive nodding		
	Mr P _{VK}	^{/59} Yep	^{/60} Yep	^{/61} Yes	

47	nr. of v.frame	55:30	55:31	55:32	55:33	55:34	55:35
	Mrs S _{VK}	part of the information <u>has</u> to be: . . at <u>least</u> a realistic framework . . to know					
	Mrs S _{NVK}	o o-----	stares at Passmann-----	o			% chuckles
	Mrs S _{NVK}			% spreads hands			% closes hands
	Mrs S _{NVK}			o - plain assertive nodding - - o		o----	plain
	Mr P _{VK}		^{/63} Hm, (what's in preview).	^{/64} Yep	^{/65} Yep		
	Mr P _{NVK}			o- chuckles-o		o-----	
	Mr P _{NVK}			% turns his trunk aside and down with			

48	nr. of v.frame	55:36	55:37
	Mrs S _{VK}	where we're <u>goi</u> ng t ^o .	^{/68} And so I think that's, that's <u>one</u> of the things
	Mrs S _{NVK}	assertive nodding - - - - o	o-----
	Mrs S _{NVK}		stares at Passmann-----
	Mr P _{VK}	^{/66} Yep	^{/67} Yes, <u>of</u> course.
	Mr P _{NVK}	- nods affirmatively - - - - -	nods affirmatively - - - - -
	Mr P _{NVK}	embarrassment - - - - -	leans far back - - - - -

49	nr. of v.frame	55:41	55:42	55:43
	Mrs S _{VK}	that would ahm . at least need to be framed in a <u>little</u> bit for us to, to know		
	Mrs S _{NVK}	-----o	o-----	stares at Passmann-----
	Mrs S _{NVK}	o- indicates frame with her hands-----	o	o- moves hand
	Mrs S _{NVK}	o---- looks down-----	o	o----- assertive nodding-----
	Mr P _{VK}	^{/69} Hm	^{/70} Yeah	
	Mr P _{NVK}	-----	nods affirmatively-----	nods affirmatively-----
	Mr P _{NVK}	-- leans far back-----	leans far back-----	leans far back-----

- 50
- | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|---|----------------|-------|-------|----------------|---------------------|----------------|
| nr. of v. frame | 55:44 | 55:45 | 55:46 | 55:47 | 55:48 | 55:48 | 55:52 |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | whether that next step . will be taken or not. | | | | | | |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | ----- stares at Passmann ----- | | | | | | |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | thoughtfully - - o o- closes hands - o | | | | | | |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | ----- assertive nodding ----- o | | | | | | |
| Mr P _{VK} | | ^{/71} | Yép | | ^{/72} | Yep, yep ((--6s--)) | ^{/73} |
| Mr P _{NVK} | ----- nods affirmatively ----- o | | | | | | |
| Mr P _{NVK} | -- leans far back ----- leans far back ----- o% takes pencil o- | | | | | | |
| | <i>/breathes in/loud</i> | | | | | | |
- 51
- | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|-------|
| nr. of v. frame | 55:55 | | | | | | 56:01 |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | - stares at Passmann ----- stares at Passmann ----- | | | | | | |
| Mr P _{VK} | ^{/74a}
[2what about... . I mean, . we could, we could agree on let's say six . . or even | | | | | | |
| Mr P _{NVK} | ----- leans back ----- leans back ----- | | | | | | |
| | <i>expulsion of breath</i> | | | | | | |
- 52
- | | | | | |
|----------------------|---|-----------------|-------------------------|-----------------|
| nr. of v. frame | 56:02 | 56:02 | 56:07 | 56:09 |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | ----- stares at Passmann ----- | | | |
| Mr P _{VK} | ^{/74b} | ^{/74c} | ^{/74d} | ^{/75a} |
| Mr P _{VK} | eight percent . [3from copy one . . [4per author . if that agrees with you. . De- | | | |
| Mr P _{NVK} | ----- leans back ----- leans back ----- | | | |
| | <i>/flicks pen clip</i> | | <i>/flicks pen clip</i> | |
- 53
- | | | | |
|----------------------|---|-----------------|--|
| nr. of v. frame | 56:10 | | |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | ----- stares at Passmann ----- stares | | |
| Mr P _{VK} | ^{/75b} | ^{/75c} | pending again -and . that is . very very preliminary- depending <u>on</u> . our calcula- |
| Mr P _{NVK} | o % points with pencil at Mrs Strothers o----- leans back ----- | | |
- 54
- | | | |
|----------------------|---|------|
| Mrs S _{VK} | ^{/76} | Hmhm |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | at Passmann ----- stares at Passmann ----- | |
| Mr P _{VK} | ^{/77}
tion, depending <u>on</u> the size of edition <u>and</u> on the actual sales price. But <u>that</u> | |
| Mr P _{NVK} | ----- leans back ----- leans back ----- | |
- 55
- | | | | |
|----------------------|--|-------|-------|
| nr. of v. frame | 56:22 | 56:25 | 56:26 |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | ----- stares at Passmann ----- | | |
| Mrs S _{NVK} | % slight shaking of head o----- slight | | |
| Mr P _{VK} | would be something we <u>could</u> agree on: . . about . eight percent . for both <u>you</u> | | |
| Mr P _{NVK} | ----- leans back ----- leans back ----- | | |

- 56 nr. of v.frame 56:59 56:30 56:3256:33
 Mrs S_{VK} /80 That's at least getting a little
 Mrs S_{NVK} - o o - chuckles -
 Mrs S_{NVK} nodding ----- o
 Mr P_{VK} /78 and the co-author. . From copy one. . Scratch nil.
 Mr P_{NVK} /79 % approaches desk
 Mr P_{NVK} ----- leans back ----- leans back ----- leans
- 57 Mrs S_{VK} more realistic.
 Mrs S_{NVK} ----- o o - laughs
 Mr P_{VK} /81 /82 /83 Okay, fine. ((laughs)) . . You see, I, I simply can't commit
 Mr P_{NVK} back ----- leans back ----- leans
- 58 Mr P_{VK} myself to, to more right now because erm: . ah I haven't got . . . the figures that
 Mr P_{NVK} back ----- leans back ----- leans
- 59 Mrs S_{VK} /84 Hmhm /85 Awright.
 Mr P_{VK} I need at the moment to calculate this . properly . . rough figures, . alright?
 Mr P_{NVK} back ----- leans back ----- o
- 60 Mrs S_{VK} /87 Erm let me just ask a:, a very general question. And then, then I know we're, /90
 Mr P_{VK} /86 Okay. /88 Hm /89 Hm
- 61 Mrs S_{VK} /91 we're probably . over your time limit. . You've driven in and, and I know you
- 62 Mrs S_{VK} need your lunch among other things, ah not to mention coffee!
 Mr P_{VK} /92 /93 Good point that! Yes
- 63 Mrs S_{VK} /94 /96 ((laughs)) But, but just as a very fast question: What kind of production time .
 Mr P_{VK} /95 Alright.
- 64 Mrs S_{VK} . do you usually work within? /98 Eight to twelve weeks:.
 Mr P_{VK} /97 Eight to twelve weeks.

Section III

Native/non-native Interactions

Constructing Misunderstanding as a Cultural Event

Volker Hinnenkamp
University of Augsburg

A pause in the wrong place, an intonation misunderstood, and a whole conversation went awry.

(E.M. Forster, *Passage to India*, 1924: 262f.)

1. Motives

Most of the research and writing on intercultural communication can be subsumed under two motivational approaches. One is intercultural communication according to aspects of ‘utilitarian’ motives (1) (using the term ‘utilitarian’ in the way adopted and described by Scollon and Wong Scollon 1995: 94ff.); the other I would like to characterize as mainly philologically motivated (2). Both labels are rather crude and in a way polemical. (1) describes the focal *raison d’être* of studying intercultural communication as being conflict driven and in need of a helping hand by intercultural communication researchers and intercultural communication practitioners. This is the area in which many theoretical and empirical specialists meet with applicators in the classroom and trainers in enterprises and public offices. Their aim is to improve analytical insights, to make instruction and language learning more effective, and to secure smooth international business and an undisturbed conduct with non-native clients. All this is summed up in the following quotation: “The ability, through increased awareness and understanding, to coexist peacefully with people who do not necessarily share our backgrounds, beliefs, values, or life styles can not only benefit us in our own neighborhoods but can also be a decisive factor in forestalling nuclear annihilation” (Samovar and Porter 1988: 1f.). (2) looks more for basic criteria of what intercultural

communication is, how intercultural communication is distinct and different from intracultural communication or those forms of communication said to be devoid of culture. It regards intercultural communication as a form of communication in its own right and it is interested in its phenomenology, its constituency and its relevance as regards communicability and comprehensibility of symbolic human interaction.

Of course, there are intersections. And there are motives, that should be described in more differentiated ways. Both approaches struggle in similar ways over that delicate ingredient called culture and how it is or becomes linked to communication so that particular constellations and particular types of encounters are justifiably called intercultural.

2. Misunderstanding in intercultural communication research

My own reflections are in general motivated by the philological approach, but the utilitarian motives will serve as my point of departure. I will concentrate on one of the most (if not the most) cited utilitarian reason for studying intercultural communication, that is to say the conflicting effects of miscommunication and ‘misunderstandings’. This perspective of intercultural communication is well documented. Take a reader like “Analyzing Intercultural Communication” (Knapp, Enninger and Knapp-Potthoff 1987) as an example; the term “misunderstanding” is used about 20 times (including three mentions in my own contribution to the volume), “miscommunication” about 15 times. Both are often accompanied by “awkward moments”, “inherent ambiguities”, “communication conflict”, “communication breakdown” and “communicative failure”. The literature is full of analyses of this particular aspect but there are few, if any, critical reflections on the notion of misunderstanding itself.

2.1 Commonsense misunderstanding

The notion of misunderstanding usually does not go beyond commonsense notions of understanding. It is used as a strictly moral category in that it figures as a disturbing factor in communication that has to be removed in order to guarantee or retrieve smooth conduct. Such an understanding of misunderstanding reflects and contributes to the ethics and norms of what constitutes ‘proper’, i.e. undisturbed and ‘clean’ conversational conduct. It is here that

many conceptualizers of misunderstanding meet with many of those of intercultural communication. It supports an idealistic view of language and communication devoid of ambivalence and fuzziness. Misunderstanding, trouble, breakdown and miscommunication in general are thus either presented as contradictory, counterproductive and suboptimal choices within the alleged consensual objective of talk and interaction as a cooperative and agreement-based enterprise, or as something which is structurally intrinsic to particular categories of encounters and situational constellations beyond such interactional dimensions as intersubjectivity and negotiability.

Rarely do we come across studies on misunderstandings as a (pragma-)linguistic phenomenon *in its own right* (cf. e.g. such attempts as Zaefferer 1977; Grimshaw 1980; Dascal 1985; Mudersbach 1987; Weizman and Blum-Kulka 1992). Even rarer are attempts at grounding misunderstanding somehow empirically. Here we find case studies on lexical ambiguity in student discussions (Loretz 1976), an experimental study on successful and failed intention attribution (Dobrick 1985), and speech act pragmatic corpus research into misunderstandings in fictional dialogues (Falkner 1997). Yet a real life dialogic perspective beyond experimental and fictional settings seems to be an absolute rarity. The title of Humphrey-Jones' dissertation "An Investigation of the Types and Structure of Misunderstanding" (1986) tells us that there is more to look at in a misunderstanding than unspecified trouble and miscommunication. Humphrey-Jones' approach is founded upon a hundred dialogic samples of misunderstandings, most of them noted by the author as they happened, what she calls a "diary method". Both Falkner and Humphrey-Jones offer precious insights into the working and origins of misunderstanding, both give structural taxonomies as to possible criteria and semantic and pragmatic sources of misunderstandability. Some in-depth analyses of a number of situated misunderstandings in real talk-in-interaction are to be found in Selting's microethnographic and conversation analytic study of conversational difficulties in institutional discourse between clients and social security officers (Selting 1987).¹ There are very few but inspiring attempts on misunderstanding from within the conversation and discourse analysis tradition.² Schegloff (1987, 1992) combines misunderstanding with particular repair positions (see below). Also Drummond and Hopper (1991) treat misunderstanding within the repair-issue. In particular they address the "relationship between the *distance* from repairable to repair-initiation. Briefly, as this distance increases, the term 'misunderstanding' becomes a better and better

descriptor for what occurs” (Drummond and Hopper 1991: 305).

2.2 *Findings in misunderstanding research*

In studies which focus on misunderstandings proper in human conduct we mainly find two different kinds of outlook. One attempts to track down the sources of, and reasons for, misunderstandings, the other attempts to identify the interactional structuredness of misunderstandings. At least one reasoning complex is accepted by both; that is the role that ambiguity and indirectness, the difference between saying and intended meaning, and more generally, coherence and mutual knowledge (or rather their disturbance) play in human speech. Apart from these global sources, there are attempts at systematizing the possible semantic and pragmatic grounds for misunderstanding at a local speech or dialogue level. Dascal for example argues that “a first step in analyzing misunderstanding is to identify the layer [of significance] in which it arises” (Dascal 1985: 443). What is aimed at is a kind of taxonomy of semantic and pragmatic grounds for misunderstanding (cf. Falkner 1997). But the interactive layers where a misunderstanding might possibly “arise” are as manifold as there are layers to be found. A taxonomy does not account for the working and treatment of a misunderstanding, it tries to objectify misunderstanding as something to be grasped as exterior to the participants who are involved in an interaction. It identifies misunderstanding without the identifying work of the (mis)accomplishers involved. What is needed rather is a perspective that is able to show that misunderstanding “is best viewed as an interactional stance, something that can be claimed and disputed or agreed upon, rather than as an objective phenomenon existing independently of participants’ claims and noticings” (Bilmes 1992: 96). “Treating something as a misunderstanding, then, is as much an interpretive accomplishment of speaker-hearers as treating something as a joke or story” (Schwartz 1977 quoted in Humphrey-Jones 1986: 21). A misunderstanding in my view may well be an interpretive accomplishment, but it may also be simply an unilateral interpretive matter and even just a felt matter. In the following section I want to approach the problem of misunderstanding by trying to exploit all three possibilities via an interactional structural analysis of different types of misunderstanding.

3. Misunderstanding’s interactional structure

3.1 Seven types of misunderstanding

There are basically 7 different types of misunderstanding (MU 1 to MU 7) that will briefly be outlined in this section. They range from what Linell (1995) calls ‘overt misunderstanding’ (MU 1 and MU 2) to ‘latent’ ones (as MU 6 and 7), with the ‘covert’ type in between (MU 3 to 5). Only the overt and covert ones will be of empirical interest here.

(MU 1) There is an immediate recognition of a misunderstanding, which is indicated by a repair at the next possible opportunity and is then followed by a return to the status quo ante.

Example 1: Fristen (Unlimited)³

1	S: °Ja, jaja°, aber wär halt entfristet, das ist das Beruhigende, ne(?) (Yeah, but it would be unlimited, I’d be at ease, you know)
2	H: Befristet- naja (Limited- well)
3	S: ENTfristet (UNlimited)
4	H: Entfristet? (Unlimited?)
5	S: Entfristet, mhm (Unlimited, ya)
6	H: Und die äh Habil machste aber trotzdem weiter(?) (But you’ll still carry on with your dissertation, though(?))

In Example 1 the whole shaded bloc from line 2 to 5 could be omitted and there would be no trace of a misunderstanding having occurred. The shaded bloc constitutes a kind of minor subdialogue consisting of a repair cycle: line 2 is the repairable and an indication of a mishearing, line 3 gives the correction of the misunderstood item, and lines 4 and 5 comprise the reassurance by the mishearer and the ratification by the corrector. For Schegloff, misunderstanding, at least this overtly manifest type, is seen to stand in close relation to the repair device, because sequentially a misunderstanding — as we can see in the above example — can only be repaired third position onward, as “repair after an interlocutor’s response (second position) has revealed trouble in understanding an earlier turn (the ‘repairable’ in first position)” (Schegloff 1992: 1301). The misunderstanding is thus *retrospectively* identified via the position of the repair turn in relation to the repairable.⁴ This locates the occurrence of a misunderstanding in a *vertical* order of sequentiality.⁵

(MU 1a) Extended variant: The misunderstood segment may be reconstructed

by virtue of identifying or localizing it as such and may even become explicated by an explicit ‘diagnosis’ (i.e. realization of the features of the problem in question) or ‘anamnesis’ (i.e. case history) of the misunderstanding’s trajectory. Such explicit diagnoses could be formulations like “I think we have a misunderstanding there” or “That’s not what I meant” or “I don’t mean X, I mean Y” etc.; a ‘case history’ we find in examples where explanations or accounts are given as to why the misunderstanding occurred: “That was metaphorically meant, not literally. You missed that point”.

(MU 2) There is an immediate recognition of a misunderstanding, which is indicated by a repair at the next possible opportunity, but there is no return to the status quo ante. The misunderstanding itself becomes a resource of continuation.

(MU 2a) Extended variant: The misunderstood segment may be reconstructed by virtue of identifying or localizing it as such and may even become explicated by explicit ‘diagnoses’ or ‘anamneses’ of the misunderstanding’s trajectory. Note: the more extended the misunderstanding’s trajectory is, the less likely is a return to the status quo ante. It will rather lead to a continuation based on the misunderstanding.

(MU 3) There is a gradual recognition of a misunderstanding, which may be indicated by disturbances in the conversational flow, by signs of dis coherence, by detours or recyclings (repetitions, paraphrases, circumlocutions, ‘talking down’-effects), by unresponded repair initiations, by suddenly or gradually developing traits of verbal, nonverbal or paralinguistic insecurity, or, simply by the indication or registration of (what Erickson and Shultz 1982 have called) ‘uncomfortable moments’, until one interlocutor becomes aware that some kind of misunderstanding has occurred. What may follow is a further treatment as described in MU1 and MU2 (including their extensions). But note: the more distant the recognition of a misunderstanding is the more effort it will take to repair it and the less likely is an easy return to the status quo ante. Furthermore, the more distant the recognition the less probable are the exact localization and identification of where the first misunderstanding occurred, particularly when the misunderstanding has built itself up over a whole stretch of turn by turn development.

(MU 4) There is a gradual recognition of a misunderstanding, which may be indicated by disturbances in the conversational flow, in signs of dis coherence,

by detours or recyclings (repetitions, paraphrases, circumlocutions, ‘talking down’-effects), by unresponded repair initiations, by suddenly or gradually developing traits of verbal, nonverbal, or paralinguistic insecurity, or, simply by the indication or registration of ‘uncomfortable moments’, until it is recognized but does not get treated as described in MU1 and MU2. That is, the misunderstanding will remain without clarification by way of a repair with reference to the misunderstanding’s anamnesis but it will be solved. In other words, interlocutors will overcome the misunderstanding without ever getting to its roots. Hence, there is no trajectory of the misunderstanding to be reconstructed but rather particular lost threads of discourse will be fitted together. This, of course, is also a kind of repair. It is like solving a complex mathematical problem without comprehending the individual steps that lead to the solution. As regards the last two kinds, Example 2 is from intercultural literature (cf. Williams 1985: 170f.).

*Example 2: Canvassing*⁶

1	IT:	What sort of work are you going to do when you finish the course?
2	V:	A few weeks ago ah (+) the school send me to factory doing canvassing (+) canvassing (+) for two weeks experience and ah the
3		boss say give me a position, but (...) when I will finish the course
4		because I have learned to do some more job and cannot take it
5		<i>6a IT: So you've been canvassing for work</i>
6b	IT:	and who said that they'd give you a job?
7	V:	The boss
8	IT:	The boss of who, of what?
9	V:	The boss of factory [laughs]
10	IT:	What was the factory?
11	V:	Canvassing
12	IT:	Oh, is that the name of the factory?
13	V:	Oh (+) Joyce (+) Joyce furniture, I think
14	IT:	Oh (+) Joyce (+) furn- (+) Joy?
15	V:	Furniture
16		Joyce
17a	IT:	Joyce
17b	IT:	They make beds?
18	V:	Yeah (+) yeah
19	IT:	Is that the place?
20	V:	Yeah
21	IT:	The place in (+) in (+) down near Fremantle?
22	V:	In West O'Connor
23a	IT:	O'Connor. Yeah, that's right. The place that makes beds.
23b	IT:	So he will give
24		you a job, will he?

Participants in this encounter are IT, a counsellor at the “Australian Commonwealth Employment Service”, and a client V, a Vietnamese, who is enrolled in a job finding training scheme. IT obviously misinterprets V’s “doing canvassing” (line 2f.). It is not understood as a description of the kind of work that is done in the factory but as canvassing for a job in that factory (line 6a). As this interpretation is not questioned, this misinterpretation is not clarified. Thus, however, the factory where V is offered a job remains underspecified. What follows is IT’s step by step inquiry into the specifics of this alleged offer. As V’s answers do not seem to observe the maxim of quantity, IT keeps on inquiring in more and more detail. Even in the exchange in line 11 and 12, where “canvassing” is linked to the factory, the misunderstanding is not solved although the confirmation check reveals another misinterpretation because “canvassing” does not refer to the name of the factory but to the kind of production process. Here we have a second misunderstanding, of course. So finally when the more general “canvassing” gets specified (or generalized) by “The place that makes beds” (line 23a), this does not clarify the first misunderstanding. It leads to an understanding without making the misinterpreted item a repairable one.

The shaded and inserted sequences of the exchange parts are all dependent on IT’s assumption of being underinformed, whereas V’s laconicity may be seen as based on the assumption of having given sufficient information. We thus receive a whole subdialogue which is subdivided into various repair sequences (including another misunderstanding), hierarchically dependent on each other without, however, getting to the repairable.

If we skip the whole subdialogue and imagine this exchange as smoothly proceeding, all that is left is Example 2a.

Example 2a.

1	IT:What	sort of work are you going to do when you finish the course?
2	V:A	few weeks ago ah (+) the school send me to factory doing can
3		vassing(+) canvassing (+) for two weeks experience and ah the boss
4		say give me a position, but (...) when I will finish the course because
5		I have learned to do some more job and cannot take it
23b	IT:So	he will give
24		you a job, will he?

(MU 5) There is a gradual recognition of a misunderstanding, which may be indicated by disturbances in the conversational flow, in signs of dis coherence, by detours or recyclings (repetitions, paraphrases, circumlocutions, ‘talking

down'-effects), by unresponded repair initiations, by suddenly or gradually emerging traits of verbal, nonverbal, or paralinguistic insecurity, or, simply by the indication or registration of 'uncomfortable moments', until the communication comes to a halt, dissolves, breaks down or is reinitiated by a change in topic. This is exactly the kind of misunderstandings Gumperz and his colleagues have worked on: "Lack of shared background knowledge leads initially to misunderstandings, but since contextualization conventions are not shared, attempts to repair these misunderstandings fail and conversational cooperation breaks down" (Gumperz 1995: 120).⁷

(MU 6) There is obviously no recognition of a misunderstanding. But an outside observer regards it as a misunderstanding; or one of the participants may have received particular information afterwards (even after a long time) that leads her to reassess the interaction (or parts of it) as a misunderstanding. The interaction in question remains, however, untouched by this discovery or reinterpretation.

(MU 7) To an outside observer there is no manifestation and no indication that a misunderstanding has occurred, yet one interlocutor (or even both interlocutors) may have the feeling that either she has or was or they have or were misunderstood. So the misunderstanding may have been noticed but remained unnegotiated.

3.2 *Reservations*

Of course, there are reservations about this apparently clearcut division of misunderstanding-types. One is that there is a graduation of variants between MU 2 and MU 3. For example, what Schegloff (1992) has named 'third position repair' as being typically indicative of a misunderstanding may also become a 'fourth or fifth position repair' etc. But the more distant the repair the more likely it is that manifestations will be less explicit and that there will be implicit indications and reconstructions will be harder. "Canvassing" is a good example of this. Another word of warning about the differentiation between the covert and the latent type: They may be analytically useful, but the deeper we get into the minutiae of the interactional structure the more likely we are to find hints of doubts in understanding and hints of these doubts being negotiated (as we will see in example 3 below). In particular the Gumperzian approach of conversational inferencing, based on contextualiza-

tion cues and conventions, gives ample evidence of how even the mismatching of one or several contextualization cues could develop into a disastrous interactional trajectory. These cues are at least analytically detectable as negotiated matters of discourse.⁸

3.3 *Misunderstanding as event: core and frame*

The description of ‘misunderstanding’ made so far is somewhat irritating and perhaps even misleading because a misunderstanding comprises much more than an singular item or intention or activity type. It also comprises the recognition of misunderstanding, its possible manifestation or indication and the reconstruction of its trajectory (by diagnosing, identifying, localizing and even by reconstructing the motives of its occurrence). It is often hard to gauge where a misunderstanding commences unless the case is clearly manifest as in MU 1. A misunderstanding ceases where interlocutors either regain their status quo ante or come to a smooth continuation according to criteria of coherence. So, as we can see in MU 3 to MU 5, the misunderstanding will be quite extended or never ending until the interlocution collapses or is reinitiated.

Note however that there are two kinds of ‘misunderstanding’ at issue; a whole stretch of talk with an alleged beginning and an end, as a speech event in its own right being structurally and interactionally describable, and a particular (often identifiable) encoding or interpretation being the alleged reason for the whole event. This I will call the *core misunderstanding*. The core in MU 1 was clearly the mishearing of the item “unlimited” (line 1) and it is this item which is made the subject of the subsequent sequence.

The misunderstanding event comprises the whole of each single example cited above. The core of the example in MU 4 was first misunderstanding V’s “doing canvassing” (line 2f.) by IT: its misinterpretation is shown in line 6a by the ratificatory statement “So you’ve been canvassing for work” which was, however, not corrected. The subdialogues created by the core misunderstanding include the managing (or handling) of the misunderstanding.

Whereas in “Canvassing” there was no identifiable core for the interlocutors, the indication of the misunderstanding normally refers right back to the misinterpreted statement. This is where the misunderstanding really begins. The transition back to the previous line of the interaction is where it ends.

So when I speak of ‘misunderstanding’, I either mean the *whole misunderstanding trajectory as an event in its own right* or the alleged identifiable *core*:

so any misunderstanding in situated communication comprises the ‘misunderstanding event’ as a frame and, embedded in it, the — more or less identifiable — ‘core misunderstanding’.⁹ Note that the frame only exists by virtue of the core; the core however is not identifiable, localizable and repairable without the frame event because these activities are part of the frame.

3.4 *Misunderstanding and intercultural communication revisited*

Now another difficulty arises. Taking into account this division into core and frame, it is quite impossible to make this distinction in cases of covert misunderstandings of the MU 4- and MU 5-type. It is here where I suggest intercultural communication could be treated as something substantially different from other forms of communications (which for reasons of contrastive simplicity we may call ‘intracultural’). That is, one criterion for assuming that intercultural communication is taking place is to regard covert misunderstandings or maybe particular kinds of covert misunderstandings¹⁰ as indicative of mismanaging differences or discrepancies in sociocultural knowledge. This hypothesis is, for example, implicit in the works of John Gumperz. They provide evidence of mismatches of interactional structure minutiae in which misunderstandings based on cultural and sociocultural conventions are characteristic of interethnic interactions, like those between Britons with an Anglosaxon background and those with a Southeast Asian background.¹¹ One hypothesis that can be derived from these findings is that covert types of misunderstandings are more frequent in interethnic encounters or in encounters between speakers with a different first language background or between native and non-native speakers. The “Canvassing” example is surely of the last kind. It is mainly characterized by native/non-native speaker problems; the culture component is less obvious here.¹²

So far I do not know of any comparative research which plausibly claims that particular kinds of misunderstanding were more frequent or typical in particular kinds of encounters such as between speakers of particular differences as to origin, background, language or culture area. It is thus hard to speak legitimately of ‘intercultural communication’ by virtue of misunderstandings which occur in particular kinds of encounters as is done in the utilitarian approach. Furthermore, I do not know of any intercultural research in which misunderstanding is clearly defined before being applied to an alleged intercultural encounter. What, we have to ask, do overt, covert and

latent misunderstandings have in common, except for their being commonly labelled ‘misunderstanding’ by the observer? As to the latent (and non-negotiated) one we have to ask if it can be regarded as a misunderstanding in its own right when it is absolutely not obvious to participants that it has occurred at all?¹³

What all types of misunderstandings seem to have in common is the *illusion of understanding* up to a certain point. The point may be discovery or discomfort. The overt one implies in particular the illusion of a first understanding being retrospectively falsified; the covert one the illusion of an understanding being gradually questioned and dismantled; the latent one the illusion of an understanding being questionable and falsifiable only by an outside observer (or a participant looking back as an outside observer). The two former ones will give the interaction in question — as we have seen above — a particular *imprint in the real time of the interaction*, i.e. it affects the interaction’s dynamic¹⁴ considerably, whereas the latter will be made a narration of conflict *ex post facto*. Note that the latter does not impinge on the parties’ actual involvement, whereas the other two will show some kind of negotiation, create sidesequences and sometimes even dialogues within dialogues, i.e. misunderstanding subdialogues.

3.5 Contextualizing misunderstandings

I have already warned against regarding the different MU-types as being clearly distinguishable as regards interactional structure. I have shown elsewhere that manifestations and indications that lead an interlocutor to infer that a misunderstanding may have occurred are highly differentiated and that they range on a manifestation continuum starting from such clear cut statements as “I think you misunderstood so and so” to slight indications like the extended halting of a pause or a doubtful look (Hinnenkamp 1998). Furthermore, we have to ask what “immediate” or “gradual recognition of a misunderstanding” means at all. As observers, we infer an interlocutor’s recognition from what we observe of how participants proceed, from what they demonstrably (mis-)understand, or, in the terms of John Gumperz, how they *contextualize* a potential misunderstanding.

All kinds of manifestations or indications that suggest that a misunderstanding may be occurring lead to the questioning or reinterpretation of the context or frame that has been taken for granted so far. Auer has attempted a

reconstruction of the contextualization work, in which interlocutors are permanently and tacitly involved by shaping it into five basic questions, which interlocutors ask each other in order to check if they are (still) acting in the same context or frame. These questions are “Are we talking to each other (right now)?”, “Who’s talking to whom (right now)?”, “What are we (just) doing with one another?”, “What are we talking about to each other (right now)?” and “On what footing are we on (right now)?” (cf. Auer 1986). And of course, not only can each of these questions be answered differently, giving rise to a misunderstanding, but a manifestation or indication of a misunderstanding may also lead to an immediate check of one’s understanding of the context so far. It will convert the above questions to ones of retrospection of the kind: “Have we talked to each other so far?”, “Who has been talking to whom so far?”, “What have we been doing with one another so far?”, “What have we been talking about to each other so far?” and “On what footing have we been so far?”. As the constitution of context is done retrospectively as well as prospectively, the questioning of a context that has been seen as valid so far leads to the identification of the immediate cause for suspicion of context erosion or change and also anticipates the remedial action needed to defend, adapt or repair.

Contextualizing is routine work. The context indications we give are highly conventionalized (cf. Gumperz 1982a; 1992a, b). We have as many interactional means for this at our disposal as there are layers and properties of our interactional structure. Without creating contexts for our interactional activities we would not be able to understand each other. Different contextualization conventions are one of the many reasons for misunderstanding. And as people from different cultural backgrounds may also have different conventions of contextualizing and framing, it is here that we find reasons for intercultural misunderstandings. But this, of course, does not inform about the interactional structure of a misunderstanding. Neither does it inform about the particular context of a misunderstanding event and about the work required to bring it into being. One question which arises from this is whether the suspicion or recognition of a misunderstanding also leads to a particular context of a misunderstanding event, and furthermore, if such a context is inferable by all parties involved. As we have seen in the first example, it took both interlocutors to manage the misunderstanding and get back to the status quo ante. The moment H gives evidence that he misheard “*entfristet (unlimited)*” by responding with “*Befristet- naja (Limited- well)*” the misunderstood

locutor corrects it immediately to “**ENT**fristet (**UN**limited)” (thereby of course demonstrating “immediate recognition”) followed by the misunderstander’s correct (and maybe astonished) repetition, thus ratifying the correct version. This again is followed by confirmation of the correct uptake “**Ent**fristet, mhm (**UN**limited, ya)”. That is, there is a reciprocal reassurance of the correct item before returning to the status quo ante. Both interlocutors have been involved in this process, both have followed the rules of a corrective cycle, both have created a corrective context, and thereby have guaranteed that “What we are talking about to each other (right now)” is actually the very same thing (again).

The momentary mismatch of topic may, however, affect other contexts as well. As we can see in the “Canvassing” example, the interrogation of the Viet-nameese client becomes quite harsh and it is only by virtue of V’s initiative of specifying IT’s question “The place in (+) in (+) down near Fremantle?” (line 21) by “In West O’Connor” (line 22) that communication returns to its normal course (in the cooperative sense). Because so far not only the thematic “What are we talking about to each other (right now)?” was available but also the schema of what kind of activity they were involved in (“What are we (just) doing with one another?”) and indeed also the schema of power, the unequal distribution of interactional rights and obligations (cf. “On what footing are we on (right now)?”).

4. Being on the wrong track: When a misunderstanding is (not) an intercultural one

4.1 Putting threads together

So far I have developed a typology of misunderstandings by macrosequential criteria and ordered them into three basic types which I have labelled in accordance with Linell (1995) “overt”, “covert” and “latent”. I have also described misunderstanding as an event in its own right, which very often has a clearly identifiable beginning and end, and which always has — unless it is latent — its own trajectory, sometimes closed and sometimes open, i.e. open ended or transformed into a new subject of its own. Misunderstanding as event has a core, which is sometimes retrospectively localized or identified. It has a frame or trajectory, which is the subsequent side sequence or even subdia-

logue by virtue of the treatment or negotiation of the core misunderstanding. The less identifiable the core, the more likely is an extended negotiation phase. Ideally, the end of a misunderstanding event is constituted by an uptake of the prior thread of conversation, now cleared, of course, of its misunderstandability. I have named this the return to status quo ante. Finally I have argued that misunderstanding as an event in its own right brings about its own conventionalized context, that is one of remedial action, initiating a sequence of acts best described by the Goffmanian term “corrective cycle” (cf. Goffman 1971).

The problem of remedial attempts as part of the misunderstanding event has been alluded to by John Gumperz’ statement that “Lack of shared background knowledge leads initially to misunderstandings, but since contextualization conventions are not shared, attempts to repair these misunderstandings fail and conversational cooperation breaks down” (Gumperz 1995: 120). Here I will follow a different line of argumentation by showing that at least some remedial practice of misunderstanding may be based on shared background knowledge. Lack of shared background knowledge — for example as to cultural praxis — may well be repaired by relying on a common stock of conventionalized routine, which we might label in contrast to cultural praxis ‘institutionalized discourse praxis’.

After starting this essay with a critique of the uncritical blending of misunderstanding and intercultural communication, I will now put the different threads of my findings and argumentation together and — armed with a much more differentiated notion of misunderstanding — will show that the bringing about of interculturality solely by virtue of connecting cultural different background of interlocutors with a misunderstanding cannot be taken for granted anymore.

4.2 *A case study of a full-fledged misunderstanding event with no words*

In the remaining section I will concentrate on one particular example of misunderstanding in order to elaborate on some of these last points. I will try to show three things: (1) How a misunderstanding creates a fully developed corrective cycle as part of the misunderstanding event. (2) How a misunderstanding may create a subdialogue without affecting the main dialogue. And (3) how a misunderstanding event may be linked to interculturality — or how not. This last point, in particular, aims at deconstructing intercultural communication along the lines of an undefined notion and concept of misunderstanding.

4.2.1 Transcript “The vanishing cup”

The transcript below (Example 3) shows a videographed sequence of 18 seconds from a university workshop on “Intercultural Communication”. Verbal and nonverbal data are presented in parallel columns. The nonverbal activity is further illustrated by pictures of ten video frames focussing on the two main interactants of the sequence. What the pictures do not show (but the video does) is the situative embedding. Fourteen students and one teacher sit in a semicircle. B is a male student, to his left sits the male teacher F. B is about one head taller than F. To the left of F there are 5 students, to the right of B 8 students, among whom is the male participant A. The composition of the seminar is multinational. The subject of the workshop is taboos.

Example 3: “Der entschwindende Becher” (The vanishing plastic cup)

Sec.	Pict No.	Speaking turns	Commentary line for F	Commentary line for B
00	1	<i>F: Also jetzt sieht man wenn man eine Sache-</i> <i>F: Well, now you see, if you know one-</i>	F gesticulates with his left hand at shoulder height, holding the plastic cup in his right hand chest high. Legs are stretched out. The left leg lies slightly angled on the right thigh so that the legs are slightly crossed at the bottom. F's eyes are turned in the direction of the left semicircle of the group.	B looks at F's face, his arms folded over his chest with hands hidden under upper arms.
01		<i>wenn man eine Sache weiß + (+)</i>	F puts plastic cup from his right into his left hand.	His right leg is stretched out towards F, his left leg drawn back, slightly bent to the left.
02		<i>dann gehn alle an-</i> so if you know one thing + then (+) all the oth-		

03	2	<i>also wenn-</i> so if-	With his left hand F puts plastic cup right between his thighs on the chair.	B lowers his gaze and follows the movement of F's hand with the plastic cup.
04		<i>ham ganz viele andre Sachen ham plötzlich n (h)(h)</i>	He crosses his legs a bit more tightly, thus enclosing the cup with his thighs more closely.	Arms and legs remain in the same position.
05		<i>Zusammenhang</i> quite a lot of other things stand all of a sudden just stand in context		
06	3	= <i>sie stehn im Zusammenhang</i> =they're somehow connected	F has both his hands raised to chest height, still looking at the participants on the left, while the plastic cup rests between his thighs.	B changes the position of his arms. His right arm stretches out in the direction of the plastic cup between F's thighs, where his left arm retreats fist downward angled at stomach height. With his right hand he grabs the cup by its rim and starts lifting it from between F's thighs.
07	4		F lowers his right hand and reaches for the plastic cup in B's left hand. His eyes remain directed at the left semicircle. With both hands he takes hold of the cup.	B holds the cup at its upper rim with his left hand from above at F's belt height.
08	5		F turns his gaze in the direction of B's face, laughing. His right hand releases the cup. By moving his right foot to the outside the left leg is released from its crossed position.	B draws his hand back and turns his upper body slightly to the left. The palms of his hands face downwards. His face looks down to the left.
		[A lifts/raises his right hand]		

09	6		F laughs, his gaze oriented in the direction of B. He holds the cup with both hands at stomach height. Legs are now parallel and bent, the feet rest on the outside edge of his shoes.	B puts his right hand on the right thigh of his stretched out leg and leaning his upper body forward he cups his face in the inner side of his left hand, thus covering his turned down upper face with the hand. The elbow of the left arm is supported on his left knee.
09 10 11		[All: Gentle laughter comes up among other participants, some scraps of talk can be discerned. As the talking fades, A points the forefinger of his right hand up and begins talking:]	B turns his face briefly back to the left semicircle and then turns towards A.	
11	7	A: <i>Ganz kurz bloß was</i> + A: Just for a tiny moment + F: [towards A] <i>Ja</i> F: Yes	Still holding the plastic cup in his right hand, F stretches his left hand over in the direction of B's right thigh and moves it up and down twice without touching or coming too close to B's thigh. F keeps on looking towards A. His feet are facing outwards	B straightens up his upper body and turns to F releasing his left hand from his face. With his right hand and supported by his body slightly leaning towards the right, he points to the space between his and F's chair. His eyes follow the movement of his right hand towards the bottom right.

12	8	<p><i>A: und zwar wegen- in Italien ist es halt so</i></p> <p>A: it's 'cause of- well in Italy it's like this</p>	<p>F leans with both elbows on his thighs. The left forearm is hanging at crutch height, crossed by the right hand which holds the plastic cup tightly. F continues to look towards speaker A.</p>	<p>B puts both his hands with fingers spread out on his thighs. He laughs and starts looking towards speaker A.</p>
13				
14	9	<p><i>dass man also</i></p>	<p>F turns his head a bit further in A's direction.</p>	<p>B puts his arms back behind the chair. His upper body is in an upright position, nearly a head taller than F. He turns his head more sharply in the speaker's direction.</p>
15		<p><i>>wegen der Rechnung kurz ne< äh</i></p>	<p>F remains in the same position.</p>	
16		<p>that one °well° >the bill I mean< uh</p>		<p>B puts his arms to the front and leans forward. With his right hand he grasps the back of his left hand.</p>
17		<p><i>da wird das eben alles zusammen-gerechnet</i></p> <p>there you add it all up and</p>	<p>F remains in the same position.</p>	<p>He looks at A. He moves his left leg from the slightly stretched out position to the right leg's angled position.</p> <p>B leans forward even further. His left foot adopts the right foot's position so that they stand exactly parallel to each other.</p>
18	10	<p><i>das machen wir dann unter Freunden aus</i></p> <p>then we figure that out among friends</p>	<p>F nods his head in A's direction.</p>	<p>B finally sits parallel to F., i.e. same height, same angle and same gaze direction.</p>


Picture sequence 1–10




Picture 1




Picture 2



Picture 3




Picture 4



Picture 5




Picture 6



Picture 7



Picture 8



Picture 9



Picture 10

“The vanishing plastic cup” in speaking turns

F: *Also jetzt sieht man, wenn man eine Sache- wenn man eine Sache weiß + dann (+) gehn*
 Well, now you see, if you know one- so if you know one thing + then
alle an- also wenn- ham ganz viele andre Sachen ham plötzlich n (h)(h)Zusammenhang
 all the oth- so if- quite a lot of other things stand all of a sudden just stand in context
 =*sie stehn im Zusammenhang*
 =they're somehow connected

[A lifts/raises his right hand]

[All: Gentle laughter comes up among other participants, some scraps of talk can be discerned. As the talking fades out, A points the forefinger of his right hand up and begins talking:]

A: *Ganz kurz bloß was*
 Just for a tiny moment +

F: *[zu A] Ja*
 [to A] Yes

A: *und zwar wegen- in Italien ist es halt so, dass man °also° >wegen der Rechnung kurz ne< äh*

it's 'cause of- well in Italy it's like this that one °well° >the bill I mean< uh
da wird das eben alles zusammen gerechnet, das machen wir dann unter Freunden aus.
 there you add it all up and then we figure that out among friends

4.2.2 *Narrating the transcript*

Obviously there is a conflict here between the cup holder F and his neighbour B. The misunderstanding is purely nonverbal. As a simple narrative one could tell it like this: F tries to say something but is somehow hindered by the plastic cup in his hand (Picture 1). He changes it from one hand to the other and finally places it on the chair between his thighs (Picture 2).¹⁵ His neighbour B tries to be helpful by taking it away from F's crotch in order to place it on the floor between the two chairs (Picture 3). But before he is in a position to realize this, F has taken the cup away from B (Picture 4), obviously insinuating some other intention (or he just avoids physical contact with his private parts). B first retreats (Picture 5), puts his head into his hand as if he were ashamed (Picture 6). Then B starts to explain nonverbally what he had intended all long while F signals to him that he should not be bothered (Picture 7). B then puts his hands ostentatiously on his thighs whereas F turns his attention back to the discussion (Picture 8). B folds his hands behind his back (Picture 9), moves them back to the front again and puts himself into a listener position, parallel in height, gaze and position to F (Picture 10). Note that this part of the story is a reconstruction of the nonverbal account given by B. Without his explanantion we would have no indication of what he had intended.¹⁶

The core misunderstanding lies in the contingent acts of grasping the cup from between F's thighs and F's defensive (and actually reconquering) reaction to it. But we now know that the trajectory of the misunderstanding comprises much more. It also includes the whole corrective cycle to follow and it is terminated by the renormalization of a very special and very short-term relationship between B and F, which is based solely on the conflict over the plastic cup's position. The example is of the extended MU 1-type of misunderstanding: "The misunderstood segment may be reconstructed by virtue of identifying or localizing it as such and may even become explicated by an explicit 'diagnosis' (...) or 'anamnesis' (...) of the misunderstanding's trajectory" (cf. above). There is certainly no explicit diagnosis here but the anamnesis is as explicit as a nonverbal one can be. It includes what B actually intended to do and is of the kind: "No, what I actually meant is this etc."

4.2.3 *Healing misunderstanding by remedial work*

Now let us look at some of these issues in more detail. The above transcript is a wonderful example of how a misunderstanding creates a fully developed corrective cycle as part of the misunderstanding event. It is only after F turns his gaze towards B's face, laughing for a moment (Picture 5), that B commences his remedial work in the classical way by indicating regret or repentance by expressing shame (Picture 6), followed by an explanatory and apologetic account (Picture 7). F responds almost at the same time with a soothing release by stretching his left hand towards B's right thigh, moving it slightly up and down twice without touching B's thigh, thus symbolically performing a light thigh slap (Picture 7). This gesture is well conventionalized as a nonverbal device for people sitting next to each other, at least among same sex interactants or good friends. Its function is friendly, non aggressive, often positively supportive and soothing. It may even be culturally conventionalized.¹⁷ B continues his repair by putting his hands very pointedly on his thighs as if he wanted to display his disciplined hands (Picture 8). Putting his hands back then is both a further demonstration of discipline and also of a transitional phase of regaining possession of his hands (Picture 9), which is followed by the full adaptation to the 'standard' listener position (Picture 10). It is this repositioning that puts a definite end to the misunderstanding event. B now has fully returned to the main interactional focus, his reintegration marks the end of a nonverbal subdialogue.

Chart 1 recapitulates the sequence as a full-fledged misunderstanding event.

Chart “The vanishing plastic cup” as misunderstanding event

Move	Performer	Move depiction	Part of misunderstanding event, type of move
1	<i>F</i>	<i>puts plastic cup between his thigh onto the chair</i>	<u>Move 1 & 2</u> Retrospectively identified MU-core (challenge/repairable)
2	B	seizes plastic cup from F’s crotch	
3	<i>F</i>	<i>stops B from continuation of move 2</i>	<u>Move 3 & 4</u> manifestation: <i>indicating a repairable</i>
4	B	withdrawal	reaction
5	<i>F</i>	<i>turns his face towards B and laughs</i>	(implicit) repair summons
6a	B	(a) pointedly depicts embarrassment and shame;	<u>repair strategies (a)–(d):</u> (a) “confession”
6b		(b) refers to space between his and B’s chairs, giving an account	(b) attempt at legitimizing move 2 (= partial anamnesis)
7	<i>F</i>	<i>soothing gesture</i>	<i>exonerating the “violator” ratification/ acceptance of repair endeavours</i>
8	B	(c) moves hands out of the way to demonstrate that they will not initiate another violation/misunderstanding	(c) self-disciplining
9	<i>F</i>	<i>attention is solely directed at speaker A</i>	<i>end to repair negotiation, return to main focus of activity</i>
10	B	(d) pointedly regains listener position	(d) reintegration and renormalization: return to status quo ante

4.2.4 *Misunderstanding as embedded subdialogue*

There is another interesting point to make here which also corresponds to the nonsimultaneity between F and B during the corrective cycle. In move number 9, F has already returned to the main activity. For him this means the end of the misunderstanding event. This is the reason why there is no further ratification of B's third repair move. During the whole event F does not opt out of the main activity, as B does by giving his full attention to the emerging nonverbal subdialogue of the misunderstanding sequence. F treats the misunderstanding *en passant*; he gives indications of a release but at the same time he selects the next speaker (Picture 7). This speaks in favour of a routine handling of misunderstandings so that the emerging subdialogue may not even disturb the main line of activity and is even embedded as participants go along. The routinized management of misunderstandings speak both in favour of being part of implicit sociocultural knowledge and hence to its susceptibility to intercultural conflict (exactly in the way Gumperz describes above), and in favour of a more generalized interactional device irrespective of sociocultural background. And of course, it is here that we have to ask how much culture there is in misunderstanding events (of this kind).

4.2.5 *Different interpretation, common repair*

This leads me to the very last point, and closes the circle of my argument. The sequence described depicts a scene from a multinational group discussion. F is German, B Turkish. So far I have concentrated on the misunderstanding process alone leaving interactants' ethnic and/or cultural background completely out of consideration. This is mainly due to my focussing on the misunderstanding event itself, i.e. its interactional structure without referring it back to pragmatic or sociolinguistic or intercultural constraints which would lead to the reasons and motives for a misunderstanding, a focus I have neglected so far in favour of macrosequential structure. For a scholar of intercultural communication the misunderstanding could easily be traced back to cultural differences in terms of territorial dealings, so that a neighbour's territory — at least among same sex — is regarded as more easily accessible under certain preconditions. One such precondition might have been the moral or aesthetic inadequacy of placing a plastic cup in the crotch. Another one might have been motivated by reasons of a kind of protective politeness, protecting F from spilling the juice in the plastic cup on his trousers. All these reasons of course as much as F's reason for putting the cup between his thighs

could well be accounted for by personal preferences irrespective of cultural background. Even if we interpret the warding off of B's intrusion in F's private parts as a defence against a surprise 'attack' from outside, we will not get any further by interpreting this as particularly culture bound. There are further particularities within the corrective cycle which may be candidates of signalling interculturality. One such phenomenon could be seen in B's 'shame-signalling reaction'; simply characterizing it as such alone may be culturally biased, of course. An even stronger sign are B's multiple repairs. One could ask if B really understands F's soothing gesture as a signal for terminating the misunderstanding. Couldn't he have (mis)understood this gesture as a request for placing his hands on his thighs and hence only did so in compliance with F's request? Then of course there is the gentle laughter from the other participants. Whether this laughter is a reaction to the plastic cup scene is not verifiable; but it may at least be interpreted as such by B which would give him multiple addressees for his remedial endeavours and may thus account for his third repair attempt.

The latter point alludes to another important precondition that has not been discussed so far, namely the institutional one. More important perhaps is the role relationship of F and B and their rights and obligations to be deduced from that. F is a teacher, B a student. What kind of light does this shed on the cup scene? Doesn't it make the territorial intrusion even stronger? Or does it legitimate the intrusion because a teacher's spilled cup in his genital area could be much more embarrassing than with a fellow student? What is the particular relationship of B and F? If we consider another precondition, namely the prehistory of the incriminated scene, then we find some indications of a less formal relationship, one where slight touches including the 'light thigh slap' have occurred before. Additional information does not contradict cultural constraints because in awkward moments such as this the institutional relationship may become reinstalled. Nor does it, however, support an intercultural interpretation of the scene.

A scene is not intercultural because it includes interactants from a different cultural background. Nor is it intercultural by virtue of a misunderstanding between interactants from a different cultural background. And even if territoriality or the treatment of taboo zones or any other cultural reason is responsible for the core misunderstanding, then we still see how a treatment of it is a cooperative endeavour irrespective of the participant's cultural background. The sociocultural knowledge necessary for constituting a repair context as

part of the misunderstanding event or in reaction to a core misunderstanding seems to be reciprocal. All of the contextualization questions quoted above, namely “Are we talking to each other (right now)?”, “Who’s talking to whom (right now)?”, “What are we (just) doing with one another?”, “What are we talking about to each other (right now)?” and “On what footing are we on (right now)?” all get answered in the same way during the misunderstanding event although their mutual validity, so to speak, had not been in force during the moment of territorial conflict. Note that most of these context-defining questions were handled on the main line as well as on the subdialogical level, one verbally and nonverbally, the other purely nonverbally (at least for F). Finally, B’s physical posture at the same height as F — even though he is a head taller than F — is to be seen as (even a physical) response to the question “On what footing are we on (right now)?”.

4.3 *Concluding remark*

What can be most strongly deduced from this example — and it is only one example, of course — is that a different interpretation or inference that initially led to a misunderstanding may be solved and clarified by a common repair, even if the misunderstanding is based on interculturality (which in the end we cannot tell). Thus, the discussion of “The vanishing cup” transcript will not give empirical evidence of the universal validity of repair-within-misunderstanding events. By discussing “The vanishing plastic cup” example at length, I intended to develop a *methodological* reflection on the delicate issue of misunderstanding¹⁸ in combination with the other delicate issue of ‘interculturality’. If some scholars think that they can easily combine the two (as it is typical in many approaches with utilitarian motives) then we have to point out their methodological shortcomings. Ideological constructs of interculturality do not make an encounter an intercultural one (Blommaert 1994). Scholars of intercultural communication must show how much culture there is in situated interaction,¹⁹ but they also have to show how many other things there are and how they can or cannot be balanced with culture and interculturality.

Notes

1. Though communication problems in general and not misunderstandings in particular are the subject of her study, it is here where we nonetheless find one of the most useful descriptions of “misunderstanding”.
2. Cf. e.g. Schegloff (1987, 1992), Drummond and Hopper (1991), Bilmes (1992); Linell (1995).
3. Original German version in which the English gloss follows for each line. The legend for the transcribing conventions follows in the appendix.
4. This pertains of course only to such an understanding of misunderstanding where the encoding of a word that was misheard, for example, is regarded as the repairable. But one might as well regard such mishearing itself as the repairable.
5. Schegloff has also mentioned that devices of a misunderstanding manifestation (“composition of third position repair”), the one I see in *horizontal* sequentiality, appear in a kind of canonical order (in English, at least, and similarly in German, cf. Hinnenkamp 1998): firstly, prefatory “no”; secondly a less obligatory kind of acceptance token; thirdly, a rejection component; and fourthly, “the repair proper”, which is then subcategorized into various kinds of accounts, one of which typically starting with “I mean” (Schegloff 1992: 1310).
6. The mode of transcription has been adapted to my system.
7. The studies of Gumperz and his colleagues provide many examples.
8. Cf. Gumperz (1982a, 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1995); Auer (1986, 1992).
9. In following conversation analysis terminology for repair we might also call it the ‘misunderstandable’ — but we then have to deal with another ambiguity namely to make a particular item a candidate for misunderstanding. Also will we face the same problems, as mentioned above, with the term or rather the locating of the repairable.
10. We might need a more fine-grained typology here.
11. Cf. e.g. Gumperz (1982a) as well as most contributions in Gumperz (1982b) or Roberts, Davies and Jupp (1993).
12. Although there are some conceptions of intercultural communication including native speaker-nonnative speaker-communication as “intercultural” per se. In the “Canvassing” example, however, there is well grounded suspicion that different rights and obligations within the institutional frame play an important role in the emergence and development of the misunderstanding. So it was the unquestioned right of IT to continue the ratification “So you’ve been canvassing for work” (line 6a) with the first question “and who said they’d give you a job?” (line 6b). We cannot tell if it is noncomprehension or compliance to the authority that line 6a is not made a repairable.
13. In the non-negotiated examples Weizman and Blum-Kulka (1992) cite, it is in no way obvious to observers that a misunderstanding has occurred, whereas one of the participants *may have indeed noticed* a misunderstanding without, however, making it explicit. What follows from this is that in fact all interactions are potentially non-negotiated misunderstandings. Also cf. Bilmes (1992).

14. This is also what Banks, Ge and Baker obviously mean when they note “A key sense of miscommunication, however, regardless of one’s theoretical orientation, is something gone awry communicatively that has social consequences for the interactants; without social consequences, the phenomenon would be of trivial interest. By social consequences, we refer generally to misattribution of motives, unwarranted actions, changes in patterns of interaction, and similar responses to encounters that might over time debilitate relationships. Consequently, for miscommunication to have impact, it is not likely to be a perturbation of smooth performance that is repaired in the current interaction” (Banks, Ge and Baker 1991: 105).
15. F’s clumsy handling of the cup actually corresponds to his restarts and self-corrections. The cup obviously is a gesticulation hindrance which again interferes with the fluidity of discourse.
16. Of course B might be lying here, rationalizing, so to speak, some other motives ex post fact, cf. Mudersbach (1987) and Bilmes (1992).
17. I do not know of any research on this gesture; the term “light thigh slap” is mine.
18. For a detailed methodological and also empirically founded discussion see Hinnenkamp (1998).
19. Cf. Blommaert (1991); Hinnenkamp (1990) and Sarangi (1994).

Appendix: Transcription conventions

Legend:

{kommt}	dubious reconstruction
(...)	incomprehensible
[]	commentary, e.g. [1.5 Sec.], [laughter]
#dadada#	scope of commentary
wie-	abortion of utterance
ne(?)	semiquestions
ih <u>n</u>	assimilation (ih <u>n</u> anstatt ihnen)
sa:gt, sa:::gt	lengthening of vowel, degree of lengthening
eating	stressed, emphasized
DAS	high volume
°da°	low volume
°°hier°°	extremely low volume, whispering
ach was	slow tempo
und dann	extremely slow tempo
>darüber<	fast tempo
>>bereits<<	very fast tempo
+	pause, below 1 second
(+)	micropause
(h)	hesitation (e.g. he (h)comes)

=	fast connection
kommen	
da	overlap and point of overlap
\$	overlap at beginning of line (in both lines overlapping)

References

- Auer, P.
 1986 "Kontextualisierung." *Studium Linguistik* 19, 22–47.
 1992 "Introduction: John Gumperz' Approach to Contextualization." In P. Auer and A. di Luzio, A. (eds), 1992, 1–37.
- Auer, P. and A. di Luzio (eds.)
 1992 *The Contextualization of Language*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.
- Banks, S.P., G. Ge and J. Baker
 1991 "Intercultural encounters and miscommunication." In N. Coupland, J.M. Wiemann and H. Giles (eds), 1991, 103–120.
- Bilmes, J.
 1992 "Mishearings." In G. Watson and R.M. Seiler (eds), 1992, 79–98.
- Blommaert, J.
 1991 "How much culture is there in intercultural communication?" In J. Blommaert and J. Verschueren (eds), 1991, 13–32.
 1994 "Ideologien in interkultureller Kommunikation". *Sprache und Literatur in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* 25, No. 74, 19–38.
- Blommaert, J. and J. Verschueren (eds.)
 1991 *The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication. Selected papers of the International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, August 17–22, 1987, Volume 3, and the Ghent Symposium on Intercultural Communication*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.
- Coupland, N., Wiemann, J.M. and Giles, H. (eds.)
 1991 "Miscommunication" and Problematic Talk. London: Sage.
- Dascal, M.
 1985 "The relevance of misunderstanding." In M. Dascal (ed.), 1985, 441–459.
- Dascal, M. (ed.)
 1985 *Dialogue — an interdisciplinary approach*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.
- Dobrick, M.
 1985 *Gegenseitiges (Miß-)Verstehen in der dyadischen Kommunikation*. Münster: Aschendorff.
- Drummond, K. and R. Hopper
 1991 "Misunderstanding and its remedies: Telephone miscommunication." In N. Coupland, J.M. Wiemann and H. Giles (eds), 1991, 301–314.

- Duranti, A. and C. Goodwin (eds.)
 1992 *Rethinking Context*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Erickson, F. and J. Shultz
 1982 *The Counselor as Gatekeeper. Social Interaction in Interviews*. New York etc.: Academic Press.
- Falkner, W.
 1997 *Verstehen, Mißverstehen und Mißverständnisse*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Forster, E.M.
 1924 *A Passage to India*. London: Arnold (repr. 1964).
- Goffman, E.
 1971 *Relations in Public. Microstudies of the Public Order*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Grimshaw, A.D.
 1980 "Mishearings, Misunderstandings, and Other Nonsuccesses in Talk: A Plea for Redress of Speaker-Oriented Bias." *Sociological Inquiry* 50 (3/4), 31–74.
- Gumperz, J.J.
 1982a *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press.
- Gumperz, J.J. (ed.)
 1982b *Language and Social Identity*. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press.
- Gumperz, J.J.
 1989 "Contextualization cues and metapragmatics: The retrieval of cultural knowledge." In B. Music, R. Grascyk and C. Wiltshire (eds), 1989, 77–88.
 1992a "Contextualization revisited." In P. Auer and A. di Luzio (eds), 1992, 39–53.
 1992b "Contextualization and understanding." In A. Duranti and Ch. Goodwin (eds), 1992, 229–252.
 1995 "Mutual inferencing in conversation." In I. Marková, C.F. Graumann and K. Foppa (eds), 1995, 101–123.
- Hinnenkamp, V.
 1990 "Wieviel und was ist "kulturell" in der interkulturellen Kommunikation? — Fragen und Überblick". In B. Spillner (ed.), 1990, 46–52.
 1998 *Missverständnisse in Gesprächen*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Humphrey-Jones, C.
 1986 *An Investigation of the Types and Structure of Misunderstandings*. Dissertation University of Newcastle Upon Thyne, England UK.
- Knapp, K., W. Enninger and A. Knapp-Potthoff (eds)
 1987 *Analyzing Intercultural Communication*. The Hague/Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Liedtke, F. and R. Keller (eds)
 1987 *Kommunikation und Kooperation*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Linell, P.
 1995 "Troubles with mutualities: towards a dialogical theory of misunderstanding and miscommunication." In I. Marková, C.F. Graumann and K. Foppa (eds), 1995, 176–213.

- Loretz, N.
1976 *Verständigung und Missverstehen: Versuch einer semantisch-pragmatischen Analyse an schweizerdeutschen und hochsprachlichen Texten*. Frauenfeld/Stuttgart: Huber.
- Marková, I., C.F. Graumann and K. Foppa (eds)
1995 *Mutualities in Dialogue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudersbach, K.
1987 "Kommunizieren als Übersetzungsproblem. Über Mißverständnisse und deren Verhinderung." In F. Liedtke and R. Keller (eds), 1987, 239–247.
- Music, B., R. Grascyk and C. Wiltshire (eds)
1989 *CLS 25, Papers from the 25th Annual Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. Part Two: Parasession on Language in Context*. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
- Pride, J.B. (ed.)
1985 *Cross-Cultural Encounters. Communication and Mis-Communication*. Melbourne: River Seine.
- Roberts, C., E. Davies and T. Jupp
1993 *Language and Discrimination. A Study of Communication in Multi-Ethnic Workplaces*. London/New York: Longman.
- Samovar, L.A. and R.E. Porter (eds)
1988⁵ *Intercultural Communication: A Reader*. Belmont CA: Wadsworth.
- Sarang, S.
1994 "Intercultural or not? Beyond celebration of cultural differences in miscommunication analysis." *Pragmatics* 4, 3. (Special Issue: Critical perspectives on intercultural communication, ed. by Michael Meeuwis), 409–427.
- Schegloff, E.A.
1987 "Some sources of misunderstanding in talk-in-interaction." *Linguistics* 25, 201–218.
1992 "Repair after Next Turn: The Last Structurally Provided Defense of Inter-subjectivity in Conversation." *American Journal of Sociology* 97, No. 5, 1295–1345.
- Schwartz, H.
1977 "Understanding misunderstanding." *Analytic Sociology* 3 [quoted by Humphrey-Jones 1986].
- Scollon, R. and S. Wong Scollon
1995 *Intercultural Communication. A Discourse Approach*. Oxford/Cambridge MA: Blackwell.
- Selting, M.
1987 *Verständigungsprobleme. Eine empirische Analyse am Beispiel der Bürger-Verwaltungs-Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Spillner, B. (ed.)
1990 *Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Kongreßbeiträge zur 20. Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Angewandte Linguistik GAL e.V.* Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang.

- Stamenov, M. (ed.)
1992 *Current Advances in Semantic Theory*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: J. Benjamins.
- Watson, G. and R.M. Seiler (eds)
1992 *Text in Context. Contributions to Ethnomethodology*. Newbury Park CA etc.: Sage
- Weizman, E. and S. Blum-Kulka
1992 "Ordinary Misunderstanding." In M. Stamenov (ed.), 1992, 417–432.
- Williams, T.
1985 "The nature of miscommunication in the cross-cultural employment interview." In J.B. Pride (ed.), 1985, 165–175.
- Zaefferer, D.
1977 "Understanding misunderstanding: A proposal for an explanation of reading choices." *Journal of Pragmatics* 1, 329–346.

Inter- and Intra-cultural Aspects of Dialogue-Interpreting

Frank Ernst Müller
University of Mannheim

In the history of linguistics, the most natural and proximate object — everyday spoken speech — only became an object of scholarly interest at a late stage, when compared to the analysis of written forms of language. There has been a similar ‘décalage’ in translatology. In this domain, the analysis of written texts has a longstanding tradition, whereas the oral counterparts of written translation, dialogue interpreting and simultaneous interpretation, have only recently become matters of interest and study. As dialogue interpreting is only a recent area of study, I will start by discussing general issues in this field, focussing on its cultural implications (Section 1). I will then present data — transcribed interpreted conversation — and interpretive findings from a small-scale empirical study dealing with interpreted dialogue of young French and German interlocutors. Linguistic, i.e. bilingual and translational aspects of the data, will be discussed in Section 2 and interactive aspects in Section 3.

1. Inter-cultural differences and intra-cultural communalities

The introduction of mediation by a co-present translator into a situation of oral communication is not merely a technical matter. It is a simplistic and inadequate idea to conceive interpreted dialogue as consisting of two analytically independent parts: (a) an ongoing conversation which is realized independently of its being translated, and (b), in addition, a co-present dialogue interpreter (henceforth: DI) who simply translates what the primary parties say into the other language.

Although there is much variation in interpreting practices, we come closer to an adequate idea, if we conceive of interpreted dialogue as conversation which is collaboratively designed for (a specific mode of) translatability.

Mediation by a DI thus has powerful effects on the entire course of an interaction. He or she will inevitably turn out to be far more than a mere ‘recorder’ of the talk of the primary parties in a given interaction. The presence of an interpreter may even exert a decisive influence on what eventually emerges as an important topic. Situations in which the DI becomes a ‘gatekeeper’ or even a ‘midwife’ for the topics talked about in an interaction have often been reported in the work of ethnographers, who have to find access to a culture which is still poorly described. In such a situation the interpreter often becomes a close companion and a guide within the foreign culture. For an example of such ‘midwifery’ by the interpreter, cf. the following quotation, taken from the ethnographic work of Georges Devereux (1970).

Chez les Mohave, tous les enfants, quel que soit leur âge, ont accès au savoir sexuel de la tribu, et cela en termes parfaitement réalistes. De plus, nombre d’entre eux ont des rapports sexuels complets avant l’âge de dix ans sans que les parents ou les autorités de la tribu y trouvent à redire. Aussi me sentais-je libre de questionner ces garçons sur leurs expériences érotiques. Je m’étais en outre assuré la présence d’un interprète adulte, homme habile, qui devait, en quelque sorte, me servir de caution morale aux yeux des enfants, car ceux-ci auraient pu craindre que je ne les dénonce aux autorités scolaires. La présence de l’interprète eut une influence décisive sur ces entretiens. Interrogés sur leurs activités sexuelles *en anglais*, langue de leurs instituteurs puritains, les garçons nièrent tout de certaines pratiques qu’ils avouèrent sans difficulté dès que la question leur fut posée *en mohave* : ils croyaient, apparemment, pouvoir énoncer en mohave ce qu’ils pensaient devoir nier en anglais, la grivoiserie verbale, tout autant que les actes sexuels étant prohibés dans un contexte anglais, alors qu’ils sont parfaitement licites en milieu mohave.¹

Devereux’s paradigm raises a number of interesting questions. One of these, which is evident from the example of the Mohave children, is the following: socio-cultural identities are not to be conceived of as invariant attributes of individual persons which are invariantly present across situations. Rather, their emergence and potential realization depends on the linguistic, procedural and interactive processes of the situations in which they occur. In more recent studies of the ‘micro-ethnography of communication’ (cf. Erickson and Shultz 1982), socio-cultural identities are considered as performances: “*Performed social identity* refers to the composite social identity actually relevant in a

given situation” (Erickson and Shultz 1982: 16).

Constellations of the kind evoked above, with marked contrasts both in linguistic and in extralinguistic cultural practices between the primary parties concerned, have traditionally been and still are of great interest to the ethnographic study of intercultural communication. But it is clear that the more common situations in western societies with many immigrants are those of an institutional kind: the practical outcomes of social transactions at the immigration office, in medical settings, in court, at the police station etc., may often depend crucially on the mediatory work of the DI.²

It is obvious that the gap both in language and in culture which separates the parties and which has to be bridged by an interpreter in a specific, situated interaction may take on many different forms. The data introduced and briefly discussed below are taken from interpreted dialogue between French and German primary speakers. The primary speakers are young apprentices, participants in a bi-national course of professional training. Both groups consist of young male working class people with not much formal schooling and hardly any previous knowledge of the other language. When compared to a setting like the one described by Devereux above, it is clear that such a constellation is much less marked by cultural differences. Although the situation is still ‘intercultural’ since it cuts across national linguistic boundaries and makes relaying by an interpreter a necessity, the primary parties to be mediated are also members of comparable European subcultures — male working class youths from France and from Germany, i.e. there are many dimensions and potential resources of co-membership. In observing and discussing properties of dialogue interpretation, we thus have to deal with both intercultural differences and intra-cultural communalities which cut across linguistic borders.

1.1. *Some aspects of the position ‘in the middle’*

The manifold negotiating and mediating aspects of the DI’s activity are conditioned by and derived from his or her position ‘in the middle’ (Knapp/Knapp-Potthoff 1985). This constitutes a central point, a pivot around which the interaction, if it is to be translated at all, needs to be organized. In the ethnographic example quoted above, the interpreter’s success is certainly also due to his socio-physical presence ‘in situ’: He can be perceived and recognized by the children in this kind of intermediary position, as a verbal and

cultural cognate, a ‘co-member’ to be trusted sufficiently to be able to reveal matters to him that would have remained unrevealed in talk addressed to a cultural outsider. More generally, the interpreter in oral communication is not only visible but also a fairly prominent participant and has a status which is different from that of his colleague in written communication, in which the translator and his/her work tend to remain invisible.³

In other institutional and interactive contexts, other qualities and types of relational work are required of the DI.⁴ For instance, as has been shown by Bischoff (1996) for non-professional DIs, they can and often do use their ‘native’ knowledge of institutions and institutional procedures to help their clients.⁵

The interpreter is also a central participant in the sense that he or she is usually the only speaker/hearer to have full linguistic access to everything that is uttered in conversation, rather than to only one ‘half’ of it, as is often the case with primary parties.⁶

Dialogue-interpreting is an ‘activity *sui generis*’ (Linell 1995: 205) and the DI’s involvement in the conversation is a highly specific one. For instance, a DI will listen to emergent turns of talk of primary parties and even analyze and understand such talk in a way which is related to his practical translation task. Emergent talk will thus first be treated as material which is to be translated at a later time.⁷

Translating a conversation also means coordinating it on the level of its socio-sequential ordering and turntaking. The interpreter may thus have a decisive influence on turn length and regulate stages in the progress of conversation. She may allocate turns and regulate who will be next speaker or recipient, initiate ‘repairs’ or comments, and, in the specifics of her translations, not just influence but co-constitute the talk exchanged by the primary parties. In short, the position of the DI ‘in the middle’ combines two activities into one, i.e. translating or relaying the conversation and at the same time coordinating it: “Dialogue interpreter-utterances will not be conceived of as exclusively relaying or coordinating units. The same contributions may in principle be conceived of as products of relaying on the one hand and of coordinating on the other.” (Wadensjö 1992: 69)⁸

In stating this and noting the creative potential of the DI, the primary parties should not be regarded as mere victims, with translation going on, as it were, above their heads. They clearly have to orient actively towards the whole machinery of consecutive translatability and to the specific mode

proposed by the interpreter. Some aspects of how primary parties orient to translatability in conversation will be discussed in the next section.

1.2. *The bias of interpreters — Two studies*

The DI's position 'in the middle' clearly does not imply that the DI is always necessarily an impartial and unbiased mediator. Linell et al. (1992: 128) have detailed some of the 'gatekeeping' procedures which are almost inevitably part of the activity of the dialogue interpreter:

The dialogue interpreter may

- a. just relay, i.e. provide renditions which are close to the originals, or
- b. stop some things from being transferred (renditions omit part of the substance of originals), or
- c. add substance to what is contained in originals, or
- d. provide renditions which are more extensively restructured (involving style shifts, mixtures of omissions and additions etc.), or
- e. provide meta-comments on what is going on (e.g. explain the meaning of words)
- f. take initiatives of substance of various sorts.

Manifest 'local' conversational, contextual or translational reasons can be decisive — and can be detected in recorded data — for the DI's application of any of these 'gatekeeping' operations. But their application may also add up to a more global and pervasive bias of the DI in translatory interaction. Empirical studies have shown that DIs may be persistently biased 'gatekeepers' (Rehbein 1985a, and Lambert 1987). They have also illustrated some of the procedural ways how this may happen.

Rehbein's study is particularly interesting, as it shows that we should not assume naively that the DI is 'naturally' biased in favour of the language and culture of his or her compatriots: Rehbein analyses the translatory interaction between a German doctor and a group of Turkish women in collective medical consultation. A Turkish woman, a high school teacher in Germany with fluent command of German, acts as DI. Translation is done consecutively on a turn by turn basis and in both linguistic directions. But the DI, when translating, does not act in the same way in both directions. Rather, she accommodates or, to use the term of Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974), she 'recipient-designs' the renditions she gives of the German doctor's utterances, which contain the professional medical advice, in a different way for the Turkish women-

recipients than she does in her reverse translations, i.e. when mediating the Turkish women to the German doctor. Rather than side with her compatriots, the DI accords her compatriots less complete and less exact renditions.

It would be naive, however, to see this kind of bias as the work — and ‘faulty’ work — of the DI alone. Primary parties orient towards consecutive translatability and ‘pave the way’ for it. Furthermore, they may do so with variable efficiency. Taking Rehbein’s study as an example, we can observe that the German doctor seems to orient to translatory interaction in a considerably more efficient way: he can be seen to adjust his contributions to the anticipated needs of consecutive translation by strongly reducing them in turn-size and linguistic complexity. By comparison, the Turkish women do not seem to orient to consecutive translatability in the same way: they repeatedly produce longish personal narratives which contain dramatized episodes with reported direct speech, which are difficult to reproduce in translation. Seen from this angle, the strong translatory inequalities that are evident in Rehbein’s study are not simply the work of the interpreter. Rather, they are achieved through shared work, i.e. they are co-produced results of an interaction in which the primary speakers contribute by paving the way for subsequent translation with variable degrees of efficiency. From a descriptive point of view, it is often more difficult to discern the cooperative share of the ‘victims’ in the translation processes and it is thus certainly true that only “empirical analyses can show that many of the problems are not attributable to individual actions, ‘faulty translations’, but instead are collectively generated in a subtle interplay between all parties involved.” (Linell 1995: 205).

The material for Monique Lambert’s (1987) experimental design was an English broadcast interview with two participants: the interviewee was an English scientist, an expert in somnology, i.e. the scientific description of processes in sleeping, dreaming, Rapid Eye Movements etc., and the interviewer was a BBC radio journalist. The recorded interview was given to 18 advanced students of translatology as material to be translated into French. The translations were recorded in a language laboratory and the results were analyzed, compared and evaluated.

An overall effect of Lambert’s study, which illustrates a gatekeeping bias arising from institutional ‘sense-making’ inherent in the interpreter’s activity in such contexts, was the following: the student-translators gave more precise and more extensive translatory treatment to the talk of the interviewee, the scientist and professional expert than they did to the talk of the interviewer. As

is well known from CA-analyses of massmedia-interviews,⁹ a basic social meaning of media-interviews is that it is usually the (answering) discourse of the interviewed person, the professional knowledge of the expert etc., which is to be exposed to a listening public mass audience. By contrast, the discourse of the co-present interviewer — formulating the questions, maintaining the conversation, introducing topics etc. — is usually considered to be merely auxiliary. By backgrounding the talk of the interviewer and by foregrounding that of the interviewee in their interpreting practices, the students were thus underlining a significant aspect of the institutional sense of the interview. In this way the interpreters, through the gatekeeping bias of their translations, reconstructed the interview as a little bit more of a massmedia-interview than it had actually been.

2. Linguistic, bilingual and translational aspects

As already mentioned, an important feature of language use from an ethnomethodological perspective is its 'situatedness', its reflexive nature as both a situated and a situating structure. If we apply this notion to translatory interaction and observation of the interpreter's work, it means that the descriptive object in question cannot be translation 'tout court', i.e. merely translation from one language into another, but mediation of one situated use of language into another.

'In situ'-qualities and intercultural orientation of the DI will be observed in the examples below, using the set of data already mentioned. They reflect the specific conditions of a setting which is both intercultural, since it cuts across national linguistic cultures (France/Germany), and intracultural, since the members of the two groups have a number of things in common (cf. above). The DI is a bilingually (German/French) raised student of translatology, who participated in the professional training project — the DI and the two groups were together for two weeks in France. The recordings are videotaped. The use of a camera introduces a formal aspect whose effects will be commented on in Section 3.

2.1. *A feature of juvenile language use: Intensification*

The ethnomethodological orientation mentioned above should not obscure the

importance of linguistic and bilingual structures. The practical task of the DI is a linguistic and bilingual one. If our interest is directed at understanding the 'orderliness' of interpreted discourse more clearly, we must also take into account the contrasts in linguistic structure of the two languages in question. Many of the phenomena recurring in interpreted conversation will remain obscure without such a comparative and translational view.

When we look at the texts produced in the recorded interactions from a linguistic point of view, i.e. with an interest in typical and recurrent properties of the everyday language used, we find considerable use of intensifiers and hyperbolic forms, of high grading and high graded expressions in appreciations and evaluations by both French and German primary interlocutors.

The saliency and frequency of hyperbolic forms and extreme values in grading can be related both to the male juvenile idiom of the speakers in question and to their working class background. It has been claimed (cf. Lakoff 1974) that middle class speakers tend, in matters of intensification, to avoid extreme values and to take up a more judicious and guarded 'neutralizing distance' (Lakoff) towards their own utterances. The recurrent use of de-intensifying practices as 'hedges', 'limiting devices' and 'mitigators' contributes, as Lakoff (1974: 169f) puts it, to 'heightening intermediate values and toning down extreme values'.

As 'counter languages', juvenile varieties are marked by deviation from established 'adult' standards in the use of language. Intensification seems to be a domain where we find such reversing and contrasting of dominant expressive manners.

Transcripts (1) and (2) illustrate the use of intensifiers and intensified appreciations which are frequently cumulative.

- (1) (A4: German participant; DI: Dialogue interpreter; F4: French participant)

89 A4:ja aber allgemein ob der eindruck von den Deutschen
 90 ob der gut oder schlecht ist bei ihm (.) allgemein von
 91 uns oder ham/um ob wir uns **schlecht aufgeführt**
 92 ham o(h)der so(h)
 93 DI: *alors ton idée ton idée générale des allemands si on*
 94 *s'est bien comporté aussi ou (.) si on a **trop foutu le***
 95 ***bordel** quoi*
 96 F4:no: n c'était **bien** (.) **sympa** (.) l'ambiance **vraiment bien**
 97 (.) en Allemagne j'espère ce sera la même chose
 98 DI: *er fand (.) dass es also **völlig o.k.** war (.) er hat **viel spass***
 99 ***gehabt** und er hofft dass=es in Deutschland genauso is*

- 89 A4:yes but generally if the impression he has of the Germans
 90 if it is a good one or a bad one (.) in general the impression
 91 he has of us or did/or if we behaved badly or h something
 92 h
 93 DI: *alors ton idée ton idée générale des allemands si on*
 94 *s'est bien comporté aussi ou (.) si on a **trop foutu le***
 95 ***bordel** quoi*
 96 F4:no: n c'était **bien** (.) **sympa** (.) l'ambiance **vraiment bien**
 97 (.) en Allemagne j'espère ce sera la même chose
 98 DI: *he thought (.) it was really all right he had had much fun and*
 99 *he hopes that it will be the same in Germany*

In fragment (1) the primary speaker's cumulation — '*bien*', '*sympa*', '*vraiment bien*', in 96 — which is also rendered in a cumulative way by the interpreter — '*völlig o.k.*', '*viel Spass gehabt*', in 98f — seems to arise out of a sequential development: the DI translates an expression of the German interlocutor, cf. '*schlecht aufgeführt*', in 91/2, which contains an appreciative grading but is not intensified. Rendering it in French, the DI uses a drastic virile slang phrase, '*trop foutu le bordel*', in 95f, which hyperbolically upgrades the intensity of the German expression.¹⁰ This intensified version of the DI then occasions and sequentially implies a response in kind, i.e. a highly intensified protestation of the French interlocutor at the next turn.

As is clear from this first example, grading is difficult to 'copy' into the other language.

If the tendency toward strong intensification is an 'inbuilt' one in juvenile language use, it may be strengthened further by the translation mode of communication and the specific conditions it imposes on formulations, cf. example (2).

In (2), a sequential development for the cumulated intensifiers of the primary interlocutor, cf. '*vraiment bien*', '*vraiment aimé*', in 59 f, is not apparent:

- (2) (Participants as before)
 59 F4:l'hébergement dans les familles euh si c'était **vraiment**
 60 **bien** euh (.) s'il a **vraiment aimé** ou pas
 61 DI: *ob dein aufenthalt in der familie ob das auch o.k. war ob*
 62 *dir das **gefallen** hat*

 61 DI: *if your accommodation in the family if this also was really*
 62 *allright if you did really like that*

However, note that the high intensification is accompanied by a linguistic indicator of overexplicitness, the use of the expletive ‘ou pas’ (‘or not’) in 60 (which is not rendered by the DI, cf. 62). Lack of sequential development and the overexplicitness noted in the speech of the primary interlocutor point to a particular use of intensifiers in interpreted conversation. Intensifiers heighten the discernibility of what is important in speech content. Note that in both cases, the intensification/cumulation grades up and makes evaluations of aspects of intercultural behaviour (and intercultural politeness) more discernible. In this way, i.e. by heightening the discernibility of things which they want to ‘get across’ at all costs, primary interlocutors can orient to the indirect and relayed character of the conversation, where utterances must first pass through the ‘hedge’ of translation before reaching the recipient. Interpreted conversation may thus also induce effects of ‘heightening intermediate values’. In fact, these effects are compatible with the hyperbolic tendency of juvenile slang and both may contribute to the generation of the saliency and frequency of intensifiers noted in the present data.

2.2. *The translation of evaluative modalities*

The DI orients to the subcultural membership of primary interlocutors and to distinctive features of their speech varieties not just by translating back and forth in both directions, but in a number of more subtle ways, notably in lexical and stylistic choices. This orientation becomes apparent in detailed observation of the translation of intensification.

Linguistic features of intensity are difficult to describe, due to their complexity — their effects may comprise and globally affect several units at once — and their gradient, i.e. their imprecise nature (cf. Labov 1972).¹¹ For these reasons, they are often not easily and directly transferable from one language to another and may be difficult to translate as a result.

When grading, and highgrade superlative terms in particular, occur in translated interactions, the DI can only rarely make use of a ‘closest natural equivalent’ (Nida), i.e. a straightforward lexical correspondence in the other language. This is, however, the case in the first of the two high gradings in fragment (3). The topic talked about — a topic both of inter- and infra-cultural interest — is soccer and the world championship in France. (‘Lens’ is a town in France and F4 explains his preference for the Lens soccer team).

(3) (Participants as before)

- 195 F4:sinon euh (2.0) oui ils ont un **super publique** Lens
 196 c'est pour ça il y a une **superbe ambiance** et une
 197 équipe qui se batte pas souvent euh c'est le principal
 198 DI: *also hauptsächlich mag er Lens weil die=n **super pu=***
 199 **=ikum habm und=s is immer ne bombenstimmung**
 200 *da*

 198 DI: *well mainly he likes Lens because they have a super audience there*
 199 *and everybody is in high spirits*
 200

In the first case, '*super publique*' (195), the interpreter can retain the linguistic intensification procedure and carry it over into his rendition in the other language, where it has a highly similar stylistic value, cf. '*super Publikum*', 198/9. By keeping the same linguistic procedure, the interpreter appropriately recipient-designs his translation. In the second case he achieves the same effect by changing the procedure and avoiding a lexical 'false friend' — '*superbe ambiance*' (196). Although using a parallel procedure¹² and translating *superbe ambiance* with '*superbe Stimmung*' would result in a grammatically admissible German translation, it would be stylistically and subculturally misplaced.¹³ Thus by selecting German *Bombenstimmung*, which is a drastic, idiomatic intensifying expression, the DI, relaying the talk of male working class youths, appropriately avoids the 'effeminate' appreciative mode which might be characteristic of educated middle or upper class speakers.

It is in lexical choices and their manifest 'recipient design' that we can see decisions of the DI being based on and referring to cultural or subcultural membership most clearly. Note that in (3) the DI omits the last part of F4's turn ('et une équipe qui se batte pas souvent' etc, 197). Rather than a 'gatekeeping' operation, we may suppose that the DI does not translate here because he is not familiar with a lexical detail which is crucial for understanding this part of the turn, namely that the meaning of 'se battre' in French standard is 'to fight'. In the present context, however, it carries the technical, soccer-specific meaning of 'to lose a match'. It is evident that detailed lexical knowledge of this kind indicates a degree of (sub) cultural familiarity or unfamiliarity of a DI.

The DI also adapts his renditions not only at the lexical level, but also at other linguistic levels, e.g. morphonology: note the DI's use of reductions, contractions and other 'casual speech'-forms¹⁴ in his German translations, for

instance in (3), reduced forms of indefinite articles ('n *super Publikum*', 198; 'ne *Bombenstimmung*', 199), of pronouns and the copula ('s is', 199). Adaptation also occurs at the syntactic level. Note, in (1), the syntactic 'laxity' of the DI in omitting the subject-verb inversion in the second of the two subordinated phrases. (A syntactically correct version in spoken German would be 'und da immer ne *Bombenstimmung* is').

Thus morphonological and syntactic adjustments, as well as lexical selections, contribute to the clearly informal variety of spoken German used by the DI in his renditions. It is evident that these and other forms of casual speech cannot be considered to be proper translations of the French original.¹⁵ Rather, they are creative mediating 'inventions' of the DI, who resorts to an existing and corresponding spoken variety of the other language. This variety is not reconstructed by the interpreter point by point, but in a more holistic way, respecting the configuration and consistency of a whole set of parameters co-occurring within a linguistic variety.

We do not have to go very far to find such a variety: the linguistic variety the DI uses in his German renditions closely matches that of his primary German interlocutors, here A4. Note, e.g. at the morphonological level, the numerous reduced forms of the German participant in fragment (4). Reductions of A4 go beyond casual speech forms to include dialect forms (cf. e.g. 'a=weng', in 116 (= standard German: ein wenig/a little); 'heut', in 120 (=heute/ today).

(4) (Participants as before)

- 114 F4:t'aimes bien les matchs ou: (0.5) boff
 115 DI: ob dir die Spiele von der WM bisher gefallen
- 116 A4:ja bloß die Deutschen ham=**a=weng** (.) **schwach**
 117 gespielt
 118 DI: il dit généralement oui mais il n'est **pas très:s** (.) **pas**
 119 **très content** (.) de ce que les Allemands ils ont joué
- 120 A4:aber heut' wird's besser heut' gewinnen=se zwei null
 121 DI: mais aujourd'hui ce sera mieux ils gagneront deux zéro
- 122 F4:((laughs))
- 123 DI:contre l'Espagne
- 124 A4:und im finale **butzen**=se Brasilien drei zwei
 125 DI: ((laughs)) et au finale ils **écraseront** le Brésil trois à deux
- 126 F4:ah en finale (laughs)
 127 DI:ouais en finale

- 128 F4:(.) *oui euh*
- 129 A4:((laughs)) **do:ch** ((laughs))
-
- 114 F4:t'aimes bien les matches ou: (0.5) boff
- 115 DI: *if you liked the games of the world championship up to now*
- 116 A4:ja bloß die Deutschen ham=**a=weng** (.) **schwach**
- 117 gespielt
- 118 DI: *hes says yes in general but he is not very (.) not*
- 119 *very happy about the way the Germans played*
- 120 A4:aber heut' wird's besser heut' gewinnen=se zwei null
- 121 DI: *but today it will be better today they will win two zero*
- 122 F4:((laughs))
- 123 DI:against Spain
- 124 A4:und im Finale **butzen**=se Brasilien drei zwei
- 125 DI: ((laughs)) *and in the finals ('au finale') they will annihilate Brazil three to two*
- 126 F4:((laughs)) ah in the finals ('en finale') ((laughs))
- 127 DI:ouais en finale
- 128 F4:(.) *oui euh*
- 129 A4:((laughs)) **doch** ((laughs))

If we look again at the grading expressions and the way they are handled in translation by the DI, the above hypothesis — that grading is linguistic material which is difficult to translate — is corroborated in transcript (4). The first grading in (4), cf. 'a=weng (.) schwach gespielt', 116, is a mitigated downgrading and belongs to the large class already mentioned: it cannot be given a direct corresponding translation in the other language.¹⁶ Bilingual comparison shows that the DI cannot remain within the lexico-syntactic framework of the French original, but has to reorganize it and give it a new linguistic shape. As the transcript shows, cf. 118f in (4a) below, the DI is hesitating about this point and is clearly searching for a suitable formulation in French:

(4a) Detail from (4)

- 116 A4:ja bloß die Deutschen ham=**a=weng** (.) **schwach**
- 117 gespielt
- 118 DI: *il dit généralement oui mais il n'est pas très:s (.) pas*
- 119 *très content (.) de ce que les Allemands ils ont joué*

Example (4a) also illustrates a recurring feature of the DI's formulations when

translating evaluations. It is true that, looking at the data overall, the DI does not act consistently when transforming first person into third person utterances. However, when it comes to translating evaluations, he takes special care to attribute the evaluation explicitly to its responsible ‘author’, the primary interlocutor.

A4’s intensifying metaphoric term, cf. (4b), 124, ‘*butzen*’, is a regional or dialectal one. Literally it means “they will clean them up”, or “polish them off” and again the term does not tolerate a lexically parallel translation in the other language. It is rendered by a hyperbolic term, ‘*ils écraseront le Brésil*’, in 125, taken from standard French and adequately chosen.

(4b) Detail from (4)

124 A4:und im Finale **butzen**=se Brasilien drei zwei
 125 DI: ((laughs)) *et au finale ils écraseront le Brésil trois à deux*

As is well known, metaphors from the military world are very frequent in the terminology of soccer ‘*aficionados*’. Replacing the dialectal German term in the way he does allows the DI to retain the linguistic structure of the original formulation in his rendition.

Transcript (4) also shows phenomena which only rarely occur in the present data and thus serve to illustrate the prevailing state of affairs to which they are an exception.

First: The DI, cf. ‘*contre l’Espagne*’, 123, momentarily switches participation status and contributes a turn in which he documents his expert knowledge about the matter under discussion. He speaks here in his own right and as a ‘normal’ participant in the interaction rather than as a specialized agent, involved in and ‘condemned’ to restoring or preparing other participants’ turns at talk.¹⁷

Second: Transcript (4) contains a short episode in which interaction is not entirely prefigured and bound up in the organizational framework of turn-by-turn interpreted conversation and in which the primary interlocutors communicate (in 128/9), albeit briefly, without an intervening translation. In more detail: A4, starting at 120, formulates a ‘wild’ hypothesis: The German team will win against Spain and even get through to the final. F4, in 126, formulates a recognition of this as a joke (‘*ah, en finale*’). (The recognition formulation is analyzed and treated by the DI as a repair of his previous ‘*au finale*’, cf. his ‘*ouais en finale*, 127). In 128 F4 starts, hesitatingly and in a low voice, to formulate a doubt about the hypothesis. As the doubt, recognizable as such by

(language independent) prosodic marks, emerges, it is contradicted jokingly and in German by A4 (**doch**), reaffirming the original 'wild' hypothesis.

This episode remains, as already mentioned, an exception to the routinely followed mode of interpreted conversation as maintained by the participants. Some consequences of this rigid organizational framework will be discussed in the next section.

In conclusion, the main point of this section has been to present and discuss observations concerning the specific 'speech exchange system' (Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson 1974) of interpreted conversation in the particular case at hand and has shown the (sub-) culturally fine-tuned nature of the activity of the DI, who selects terms and other stylistic options so that they may figure as integral parts of the sub-cultural speech variety of the recipients for whom they are designed. There is thus not just one type of mediation which leads from one language to another. Mediation proceeds from one situated use of language and, in the present case, from one juvenile language variety to a corresponding variety of the other language.

3. Interactive troubles in interpreted conversation — 'Lousy conversation'

Even though the DI in our constellation is well versed in juvenile language use and remains close to the speech of the primary interlocutors in his renditions, most of the recorded conversations appear strained, clumsy and unfluent. They are interspersed with silences and are a long way from the flow which we would find in unmediated 'natural' conversation. The following transcripts illustrate recurring difficulties in these conversations, notably minimal progression and fragmentation into small units which remain isolated and fail to give rise to continued and coherent developments.

(5) (Participants: F1, DI, A1)

03 F1: est-ce que t'aime bien euh ce lycée?

04 DI: *also sie fragt ob dir die Schule hier gefällt*

05 A1: ja die Schule gefällt mir sehr gut

06 DI: *i dit qu'i aime bien*

07 F1: est-ce qu'il travaille autant (.) ici que là-bas?

08 DI: *ob du genauso viel arbeitest wie zuhause in Würzburg*

- 09 A1:äh ja (1.0) ich arbeite genauso viel wie in Würzburg
 10 DI: *Il dit que c'est vrai qu'il travaille autant que chez lui en*
 11 *Allemagne*
 12 (2.0)
- 13 F1:comment il a trouvé la France?
 14 DI: *wie dir Frankreich gefallen hat*
- 15 A1:ja Frankreich is=sehr gut ich werd wieder nach Frankreich
 16 kommen
 17 DI: *Il dit qu'il a bien aimé il reviendra certainement en France*
 18 (4.0)
- 19 F1:ce qu'il aime bien faire là-bas en Allemagne
 20 DI: *was du in deutschland so gerne so machst im allgemeinen*
 (interaction continues in the question-answer mode)
-
- 03 F1:est-ce que t'aime bien euh ce lycée?
 04 DI: *well she asks whether you like our school*
- 05 A1:ja die schule gefällt mir sehr gut
 06 DI: *he says that he likes it very much*
- 07 F1:est-ce qu'il travaille autant (.) ici que là-bas?
 08 DI: *if you work as much (.) here as at home*
- 09 A1:äh ja (1.0) ich arbeite genauso viel wie in Würzburg
 10 DI: *he says that it's true that he works here as much as at home in*
 11 *Germany*
 12 (2.0)
- 13 F1:comment il a trouvé la France?
 14 DI: *how you liked France*
- 15 A1:ja Frankreich is=sehr gut ich werd wieder nach Frankreich
 16 kommen
 17 DI: *he says he liked it very much and will come back to France*
 18 (4.0)
- 19 F1:ce qu'il aime bien faire là-bas en Allemagne
 20 DI: *was was du in deutschland so gerne so machst im allgemeinen*
 (interaction continues in the question-answer mode)

(6) (Participants: F2; DI; A2)

- 48 F2:alors comment trouves-tu la l'Allema/la France?
 49 DI: *wie du Frankreich findest*

- 50 A2:((laughs)) ja is schön hier es is schön hier
 51 DI: *eh il dit que c'est très beau ici*
- 53 F2:aimes-tu le projet qu'on est en train de faire?
 54 DI: *äh wie dir das das projekt gefällt das wir hier bauen das modul*
- 55 A2:s interessant ((laughs))
 56 DI: *il dit que c'est très intéressant*
- 57 F2:les filles te plaisent ici?
 58 DI: *ob dir die mädels hier gefallen*
- 59 A2:((laughs)) ja
 60 DI: *oui*
- 61 (2.5)
- 62 F2:que préfères-tu le lycée de Courghain ou l'Ile de Jeanty ou
 63 tu dors?
 64 DI: *was dir besser gefällt die schule hier also Lycée du Courghain oder
 65 wo wir schlafen l'Ile Jeanty*

(interaction continues in the question-answer mode)

- 48 F2:alors comment trouves-tu la l'Allema/la France
 49 DI: *how you like France*
- 50 A2:((laughs)) ja is schön hier es is schön hier
 51 DI: *well he says it's very nice here*
- 53 F2:aimes-tu le projet qu'on est en train de faire?
 54 DI: *how you like the project we're constructing the module*
- 55 A2:s interessant ((laughs))
 56 DI: *he says it's very interesting*
- 57 F2:les filles te plaisent ici?
 58 DI: *if you like the girls here*
- 59 A2:((laughs)) ja
 60 DI: *yes*
- 61 (2.5)
- 62 F2:que préfères-tu le Lycée de Courghain ou l'Ile de Jeanty ou
 63 tu dors
 64 DI: *do you prefer the Lycée du Courghain or the Ile Jeanty where we
 sleep*

(interaction continues in the question-answer mode)

(7) (Participants F3, DI, A3)

- 113 F3:qu'est qu'il fait comme sport?
 114 DI: *was du zuhause für sport machst*
- 115 A3:fussball spielen dischdennis ab=un=zu
 116 DI: *eh il joue au foot et parfois il joue au ping-pong*
- 117 F3:et (.) il n'a pas encore loupé un match de la Coupe du Monde?
 118 DI: *hm?*
- 119 F3:il n'a pas encore loupé un match de la Coupe du Monde (.) les
 120 matchs de foot
 121 DI: *ob du die fussballspiele von der WM jetzt schon gesehen hast*
- 123 A3:net alle des Deutschlandspiel hab=ich gsehn und (.) des andere
 deutschlandspiel werd ich mir auch angukn was jetzt kommt
 124 DI: *il dit qu'il n'a pas vu tous et*
- 125 F3:ouais
 126 DI: *attend l'interprète (.) et sauf*
 127 *le jeu d'ouverture de l'Allemagne et celui de ce soir contre*
 128 *l'Espagne*

(interaction continues in the question-answer mode)

- 113 F3:qu'est qu'il fait comme sport?
 114 DI: *what kind of sports do you do*
- 115 A3:fussball spielen dischdennis ab=un=zu
 116 DI: *well he plays soccer and sometimes ping pong*
- 117 F3:et (.) il n'a pas encore loupé un match de la Coupe du Monde
 118 DI: *hm?*
- 119 F3:il n'a pas encore loupé un match de la Coupe du Monde (.) les
 120 matchs de foot
 121 DI: *if you have seen the matches of the world championship*
- 123 A3:net alle des deutschlandspiel hab=ich gsehn und (.) des andere
 deutschlandspiel werd ich mir auch angukn was jetzt kommt
 124 DI: *he says he has not seen all of them and*
- 125 F3: y es
 126 DI: *wait for the interpreter*
 127 *except for Germany's opening match of and the one tonight*
 128 *against Spain*

(interaction continues in the question-answer mode)

A linguistic observation first: standing close together with the informal features of primary interlocutors' speech varieties that have been commented on in the previous section, we paradoxically find features of formality: note in

particular the standard language correctness in the question forms of the French speakers — generally inversion or *est-ce que*. (In one of the rare instances of a decidedly informal question mode, cf. F3 in (7), 117, this prompts a repair-turn of the DI, cf. 118).

As the transcripts illustrate, the turn of a primary interlocutor, which is usually brief and reduced to a format that is easy to translate subsequently, is followed in most cases by an equally brief translating turn of the interpreter. Brevity of turn is of practical translatory interest to the DI, particularly when he interprets his task in a narrow, ‘literal’ sense, i.e. that of rendering original formulations carefully and in great detail. This is obviously the case of the DI in our constellation, who routinely intervenes and is routinely accorded a ‘slot’ to intervene in by the primary speakers, at very short ‘portioned’ intervals: turn-taking occurs mostly at the first possible completion point — and transitional relevance point — of utterances; this point usually comprises only one syntactic construction.¹⁸ However the potential advantage of brevity — precise, ‘literal’ renditions of the DI — has a corresponding disadvantage: brevity of turns fragments the progress and continuation of a conversation into short units which are separated from each other by intervening translation.¹⁹ We thus have short units which are treated with ‘long’ translation machinery in both linguistic directions.

The examples quoted above also illustrate the scarcity of ‘back channel’ or other forms of within-turn cooperation in the present data. Obviously, the primary recipient cannot — as in ‘natural’ conversation — directly cooperate in the development of the primary speaker’s emerging turn. If at all, back channel phenomena occur at monolingual turn transitions between the DI and one of the primary interlocutors. They also seem to be dispreferred by the present DI: Note, in (7), 126, reproduced here as (7a), the intervention of the DI.

(7a)

- 123 A3:net alle des deutschlandspiel hab=ich gsehn und (.) des andere
Deutschlandspiel werd ich mir auch angukn was jetz kommt
124 DI: *il dit qu'il n'a pas vu tous et*
125 F3:ouais
126 DI: *attend l'interprète (.) et sauf*
127 le jeu d'ouverture de l'Allemagne et celui de ce soir contre
128 *l'Espagne*

The DI rejects (‘attends l’interprète’/ ‘wait for the interpreter’, 126) an attempt to back channel of F3. F3’s attempt is inserted at a point where the DI’s

translation/rendition is not yet complete. The DI here evokes the institutional prerogative of the interpreter to complete his translating turn before responding to anything else.²⁰

Continued topical coherence in the interactions is of a low range. Note that in the interactions quoted above, each new primary speaker turn opens a topic and formulates a question and each subsequent turn already constitutes a final response to this question and closes the topic. In other words, no topic is developed or pursued across the span of more than two turns. (In almost all interactions, only one topic — German and French soccer teams and their fortunes at the world championship — is sustained and developed across a number of turns.)

It is implausible to interpret the laconic minimalism occurring in the recorded interactions between the French and the German apprentices — young people of the same sex, of approximately the same age, of similar professional education and coming from two neighbouring European countries — as a phenomenon of cultural distance. Rather, there may be other reasons, particularly the formality of the recording situation which exposes the oral productions of the participants to repeated public inspection. This formality is also clearly at odds with the informal linguistic varieties used by the participants.

However, we may also attribute the formality to the unaccustomed formalism introduced by structural properties of translatory interaction in general and, more specifically, by the extremely fragmented mode in which this is routinely realized in the present constellations. Sacks (1972, 1995), discussing monolingual interaction, uses the term “lousy conversation” to refer to a conversational style that is marked by the lack of ‘tying structures’ and topic coherence that prevails in our data:

It’s a general feature for topical organization in conversation that the best way to move from topic to topic is not by a topic close followed by a topic beginning, but by what we call a *stepwise* move. Such a move involves connecting what we’ve just been talking about to what we’re now talking about, though they are different. I link up whatever I’m now introducing as new topic to what we’ve just been talking about. Now, this stepwise thing is a really serious feature of topical organization, and it’s my rough suspicion that the difference between what’s thought to be a good conversation and what’s thought to be a lousy conversation can be characterized that way, i.e. a lousy conversation is marked by a large number of new topic starts as compared to such a conversation in which, so far as anybody knows we’ve never had to

start a new topic, though we're far from wherever we began and haven't talked on just a single topic, it flowed. (Sacks 1995/II:566)

We started out by pointing out the “midwife” role that a DI may have in generating topical talk in certain constellations. We close by pointing out the formalizing and fragmenting effects which translatability and its cumbersome and costly machinery may have on the natural flow of conversation in other constellations. We have thus come a long way from where we started, although we have only been discussing a single topic.

Notes

1. ”In the community of the Mohave, all the children, whatever their age may be, have access to the sexual knowledge of the tribe and in quite realistic terms. Moreover, a number of them have full sexual relations before the age of ten and without any restrictions imposed by their parents or the authorities of the tribe. I also felt free to address these children and to ask them questions concerning their erotic experiences. Furthermore, I had taken care to be assisted by an adult interpreter, a versatile person, who was to serve also, in a way, as a moral warrant in the eyes of the children, as the children might have been afraid of being reported to the school authorities. The presence of the interpreter had a decisive influence on the course of these interviews. When they were asked to report their sexual activities *in English*, the language of their puritan school teachers, the boys completely denied practices which they frankly admitted when asked *in Mohave*. Obviously they thought they were free to formulate in Mohave what they thought they had to conceal in English, as verbal references to sexual practices were as illicit as the sexual practices themselves within an English context, while being perfectly allowable in a Moave context.” (My translation, F.E.M.). I quote Devereux's text following Gobard (1970: 41f).
2. For descriptions of the activities and the many roles of the professional dialogue interpreter cf. e.g. the studies of Wadensjö (1992), Linell, Wadensjö and Jönsson (1992), Apfelbaum (1996), (1998a, b). Cf. also studies on the interpreting of non-professional DIs, as, e.g. Knapp/Knapp-Potthoff (1985, 1987); Rehbein (1985a); Lambert (1987), Müller (1989), Bührig/Meyer (1998).
3. For the invisibility of the translator in written communication, cf. Venuti (1995).
4. For a detailed description of the manifold activities of ‘community interpreters’ in Swedish institutions cf. Wadensjö (1992).
5. It is true that DIs have also been reported — e.g. those working in police stations — to take sides with the agents of the institution and work as ‘auxiliary police agents’ (cf. Donk 1994).
6. For a more detailed discussion of this point cf. Müller (1989)
7. For empirical evidence documenting this ‘analytical mentality’ of DIs cf. Müller (1989).

8. On the simultaneous relaying and coordinating activity of the interpreter, cf. also Apfelbaum and Wadensjö (1995), Apfelbaum (1997, 1998)
9. Cf. in particular Heritage (1985), Heritage and Greatbach (1991).
10. As French juvenile language use can safely be considered to be, by comparison, the more rough, tough and virility-oriented one, translating into French often involves similar upgrading and, into German, downgrading in intensity also in other cases which cannot be documented here. For the virility-orientation of French slang cf. Bourdieu (1991a).
11. Cf. Labov (1972: 43): "Intensity by its very nature is not precise: first, because it is a gradient feature, and second, because it is most often dependent on other linguistic structures."
12. In oral processing, time is a limited resource. For this and other reasons, translation procedures are preferred which allow, in the reconstruction of the target utterance in the other language, a parallel linguistic structure to be maintained. For this preference in translatory interaction, cf. Müller (1995).
13. Due partly to its still clearly recognizable and prominent French origin, the French adjective 'superbe', which also exists in German usage with a slightly Germanized pronunciation, is part of the linguistic and cultural repertoire of educated and sophisticated German speakers. By using 'superbe', German speakers usually display and make conspicuous their familiarity with French language and French culture. ('superbe Stimmung', or even 'superbes Ambiente', would be a fitting comment on the latest vernissage, a recent opera performance, etc.).
14. For the notion of 'casual speech', cf. Zwicky (1972). Casual speech in German is an as yet poorly described variety, as is admitted e.g. by Matheier (1994). Phonetic features of casual German are listed in Kohler (1995).
15. At the lexical level, one could hardly imagine looking up and finding anything like the 'equivalences' briefly discussed above in a dictionary.
16. By 'directly corresponding translation' I mean the following: although we have directly corresponding single lexico-syntactic items in French (i.e., 'a= weng'/'ein wenig' = 'un peu'; 'schwach' = 'faible(ment)'; 'spielen' = 'jouer'), these items cannot be configured ('collocated') in the same way. It is thus quite impossible to choose a translation like 'ils ont joué un peu faiblement'. For a comparative study of collocations in German and French cf. Scherfer (1998).
17. The participation status of DIs can be interpreted in many different ways, by both the DIs themselves and by the other participants. It may be, as in the data discussed above, largely routinized and stable but it may also be a matter of continued negotiation within one and the same constellation of participants. For discussion cf. e.g. Knapp/Knapp-Potthoff (1985), Müller (1989), Wadensjö (1992), Malheiros-Poulet (1995), Apfelbaum (1995, 1998a, b), Bührig and Meyer (1998). Cf. also the discussion above on the 'bias' of DIs.
18. For participants' 'negotiation' of the length of turns to be translated in interpreted conversation, cf. Apfelbaum (1998b); for particular difficulties arising from the 'portioning' of turns, an inevitable constraint in interpreted conversation, cf. e.g. Bührig and Meyer (1998: 102f).

19. In constellations where a translation mode of interaction is not an absolute necessity and other modes — e.g. ‘exolingual conversation’ — are viable pathways, the translation mode is a dispreferred choice and only selected for specific needs, cf. Müller (1989), Apfelbaum (1998b).
20. Clearly, this may be handled differently in other constellations, cf. e.g. Apfelbaum (1998a).

References

- Apfelbaum, B.
 1997 “Der Umgang mit interkulturellen Konflikten in Gesprächen mit Dolmetsch-bedarf: Beispiele aus einer deutsch-französischen Industriekooperation”. *GAL-Bulletin* 26, pp. 63–78
 1998 “‘I think I have to translate first..’ Zu Problemen der Gesprächsorganisation in Dolmetschsituationen sowie zu einigen interaktiven Verfahren ihrer Bearbeitung”. In Apfelbaum/Müller (eds), pp. 21–46
- Apfelbaum, B. and H. Müller (eds)
 1998 *Fremde im Gespräch. Gesprächsanalytische Untersuchungen zu Dolmetschinteraktionen, interkultureller Kommunikation und institutionalisierten Interaktionsformen.* (IKO-Verlag)
- Apfelbaum B.
 1998a “Instruktionsdiskurse mit Dolmetscherbeteiligung. Aspekte der Turnkonstruktion und Turnzuweisung”. In A. Brock and M. Hartung (eds), *Neuere Entwicklungen in der Gesprächsforschung. Vorträge des Pragmatischen Kolloquiums Freiburg.* Tübingen (Narr), 11–36.
- Apfelbaum, B. and C. Wadensjö
 1995 “How does a VERBMOBIL affect conversation. Discourse analysis and machine-supported translatory interaction”. MS, to appear in Ch. Hauenschild and B. Heizmann (eds), *Machine Translation and Translation Theory.*
- Bischoff, B.
 1997 *Zur Problematik der Verantwortung beim Sprachmitteln. Ein Vergleich deutschen und afrikanischen Sprachmittlerverhaltens.* Magisterarbeit (Universität Hamburg).
- Bührig, K. and B. Meyer
 1998 “Fremde in der gedolmetschten Arzt-Patienten-Kommunikation”. In Apfelbaum and Müller (eds), 85–110.
- Bourdieu, P.
 1991 *Language and Symbolic Power.* Edited and introduced by J. B. Thompson. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
 1991a “Did you say ‘popular’?”. In Thompson (ed.), (1991), 90–104.

- Caffi, C.
1993 "Ricerche pragmatiche e traduzione: Per una prospettiva italiana". In Vincenzo Bonini/Marco Mazzoleni (eds), *L'italiano (e altre lingue). Atti del IV. seminario di studi. Milano, 13.-14. settembre 1991*. Pavia: Gianni Luculano editore, 177–203.
- Devereux, G.
1970 *Essais d'ethnopsychiatrie générale*. Traduction Tina Jolas et Henri Gobard. Paris: Gallimard.
- Donk, U.
1994 "Der Dolmetscher als Hilfspolizist — Zwischenergebnis einer Feldstudie". *Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 1*, 37–557.
- Erickson, F. and J. Shultz
1981 *The counselor as gatekeeper. Social interaction in interviews*. New York: Academic Press.
- Garfinkel, H.
1967 *Studies in ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Gobard, H.
1970 *L'aliénation linguistique — Analyse tétraglossique*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Goffman, E.
1979 "Footing". *Semiotica 25*, 1–29. (Also in E. Goffman (1981), *Forms of talk*. Oxford: Blackwell, 124–159).
- Knapp, K. and A. Knapp-Potthoff
1985 "Sprachmittlertätigkeit in der interkulturellen Kommunikation". In Rehbein (ed.), 450–463.
1987 "The man (or woman) in the middle: Discoursal aspects of non-professional interpreting". In K. Knapp, W. Enninger, A. Knapp-Potthoff (eds), *Analyzing intercultural communication*. Berlin: de Gruyter, 181–211.
- Kohler, J.
1995² *Einführung in die Phonetik des Deutschen*. Berlin: Erich Schmidt.
- Lakoff, G.
1974 "Dialogue with Herman Parret". In Parret (1974), 151–179.
- Lambert, M.
1987 "Le poids de l'interaction sociale dans les choix des traducteurs". *Encrages 18/19*, (Université de Paris VIII), 181–195.
- Linell, P.
1995 "Troubles with mutualities". In I. Marková, C. F. Graumann and K. Foppa (eds), *Mutualities in Dialogue*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 176–213.
- Linell, P., C. Wadensjö and L. Jönsson
1992 "Establishing communicative contact through a dialogue interpreter". In Grindsted, A. and J. Wagner (eds), *Communication for Specific Purposes — Fachsprachliche Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Günter Narr, 125–142.
- Malheiros-Poulet, M. E.
1995 "Le rôle de l'intermédiaire linguistique dans les situations de contacts interculturels". In Ch. Kerbrat-Orecchioni and Ch. Plantin (eds), *Le trilogue*. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon/CNRS, pp. 134–160.

- Matheier, K.
1994 "Vom 'feinen' und vom 'unfeinen' Deutsch". In Lanthaler, F. (Hg.), *Dialekt und Mehrsprachigkeit*. Beiträge eines internationalen Symposiums, Bozen 1993/Dialetto e pluri-linguismo. Atti di un simposio internazionale, Bolzano 1993. Meran: Alpha und Beta, 89–101.
- Müller, F. E.
1989 "Translation in bilingual conversation — Pragmatic aspects of translatory interaction". *Journal of Pragmatics* 13, 713–739.
1995 "Präferentielle Strukturen beim Übersetzen und beim Simultandolmetschen". In A. Lauer, H. Gerzymisch-Arbogast, J. Haller, E. Steiner (Hrsg.), *Übersetzungswissenschaft im Umbruch. Festschrift für Wolfgang Wilss*. Tübingen: Gunter Narr, pp. 281–291.
1998 "Verblühte Kritik — 'Face work' im interkulturellen Diskurs und seine Übersetzung beim Simultandolmetschen". In Apfelbaum and Müller (eds), 145–162.
- Parret, H.
1974 *Discussing Language*. The Hague/Paris: Mouton.
- Pöchhacker, F.
1994 Simultandolmetschen als komplexes Handeln. Tübingen: Narr.
- Rehbein, J. (ed.)
1985 *Interkulturelle Kommunikation*. Tübingen: Gunter Narr.
- Sacks, H.
1995 *Lectures on Conversation*, Vols. I and II in one paperpack volume. Edited by Gail Jefferson. With an introduction by E. Schegloff. Oxford: Blackwell.
1972 "Lecture 5, Topical vs. pair organization". In Sacks (1995), vol. II, pp. 561–570.
- Sacks, H. and E. Schegloff
1979 "Two preferences in the organization of reference to persons in conversation and their interaction". In Psathas, G. (ed.), *Everyday Language. Studies in Ethnomethodology*. New York: Irvington Publishers, 15–23.
- Sacks, H., G. Jefferson and E. Schegloff
1974 "A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation". *Language* 50, 696–735.
- Scherfer, P.
1998 "A propos des règles de collocations lexicales". MS, University of Wuppertal, to appear in: Festschrift für Jean Petit.
- Schlobinski, P., G. Kohl and I. Ludewig
1993 *Jugendsprache. Fiktion und Wirklichkeit*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Thompson, J. B. (ed.)
1991 *Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power*. Translated by G. Raymond and M. Adamson. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Vermeer, H. J.
1985 "Was dolmetscht der Dolmetscher, wenn er dolmetscht?" In Rehbein (ed.), 475–482.

- Zwicky, A. M.
 1972 "On casual speech". In P. M. Peranteau, J. N. Levi, G. C. Phares (eds), *Papers from the Eighth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society*. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 607–615.
- Venuti, L.
 1995 *Rethinking Translation*. London: Routledge.
- Wadensjö, C.
 1992 *Interpreting as Interaction. On dialogue-interpreting in immigration hearings and medical encounters*. Linköping: Linköping University Press.

Appendix

Conventions of the transcription

(.)	brief pauses (below half a second)
(0.5)	longer pauses in seconds
<u>bien</u>	strongly accentuated syllable or word
très	intensifiers and intensified expressions are marked by bold face
vrai:ment	elongation of vowel
=	(within turn) uninterrupted articulation
=	(between turns) latching of turns
(? ?)	not or not clearly understandable unit
((laughs))	comments
<u>h h h</u>	laughing (when articulated in syllables)
?	question mark for strongly rising question intonation
euh	low voice
sympa	loud voice
<i>translations</i>	translations of the dialogue interpreter are marked by italics
translations	approximate English translations of mine are provided only for the German parts of the interaction and follow the transcript

The Conversational Construction of Social Identity in Native/Non-native Interaction

Franca Orletti
University of Rome III

1. Introduction

In 1966, in a lecture aiming “to build a method which provides for some utterances as a recognizable invitation”, Sacks (1992) took an innovative approach to the question of how participants in interaction use their words and overall interactional choices to highlight only some of the many membership categories in which they occur. The social identity of speaker and interactant was determined by their definition of their discourse subject — “we were in an automobile discussion”. In the lecture, Sacks described a teenage group therapy session with a new patient joining the group. Sacks showed how the choice of the particular utterance “we were in an automobile discussion” by a veteran member of the group to formulate the topic of the discussion in which they were involved before the arrival of a newcomer, placed participants in a common category of teenagers and potential “hotrodders” but not of patients. The new arrival, who recognised the subject as one which did not require any particular expertise and which any teenager could talk about, interpreted the utterance as an invitation to join the group.

The idea that speaker identity is locally constructed during interaction and is not a mere reflection of external social reality is shared by a number of research trends within interactional sociolinguistics and other psychological or sociological approaches to discourse and interaction. It should not however be confused with the more widely shared view that speaking is itself an act of identity (Le Page, Tabouret-Keller 1985) because our linguistic choices show

who we are, where we come from etc. What Sacks and the constructionists wish to highlight is the constructed, or at least locally reconstructed, character of identities and social roles. The Goffmanian notion of “self” has been reinterpreted by some authors in these terms. According to Chaput Waksler (1989: 4) “the self emerges in Goffman’s work not as a state but as a constellation of ongoing actions” — actions that are not realized in a vacuum, but that are moments, behaviors, and verbal and non-verbal actions constituting social interactions. “The self must continually be constituted and reaffirmed in interaction”, claims Warfield Rawls (1989: 152), recommending an ethnomethodological reading of the theoretical notion of self in Goffman’s early work.

The centrality, claimed by Sacks, of conversational and, more generally, discursive practices in manifesting and constructing our social identities is confirmed by sociolinguistic (Schiffrin 1996) and social psychological (Harré 1987; Davies & Harré 1990) theories that we “position” ourselves — “positioning” being the label given to this process — through our discursive practices, i.e. we define our social identity through the words we choose, the topics we discuss, the way we structure discourse and conversation, and the participants we select as interlocutors. This approach emphasizes the fact that in certain discourse genres, stories, narratives, accounts and particularly avowals, the self of the author emerges as a social and cultural, rather than psychological, entity. When telling a story, the author creates a world in which he or she projects his or her normative expectations of social conduct, values, perception of social identities and normative expectations. It is no coincidence that stories have always been occasions for socialization in adult-child relations, due to the way in which a specific socio-cultural vision of reality is filtered through the plot as a whole and the descriptions of the characters. Schiffrin (1996: 170) underlines that “the form of our stories (their textual structure), the content of our stories (what we tell about) and our story telling behavior (how we tell our stories) are all sensitive indices not just of our personal selves, but also of our social and cultural identities”.

Along with other authors (Gergen 1987; Harré 1987; Taylor 1991), I believe that the process of socially and culturally locating ourselves and positioning ourselves in the social micro-order of interaction runs through all our discursive activities, from the choice of the form and content of what we say to the participant structure (Philips 1972) we adopt. As a sociolinguist, I naturally find this perspective particularly convincing, since it places lan-

guage at the center of the construction of the social micro-order of interaction, attributing to it the role of constituting, reconfirming and negotiating the social identities in play. Taking on board Sacks' suggestions means attributing a different significance to the language-social identity relationship from that given by sociolinguistic studies of variation. It means that the real importance of language and all communicative activities is recognized: our social identities in the local management of interaction are not fixed or mirrored by our positions in the larger social structure of society but are asserted, confirmed or disconfirmed by means of what we say or do in the interaction.¹

2. Multiple social identities and the function of contextualization in making them relevant

When two or more people meet and sustain social interaction, each brings with him/her a number of identities. For example, interactants may be women, mothers, wives, colleagues, of different ethnic or racial backgrounds, of higher or lower social status, old or young, native or non-native and so on. Identities may be more or less evident due to external characteristics such as physical appearance, clothes or skin colour; others, such as status as speaker/hearer, interviewer/interviewee — what might be termed communicative role — can only be created or confirmed through communicative exchange. However, this does not mean that the former, unlike the latter, are always present and relevant; they only emerge if they are evoked or given relevance by means of interaction. In this context, Erickson and Schultz (1982) refer to “performed social identity” to indicate the interactional work carried out by participants in order to make relevant certain identities or packages of identities. Identity construction and selection work takes place moment by moment during the communicative exchange and is realized by choosing one variety of communicative repertoire rather than another, choosing the subject, choosing words and choosing the labels defining the topic: often one only needs to look at these labels to understand which identity or which of our selves is being brought into play. In an interaction involving more than two participants, other signs of identity may be the choice of one interlocutor rather than another or any of the communicative choices, verbal or non-verbal, that can act as contextualization cues by contributing to define the social communicative situation in which the participants are involved (Gumperz 1992a, 1992b). The construction of the identity of

participants is only one aspect of the complex process of contextualization through which interactants make sense of what is happening in the interaction. A way to understand how an identity or role is created or recreated during interaction is suggested by Auer's analysis of the contextualization process (1992). In redefining the characteristics of contextualization theory and reinterpreting conversational analysis' flexible and reflexive theory of context, Auer asks whether, within context, there is a confirmability scale in interaction. Using a distinction already made by Giddens (1976) and Hinnenkamp (1991), he asks how much of context is "brought along", and how much of it is "brought about" in interaction: "in some cases context is "brought along" and merely has to be indexed to become (or remain) relevant, whereas in others context emerges only as a consequence of interactants' contextualization work, i.e. it is "brought about" exclusively" (p. 26). He distinguishes three different types of contextual information in terms of their "brought along" and "brought about" properties:

1. Context that is created *ex novo* from interaction, such as knowledge that interactions construct on participation frameworks, thematic organisation, sequential structure, interactants' ways of relating to transmitted content, knowledge constructed moment by moment in non-institutional interaction between peers.
2. The same type of contextual information is "brought along" in institutional interaction in which participants arrive with expectations as to how the information will be structured. Auer refers to these aspects of context as "default assignment" (p.26), though stressing that during interaction "brought along" roles must be continually confirmed and reconstructed if they are to be maintained.
3. "Brought along" elements of context — such as the space-time collocation of event and participants — which can still remain in the background with no relevance to the interaction unless participants "bring them about".² Unlike social roles, these characteristics cannot be changed by interaction but only undergo stronger or weaker emphasis.

Thus Auer, too, stresses the need to look at what happens during interaction — at what he, like Gumperz, calls "contextualization work" — in order to understand which aspects of interaction are made relevant by participants. His analysis is similar to that of Schegloff who, though working within conversational analysis theory, concludes that it is necessary to look at the detail of the interaction in order to understand which aspects of context are relevant

to interactants.

This perspective will be used to investigate interaction between a native Italian speaker and a non-native Eritrean immigrant who had come to Italy to look for work. We will look particularly at whether the ethnic identity of participants have always been focused and made relevant by participants and whether the participation framework and distribution of interactional power can always be attributed to native/non-native position, i.e. whether the relationship between native and non-native always produces asymmetrical interaction in which the native usually occupies the up position and the non-native the down position. The interaction will be analysed in detail so as to avoid easy interpretations based on rigid social determinism. We will particularly investigate whether, as Hinnenkamp (1991) has already elegantly shown in another case of intercultural communication, role relations to be expected on the basis of “brought along” contextual factors can be changed or even turned round during interaction.

We will also try to understand the way in which the construction of identities takes place through the combined — although not always co-operative — efforts of all participants. It is, after all, not enough for an individual participant to exhibit images of him or herself, since other participants must be made to accept them; they must be negotiated with others. The identities brought into play may also be those that we would never have wanted to exhibit, but that are revealed by other participants in the interaction.

3. The identity of the immigrant and the control of local power in interaction

Studies dealing with interethnic interaction between natives and immigrant workers have often focused on asymmetrical encounters. In these encounters, many factors, if brought into play during the course of the interaction, can help bring about an asymmetry of interactional power. Among the potential causes of unequal social power among actors, one finds:

- different occupational status; immigrants workers generally occupy low level working positions in the social hierarchy, carrying out jobs that have been turned down by natives, or that are considered degrading;
- lack of control over the host country language (which is used to manage the interactions) by one of the parties, namely the non native;

- the institutional character of the contexts in which the interactions take place and the data are recorded; in such contexts — e.g. “the factory”, “the social work bureau”, “the medical studio” — the native generally represents “power” since he/she personifies the institution (e.g. the “factory owner”, the “social worker”, the “medical expert”); indeed, this personification mechanism extends to the entire staff of a given institution, i.e. to all those who make the institution run (office help, administrators, etc.);
- the charitable or social assistance aims of the exchanges recorded, in which the native voluntarily helps the non-native with goods or services and the non-native appreciatively accepts them; this bias is perhaps due to the charitable character of the institutions in which the interactions are so often recorded;
- the kinds of speech event or linguistic activity recorded, which tend to be “questioning” and, more specifically, “interviews” conducted by the native; numerous studies have shown how the role of the interviewer determines the communicative strategies pursued and how this, in turn, determines the overall structure of the interaction (Heritage 1985; Greatbatch 1988; Mishler 1986; Testa 1994)

The simultaneous presence of many factors that can create asymmetry in the management of interactional power makes it difficult to assess the role played in this respect by the identity of the immigrant. This makes it necessary to analyze interactions in which the relative significance of the various identities brought into play emerge at their clearest, such as extracts of casual talk taken from daily life in which the influence of institutions is not present.

An exemplary case of this is the analysis of a street interaction carried out by Hinnenkamp (1991), in which the evident asymmetry determined by the role of beggar and probable benefactor is overturned when the benefactor’s identity as a non-native is evoked, along with the stigma associated with being non-native by the native who exposes it. Hinnenkamp’s analysis reveals the conflict between the social identity that situations tend to attribute to participants and the identity these participants regard themselves as possessing. It also demonstrates the complexity of the interactional work carried out by one participant in order to establish an asymmetry that overturns roles which would have seemed obvious to anyone observing the situation (one man begging in the street and another man stopping to give him money). In our analysis, in order to understand the identities and the weight attributed to each by the interactants, we will examine everyday encounters between two

women, one native and one non-native, between whom there is a degree of friendship. We will also include ethnographic aspects of the situational factors that exist over and above the interaction (who the participants are, where they are, the activity in which they are involved), i.e. contextual factors that participants “bring along”. We will thus be able to examine the entire process by which the participants select and adopt their communicative behavior, creating and recreating the context and highlighting (bringing about) only a few of the many possible contextual factors. This is the theoretical approach to intercultural communication adopted by Gumperz, Erickson and Shultz.

4. Data

The data analysed here is composed of spontaneous interaction between an Italian speaker and a non-native Eritrean speaker, whose mother tongue is Tigrinya. The non-native informant, Medina, has been living in Italy for about 17 years. She has not been exposed to any form of explicit language teaching, either in her own country or in Italy. We might say that she is in a position of semi-illiteracy. Medina was observed for three years in spontaneous interaction and three hours of recorded data were analysed. This prolonged observation has a different aim from other longitudinal studies: the aim is not to collect data on the development of linguistic competence, but to analyse the communicative strategies adopted by the informant in a range of non-elicited linguistic activities. The fieldworker, i.e. the Italian native speaker, is a mature university student originally from Sardinia. Her social environment is somewhat precarious because she is working and studying for her degree at the same time, as well as living away from home. The interaction occurs in the informant’s home and is initially characterised by a semi-formal relationship, as both interactants have been living in the same block of flats and thus share the same kind of domestic problems. This is made clear by the changes in the use of forms of address, initially shifting between the informal “tu” and the formal “lei” and subsequently using “tu” only, and by the corresponding changes in the routines that characterise the ritual layer of the interaction. In this kind of unstructured research context it was possible to collect data on different linguistic activities and discourse genres: descriptions elicited by a visual element (photographs collected in an album), narratives, arguments, expressions of wishes and hypotheses, conversations on everyday topics or on more complex issues such

as the political situation, contraception and jealousy.

The fragments analysed here belong to two interactions with very different objectives. The first takes place after the informant and fieldworker have known each other for about a year. It is conducted by the fieldworker as a real interview aimed at reconstructing the informant's biography. The second is a discussion about politics.

5. Analysis

5.1 *Defining the contextual frame*

Let us first look at interaction 1:

Interaction 1

Setting: informant's home

Participants: Medina (non-native speaker), Marisa (native Italian speaker), a guest, Sara (Medina's daughter)

MA = Native ME = Non-native

Marisa knocks on Medina's door as she does almost every day

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. MA: <i>buongiorno! (0.2) stai facendo pulizie?</i> | MA:hello (0.2) So you're cleaning the house? |
| 2. ME: <i>stamattina faccio tutto insieme</i> | ME:I'm doing the whole lot this morning. |
| 3. MA: <i>che lingua usi quando qualcuno suona alla porta?</i> | MA:what language do you use when someone rings at the door? |
| 4. ME: <i>tutti e due (0.3) in genere in italiano quando dico chi è non risponde dice mamma dice hai dimenticato e ha risposto anche nella mia lingua=</i> | ME:both (0.3) mostly Italian when I say "who is it?" he doesn't answer, so she says Mom she says you forgot and answered in my language too= |
| 5. MA: <i>lui è qui in vacanza?</i> | MA:(referring to the guest) is he on holiday here? |
| 6. ME: <i>(0.5) no no deve andare in Canada</i> | ME:(0.5) no no, he's got to go to Canada. |
| 7. MA: <i>ma è tuo parente?</i> | MA:but is he a relative or yours? |
| 8. ME: <i>no, no.</i> | ME:no no |
| 9. MA: <i>è tuo amico?</i> | MA:is he a friend of yours? |
| 10. ME: <i>no, no.</i> | ME:no, no |
| 11. MA: <i>ma tu hai altri parenti qui vero?</i> | MA:but you do have other relatives here, don't you? |
| 12. ME: <i>no amici=</i> | ME:no friends= |

13. MA: *=ah solo amici quel bambino con gli occhiali* MA:ah, only friends, that kid with the glasses?
14. ME: *erano fratelli, si lui era//* ME:they were brothers, yes he was//
15. MA: *//fratello di tuo marito?* MA:// a brother of your husband?
16. ME: *lui era della zona di là e gli altri erano fratelli e la moglie (0.5) com'è giornalista sei?* ME:he was from out there too and the others were his brothers and his wife (0.5) but are you now a journalist?
17. MA: *quanto tempo è che state in Italia?* MA:how long have you all been in Italy?
18. ME: *Io? (0.2) sedici anni venuto a Natale* ME:me? (0.2) sixteen, came at Christmas
19. MA: */.../ tu mi hai detto che sempre vi incontrate ogni settimana con altre persone* MA:you told me you always have these get-togethers, every week, with other people
20. ME: *(0.5)* ME:(0.5)
21. MA: *sei venuta da sola* MA:did you come by yourself?
22. ME: *si l'aereo* ME:yes, the plane.
- MA: *no, dico, la prima volta che sei venuta qua* MA:no, I mean, the first time you came here
23. ME: *si c'erano paesani io lo sapevo piatto taula tegamino, bicchiere dal mio paese, io le cose imparato così* ME:yes, there were folks I knew plate, dish, pan, glass from back home, I learned these things like that
24. MA: *sei andata a scuola?* MA:did you go to school?
25. ME: *no (0.5)* ME:no ((interrupts to speak with
26. MA: *no, no* MA:no, no
27. ME: *eccomi tutto pulito* ME:((looking at the baby)) here I am all clean. now he has to eat
28. MA: *adesso lui deve mangiare che cucinate oggi?* MA:what are you cooking today?
29. ME: *melanzane la pasta si la pastasciutta mangiamo così è Sara problema lei un po' difficile non mangia quello che trova e allora oggi faccio un po' carote patate* ME:eggplants, pasta yes pasta that's what we eat it's Sarah problem ((Sarah is the other child)) she a bit difficult doesn't eat what she gets so today I do some carrots potatoes
30. MA: *volevo chiederti un'altra cosa poi me ne vado. che scuola hai frequentato?* MA:I wanted to ask you one more thing, then I'll be off. how much schooling have you had?

As we said before, the informant and the fieldworker have known each other for at least a year and the encounter has been preceded by many others. This

particular encounter is characterised by a break in the frame (Goffman 1974) by the fieldworker, whose questions are aimed at reconstructing the non-native's biography. The first two turns in the opening sequence do not make this interaction any different from the preceding ones. Marisa, the native speaker, knocks on Medina's door and she opens it. There is nothing unusual about the opening sequence (ll. 1 and 2). The Italian greeting "buongiorno" used in formal situations and in co-occurrence with the address form "lei" often alternates in the data with the informal "ciao" which co-occurs with "tu". The "buongiorno" used here does not therefore seem to signal anything in particular.

A rapid question-answer sequence starts at line 3 in which the native asks the questions and the non-native provides the answers. These are intrusive questions that penetrate into what Goffman calls "the territories of self". The exchange continues easily up to l.16 (1). At this point the non-native, Medina, formulates the interaction by glossing (Garfinkel, Sacks 1970). Her rhetorical question "are you now a journalist?" and the laugh that follows have the same function as the metacommunicative signals analysed by Bateson, where the message "this is a play" recategorises the bites exchanged by the chimpanzees and makes them acceptable since they are only pretending to fight rather than really fighting. Medina's utterance allows us to put the l.3 to l.23 sequence in a different frame, thus making it appropriate. However, the utterance is a particular kind of metacommunicative message, i.e. a formulation. According to Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) and Orletti (1983), formulations are metacommunicative comments through which a definition is given of what the participants are doing or saying in the interaction. Formulations are thus a possible repair to the indexicality of linguistic forms and one of the main instruments for the joint construction of the sense of the discourse. In this case Medina's formulation also has the function of simultaneously signalling and repairing the problem. The definition of Marisa as a journalist, followed by laughter, makes the interviewer's behaviour acceptable to the non-native. The laugh can be regarded as a contextualization cue (Gumperz 1992a,b) which allows the entire sequence to be reframed as a game.

The interactional problem to be repaired is twofold:

1. The first problem involves the positioning of the interview, which is placed in the opening section of the encounter straight after the greetings. A visitor in this position would normally move from the opening to the central part of the encounter via a series of conversational routines, such as a ritualistic exchange about health. However, in this encounter this series of routines is

missing and, with it, its mitigating effect on the potential threat to the self represented by an incursion into somebody else's territory. The series of routines would only be unnecessary if the encounter were to be reframed differently and this is precisely what has happened in the present case, in which an encounter between neighbours is reframed as a research interview.

2. The second problem involves the type of actions carried out by Medina: the triggering of explicit questions on personal matters is completely inappropriate in an encounter between friends. This might explain why the repair work is carried out by Medina rather than by Marisa, who had caused the problem needing repair and had invoked a different frame by departing from the previous one. Medina's face is at stake and it is only by recognising that a new frame has been enacted that the potential twofold threat to face can be avoided. By phrasing the formulation as a rhetorical question, Medina involves the other participant in redefining the situation and thus in the repair work. Medina's later behaviour also has a significant function in the contextualization process. As soon as she has asked her rhetorical question, she bursts into laughter thus transforming the interview into a game. In a sense, this is a second level contextualization which operates on the definition of the situation that has just been set up. It is as if Medina has said "All right, I accept the definition of the situation that you are proposing but only as a game".

In the turn immediately afterwards Marisa resumes her role as interviewer, thus confirming the shared redefinition of the situation. The interaction continues as an interview until 1.31 when Medina turns to the baby and tells him that she is now clean, implying that it is time to have lunch. This exchange occurs in the presence of Marisa who, though not the addressee, can grasp its significance. Whether intentionally or not, Medina is exploiting the opportunities offered by this particular participation framework (Goffman 1981) to allow information to be passed to participants whose role is simply that of an unaddressed recipient, i.e. a participant whose presence is ratified but who is not being spoken to at that particular moment.

Immediately after this (1.28), Medina involves Marisa more directly by saying "now he (the baby) has to eat." With this statement Medina calls into question the interview frame which has been accepted and shared by participants up to that point. Her aim is to revive the "encounter between neighbours" frame in order to try to bring the interaction to an end. This new frame is activated for six turns, as shown by the discourse topics involved.

However, the "interview" style is maintained by Marisa as she continues

to ask questions about day-to-day matters such as food and what Sara, the other child, likes to eat. Marisa intends to reestablish the interview frame by formulating what she intends to do (1.31). However she mitigates this forced reopening of the frame by accepting the suggestion to close the interaction (“I wanted to ask you one more thing and then I’ll be off”).

Marisa’s interview, which is clearly the contextual frame determining the communicative choices of the two interactants, continues for several more minutes. Marisa asks brief and direct questions and Medina responds with declarative sentences focused on the topic of the question, often accompanying her answers with explanatory comments which make her turns longer than Marisa’s. The development of the interaction fits perfectly into the interview canon described by Heritage (1985). The asymmetry of communicative power is entirely determined by the contextual frame used (the interview) and appears to be unrelated to the native/non-native identities of the participants. It is the activity in which Marisa and Medina are involved which leads one to ask questions, directing the topic choice and thematic development of the conversation, and the other to respond.

Furthermore Medina does not attribute a negative significance or a subordinate role to her identity as an immigrant. This emerges clearly from her answer to Marisa’s question about houses — “you told me last time that you illegally occupied an apartment block when you first arrived”. In her reply, which is Medina’s only personal narrative in Interaction 1, she explains to Marisa that she and her family have never illegally occupied houses. This is a discourse by Medina on the stereotype associating the status of immigrant with life styles that may be chosen by some immigrants but not all. Marisa’s use of the expression “occupation of houses” has a connotation of social struggle over housing which united both immigrants and natives in Italy during the 1970’s when accommodation could not be found at reasonable rents and when many landlords actually kept empty flats off the market for fear of being obliged to accept tenants paying low rents. Quite unconsciously, Marisa is acting in line with the process of generalisation that lies at the root of cultural stereotyping and racism, in which the characteristics of an individual or limited number of individuals are extended to the entire group. Medina refuses to accept the term “illegally occupy” and makes it clear that, even though she lived in a house that had been illegally occupied, she was not responsible for its original illegal occupation. Other people had illegally occupied the house and Medina’s presence was justified by the fact that her

husband worked as a caretaker — a job that in Italy goes with the right to free accommodation.

Let us now examine the extract in which Medina summarises the story of her relationship with the so-called “Occupied Convent”:

Extract 2

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>1. MA: <i>tu mi hai detto l'altra volta che avete occupato delle case quando siete arrivati qua</i></p> | <p>MA:you told me last time that you occupied some houses when you first arrived here</p> |
| <p>2. ME: <i>si</i></p> | <p>ME:yes</p> |
| <p>3. MA: <i>= e dove le avete occupate</i></p> | <p>MA:and where was this?</p> |
| <p>4. ME: <i>dietro Colosseo</i></p> | <p>ME:behind the Colosseum</p> |
| <p>5. MA: <i>e per quanto tempo ci//</i></p> | <p>MA:and for how long did//</p> |
| <p>6. ME: <i>//non è che abbiamo occupato. noi abitiamo Prima Porta a Prima Porta nata Sara no. un tempo noi conosciamo questa gente/quasi da dieci anni e c'è riunione la facciamo là, tutto quanto la festa sposato l'/ sai. preparano ballerini. via del Colosseo 17 cioè prima era delle suore bambini, hanno conosciuto una casa grande sai? vendono quadri tante cose là dentro, c'era una chiesa. era una casa grande quando entri. allora un anno/un anno e sette mesi siamo state là. siamo cioè il portiere la notte mio marito davanti a la casa, perchè erano fuori senza nessuno/ quella meglio di prima no allora per so quello siamo stati là. là erano/facevano non era di loro. hanno occupato anche loro la casa allora occupavano chi ballare studiare cose là. non ci sei mai venuta là?</i></p> | <p>ME:it wasn't us that occupied. we live Prima Porta district, at Prima Porta Sara born, no? after a time we know these people/almost for ten years and there is meeting, we have it there. all the big party, married there/ you know. they teach dancing. Colosseum Street, number 17. I mean first it belong to nuns kids get to know them, a big building, you know? they sell paintings lots of things inside. there was a church, it was a big building when you go in. then a year/a year and seven months, we lived there. we are I mean the caretaker at night, my husband in front of the building, because they were outside without anyone / that better than before, no? that's why we were there. there, they were/they did it wasn't theirs. they occupied the building, too. they occupied whoever dance, study, things like that. you never came there?</p> |
| <p>7. MA: <i>non so probabile</i></p> | <p>MA:I don't know, I might have.</p> |

8. ME: *facevano tante cose là. ballavano*= ME:they did a lot of things
there. they danced=
9. MA: *=insomma era un punto di ritrovo* MA:so it was a meeting place
10. ME: *eh! eh un punto di ritrovo eheh...* ME:yes. yes, a meeting place
ehh ...

This narrative inverts the roles of native/non-native opposition. It is Medina who explains to Marisa what the “occupied convent” really was, not the other way around. The fact that Medina knows more about Roman life than Marisa does is unsurprising since Marisa in a way is also an immigrant, having moved from Sardinia to mainland Italy (referred to by Sardinians as “the Continent”). Nor has she lived in Rome for as long as Medina has. The fact that both women are immigrants creates a relationship of “co-membership” (Erickson, Schultz 1982) that often emerges in their conversational choices, though not in this extract in which there seems to be a state of communicative asymmetry with Medina occupying the dominant role. This role reversal is clear in the interactional development when Medina changes tack at the end of her narrative and asks Marisa a question — “you never came there?”.

The entire narrative puts Medina in a position of power in that she is the one who assumes the teaching role, explaining to Marisa events from her past that she may not know as well as details about the place she lived for over a year — a place that was regarded as a kind of cultural institution in Rome during that period. Medina’s role as a guide is signalled by her constant use of “sai”,³ a discourse marker used in Italian to involve the interlocutor by attributing him or her with knowledge that he or she undoubtedly does not possess.

This new arrangement lasts for a very short time. After a few more words, in which Medina explains how she then bought her house, we return to the interview frame. The interview comes to an end, after further question-answer exchanges, in extract 3 below:

Extract 3

1. MA: *è ora di pranzo. ti ringrazio* MA:it’s time for lunch. thanks a
moltissimo lot.
2. ME: *niente. grazie a lei* ME:not at all. thank you.

The fact that it is Marisa who opens the closing sequence is perfectly in line with the definition of the situation and linguistic event which the participants have agreed to recognise, namely the research interview, in which the inter-

viewer rather than the interviewee opens and closes the interaction. What is striking here is the expression used by Medina as a closing formula in response to Marisa. Her “*grazie a lei*” is a return to the “*lei*” address form that signals a formal relationship between interlocutors at a point when the reciprocal use of the informal “*tu*” form seems to have already been consolidated. However, this may not be a lapse into the social relationship of formal courtesy triggered by the contextual frame. Medina may be using the entire phrase as a crystallised, idiomatic form without conceiving of “*lei*” as something separate from it. Medina has clearly learnt the form as an unanalysed chunk representing a conversational formula for responding to thanks and is using it in this way here.

5.2 *A discussion about politics*

We now turn to the second interaction:

Interaction 2

Setting: informant’s home

Participants: Marisa, Medina, Sara (Medina’s daughter)

Extract 4

MA = Marisa, the native; ME = Medina, the non-native; SA = Sara, Medina’s daughter

(Marisa knocks at the door)

- | | | | |
|---------|--|---------------|--|
| 1. ME: | <i>chi è?</i> | ME:who | is it? |
| 2. MA: | <i>sono Marisa</i> | MA:it’s | Marisa. |
| 3. ME: | <i>ciaoo! vieni qua vieni</i> | ME:hellooo! | come here, come. |
| 4. MA: | <i>ero preoccupata per voi. non vi
ho più visto ed ho pensato che
eravate tutti malati</i> | MA:I | was worried about you (.)
I haven’t seen you around and I
thought you might all be sick in bed |
| 5. SA: | <i>no io</i> | SA:no | me. |
| 6. MA: | <i>ah vedi che c’era qualcuno malato</i> | MA:ah! | you see? there was
someone sick! |
| 7. ME: | <i>((ride))</i> | ME:((laughs)) | |
| 8. MA: | <i>ma ho detto questa famiglia che fa?
non si vede più in giro!</i> | MA:I | said to myself what has
happened to this family? no one has
seen them around! |
| 9. ME: | <i>((ride))</i> | ME:((laughs)) | |
| 10. MA: | <i>invece voi state guardando la</i> | MA:but | here you are instead |

- televisione e ve ne fregate di me
che mi preoccupo per voi*
11. ME: ((ride)) ME:((laughs))
12. SA: ((ride anche lei)) SA:((laughs too))
13. MA: *ma avete ospiti? disturbo?* MA:but do you have visitors?
am I disturbing you?
(con ironia) me ne devo andare? ((ironically)) should I leave?
14. SA: *((parla sotto voce: il fratello
dorme))* SA:((whispering: her brother is
asleep))
15. ME: *no, no le rompi le scatole, dove vai
di quà di là* ME:no no. you'll disturb him,
what are you doing running around
like that?
*((dove vuoi accomodarti,
in cucina o in salotto?))* ((where do you want to sit,
in the kitchen or the living room ?))
16. MA: *andiamo in cucina che è più
piccola va!* MA:let's go in the kitchen. it's
cosier, you know.
*stai facendo i compiti? guarda cosa
ti do,* are you doing your homework? here,
per te e Michele look what I've got for you,
for you and Michael
17. SA: *che carino! grazie!* SA:oh, how nice! thank you!
18. ME: *proprio a te pensava* ME:she was just thinking of you
19. MA: *eh pensava e perchè non sei venuta
a trovarmi!* MA:humph! thinking of me/ and how
come you never came for a visit!
20. ME: *noo stamattina siamo andati dal
dottore* ME:noo! we went to see the
doctor this morning
21. MA: *e perchè?* MA:oh! why?
22. ME: *c'ha avuto la bronchite c'aveva
quando venuta te no? ((visita
precedente di M.))* MA:she's had bronchitis. she
had it when you came didn't she
((Marisa's previous visit))
23. MA: *aah!* MA:aah!
24. ME: *e dopo ha detto — questa bronchite
non deve uscire fuori non deve
andare scuola
e dopo stata a casa perchè se no
dice che//* ME:and then she said — this
bronchitis is not supposed to leave
the house it's not to go to school
and after stayed home because if not
she says that//
25. SA: *guarda che carino mamma
((il regalo))* SA:(showing gift)//look how
nice it is, mom!
26. ME: *eh bello, dai vieni ((siediti))* ME:mmm, nice! come on sit down here!
27. MA: *no no, te l'ho detto
sono scesa per vedere una certa
signora Medina che non si fa vedere* MA:no no I told you I've come
down to see a certain Mrs Medina
who never calls on anyone
28. ME: *io poi ogni tanto esco entro esco
entro* ME:well, I, now and then, go
out, come back, go out, come back!!
29. MA: *eh si! esci, entri, entri esci* MA:that's right! in and out, out and in!
30. ME: *lei stata male solo che io esco con* ME:yeah but she been sick so I

- Michele poi a scuola una settimana chiusa!* just go out with Michael then to school closed for a week!
31. MA: *si è vero per le elezioni* MA:yes that's right for the elections
32. ME: *eh! poi sabato ero uscita poi sono rimasti col padre ieri neanche tutta giornata pranzo fuori tutti quanti* ME:yeah then saturday I had go then they stayed with their father, yesterday not even all day, lunch out for all of them
33. MA: *pensavo che fossi preoccupata per le elezioni* MA:I thought you were worried about the elections
34. ME: *che preoccupata?* ME:why worried?
35. MA: *se avessi potuto votare chi avresti votato?* MA:if you had been eligible to vote who would you have voted for?
36. ME: *ammazza ladri* ME:those who kill the thieves
37. MA: *chi sono gli ammazza ladri?* MA:who are the ones that kill the thieves?
38. ME: *quelli là ti fregano tutti soldi* ME:those guys, they take all your money
39. MA: *ma hai visto i risultati, tutti i fascisti che hanno vinto, che vergogna!* MA:but did you see the results? all those fascists who won? what a disgrace!
40. ME: *eh che credi che essere che vincono?* ME:yeah. who you think they are that win?
41. MA: *chi credi che vince?* MA:who do you think is the winner?
42. ME: *ma non c'è nessuno sono tutti uguali* ME:there's no one, they're all the same

This exchange takes place about two years after the first one, shortly after the Rome mayoral elections. Like all the other encounters between Medina and Marisa, this take place in Medina's house and has no special goal. In this first extract there is an extended opening sequence with an exchange of greetings followed by conversational routines that normally occur in this type of encounter. The central topic of the encounter, the electoral results, emerges gradually after Medina's comment on the fact that the schools had been closed because of the elections. Although Marisa directs the conversation towards the election topic, she cannot be considered to have introduced it, since the topic would not have emerged at all without Medina's utterance, as can be seen in lines 31 to 33.

In this extract the discourse topic is jointly constructed. The entire interaction seems to develop according to an equal distribution of participation rights, even though cultural difference is made relevant through both the discourse content and the native's pedagogic role. The latter underlines the

linguistic inequality between the two; it should be noted that in ll.36–42 Marisa reformulates Medina’s words on no less than two occasions, even though she has failed to understand what Medina is saying and the kind of discourse she is constructing. In l.37ff. Marisa fails to realise that the expression used by Medina — “ammazza ladri” — is not a pidginised version of the Italian “chi ammazza i ladri” or “chi ammazzano i ladri” (the one(s) who kill(s) the thieves). There are two further interpretations of what Medina meant to say. In the first, “ammazza” is a Roman dialect form being used as an intensifier. The native version would be “ammazza che ladri”, the equivalent of “sono proprio dei ladri” (they’re real thieves) in standard Italian. In the second, “ammazza” stands for “massa”, used metaphorically in Italian to indicate a large quantity; Medina’s comment could thus be interpreted in standard Italian as “massa di ladri” (a bunch of thieves”) or “sono tutti una massa di ladri”) (they’re all a bunch of thieves). Due to the similarity between the two Italian expressions and to the fact that either can occur in the same sequential collocation and with the same function (i.e. as comment), they may have been reinterpreted in the variety of Italian used by Medina as a single expression. What is important is that these expressions, or their contamination, are perfectly appropriate to the kind of discourse that Medina is formulating. This discourse might be defined by the Italian expression “piove, governo ladro” (“it’s raining and it’s the government’s fault”), which acts as a refrain throughout its formulation. In this kind of political discourse, generic claims such as “all politicians are corrupt” and “it’s all the government’s fault” are repeated, with the speaker adopting no precise political position beyond a vaguely negative attitude towards those in power. It is the kind of discourse that is constructed by people at the market or on buses, involving interlocutors who meet for the first and presumably only time. Even though it can be formulated by people who know one another, its emergence indicates a reluctance to become involved in a genuine political discussion.

The misunderstanding, however, stems from the fact that Marisa is convinced that she is producing a genuine political discourse with Medina. It becomes clear, however, in l. 42 that the discourse is of the “it’s raining and it’s the government’s fault” type when Medina states that all politicians are the same. What we have here is a case of “intercultural miscommunication” (Gumperz and Roberts 1991), although it has little in common with those analysed by Gumperz. In this case, the non-native demonstrates a full, native-like awareness of the communicative routines and discourse schema of the

social and communicative networks in which she is involved each day. The misunderstanding in this case stems from the fact that the interactants, while drawing on the same communicative and cultural repertoire, act according to different discourse schemata, failing to agree on the definition of the linguistic activity in which they are involved. Unlike the cases analysed by Gumperz, Marisa's misunderstanding is not produced by the fact that a particular expression might have different interpretations depending on the different cultural backgrounds in which it is read but stems from the fact that the native and non-native speakers construct parallel but different discourses. Once the phase of temporary "miscommunication" has passed, the conversation resumes on an equal footing on the subject of the conditions of immigrant workers in Italy. As is typical in a conversation between women friends, it moves in an entirely casual manner from personal topics to more general issues such as the condition of women in Italy and Eritrea. Towards the end of the interaction the arrival of Sara brings about a sudden change, shifting attention to the hanging up of her rag doll and the tea that Marisa and Medina are drinking. Medina's attitude makes the whole of this interaction highly significant. What makes this encounter interesting is not so much the fact that it concerns topics like politics that are not strictly connected to domestic matters and takes place on an equal footing, but that at the end Medina presents a positive view of her own cultural identity.

Extract 5

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. SA: <i>mamma dove l'appendiamo?</i>
<i>((il pupazzo))</i> | SA: mom, where should I hang
it up? ((the doll)) |
| 2. ME: <i>Sara e che so!</i> | ME: Sarah! how should I know! |
| 3. SA: <i>ooh! a me non me l'hai fatto</i>
<i>((il té))</i> | SA: oh! you didn't make one for
me ((a cup of tea)) |
| 4. ME: <i>chi? il té lo vuoi? ((ride))</i> | ME: who? tea you want?
((laughs)) |
| 5. SA: <i>eh</i> | SA: mmm! |
| 6. ME: <i>fai i compiti su!</i> | ME: do your homework, go on! |
| 7. MA: <i>prima i compiti poi il té</i> | MA: first your homework, then
some tea! |
| 8. ME: <i>limone vero ((rivolta a Marisa))</i> | ME: lemon, right? ((to Marisa)) |
| 9. MA: <i>si, si limone</i> | MA: yes, yes lemon |
| 10. ME: <i>aah! dimenticato quella lascia stare,</i>
<i>ti metto la tassinia ohi ohi ((ride))</i> | ME: aah! forgot it! don't touch it
((the glass)), I'll get you a cup ohi
ohi ((laughs)) |
| 11. MA: <i>lascia stare che mi va bene lo stesso</i> | MA: don't bother, it's all the same |

- ((bere il té da un bicchiere di vetro))* to me((i.e. drinking tea from a glass))
12. ME: *vedi ti ha pensato come mia paesana, hai capito?* ME:see? I thought of you as my countrywoman you understand?
13. MA: *questo è bello che mi hai pensato come tua paesana, dammi un cucchiaino per cortesia* MA:it's nice that you thought of me one of yours. give me a teaspoon, would you?
14. ME: *ti brucia?* ME:too hot?
15. MA: *o con il dito ((con ironia))* MA:or with a finger ((joking))
16. ME: *ah con il dito* ME:ah, with a finger.
17. MA: *va bene che mi hai pensato come tua paesana tanto quando ti trasferisci ti vengo a trovare* MA:I'm glad you thought of me as one of your countrywomen, 'cause when you go back, I'll visit you.
18. ME: *ma magari!* ME:ooh I hope so!

In this sequence we see the way in which the opposition between in-groupness and out-groupness, generally used by natives to categorise non-natives, is used by Medina to affiliate Marisa with her own group. The affiliation is achieved implicitly through non-verbal behaviour (i.e. pouring tea into a glass rather than a cup) and formulated explicitly (l.12). Marisa evaluates this behaviour positively (l.13) and also expresses the desire to visit her when she leaves Italy (l.17). In Medina's words and Marisa's response we see how native/non-native opposition is not always loaded with negative values for the non-native group, and how it is impossible to restrict analysis to the identities exhibited in the interaction. We also need to consider values associated with the identities and the extent to which they are shared by the interactants.

6. Conclusions

Our data have shown, on the one hand, asymmetries in communicative roles occurring in interactions where what was made relevant was more the type of linguistic activity than the native/non-native opposition involved, and, on the other, symmetries in participation status in interactions where this opposition was made relevant. The native/non-native opposition remains in the background but is not enough to justify an unequal distribution of participation rights. It is the activation of contextual frames such as the interview which leads to asymmetry in interactional power. It might therefore be argued that native/non-native interaction is not intrinsically asymmetrical.

Analysis of the details of the conversation reveals how the process of positioning and the negotiation of social identities make use of all the instru-

ments, both linguistic and interactional, available to the participants, from the use of a word to the use of a discourse topic. It shows how identities are multi-faceted complexes of attributes and qualities and how different participants can attribute opposing qualities to a single identity, that of the non-native. Through their discourse practices the participants compare the value judgements by which they evaluate identities. Initially negative judgements, which are often the result of stereotypes, are overturned in this subtle interactional game. The interaction also creates affiliations between members of different categories.

Finally, although this is not clear from the translation, the interactional data also show that in the acquisition of second language competence such as that achieved by Medina after 17 years in Italy, there is no longer a relationship between communicative capacities and linguistic capacities in the strict sense. Medina's Italian is full of fossilised forms, and often has agreement problems because of her generalised use of the third person singular for verb forms; this sometimes creates difficulties in interpretation for her listeners. Nonetheless, it allows her to play the subtle discourse game of "performing her social identity" and to negotiate the contextual frames to be regarded as operative for the ongoing interaction. This is thus a further demonstration of the need, assuming there still is one, to distinguish communicative competence from grammatical competence, as Hymes (1972) proposed many years ago.

Notes

1. This position is close to that of Schiffrin (1996): "The view offered here suggests that identity is neither categorical or fixed: we may act more or less middle class, more or less female, and so on, depending on what we are doing and with whom. This view forces us to attend to speech activities, and to interactions in which they are situated, as a frame in which our social roles are realized and our identities are displayed and even further, as a potential resource for the display (and possible creation) of identity." (p.199).
2. As regards the importance of contextualization work in making brought along aspects of context relevant, Auer (1992: 27) states: "Lack of such contextualization work may render visible features of the situational context irrelevant for interaction; a participant's gender may then be as interactionally unimportant as the presence of a piano in the room."
3. "Sai" is generally translated (and has been translated here) as "you know", even though its discourse function in Italian does not correspond exactly to the discourse function of "you know" in English, as described by Schiffrin (1987).

References

- Auer, P.
 1992 "Introduction: J. Gumperz' approach to contextualization". In P. Auer & A. Di Luzio (eds), *The contextualization of language*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins B.V.
- Bateson, G.
 1972 "The message 'This is a play'". In G. Bateson, *Steps Toward an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Boden, D., and Zimmerman, D.H. (eds)
 1991 *Talk and Social Structure: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Chaput Waksler, F.
 1989 "Erving Goffman's sociology: An introductory essay". In F. Chaput Waksler (ed.), *Erving Goffman's Sociology*, Human Studies, Special Issue, 12: 1–2, 1–18.
- Cicourel, A.
 1972 "Basic and normative rules in the negotiation of status and role". In D. Sudnow (ed.), *Studies in social interaction*. New York: Free Press, 229–258.
- Davies, B., and Harré, R.
 1990 "Positioning: Conversation and the production of selves". *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior*, 20: 43–63.
- Drew, P., and Heritage, J. (eds)
 1992 *Talk at Work. Interaction in Institutional Setting*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Erickson F., and Schultz J.
 1982 *The Counselor as Gatekeeper*. New York: Academic Press
- Garfinkel, H. and Sacks, H.
 1970 "On formal structures of practical actions". In C. McKinney and E.A. Tiryanan, *Theoretical Sociology*. New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 338–366.
- Gergen, K .
 1987 "Toward self as relationship". In K. Yardley and T. Honess (eds), *Self and Identity: Psychosocial perspectives*. New York: Wiley, 53–63.
- Goffman, E.
 1981 *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
 1974 *Frame Analysis*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Greatbach, D.K.
 1988 "A Twin-Taking System for British new Interviews". *Language in Society*, 17: 401–430.
- Gumperz, J.
 1992a "Contextualization on Revisited". In P. Auer and A. di Luzio (eds), *The Contextualization of Language*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins B.V., 39–53.

- 1992b "Contextualization and understanding". In A. Duranti, Ch. Goodwin (eds), *Rethinking Context*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gumperz, J. and Roberts, C.
1991 "Understanding in intercultural encounters". In J. Blommaert and J. Verschueren (eds), *The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins B.V.
- Harré, R.
1987 "The social construction of selves". In K. Yardley and T. Honess (eds), *Self and Identity: Psychosocial perspectives*. New York: Wiley, 41–52.
- Heritage, J.
1985 "Analyzing News Interviews: Aspects of the Production of talk for an 'overhearing audience'". In T. van Dijk (ed.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis, vol. III*. London: Academic Press, 95–119.
- Hinnenkamp, V.
1991 "Talking a person into interethnic distinction: A discourse analytic case study". In J. Blommaert and J. Verschueren (eds), *The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication*. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins B.V.
- Hymes, D.
1972 "On Communicative Competence". In J.B. Pride and J. Holmes (eds), *Sociolinguistics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 269–285.
- Le Page, R.B., and Tabouret Keller, A.
1985 *Acts of Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mishler, E.G.
1986 *Research Interviewing*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Orletti, F.
1983 "Pratiche di glossa". In F. Orletti (ed.), *Comunicare nella vita quotidiana*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Philips, S.
1972 "Participant structures and communicative competence: Warm Springs children in community and classroom". In C. Cazden, D. Hymes, and V. John (eds), *Functions of Language in the Classroom*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Sacks, H.
1992 *Lectures on Conversation, vols. 1 and 2*. G. Jefferson (ed.). Oxford, Blackwell.
- Schiffirin, D.
1987 *Discourse Markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schiffirin, D.
1996 "Narrative as self-portrait: Sociolinguistic constructions of identity". *Language in Society*, 25, 167–203.
- Taylor, Ch.
1991 "The dialogical self". In D. Hiley et al. (eds), *The interpretive turn: Philosophy, science and culture*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 304–314.

Testa, R.

- 1994 “Le descrizione nell’ intervista sociolinguistica: procedure di analogi e analisi procedurale”. In F. Orletti (ed.), *Fre conversazione e discorso*. Roma: NIS, 121–139.

Warfield Ralws, A.

- 1989 “Language, self, and social order: A reformulation of Goffman and Sacks”. In F. Chaput Waksler (ed.), *Erving Goffman ‘s Sociology*. Human Studies, Special Issue, 12: 1–2, 147–172.

External Appropriations as a Strategy for Participating in Intercultural Multi-Party Conversations¹

Gabriele Pallotti
University of Bologna

The rapidly growing field of intercultural communication studies has provided many insights into how people interact when their cultural backgrounds are not completely shared or attuned. We are now aware that linguistic understanding is not enough to ensure that interlocutors will achieve their interactional goals smoothly and satisfactorily. There are background assumptions, interpretation cues and interactional scripts that vary from culture to culture and that are likely to condition the ways in which speakers conduct and interpret interactions. A number of studies have pointed to the misunderstandings that may and do arise when cultural backgrounds are not shared. In order to isolate the 'cultural' factors responsible for the misunderstandings, these studies were often based on encounters in which speakers had a good command of the language, which was then ruled out as a possible problematic source (e.g. Gumperz 1982, 1992; Scollon & Scollon 1981; Tannen 1984).

Work in applied linguistics, on the other hand, has stressed the consequences for interaction of speakers' limited command of a second language. A number of studies have been carried out on the conversational strategies employed by native and non-native speakers to overcome the difficulties posed by limited language proficiency. However, learners' cultural background, and the general socio-cultural context in which learning and observed interactions take place (e.g. Gass & Varonis 1985, 1989; Long 1981, 1983, 1996) has seldom been taken into consideration.

What is needed is a convergence of the two fields in order to produce analyses which are sensitive to both intercultural and interlinguistic aspects.

This is in line with Gumperz's call to "abandon the existing view of communication which draws a basic distinction between cultural and social knowledge on the one hand and linguistic signaling processes on the other" (1982: 186). Furthermore, both the sociolinguistic/ethnographic and applied linguistic approach have rarely taken developmental aspects, i.e. how individuals gradually learn the linguistic and cultural means for achieving mutual understanding in interactions, into consideration.

From this developmental perspective, linguistic and sociocultural knowledge must also be seen as tightly intertwined, extending the "language socialization" approach of Schieffelin & Ochs (1986a, 1986b) to situations of second language and second culture acquisition. Studies of language socialization have stressed the culturally bound nature of language acquisition and use by children and their interlocutors, paying attention to the interactional contexts in which children are socialized "through language" and socialized "to use language" (Schieffelin & Ochs 1986b: 163). The same ethnographic attention should be directed to the acquisition and use of a second language which, especially in naturalistic contexts, involves socialization and acculturation processes as well (Pallotti 1996, 1999; Pease-Alvarez & Vasquez 1994; Poole 1992; for an earlier, though somewhat different, approach, see Schumann 1978).

This paper attempts to provide such an analysis. It focuses on the ways in which a Moroccan five year old girl, Fatma, learned to participate in interactions in an Italian nursery school by acquiring the linguistic means and the sociocultural knowledge necessary for being accepted as a competent member of the school's micro-culture. Her language acquisition will not be seen simply as a matter of reconstructing a code, but as a process functional to, and dependent upon, the development of sociocultural competence. More specifically, the longitudinal analysis will follow the evolution of a very basic device for achieving textual cohesion in the multi-party conversations typical of a nursery school: the repetition of other speakers' expressions. These allo-repetitions, which I call 'appropriations' in order to stress their function of producing words originally uttered by others, can be seen both as a linguistic device for achieving textual coherence and as a social strategy for participating in interactions. Their number, form and function depend on the particular sociocultural context in which Fatma learned and used Italian; by examining this basic device it will be possible to see how the girl gradually developed her social and linguistic competence in a given context.

Previous work has focused on the interplay between child second language acquisition and socialization. For example, Wong-Fillmore (1976) analyzed the "social strategies" used by young second language learners interacting with their peers; her account, however, was based on observations of children artificially isolated from their ordinary school context and it is only inferentially that one can reconstruct the everyday contexts in which second language children were linguistically socialized. Saville-Troike and Kleifgen's research, on the other hand, observed children learning their second language in kindergartens and primary schools and purported to describe how linguistic and cultural integration go hand in hand (e.g. Saville-Troike & Kleifgen 1986; Kleifgen & Saville-Troike 1992). A fundamental notion in this research is that of "script": children rely on their general background knowledge of what is expected to happen in school in order to interpret the language being spoken around them; if the appropriate non-linguistic "cues" are identified, children can participate successfully in many activities even though they understand virtually nothing of what is being said. Kleifgen and Saville-Troike explicitly link their notion of "cues" to Gumperz's (1982) "contextualization cues", and agree with his call to override the traditional separation between sociocultural and linguistic knowledge. However, whereas the interpretation of nonlinguistic cues is often seen in studies of intercultural communication to be responsible for communication failure, other studies, like those by Saville-Troike and Kleifgen, emphasize the usefulness of nonlinguistic cues for achieving understanding. These cues, in other words, can be more or less shared by members of different cultures, and ascertaining which of them are a help and which are a hindrance in interlinguistic and intercultural communication remains an empirical question, which also needs to take the different stages of language and culture acquisition into consideration.

The issue of repetition in interlinguistic conversations has also received attention in previous research. Several authors have stressed its importance in providing cohesion when other more elaborate cohesive devices are not available (Keller-Cohen 1979; Vion & Mittner 1986; Wagner-Gough & Hatch 1975). Mittner (1984) goes a step further in suggesting that repetition may serve as a kind of "phatic confirmation", reassuring the speakers that they are still together, that despite the partial sharing of the linguistic code the conversation has not broken down. These studies, however, are all based on dyadic conversations, in which the question of who has the right to speak to whom is not at issue. In an environment such as the nursery school, on the other hand,

the right to participate is *always* at issue: the repetition of other people's words can be seen as a way of winning the battle for participation, and this is how it will be seen in the present paper. But before turning to an analysis of Fatma's appropriations, it is necessary to build a framework for describing participation in the nursery school.

Goffman (1979) provides a useful preliminary characterization of participant roles. He distinguishes between "ratified" (or "official") participants and "bystanders": the former are engaged in a "social encounter",² the latter are "persons who are not ratified participants and whose access to the encounter, however minimal, is itself perceivable by the official participants" (Goffman 1979: 8). Goffman notes that the distinction between ratified participants and bystanders is not always clear-cut: there may be for example "open states of talk" in which "participants [have] the right but not the obligation to initiate a little flurry of talk, then relapse back into silence, all this with no apparent ritual marking [...] [This] is neither ratified participation nor bystanding, but a peculiar condition between" (Goffman 1979: 10). A lunch in a nursery school can be characterized as an "open state of talk" (or a "continuous state of incipient talk", Schegloff and Sacks 1973): given its multi-party character, there may be two or three people engaged in an encounter, for example a conversation, with two or three others who are not, but who can legitimately become involved in it without any particular ritual marker. In this situation too we have a "peculiar condition between" ratified participation and bystanding.³

Another useful notion for extending Goffman's terminology to account for such situations is that of *vector of activity*, introduced by Marilyn Merritt (1982a, 1982b). Merritt notes that in a classroom there are several activities going on at the same time and that participating in them is by no means easy. The way children act in isolation or with others can be seen as a series of moves along different "vectors of activity" in a "matrix of activity". This conceptualization, Merritt argues, is more apt to describe what goes on in classroom multi-party interactions than notions such as "becoming participants" or "getting the floor".

Taking Goffman's and Merritt's analyses as a starting point, I will now introduce some terms to analyze participation in nursery school interactions.⁴ The term *participant* will be used in a general, neutral sense, simply meaning 'one who is there' as opposed to 'absent'. Participants will be said to be *active* when they perform actions directed at co-constructing a common focus of attention with someone else.⁵ In other cases, when participants are absorbed in

solitary, non-social activities, they will be defined *potential* participants. Being active, however, is not equivalent to being “ratified” in Goffman’s sense. A participant is *ratified* only when another participant ratifies, i.e. takes some course of action that displays recognition of the activated participant’s invitation to do something together; in a nursery school, children often become active participants without anybody ratifying their attempts. A final category is that of *addressee*. As one cannot by oneself become a ratified participant, so one cannot be considered an addressee independently of some other participant’s actions — the status of addressee can only be achieved if someone else involves us in activities directed at co-constructing a common course of action.

Turning now to how participants move from potential to active, entries into conversation in a multi-party encounter can be divided into three main categories. First, one can open a conversation with others who are not engaged in any other interaction; I call this an *opening*. Alternatively, one can try to involve others who are already engaged in some vector of activity. In this case, I distinguish between *introductions* (trying to join others in their vector of activity) and *intrusions* (trying to open a new, different vector of activity; that is, trying to pull the addressee(s) out of their already established vector). This paper will deal only with introductions and a particular strategy for performing them — the appropriation of other people’s words.

It is also useful to distinguish between two types of appropriations (Pallotti 1994): *internal appropriations* are those in which a speaker repeats words of which s/he was the addressee; this is the most studied type and it is the only one allowed in dyadic interactions. In *external appropriations*, on the other hand, the speaker repeats words that were directed to some third party: when such words were uttered, the speaker’s role was not that of addressee, but of potential participant. By using external appropriations a limited proficient speaker like Fatma can hook up to a vector of activity opened by others — she can introduce herself into it — *without anybody having invited her*: a common condition in this nursery school, where participation rights are rarely bestowed by others and have to be actively earned.

External appropriations are both a linguistic and a socio-anthropological object of study. In order to introduce oneself into an open vector of activity, one has to be coherent with it, and if the activity is linguistic, linguistic cohesion will be at issue. On the other hand, linguistic cohesion across turns can be seen as a way of doing something together, that is as a form of participation in the same activity. An analysis of external appropriations

should thus bring together the linguistic notion of cohesion with the socio-anthropological one of participation. It is therefore necessary, before turning to Fatma's external appropriations, to provide a description of the micro-cultural setting in which her second language socialization took place.

1. The setting

Fatma is a Moroccan girl born in France, where she lived until she was five. She and her family then moved to Italy where, after a few months, she was enrolled in a local nursery school. She had never attended any other caregiving institution in France, so the only language she could speak was Moroccan Arabic. She was videotaped from her very first days of school for a period of eight months. Videotaping took place approximately three mornings a week, from 9.00 a.m. to 1.00–2.00 p.m., producing an average of three hours of tape per day. Fatma was not the only Moroccan child in the nursery, and the research project included another child, Rashid. A wireless microphone was placed in the vicinity of Fatma and Rashid, and five other fake wireless microphones (indistinguishable from the real one as they were all in small cloth bags) were scattered all around the room — the children knew they were being recorded, but they were not made aware of the interest in those two particular children. A total of 150 hours of tape were recorded.⁶

The nursery school had 25 children enrolled, aged three to five; half of them were three year olds. There were two full-time teachers, one working from 7.30 a.m. to 1.00 p.m., the other from 12.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. They sometimes overlapped at lunch time, which was from noon to 12.30. A part-time teacher, who paid special attention to language minority children, was in the school four mornings a week, from 9.00 to 12.00 a. m. A full time aide was present from 9.30 to 2.00 and another from 4.00 to 5.30 p.m.

Except for Fatma and Rashid, all the children spoke Italian, although not all of them were monolingual — four other children spoke different languages, their proficiency in Italian ranging from good to native-like.

The data discussed in this paper come from a particular moment of the day, lunchtime. The reason for this choice is that lunches are a well defined speech event, with clear boundaries and a recurrent structure. Furthermore, their participation structure allows for different types of interaction, from long two-party dialogues to choral performances of jokes, greetings and requests.

There can also be long stretches of “continuous states of incipient talk” (Schegloff and Sacks 1973), when nobody speaks but anybody might start from one moment to the next. During lunch adults interact freely with children (that is, adult-child talk is not part of structured activities), but there are also times when no adult is present and conversations develop among children. Last but not least, the audio quality of lunches, when children sit at the same place in front of the wireless microphone for a prolonged period of time, is generally good.⁷

Lunch in a nursery school differs in many ways from one with adult participants, especially with respect to its participation framework. Adult participants at lunch, at least in Italy, have two main goals — consuming their food and sustaining social activity. Seven or eight adults having lunch together may consider the social side more important than the physiological act of food ingestion. Sitting at a table communicating with others but eating almost nothing is not considered as impolite as just eating all the time without uttering a single word. In nursery school the priorities are reversed — eating comes first. Children are praised according to how much and how quickly they eat. Communication is permitted insofar as it does not interfere with eating but it is rarely encouraged; if it does interfere, it is immediately suppressed by the adult.

Since conversations are not always allowed, children who wish to get a turn at talk have to seize their chance at the right moment. However, it is not often clear when talking is allowed and when it is not. In general, the first fifteen minutes of lunch are more constrained — conversations are often blocked at their start or after a few turns. Later, while the second course is being consumed, longer communicative encounters are allowed, and even more so during the fruit course.⁸ However, it is completely within the adult’s power to stop a conversation at any time. When the adult is absent, freer interactions may take place, sometimes quite noisily, which are sooner or later interrupted by adults, even if they are not sitting at the table.⁹

Let us now look at this communicative environment from the point of view of a child who understands very little of what is being said, and who can express herself with only a handful of words, connected by pragmatic principles of discourse organization, a very rudimentary syntax and virtually no morphology (in other words, Fatma is a speaker of the “basic variety” described by Klein & Perdue 1997). This was the case with Fatma for most of the time she was recorded. For her, more than for the other children, it was not

always clear when speaking was allowed; furthermore, she had the additional problem of not understanding what the others were talking about. If she did not want to be just a spectator to conversations but an active participant in them, she had two options. She could start a new course of talk, with a new topic or focus of interest. This was problematic because she would have to do it with her very limited linguistic means and, as a consequence, her production was very likely to turn out unintelligible or uninteresting. The advantage, however, was that she could choose what to talk about, picking up one of the very few topics that she could linguistically deal with. Alternatively, Fatma could try to become a ratified participant in an already open conversation. An advantage was that the conversation focus had already been established by other, more proficient speakers; however, she would have to adapt herself to conversational topics chosen by others, which might have been too difficult for her. Furthermore, even when the conversation was on a topic about which Fatma had something to say, she would have to speak at the right moment, which might be only a split second, due to the fast pace of conversations among natives.¹⁰ Given Fatma's limited understanding, satisfying all these requirements was not easy, especially *when nobody had selected her as an addressee*, that is when nobody had explicitly invited her to participate in the conversation.

External appropriations are an efficient way of solving some of these problems. Repeating words uttered by others ensures that one's turn will be somehow coherent with what they are talking about; furthermore, the words to be used are already there and can be immediately recycled in the few tenths of a second that occur between turns, without time-consuming word searches.¹¹ It is thus not surprising that the majority of Fatma's introductions included words repeated from previous turns, as can be seen from Table 1. In the first two periods of study (from the second to the sixth month of exposure to Italian), three introductions out of four contained appropriated words. This figure decreased in the third period (seventh and eighth month), but even then, more than half the number of times Fatma entered already open conversations, she did so by repeating expressions previously uttered by others.¹²

These repetitions of linguistic expressions uttered by others *who were not talking to Fatma* were an efficient way to become an active, ratified participant even with very limited linguistic resources. Their form and function developed over time, and the remainder of this paper will consist in an analysis of this development.

Table 1. Verbal introductions in verbal activities with and without appropriations

Period	Verbal Introductions	With app.	W/out app.	?
I	38	29 (76%)	8 (21%)	1 (3%)
II	32	23 (72%)	8 (25%)	1 (3%)
III	44	25 (57%)	17 (39%)	2 (4%)

2. First period

Fatma used appropriations from the very first days of school. Most of these were external, involving words taken from conversations in which she was not a ratified participant. For example, in the first recorded lunch, after six weeks of school, four out of seven appropriations were external: their function was not to provide coherence in a conversation in which Fatma was already engaged, to respond to a participant who had selected her as addressee, but to join other speakers in what they were already doing independently of her.

One striking feature of many external appropriations during the first period was that they were not the type one would expect, that is contributions to a conversation like 'having one's own say' about the current topic. Most of Fatma's early introductions in on-going activities were of a simpler kind; they consisted simply of aligning herself with what others were doing. To use a visual metaphor, she was not so much adding her turn to a vertical construction which had gradually grown out of a sequence of contributions as putting her contribution beside those of others in a horizontal, parallel fashion. Thus, Fatma's earliest appropriations helped her not so much do something *together* with others as do *the same thing* as others. The following is a typical example:¹³

23/10

[Idina (ID) approaches the table and looks at T1 and T2 talking.
Idina gets closer to T2]

T2-(ID): *pera o mela?*
PEAR OR APPLE?

(0.8)

T2-(): *mela?*
APPLE?

(1.0)

T2-(): *questa?*
THIS?

- (0.7)
 T2-(:) *Vuoi la mela?*
 DO YOU WANT THE APPLE?
 F-T2: *ga mella, la mella.* ((looking towards T2))
 THE APPLE, THE APPLE
 (2.0) ((T2 gives apple to Fatma))
 F-T2: *<grassi, ga mella>*, ((taking apple))=
 THANK YOU, THE APPLE
 (1.8) ((Fatma bites the apple))
 T2:((swallows)) *prego.*
 YOU'RE WELCOME

By repeating *the apple*, Fatma did what Idina was doing — asking for a particular kind of fruit. She could thus participate in on-going activities like any other child. Many external appropriations of the first period have this function of joining others in interactional activities. Thus we find Fatma asking for water or fruit, greeting a teacher and repeating words for chasing a wasp after other children had started these vectors of activity.

Repeating other children's words had another function besides that of performing something together: it ensured that Fatma was doing the right thing at the right time. In fact, there were particular moments when water or fruit could be requested and the rules specifying their occurrence were hard for Fatma to understand.¹⁴ Therefore, a safe strategy was to pay attention to what others were doing and intervene only after a teacher had offered or a native speaker child had requested the desired item. The following is a case in point, in which Fatma repeats the word *pear* after it was uttered at another table; although Fatma did not interact with the aide A1 who had pronounced the word, she took her utterance as a signal that fruit distribution had started.

- 23/10
 [T1 and T2 are talking at Fatma's table]
 A1:((at other table)) *bimbi, cosa volete di frutta, pera?*
 KIDS, WHAT DO YOU WANT FOR FRUIT, PEAR?
 (0.6)
 T2-T1 ((at Fatma's table)): ()
 F: *maestra, [pera.*
 TEACHER, PEAR
 T1-T2:[*non è venuto, [però:-*
 HE'S NOT COME, BUT
 F:[*Maestra:* ((turning back)).
 TEACHER
 T2-T1: () *io l'ho visto.*
 () I'VE SEEN HIM

(0.3)

T1-T2: *aveva l' herpes, eh,*
HE HAD HERPES, AH

Hearing aide A1 say the word *pear* was a signal that the right moment for asking for fruit had come. From this point of view, Fatma's turn was adequately placed and was, in all its essentiality, clearly understandable as a request for fruit. Hearing the recognized word *pear* was a cue for interpreting what was going on and repetition of the same word was a display of Fatma's ability to act appropriately at the right time. Why, then, was her request not taken up by the two teachers at her table, T1 and T2? It is clear that they were engaged in a vector of activity, a conversation about another child, and that Fatma's turn was an intrusion into it; in fact Fatma abandons her attempts after a few tries. We thus have a clear example of how difficult it is for children to have their conversational contributions ratified by others; for a child in a nursery school, the status of ratified participant is never a given, but has to be earned. Strategies such as external appropriations increase the likelihood that one's turn will be taken up but, as we shall see again in the following pages, such an outcome is never guaranteed.

Although most of Fatma's external appropriations in the first period are of the 'doing the same thing' type, there are also some early attempts at achieving coherence at the level of 'talking about the same thing'. In these episodes, the girl tries to co-construct a 'vertical' course of action, contributing one or more turns to an on-going conversation. But, again, this is not an easy thing to do in a communicative environment like the nursery school, as can be seen in the following example, from the second recorded lunch.

28/10

[Teacher T1 is talking with aide A1 and teacher T2 about taking children out to the playground after lunch]

T1-A1: *no, non- sono indecisa, ero qua che pensavo, te cosa dici?*

NO, NOT, I HAVEN'T MADE UP MY MIND, I WAS HERE THINKING,
WHAT DO YOU THINK?

A1-T1: *perchè (sotto), fuori è freddo?*

BECAUSE (BELOW), IS IT COLD OUTSIDE?

T1-A1: *moh, non è freddo.*

DUNNO, IT'S NOT COLD.

T2-T1: *Non è freddo. E' un po' umido.*

IT'S NOT COLD. IT'S A BIT DAMP.

F: *[ke] freddo, Maura, [ke] freddo.* ((without looking T1)).

[KE] COLD, MAURA, [KE] COLD

(0.4)

- F-T1: ([ke] *freddo*, **Maura*^o ((turning to T1))
 ([KE] COLD, MAURA)
- T1-A1: [*ah ma le tiro su anch'io, se voglio andar giù nè mica un problema,
 quando vado giù,*
 AH, I CAN PULL THEM ((FOLDING BEDS)) DOWN TOO, IF I
 WANT TO GO DOWN IT'S NOT A PROBLEM, WHEN I GO DOWN
- (0.6)
- F-T1: *no (è) Fatma* [(ke] *freddo*)
 NO (IS) FATMA, ([KE] COLD)
- T1: [*andiamo fuori, bimbi?*
 SHALL WE GO OUT, KIDS?
- (0.6)
- F-T1: *sì.* ((nodding))
 YES

Here Fatma recognizes the word *cold* and by repeating it tries to become a participant in the conversation between the teachers T1 and T2 and the aide A1. None of them, however, takes up what she says, and she only has a chance to speak when T1 turns to all the children at her table asking whether they want to go out. Analyzing these turns' position and composition, we can see that Fatma repeats the key word *cold*, adding only an attention getter (*Maura*, T1's name) and the polyfunctional particle [ke].¹⁵ The first utterance is produced by Fatma looking away from the selected addressee (T1, Maura), who is visually addressed only in the second utterance. The third utterance, not clearly audible, is partially overlapped by T1 who was beginning to speak to all the children. In all these utterances Fatma speaks softly and does not react to T1's disattention; in other words, she does not display any clear communicative intention. Such behaviors were not rare in the first period, when Fatma repeated words from conversations without accompanying them with other moves designed for her message to be ratified. Often these external appropriations were not placed in adequate positions and they frequently interrupted the intended interlocutor(s) rather than introducing Fatma's turn into their vector of activity at an appropriate conversational slot. In looking at these examples, one gets the impression that Fatma was practicing with language and at the same time trying to enter conversations using words whose meaning she was not so sure of.

Another episode involving the same word, *cold*, but taking place a few weeks later, is quite different and is one of Fatma's most sophisticated introductions in this period. Here too the girl hears a teacher talking to a child about 'cold' and here too she wants to have her say about it. But notice the

differences: in this case Fatma employs all the means available to her to attract T2's attention, and does not give up until her goal is eventually reached. Furthermore, what she produces is a fully fledged conversational contribution, with a clear reference-and-predication structure. One thus gets the impression that here Fatma knows better what to do with the word *cold* — another way of saying that she knows its meaning (Wittgenstein 1953).

17/11

ID-T2: *ho freddo*.

I'M COLD.

(0.3)

T2-ID: *hai freddo? In effetti è un po' freddo*.

YOU'RE COLD? IT'S A BIT COLD ACTUALLY.

T2-F: *mangia fatma. Tieni*. ((placing a bowl of custard before her))

EAT FATMA. TAKE IT.

(0.9)

T2-ID: [*è buo::na*]. ((giving her custard))

IT'S GOOD.

[[((Fatma turns to T2 and touches her))

T2 doesn't turn, as she's turned to Idina

F-T2: *maestra*. ((still touching her))

TEACHER

(1.4)

F-T2: *maestra* ((still touching her)).

TEACHER

(2.4) T2 keeps looking at ID, then turns to Fatma.

F-T2: *no no io freddo, [ke] questa* ((pointing to her pullover's sleeve)),
questa no freddo.

NO NO I COLD, [KE] THIS, THIS NO COLD.

(0.3) T2 looks at Fatma

T2-F: *non hai freddo?*

YOU'RE NOT COLD?

F:[*questo* ((pointing to arm)), *questo *(nno freddo)*°

THIS, THIS (NO COLD)

[[((T2 throws a grape in front of Fatma))

((Fatma picks up grape and eats it))

In this episode, Fatma is clearly trying to introduce herself into an already open conversation, and does not give up until she is fully ratified by the teacher. T2 and Idina have established a shared topic, the fact that it is cold; Fatma recognizes the key word *cold* and tries to participate with her 'no I cold, [ke] this no cold', glossable as I'M NOT COLD BECAUSE I'M WEARING A PULL-OVER.¹⁶ But to have her production understood by T2, she needs her visual

attention so that the deictic *this* can be interpreted. A series of attention-getters such as touching and the word *teacher* are thus prefaced to the ‘substantive’ turn, delivered only after T2 is looking at Fatma. Here linguistic and non-linguistic means conspire to make Fatma’s move an adequate introduction into a conversation she had recognized to be about COLD. The repetition of the key word allowed Fatma to participate in a step-by-step conversation in which everybody could add a linguistic contribution — a form of participation characteristic of mature, proficient speakers. However, Fatma’s entry, though ingenious, was somehow ill-positioned. She started to try to get the teacher’s attention when the conversation topic had already shifted from COLD to EATING. Using our terminology, Fatma’s attempts to *introduce* herself into a conversation about COLD were in fact *intrusions* into a subsequent conversation about EATING.

From these first examples it is already evident how difficult it was for the child to hook up to on-going conversations: she had to recognize at least one content word, then produce a sentence representing a relevant and original contribution to what was being said, all this in the split seconds allowed by the rapid conversational flow among native speakers. Repeating a word she had understood was one of the safest ways for her to achieve some of these goals: the repeated word was readily available in working memory after acoustic priming and it ensured some coherence with the topic at hand. In the simplest forms of external appropriations — just doing what the others are doing — a *verbatim* or simplifying repetition was sufficient; in more complex introductions into conversations — attempts at becoming a participant in a prolonged, co-sustained course of action — it was necessary for the contribution to be original and informative. Fatma, at age five, knew that in mature conversations turns are linked in the way that Bloom et al. (1976) call “same topic — something new”. The repeated expression ensured topic maintenance; the ‘something new’ added to it contributed to making the turn interesting and informative. But all these requirements — relevance, informativeness, and timeliness — were rarely satisfied together in Fatma’s introductions in the first period. Within a few months the girl had made significant progress in this respect.

3. Second period

Table 1 shows that in the second period of the study, Fatma joined other speakers already involved in conversations by repeating three times out of four some portions of what they had said. External appropriations thus continued to play an important role in giving her contributions the necessary cohesion for getting her accepted as a ratified participant in on-going verbal interactions.

These moves, however, become more sophisticated. There are still appropriations of expressions like greeting or asking for fruit, water or bread that serve to perform an activity with other children ‘chorally’, but these decrease in number towards the end of the second period. Fatma does not need to wait for someone else to start one of these sequences and is often an autonomous initiator. Parallel to this is the increase in external appropriations used to join other children or adults who are “just conversing” (Garvey 1984). The term “just conversing” should not deceive. It refers to a complex activity that develops slowly in childhood and is highly practiced by adults; in it, speaking is not subsidiary to any other immediate goal but an end in itself. Participating in “just conversing” activities is thus a sign of linguistic proficiency and socio-cultural competence, and it is necessary in order to be considered a fully fledged member of a speech community.

Appropriation helped Fatma play this role of competent participant. In fact in the second period, by repeating words that she recognized and understood, the girl tried increasingly to become a ratified participant in ‘vertical’ sequences of turns around a common theme. She could thus show, with her minimal linguistic means, that she could participate in conversations growing out of the collective, sequential work of two or more participants, in which talk is an end in itself, and not just a means for achieving some other goal; furthermore, in such conversations language is the most important carrier of information, having little or no dependence on the immediate physical context.

Let us look at a few introductions from the second period. A useful participation device acquired in this period is the expression *me too*. It is used by many Italian native-speaking children, and it is one of the most basic ways of displaying the relevance of what is being said to the on-going conversation. Minimally, *me too* plus the appropriation of some expression satisfy the basic requirements for a “same topic — something new” turn: the repeated expression guarantees coherence while *me too* provides the new information that a

certain predicate holds for another subject. A similar strategy is at work in the following example, in which other children before Fatma are engaged in the *me too* routine.

22/1

T2-PA ((at another table)): *a casa tua cosa fai, Patrizio, vai a letto?*

PATRIZIO, WHAT DO YOU DO AT HOME, DO YOU GO TO BED?

PA:si. () *dopo*,

YES. () AFTER,

T2: *da solo? O viene anche la mamma?*

ALONE? OR MOMMY COMES TOO?

(0.7)

PA-T2: *no;* () *da solo*,

NO, () ALONE,

T2-PA: *e:: che bravo, sei già grande*

HEY! WHAT A GOOD BOY, YOU'RE ALREADY A BIG BOY

DE ((at Fatma's table)): *anch'io sto da solo. U- Una volta, .hh quando (loro) dormono di là dormo subito con loro sul letto grande.*

ME TOO I SLEEP ALONE. ONCE, WHEN (THEY) SLEEP

THERE I SLEEP WITH THEM AT ONCE IN THE BIG BED.

A1:hm

DE: *si*

YES

GI: *anch'io* (), *letto gra[nde*

ME TOO (), BIG BED

DE:[()] *anch'io mi addormento, .hh pian piani[no, e dopo e dopo-*

] sulla poltrona.

ME TOO I FALL

ASLEEP, SLOW SLOW, AND THEN () ON THE ARMCHAIR

F:[

ANCH'IO

ANCH'IO ANCH'IO CE L'HO IL LETTO GRA:NDE.]

ME TOO ME TOO

ME TOO I'VE GOT IT THE BIG BED.

(1.0) ((A1 looks at Fatma))

F: **come mamma**

LIKE MOMMY

A1-F: hm?

(0.5)

A1-F: *Vai nel lettone con la mamma anche tu? e(h)e(h) dai.* ((taking a tissue out of her pocket))

DO YOU GO INTO THE BIG BED WITH MOMMY TOO? AH AH C'M ON.

(): *anche io,*

ME TOO

F: **(non) ce l'ho,**=

I HAVEN'T GOT IT

- A1-F: =*tieni* ((handing her a tissue))
 TAKE THIS
 F: *ce l'ho* (
 I'VE GOT IT (
 ((Fatma takes tissue and blows her nose))

Here Fatma appropriates not only the words expressing the topic, *big bed*, but also the words for the activity of expressing-one's-point-of-view-on-the-same-topic, *me too*.¹⁷ With her elementary 'me too + appropriation' turn she manages to introduce herself into a conversation and receive ratification from the adult. But what makes this a successful introduction? Fatma's turn was delivered at a higher volume than average, and it had a *con brio* tempo with fast machine-gunning of *me too* at the beginning. In fact, although it completely overlaps Derek's turn, it is Fatma's turn, not Derek's, that receives uptake from aide A1. So this mixture of volume, tempo, linguistic 'weight' (three *me toos* instead of one) and linguistic coherence (both on the level of the *me too* routine and on the level of the appropriated topic) can probably account for the ratification received by Fatma. *Probably*, it should be emphasized. There are cases, as we will see, in which these features are present and Fatma's turn nonetheless receives no ratification, although in the whole corpus it seems that the presence of *all* of these features is a good predictor of uptake.¹⁸

Another successful introduction from the second period shows a second conversation participatory skill that Fatma is gradually acquiring. It is the skill of recognizing the right slot in an on-going conversation to put her introduction into, and it is in a way complementary to the above described strategy of 'machine-gunning' a series of words to make a turn 'heavier' regardless of its position in the conversational sequence. With this skill Fatma learns to identify the right place in which her turn, though not loud or 'heavy', has a good chance of receiving ratification. In the following episode Fatma introduces herself in a typical lunch-time conversation between a teacher and a child who refuses to eat. By this time Fatma has acquired the basic lexicon for dealing with such situations, expressions like *eat, good, all, finished, (no) like*, and when she recognizes them in the conversational flow she seldom misses an opportunity to introduce herself.

- 22/1
 GI: *non mi piace questa*= ((whining))
 I DON'T LIKE THIS

- T2: =*Gianni prova a sentirla.*
GIANNI TRY AND TASTE IT
- GI: *no*
NO
- (1.0)
- F-T2: *no piaci* ((turning to T2))
NO LIKE
- (0.5)
- T2-F: *buono?*
GOOD?
- ((Fatma looks at Gianni))
- F-T2: =*e- o-* ((looking to Gianni)) **m- Gi[an-]** ((looking at Gianni, quickly turning to T2 when she starts speaking))
- T2: [a Gian-]
GIANNI
- (.)
- T2: [*A Giann*]i non piace? ((shaking head no))
GIANNI DOESN'T LIKE IT?
- F: [**Gi-**]
- F: **no** ((shaking head))
NO
- T2: [*allora Gianni stai fermo [metti giù il bicchiere, che se lo rompi dopo non puoi bere*
THEN GIANNI KEEP STILL PUT YOUR CUP DOWN, IF YOU BREAK IT
THEN YOU CAN'T DRINK
[[((Fatma looks at T2))
[[((Fatma turns and starts eating again))

Fatma recognizes Gianni's *I don't like* and the routine in which it is framed, that of a child refusing to eat and an adult trying to persuade him; by turning to the teacher T2 and repeating *no like* Fatma introduces herself into the conversation. Two things should be noted in this introduction. The first is that Fatma does not reiterate her *no like*, like her *me too* in the previous example. The reason is probably that when she utters *no like* the conversational rhythm is not as fast and dense as it was in the other lively, multi-party conversation about going to bed. Fatma thus has time to place her utterance in a relatively long gap between turns. *Relatively* long, it should be stressed: one second is a long gap in a conversation, but Fatma's sense of timing in inserting her turn in that one second gap is noteworthy, and it is a sign that her participation skills have developed considerably.

A second feature in this episode that shows a development in Fatma's participation strategies is the topic she appropriates. Unlike all the previous examples, Fatma does not talk about herself, but about Gianni. This too is a

novelty in her speech, as can be seen from T2's initial misunderstanding of her turn. Fatma's elliptical *no like* could in fact be interpreted both as I DON'T LIKE IT or AS HE DOESN'T LIKE IT.¹⁹ T2, by asking Fatma *good?*, displays the former, speaker-centered interpretation. Fatma, turning to Gianni and trying to pronounce his name, shows instead that her *no like* should be interpreted as referring to Gianni; this is in fact how T2 reformulates the utterance. This shift is an important step in Fatma's evolving participation strategies. Now she not only appropriates words in order to say something about herself but tries to participate in conversations by producing turns referring to others. She is thus enlarging both the range of topics she can deal with and the types of contributions she can make to conversations.

Let us look now at a few examples of failed introductions. From a formal point of view, they do not differ sharply from the examples we have just examined. They are relatively intelligible, placed in 'free' conversational slots and contingent upon previous turns as a result of the appropriation of expressions. They are also original contributions because of the addition of new words.

8/1

[T2 and A1 are talking about some children possibly being ill]

T2-A1: *comunque anche lui è un po' strano. Stamattina era un po' - Cioè guarda che se si sono ammalati, sappiamo già il motivo eh,*

ANYWAY HE TOO IS A BIT STRANGE. THIS MORNING HE WAS A LITTLE- I MEAN, LOOK, IF THEY'VE FALLEN ILL, WE ALREADY KNOW THE REASON

(1.1)

F: *io malata la testa, io malata.* ((looking at T2 and resting head on her hand))
I ILL THE *HEAD, I ILL.²⁰

(1.0)

F: *malata la <testa>*
ILL THE *HEAD

(1.0)

WA: *non si dice la trestra, alla testa.*

YOU CAN'T SAY THE *HEAD, IN THE HEAD.

F: *alla trestra*
IN THE *HEAD

(0.3)

WA: *no, >alla testa<*
NO, IN THE HEAD

(2.2)

F: *no, lalla testa*
NO, *IN THE *HEAD

(0.2)

WA: *no, alla testa. Me l'ha detto la la- (0.4) la la maestra.*

NO, IN THE HEAD. TEACHER TOLD ME.

(2.5)

WA: °*testra, testra*°.

*HEAD, *HEAD.

F: *testra.*

*HEAD.

(0.3)

WA: *no, testa.*

NO, HEAD.

F: *ecco.*

HERE IT IS

T2-WA: *basta. Walter stai zitto, se no Fatma dopo parla. Tieni la bocca chiusa, me l'avevi promesso.*

THAT'S ENOUGH. WALTER KEEP QUIET, OTHERWISE FATMA SPEAKS. KEEP YOUR MOUTH CLOSED, YOU PROMISED ME.

Here Fatma recognizes the word *ill* and adds *head* to it to produce 'I ill the head', which is relevant, informative and 'interesting' given the teachers' ongoing preoccupation with children's illness. The selected addressee is clearly teacher T2, from whom Fatma took *ill* in the first place. Fatma is thus trying to use an external appropriation to introduce herself into the teacher's and aide's vector of activity; however they do not ratify her active participant status. The one who does is Walter, who does not respond to the gist of Fatma's utterances but to their form, correcting the way the word *head* is pronounced. This at least ratifies Fatma as a participant in the conversation which continues for some turns on pronunciation matters until it is abruptly interrupted by the teacher. Fatma's introduction was not produced at high volume and was not made 'heavy' with a rapid burst of repeated expressions. It was, however, placed in a pause and definitely relevant to the conversation at hand. T2's and A1's lack of response could be explained in several ways. On the one hand it might depend on their not having perceived Fatma's turn, which was not particularly attention-seeking, or else they might have perceived it but deliberately ignored it since they wanted the children to be quiet (the episode took place in the first few minutes of lunch in which particular emphasis was placed on children eating their first course quickly). A third possible explanation is a combination of the two. The adults might have perceived that Fatma was communicating something without grasping what she was saying; given the primary need at this stage of the lunch to get the children to eat without distractions, they might not have wished to encourage Fatma to give further

explanations.

Another failed attempt at participation is at the end of the second period, after Fatma had been in school for six months. Several features make her external appropriation a more sophisticated contribution than the previously analyzed ones; yet in this case too Fatma is unable to get ratification from the teacher from whom she had taken the words and whom she had selected as addressee.

24/2

[Teachers T1 and T2 are talking, sitting at Fatma's table]

T2: *sono andata a una festa in maschera (0.2) ieri sera, c'erano delle più fatte maschere,*

I WENT TO A FANCY DRESS PARTY YESTERDAY EVENING, THERE WERE SUCH FUNNY COSTUMES,

(0.5)

T2: *uno da lavatri:ce.*

ONE LIKE A WASHING-MACHINE

T1:h h ((giggles))

T2: *col tu:bo, [()-*

WITH THE PIPE

T1:[*con lo scatolone? Con uno scatolone [l'aveva fatto?*

WITH A PACKING CASE? WITH A PACKING CASE SHE MADE

IT?

T2:[*sissì. Sissì.*

YES. YES.

(0.5)

T2: *ma dei lavori da:*

SUCH FUNNY THINGS

(0.8)

T2: *dopo: uno da pavo:ne, (0.6) lo tirava su si apri:va: ((gesture behind the back))*

THEN, ONE LIKE A PEACOCK, HE PULLED IT UP AND IT OPENED...

T1: *la c- la coda ((gesture behind the back)). Pensa.*

THE TAIL. AMAZING.

T2: *proprio.*

RIGHT.

(1.8) ((T2 brings a mouthful to her mouth, T1 wipes her lips. Fatma stares at T2 with head resting on hand))

F: *la mamma, ndata ndata [alla [fɛ:sta, ((looking at T1))*

MOMMY, WENT WENT TO THE PARTY

T2-AN:[*hm. [() il pane, lo vuoi?*

HM. () THE BREAD, DO YOU WANT IT?

[(T1 looks at Fatma)

(0.4)

- F: (*oggi*) [() *la fe:sta.*] ((touching T1))
 (TODAY) () THE PARTY.
- T1: [*io me ne sono fatta una piena sabato, (0.5)*] (0.4) *dalle tre a mezzanotte.*
Dalle [tre, alle sette di sera con i miei figli a scuola,]
 I HAD AN OVERDOSE SATURDAY, FROM THREE TO MIDNIGHT.
 FROM THREE TO SEVEN IN THE EVENING WITH MY CHILDREN AT
 SCHOOL,
- F: [*una festa, (0.6) (molto arrivata),*] ((looking at T2))
 A PARTY, (VERY ARRIVED)
- T2: ah:
 [Fatma turns to speaking to Adele]

This is one of the most sophisticated introductions analyzed so far. First, its lexical composition displays a knowledge of expressions ranging over semantic domains other than the simple, here-and-now notions of eating, feeling cold, requesting goods and services: Fatma tries to join a conversation about parties. Furthermore, she does not talk about herself but about her mother, which is another step towards more mature, decentered discourse. Thirdly, the girl places her introduction into the teachers' exchange in an appropriate sequential position: after a significant pause following a terminal intonation contour in both teachers' last turns. Finally, it is a "same topic — something new" turn, in which the appropriated word *party* ensures coherence while being framed in a construction with a new subject (Fatma's mommy). Despite all these features, Fatma's turn receives no uptake, even after a second more explicit try involving a non-verbal attention-seeking device such as touching, and a third try, directed at another interlocutor, T2.

Why this lack of ratification? Fatma's turn, though not particularly loud or 'heavy', is first placed 'in the clear' and then reiterated with additional non-verbal attention-getters. T1, in fact, does glance at Fatma but does not ratify her as participant. Furthermore, the exchange took place towards the end of lunch, when some distraction from eating was allowed. So we cannot blame Fatma for having carried out a faulty introduction; why then does she not get ratified? We see enacted here an obvious status asymmetry: one between adult and child overlapping with one between teacher and pupil. T1 noticed Fatma's attempt at contributing to the conversation: had she been an adult, T1 would very probably have taken up her contribution, as adults are "held accountable" (Garfinkel 1967) if they do not respond to conversational moves addressed to them by other adult speakers. In this case, however, the teacher is not held accountable for not answering Fatma, even though she has clearly shown that her turn *was* noticeable and *was* actually noticed. T1 chose not to include

Fatma in the vector of activity in which she and T2 were involved, and the social norms of the nursery school allowed her to do so. Children are held accountable if they do not respond to teachers, whereas the reverse does not hold: this is not an a priori assumption but is manifest in episodes such as this and the previous one. Being socialized in the nursery school means learning such rules and learning how to communicate within these constraints. It is no accident that Cathcart-Strong (1986), in a study of second language children's communicative strategies, adds the maxims "be interesting" and "be persistent" to Grice's (1975) four conversational maxims: a child in a nursery school has to learn that ratification is never owed — either by adults or other children — but has to be earned, and the means to earn it have to be learnt as well. Fatma's developing skills in appropriating words and inserting them in well constructed and well positioned turns were functional to achieving this goal, although success was not guaranteed.

Despite these failures, Fatma's introductions with external appropriations in the second period show a clear qualitative change: she can now participate more often in "just conversing" interactions; she has access to topics not necessarily centered around herself and the immediate situation; she can select adequate points of entry for her turns or, alternatively, she can make them linguistically conspicuous in order for them to be perceptible even in dense multi-party conversations. Her chances of becoming a ratified participant are thus increased, and they will increase even more in the third period when these means are further developed and refined.

4. Third period

After seven months in school, Fatma's Italian allowed her to produce more independent, complex turns in order to join already open conversations. In fact, in the last two months of the study, 57 % of her introductions contained appropriated words — a still high proportion, but lower than the 76 % of the first period. Furthermore, even when Fatma introduced herself by borrowing words, she added much of her own, constructing turns that were both coherent and original.

An important step in this period is Fatma's growing ability to participate in narrative sequences. Students of first and second language acquisition recognize that narrating is a complex activity, requiring a good lexical reper-

toire and sufficient grammatical competence to express situations independent of the immediate here-and-now context. This is still a formidable task for a child like Fatma who, after seven months of exposure to Italian, could identify and produce a very limited subset of the sentences that children her age can produce in their mother tongue. The following episode shows the problems that she encountered in introducing herself in a conversation in a descriptive-narrative key. Appropriation, however, was an efficient means of achieving at least one of the goals, that of coherence. It is a very weak form of coherence, based on a single recognized and reproduced word, but it is still a way of ensuring that Fatma's turn is somehow tied to the preceding discourse.

2/3

T1-FR: *non mi hai neanche raccontato com'è la tua casa nuova. Gliel'hai detto a Gabriele che da venerdì abiti qua?*

YOU HAVEN'T EVEN TOLD ME WHAT YOUR NEW HOME LOOKS LIKE.
HAVE YOU TOLD GABRIELE THAT YOU HAVE BEEN LIVING HERE
SINCE FRIDAY?

FR-GP: [*abito già nella casa nuova.*

I ALREADY LIVE IN THE NEW HOUSE

[(Fatma smiles looking at GP smiling at Franco)]

FR: *abbiam già- abbiamo già rotto, abbiamo già rotto l'armadio perchè ()*

WE HAVE- WE'VE ALREADY BROKEN, WE'VE ALREADY BROKEN
THE WARDROBE

T1: *rotto [l'armadio? ((surprised))*

BROKEN THE WARDROBE?

F: [*casa .hh casa .hh casa mia .hhh mia pochino, .hh pochino io sono io
sono .hh Strasburgo.*

HOME, HOME, MY HOME, MY TINY BIT, TINY BIT I AM I AM
STRASBOURG.

T1: *Strasburgo, in via Strasburgo. Sì.*

STRASBOURG, IN STRASBOURG STREET. YES.

(0.6)

F: [*i] casa .hh [i] casa mia bia:nca, [.h ba:mbole,*

[I] HOME, [I] MY HOME WHITE, DOLLS,

T1:[hm

T1:((swallows)) *hai molte bambole?*

HAVE YOU GOT MANY DOLLS?

[Conversation about Fatma's home follows]

Fatma identifies the word *home* (and probably nothing else except perhaps fragments too short to give her a clue as to what the others were saying about the home) and introduces herself into the conversation with a contribution about *her* home. Notice, however, how her turn is delivered. She repeats the

key word *home*, thus clearly establishing it as a “topic candidate” (Keenan 1977). She then adds, among numerous intakes of breath, the determiner *my*, the expression *tiny bit* (with no clear function, but perhaps an affect-marked way of holding the floor; Pallotti 1996), and finally the predicate *I am Strasbourg* (as Fatma lives on Strasbourg Street, it probably means I LIVE ON STRASBOURG STREET). In this and the following turn, Fatma is trying to tie everything possible to the topic candidate *home*; what she produces, however, is not readily interpretable, as is shown by the teacher’s comprehension checks. Furthermore, the coherence that she achieves with the on-going conversation is of a very superficial type, granted only by the topic candidate HOME: the teacher and Franco were talking about Franco’s new home and about moving while Fatma ends up saying where she lives. In short, for Fatma to join a conversation about *home* with a description of *her* home is still highly problematic. In the previously analyzed episode, the key words *big bed* were provided by others, and Fatma’s turn consisted of simply adding *me too* to them. Here, much more is required to express something relevant and original about the home, and it is only thanks to T1’s patience that the conversation continues.

This example is important in that it shows how Fatma can now add significant linguistic contributions to the words that she appropriates, as several predications (*my*, *Strasbourg street*, *white*, *dolls*) are attached to the appropriated topic *home*. From this point of view, the balance is reversed with respect to the first period, when she only often added a particle (*no*, or the polyfunctional [ke]) to the repeated expressions; now she only appropriates a word and uses it as a point of departure for complex linguistic elaborations.²¹ Furthermore, Fatma now often participates in conversations with little or no connection to the here-and-now context; she hooks up to dialogues about the home, about her past experiences, and not just about food, water and feeling cold.

Another episode from a few weeks later shows similar features. As in the last example, Fatma recognizes very little of what is being said but enough for her to have a turn of her own with the addition of some words from her stock. Again, the repetition ensures that her turn is somehow connected to the on-going conversation; but here too, as in the previous example, the weak coherence provided by the recognition and repetition of a single word produces an abrupt shift of focus.

3/5

[GP is talking with Siri (SR) and Mario (MR) about his meeting Mario's mother at the Coop supermarket]

GP: [*Eravamo () incontrati,*
WE MET

SR: [*(avev-)*
(SHE HAD-)

(0.4)

SR: *aveva [detto [()*
SHE HAD SAID ()

MR: [*dove era?*
WHERE WAS SHE?

GP: [*era davanti al Coop che aveva le borse della spesa,*
SHE WAS IN FRONT OF THE COOP WITH HER GROCERY
BAGS,

SR: *aveva detto,*
SHE HAD SAID,

GP: *alla [Coop, era stata.*
AT THE COOP, SHE HAD BEEN.

SR: [*ah, come stai? ()*
AH, HOW ARE YOU? ()

MR-GP: ()

GP-MR: hm?

F-GP: *e io sono e io sono [ki] vado, .h [[ki] vado alla Coop da sola.*
AND I AM AND I AM [KI] GO, [KI] GO TO THE COOP ALONE

[GP turns to Fatma

GP-F: e:: ((= don't exaggerate!))

F: *sì* ((nodding with a smile))
YES

GP:e: :

F: *(io io, [hm] Coop, Coop, vicino Strasburgo.* ((gesture of hand circumscribing))
((Fatma lives on Strasbourg street))

(I I, HM) COOP, COOP, NEAR STRASBOURG.

MR-GP: [*invece non ti ho visto, io.*
BUT I HAVEN'T SEEN YOU, I.

(0.6)

GP-F: *il Coop è vicino a Strasburgo, sì, [però la scuola no:*
THE COOP IS NEAR STRASBOURG, YES, BUT THE SCHOOL ISN'T

F: [*sì*
YES

Fatma recognizes the word *Coop*, a supermarket in the neighborhood. The two children and GP were talking about the Coop and GP meeting Mario's mother there. Fatma's strategy here is quite similar to the one used in the previous example: she starts with a filler *and I am and I am*, then adds her original

contribution to the conversation about Coop, *I go to the Coop alone*, with self-repetitions and intakes of breath. These false starts, from a psychological point of view, may signal Fatma's painstaking attempts at constructing a sentence in Italian, given the starting point *Coop*. But as we have seen, from the point of view of conversation organization they make her contribution more audible and more perceptible as having communicative intent. This and the previous example, in fact, are constructed in a remarkably similar fashion: an initial rapid burst of 'background' words (in one case the repeated topic candidate, in the other the generic *I am*, introducing the fact that what follows will involve Fatma — analogous in this respect to *me too*), then some other self-repeated words and finally what could be termed the 'comment' (*I am Strasbourg and I go to Coop alone*).²²

The last episode to be analyzed is one of Fatma's most complex sentences produced in the period of observation, not only in terms of the length of the utterance, but also its structure, which consists of several subordinate clauses. In it, Fatma seems to have gone a long way towards solving the "problem of analysis" and the "problem of synthesis" (Klein 1986). What she says is not linked to the here-and-now context but is a mini-narration of a past event and part of a "just conversing" sequence in which the exchange of ideas through language is an end in itself.

27/4

[In the morning the children went to a public library on a bus. They are now discussing with aide A1 what the bus driver said to them]

MR-A1: *l'autista del pulmino ha detto, .hh se non facete i buoni, vi mangio ha detto.*

THE BUS DRIVER SAID 'IF YOU'RE NOT GOOD I'M GOING TO EAT YOU', HE SAID.

A1: *vi mangio?!*

I EAT YOU?!

SR: *e poi ci ha sgridato.*

AND THEN HE TOLD US OFF.

(0.5)

SR: *Ha sgridato l'Idina.=*

HE TOLD IDINA OFF.

A1:= *non siete micca molto bravi, eh, a farvi sgridare anche dall'autista. Poi hai detto che siete stat bravi, tu?* ((looking at Idina))

YOU'RE NOT THAT GOOD, ARE YOU? BEING TOLD OFF BY THE BUS DRIVER TOO! AND YOU SAID YOU WERE GOOD, YOU?

MR: *sì, l'ha detto lei* ((pointing to Idina))

YES, SHE SAID IT.

A1: *c'hai un bel coraggio, eh?* ((looking at Idina, then pointing at her))

- YOU'RE CHEEKY, HUH?
- (ID):sì
YES
- ID: *però, però l'autista ci ha detto () che ci mangia*
BUT, BUT THE DRIVER TOLD US () HE'S GOING TO EAT US.
- A1: *fosse ve:ro, [ne mangiasse due o tre.]*
IF ONLY IT WERE TRUE, THAT HE EATS TWO OR THREE OF THEM.
- F: *[ha detto (0.7)] [ha detto l'autobus .hhh=*
SAID (0.7) SAID THE BUS .HHH=
- A1:[hmm?
- F:= *ha detto §§ non fate non [fate, .hhh non fate i bravi [no=*
=SAID YOU'RE NOT YOU'RE NOT .HH YOU'RE NOT GOOD YOU DON'T=
[era uno grasso? ((turning to Mario))
WAS HE FAT?
- MR-A1:[sì
YES
- A1:[*era tanto grosso () ci stan tre di bambini nella pancia]*
HE WAS SO BIG () THREE CHILDREN CAN FIT IN HIS BELLY
- F: = *.hh [no, non mangiate. .h h h] ha detto ha detto l'autobus .hhh non fate non*
fate i bravi no .hhh non mangiatehh
= .HH DON'T, YOU DON'T EAT .HHH SAID SAID THE BUS .HHH YOU'RE
NOT YOU'RE NOT GOOD YOU .HHH DON'T EAT
- A1-F: hm. ((nodding, towards Fatma))
(0.4)
- ID: *no! sì, ha detto che mangiate, e non mangiate e mang- e- e- e fate i bravi.*
NO! YES, HE SAID THAT YOU EAT, AND DON'T EAT AND EAT- AND
AND AND YOU'RE GOOD
- (0.8)
- ID: *ha detto no no non fai i bravi*
SAID YOU'RE NOT YOU'RE NOT GOOD
(Fatma starts eating again)

The conversation was about a past event with no direct connection to the immediate interactional context: everybody was “just conversing” about what happened in the morning. In the first period of the study, it would have been unthinkable for Fatma to participate adequately in such a conversation. Now she can introduce herself with her turn and be ratified by two participants, aide A1 with her *hm* and her nodding and Idina with her *No! Yes*, and ensuing sentences. But in her turn Fatma appears to do much more than she is actually capable of: in fact it is easy to see that virtually all of Fatma's turn is made up of words previously uttered by others. These appropriated words, however, are originally combined into a new construction, so that what Fatma says is strongly coherent with the conversation topic and at the same time original.

Other children were reporting what the bus-driver had said, namely that he would have eaten them if they had not behaved well. Fatma recognizes all the key words of this conversation (*said, bus driver, eat, be good*), which she inserts into her turn. This turn is constructed step by step by a gradual addition of elements repeated two or three times. The resulting proposition is glossable as THE BUS DRIVER SAID: IF YOU ARE NOT GOOD YOU DON'T EAT, a complex proposition, made up of three interdependent clauses. But its meaning is quite different from that of the turns previously produced by other children. While they were talking about the driver eating them, Fatma, more commonsensically, reports that the driver threatened them with not having lunch. It is thus evident that Fatma's knowledge of Italian was still limited essentially to the lexicon, with her grammatical knowledge lagging far behind. In all her friends' sentences she had recognized a good number of lexical items, but not the main relationships expressed by morphosyntax, for example between the act of eating and its subjects and objects. Nonetheless, her contribution is effective, as it introduces a new point of view in the discussion and gets ratified, although its position in the conversational sequence shows that it is problematic for the children to have a turn at talk even when introducing themselves with complex and original turns. In fact, Fatma has to repeat her sentence twice because the first attempt overlapped with a dialogue between aide A1 and Mario. Only the second emission was 'in the clear' and only after that did Fatma receive uptake.

5. Conclusions

This last example shows that Fatma still has a long way to go before being able to use Italian like her schoolmates. However, there has been a clear evolution in the way she participates in interactions, from the early introductions in choral activities like asking for water to the final examples in which she displayed an ability to engage in the complex, linguistic-only activity of "just conversing". External appropriations had a crucial role in helping her achieve the status of ratified participant in already open vectors of activity, and their form developed significantly in at least three different respects.

First of all, Fatma repeated other speakers' words in order to play different participant roles. Initially, most of her appropriations helped her join others in performing chorally, in parallel, a single activity like requesting,

greeting or chasing something or someone. This too is a form of participation, since Fatma showed that she was able to do what others were doing at the right moment. However, it is a very simple, basic form of 'doing together'. As time went by, Fatma appropriated this type of linguistic move less and less. Instead, she attempted to become a participant in activities constructed 'vertically', that is step-by-step by a group of people. This is especially true of conversations, which do not consist of three or four speakers doing the same thing simultaneously but of an ordered sequence of turns. In order to join these activities Fatma appropriated previously uttered words, but this time adding her own 'conversational brick' to a co-constructed course of action. This leads us to a second developmental path.

In the first period, Fatma usually added little of her own to the appropriated words. Instead she tended to subtract, to simplify the model sentences. Although this does not prevent joining in 'choral' activities because in this kind of activity nothing new needs to be added to the form of previous turns, if one wants to participate in an activity co-constructed by means of language something new has to be contributed. In the first period Fatma did this by adding minimal contributions to the appropriated expressions, like a negative expression or a polyfunctional particle [ki] or [ke], which allowed her turn to be 'original' with only minimal alterations. In the second, and even more so in the third period, when the girl appropriated words to participate in conversations, she took one or two items from previous discourse and added significant contributions of her own. In other words, the appropriated expression was a starting point for producing elaborate original constructions which, by virtue of the element borrowed from previous turns, had a good chance of being on-topic.

We now turn to the third developmental trend. In the seven months of observation, Fatma's productions gradually moved from almost constant reference to the immediate extralinguistic context to a more decontextualized range of topics. This is linked to her acquisition of a wider lexical repertoire, which allowed her to deal with areas other than those which she first tried to master in learning Italian, such as interaction-management or requesting essential commodities. After the linguistic means to achieve these basic goals had been acquired, Fatma developed the necessary skills for other forms of communication such as "just conversing" — one of the last and most complex verbal skills acquired by children and one of the most frequently practiced by adults. This is what Fatma was doing when she joined conversations about big

beds, people going to supermarkets and bus drivers: by giving an account of her experiences, she was joining a purely linguistic activity with a purely linguistic contribution.

The strategy of appropriation accompanies the child in this development too, from the repetition of words necessary for making comments about the on-going situation or for performing actions in it, to the repetition of words giving coherence to a purely linguistic exchange. In other words, over time appropriation helped to give a coherence which was based less on the extralinguistic context and more on the purely linguistic co-text.

Finally, Fatma developed other strategies — in addition to appropriation but interacting with it — that were necessary for her turns to be ratified. Turns with appropriated words satisfied some requirements, such as relevance and informativeness, thus responding to the “be interesting” maxim (Cathcart-Strong 1986). However, these features alone were often not sufficient to win the battle for ratification. Participants involved in already open vectors of activity might have been too preoccupied with them to display acceptance of a newcomer or simply to perceive that Fatma was trying to introduce herself. Fatma thus developed strategies to make ratification more likely (recall that ratification was never *due*). One of these was ‘machine-gunning’ particular words, like the repeated topic candidate or pragmatic fillers such as *I am* and *me too* at the beginning of the turn to produce a ‘heavy’, loud outburst that would attract attention. This strategy is similar to what Cathcart-Strong calls “be persistent”. Another more sophisticated skill developed in the second and third period, namely the ability to place her turns in conversationally ‘free’ positions where they would be clearly audible even without increasing their volume, tempo or length.

Appropriation is one of the most basic ways to make one’s turns cohere with those of others. However, the notion of cohesion between one turn and another always needs to be contextualized in a particular participation framework, since turns that are coherent with those of others are produced only for the purposes of participating in some shared course of action. Thus, we need to see linguistic cohesion and the strategies employed to achieve it as one of the means that interactants use to participate in co-constructed courses of action. The present approach has viewed appropriation as a strategy for achieving verbal interactional cohesion in a particular micro-culture, that of an Italian nursery school. Fatma’s interactions in her first eight months in the nursery can be seen as part of a process of language socialization, in that she was

simultaneously socialized through language and socialized to use language (Schieffelin and Ochs 1986b). As Schieffelin and Ochs have shown for first language acquisition, and Kleifgen and Saville-Troike (1992) for second language acquisition, the problems of acquiring culture and language go together. By learning the language one can better understand and learn the culture, and learning the culture — what others do, when, and why — helps one understand what people say.

In this respect Fatma's case is particularly interesting, as she was observed from her very first contacts with a completely new lingua-cultural milieu. Her acquisition and use of Italian took place in a well-determined context, a micro-culture with its own rules for participation and interaction. In this culture, for example, one-to-one, private conversations were the exception rather than the rule: if Fatma wanted to participate in conversations, she often had to do so on her own initiative by joining others who were already engaged in some vector of activity. Being ratified as a new participant in these vectors of activity was never guaranteed and seldom easy. Both adults and children often ignored even the most conspicuous requests for attention; adults, furthermore, could also explicitly deny access to conversations. Fatma thus had to learn how to enter conversations at the right time and in the right way, and appropriation helped her to achieve these fundamental goals.

As the study of intercultural communication has evolved in interpretive sociolinguistics, it has given us important insights into the way language, culture and interaction are tightly intertwined. The results of this paper suggest some directions for future research. A first obvious line of research would be to verify the extent to which the present analysis can be extended to adult speakers. Factors such as face and interaction management should be compared between adult and child speakers. Secondly, a crucial assumption of studies like this is that the communicative environment contributes to shaping the interactions that take place in it (Pallotti 1996): what happens in a (Italian) nursery is likely to differ quite markedly from what happens in a cafeteria or at a party where adults meet and interact. It is thus necessary to investigate the use of external appropriations by non-native speakers in different communicative environments.

This study also calls for more work on multi-party interactions: intercultural encounters in which more than two parties are involved deserve more systematic treatment than they have received so far. The field of intercultural communication should also include more longitudinal studies on how individu-

als gradually acquire the skills needed to conduct intercultural encounters.

More generally, closer contact between researchers in intercultural communication and second language acquisition is desirable. Much research on intercultural communication has dealt with understanding problems attributable to different cultural interpretation schemata, often ruling out limited linguistic proficiency as a factor. However, many intercultural interactions occur among people who, besides partially sharing their cultural schemata, also partially share a language code. We must find a way to conceptualize these two factors together, as there is a continuous interplay between them in actual intercultural encounters. What one does in interaction is a function of what one can do (Halliday 1978), and, as Gumperz notes, “only by looking at the whole range of linguistic phenomena that enter into conversational management can we understand what goes on in an interaction” (1982: 186). Gumperz wanted sociocultural knowledge to be included among the factors impacting on the outcomes of linguistic interactions and, as a result of his pioneering work, there was an increase in the number of studies which kept the linguistic knowledge factor constant in order to investigate the role of sociocultural elements. Now the time has come for a systematic analysis of how different levels of linguistic and cultural sharedness interact in determining the strategies that speakers adopt when faced with people from other linguistic and cultural backgrounds. In the examples that we have examined, Fatma’s linguistic productions were a function of both her linguistic and sociocultural knowledge — of her knowledge of how to interpret and use language and of her knowledge of what is and can be done (and when, and how) in the nursery school culture. If we follow Gumperz’s call to “abandon the existing views of communication which draw a basic distinction between cultural or social knowledge on the one hand and linguistic signalling processes on the other” (1982: 186), then a coherent view of linguistic and cultural acquisition should be on the agenda for intercultural communication research in the years to come.

Notes

1. I wish to thank William Corsaro, Aldo Di Luzio and Franca Orletti for their comments on a previous version of this paper. The responsibility for any shortcomings remains entirely mine.

2. An “encounter” consists of “two or more persons in a social situation [who] jointly ratify one another as authorized co-sustainers of a single, albeit moving, focus of visual and cognitive attention” (Goffman 1964: 134).
3. After Goffman’s pioneering article, the literature on multi-party conversations has grown considerably, and cannot be fully reviewed here (see e.g. Clark 1992; Egbert 1997; Goodwin and Goodwin 1990; M. H. Goodwin 1991; Kerbrat-Orecchioni and Plantin 1995; Linell and Korolija 1997; Müller 1995; Parker 1984 among many others). Goffman’s framework, however, remains a fundamental reference for most of these works.
4. In this paper I will primarily be concerned with linguistic interactions (i.e. conversations). The analytic framework, however, is designed to account for both linguistic and non-linguistic interactions.
5. These actions can be very subtle, consisting of small movements of the eye, smiles, nonverbal sounds. On the other hand, in our data even verbal behaviors cannot always be regarded as only being directed at co-constructing a vector of activity with others, as children often play with language with no clear intention of involving others. Therefore the distinction between active and potential participants, like that between addressees and non-addressees, is sometimes problematic, and it should be conceived of as a continuum rather than as a dichotomy (Goodwin 1981; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1990).
6. Analysis has been carried out only on a part of the data, those taken from meal times and in which Fatma was present (approximately 25 hours) and the whole first month of school (approximately 20 hours). The remaining data await further investigation.
7. A joint research project coordinated by Elinor Ochs and Clotilde Pontecorvo focuses on family interactions at meals in Italy and the United States (see e.g. Ochs, Pontecorvo and Fasulo 1996; Ochs and Taylor 1992; Sterponi and Pontecorvo 1996 and references therein). Although there are interesting similarities and differences between these settings, a systematic comparison of meals at home and in the nursery would go far beyond the scope of this paper.
8. In Italy the standard meal consists of a first course (usually pasta), a second course (meat/ fish and vegetables) and a dessert, usually fruit.
9. This communicative situation is thus quite different from that described in other studies, for example by Kleifgen and Saville-Troike (1992), in which children were observed interacting in school events in which the teacher strove to elicit as much talk as possible. Lunches at a nursery differ from those settings in which an adult researcher explicitly interacts with a child for the purposes of a scientific investigation (e. g. Calleri 1996; Keller-Cohen 1979; Wagner-Gough and Hatch 1975).
10. To use Wolfgang Klein’s (1986) terms, Fatma had to solve the two problems of “analysis” (understanding what was being said) and “synthesis” (producing some intelligible utterance) in a few tenths of a second.
11. Psychological considerations are outside the main scope of this paper, so I will not go into a discussion of the role of the words appropriated by Fatma as ‘primers’ for activating the girl’s representations of those words. Let me just note two things about this issue. The first is that more than 75 % of Fatma’s appropriations concerned words that the girl could already produce spontaneously. This means that when she repeated words uttered by

others she normally knew what she was doing, she was not just parroting. Secondly, according to Paradis' (1993) "activation threshold hypothesis", it is easier for bilinguals to activate a linguistic item in working memory upon hearing it than to self-activate it in a spontaneous production. Thus it is easily possible that the words repeated by Fatma were "primed" (Bohannon and Stanowicz 1989) by their models in the native speakers' speech, making their production easier and faster (for a psychological treatment of repetition in language acquisition see the papers in Speidel and Nelson 1989; for a treatment of repetition in interlinguistic conversations focussing on its role facilitating comprehension and production, see Ciliberti 1996).

12. Calleri (1996) also notes that the number of repetitions tends to decrease when learners move from the very initial stages.
13. Transcription conventions are those used in conversation analysis (c.f. Atkinson and Heritage 1984). Fatma's turns are boldfaced. Transcription is broadly orthographic, marking only the most evident differences between Fatma's pronunciation and standard Italian. § is a pharyngeal fricative. Dates preceding examples indicate day and month (e.g. 27/4 = 27 april). Participants are identified by the following symbols: F = Fatma. T1, T2 = teachers. A1 = aide. GP = Gabriele Pallotti. ID, WA, FR etc. = children.
14. For example, water and bread were distributed only after children had finished their first course; fruit was served only to those children who had eaten a substantial part of their second course, or after all the others had done so. Water was poured by an adult, bread was distributed by a particular child wearing an apron (the 'waiter'); finally, fruit in the central fruit bowl could never be taken directly by children, but had to be requested from an adult.
15. An examination of Fatma's interlanguage is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the girl used (for many months) particles like [ki], [ke] and [di] in a pleonastic, unsystematic way, probably 'miming' the actual use of free grammatical morphemes in Italian. They will therefore be transcribed phonetically so as not to imply a command of complementizers, prepositions etc.
16. Small capitals are used to represent the content or meaning of a word or sentence; its form is expressed by the use of italics.
17. Although considerations regarding Fatma's interlanguage are outside the scope of this paper, it is undeniable that her initial approach to the new linguistic code has been essentially based on the acquisition of lexical or quasi-lexical forms and that at this stage it was difficult for Fatma to understand the relationships expressed by grammatical morphemes. Thus, while the other children were discussing with the adults about *going to sleep* in the big bed *with* their parents, Fatma, who probably had not understood this completely, states that she *has* a big bed *like* her mommy. Aide A1's interpretation is clearly driven by what was said before Fatma's turn, which is 'normalized' as 'you too go to the big bed with mommy'. It is hard to tell what Fatma understood of A1's rephrasing, although she twice reiterates her 'I've got it', which might display that she perceived some discrepancy with what she had said (probably the lack of the verb *have* or of the preposition *like*) in A1's reformulation.
18. For a fuller (although still quite sketchy) discussion of Fatma's "sentence producing tactics" (Wong-Fillmore 1976), see Pallotti (1996).

19. The Italian equivalents of *I don't like it* and *he doesn't like it* are, respectively, *non mi piace* and *non gli piace*. Fatma's *no piaci* is a combination of the invariable negative adverb *no* with what in Italian would be the verb 'like' in the second person singular of the present tense, but probably is her rendering of *piace* (Arabic does not discriminate between /i/ and /e/). So, *no piaci* is equally ambiguous in Italian as the English *no like*.
20. 'Head' in Italian is *testa*. Fatma says [testra] instead, to which Walter's objections are directed. In the English translation *HEAD will stand for mispronounced tokens of *testa*.
21. Calleri (1996) notes a similar development in two Chinese children acquiring Italian as a second language, whose repetitions tended to become increasingly "enlarged" with respect to the model utterances.
22. Fatma's gradual approximations to an intelligible, complex sentence resemble Scollon's (1979) "vertical constructions". Vertical constructions are propositions developed step-by-step over several utterances and often constructed by different speakers, one of whom is usually more competent than the other, so that the learner provides bits of talk that the 'expert' integrates into a coherent construction. These vertical constructions, however, are to a great extent a by-product of a particular communicative environment, with few interactants (usually two) fully available to each other. In the nursery school speech economy, the multiple competing vectors of activity and the difficulty of being accepted into them often induce participants to make vertical constructions by themselves, as they cannot hope that their bits and fragments of sentences will be picked up, amended and recast by other, more competent speakers.

References

- Atkinson, J. M. and Heritage, J. (eds)
1984 *Structures of Social Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bazzanella, C. (ed.)
1996 *Repetition in Dialogue*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Bloom, L., Rocissano, L. and Hood, L.
1976 "Adult-child discourse: Developmental interaction between information processing and linguistic knowledge." *Cognitive Psychology*, 8: 521–552.
- Bohannon, J. N. and Stanowicz, L.
1989 "Bidirectional effects of imitation and repetition in conversation: A synthesis within a cognitive model." In Speidel and Nelson (1989), 121–150.
- Calleri, D.
1996 "Chinese children learning Italian: Allo-repetition forms and functions in semi-guided dialogues." In Bazzanella (1996), 29–38.
- Cathcart-Strong, R.
1986 "Input generation by young second language learners". *TESOL Quarterly*, 20: 515–530.
- Ciliberti, A.
1996 "Repetition in Native/Non-native interaction." In Bazzanella (1996), 39–49.

- Clark, H.
1992 *Arenas of Language Use*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Duranti, A. and Goodwin, C. (eds)
1992 *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Egbert, M.
1997 "Schisming: the collaborative transformation from a single conversation to multiple conversations". *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 30: 1–51.
- Garfinkel, H.
1967 *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Garvey, C.
1984 *Children's Talk*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Gass, S. and Varonis, E.
1985 "Task variation and nonnative/nonnative negotiation of meaning". In S. Gass and C. Madden (eds), *Input in Second Language Acquisition*. Rowley: Newbury House, 149–161.
1989 "Miscommunication in nonnative speaker discourse". In N. Coupland, H. Giles and J.M. Wiemann (eds), *Miscommunication and Problematic Talk*. Newbury Park: Sage, 121–145.
- Goffman, E.
1964 "The neglected situation." *American Anthropologist*, 66: 133–6.
1979 "Footing." *Semiotica*, 25: 1–29.
- Goodwin, C.
1981 *Conversational Organization: Interaction between speakers and hearers*. New York: Academic Press.
- Goodwin, C. and M. H. Goodwin
1990 "Interstitial argument." In A. Grimshaw (ed.), *Conflict talk*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 85–117.
- Goodwin, M.H.
1991 "Byplay: participant structure and framing of collaborative collusion". In B. Conein et al. (eds), *Les formes de la conversation*. Paris: CNET, 155–180.
- Grice, P.
1975 "Logic and conversation". In P. Cole and N.K. Morgan (eds), *Syntax and semantics*. Vol. 3: *Speech acts*. New York: Academic Press, 41–58.
- Gumperz, J. J.
1982 *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1992 "Contextualization and understanding." In Duranti and Goodwin (1992), 229–25.
- Halliday, M. A. K.
1978 *Language as Social Semiotics*. London: Arnold.
- Hatch, E. M. (ed)
1978 *Second Language Acquisition: A Book of Readings*. Rowley, Mass: Newbury House.

- Itoh, H. and E. Hatch
1978 "Second language acquisition: A case study." In Hatch (1978), 76–88.
- Keenan, E.
1977 "Making it last: Repetition in children's discourse." In S. Ervin-Tripp and C. Mitchell-Kernan (eds), *Child Discourse*. New York: Academic Press, 125–138.
- Keenan, Ochs, E., Schieffelin, B. B. and Platt, M.
1978 "Questions of immediate concern." In E. N. Goody (ed.), *Questions and Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 44–55.
- Keller-Cohen, D.
1979 "Repetition in the non-native acquisition of discourse: its relation to text unification and conversational structure." In R. Freedle (ed.), *New Directions in Discourse Processing*. Norwood: Ablex, 245–271.
- Kerbrat-Orecchioni, C.
1990 *Les interactions verbales*. Tome I. Paris: Colin.
- Kerbrat-Orecchioni, C. and Plantin, C. (eds)
1995 *Le trilogie*. Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon.
- Kleifgen, J. and Saville-Troike, M.
1992 "Achieving coherence in multilingual interaction." *Discourse Processes*, 15:183–206.
- Klein, W.
1986 *Second Language Acquisition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Klein, W. and Perdue, C.
1997 "The basic variety (or: Couldn't natural languages be much simpler?)." *Second Language Research*, 13: 301–347.
- Linell, P. and Korolija, N.
1997 "Coherence in multi-party conversation." In T. Givón (ed.), *Conversation: Cognitive, communicative and social perspectives*. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 167–205.
- Long, M.
1981 "Questions in foreigner talk discourse." *Language Learning*, 31: 135–157.
1983 "Native speaker/non-native speaker conversation and the negotiation of comprehensible input." *Applied Linguistics*, 4: 126–41.
1996 "The role of the linguistic environment in second language acquisition." In W. Ritchie and T. Bhatia (eds.), *Handbook of Second Language Acquisition*. San Diego: Academic Press, 413–468.
- Merritt, M.
1982a "Repeats and reformulations in primary classrooms as windows on the nature of classroom engagement." *Discourse Processes*, 5: 127–145.
- Merritt, M.
1982b "Distributing and directing attention in primary classrooms." In C. L. Wilkinson (ed.), *Communicating in the Classroom*. New York: Academic Press, 223–244.
- Mittner, M.
1984 "Strategies discursives, variabilité et situations de communication." *Studies in second language acquisition by adult immigrants*. Tilburg Studies in

- Language and Literature, 6. Tilburg: Tilburg University, 83–112.
- Müller, F.
 1995 “Interaction et syntaxe — structures de participation et structures syntaxiques dans la conversation à plusieurs participants.” In D. Veronique and R. Vion (eds), *Modèles de l'interaction verbale*. Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l'Université de Provence, 331–343.
- Ochs, E. and Taylor, C.
 1992 “Family narrative as political activity.” *Discourse and Society*, 3: 301–340.
- Ochs, E., Pontecorvo, C. and Fasulo, A.
 1996 “Socializing taste.” *Ethnos*, 61: 7–46.
- Pallotti, G.
 1994 “Borrowing words: appropriation as a communicative strategy in children learning a second language.” Paper presented at the *Second Language Research Forum*, Montreal (Canada), October 6–9, 1994.
 1996 “Towards an ecology of second language acquisition: SLA as a socialization process.” In E. Kellerman, B. Weltens, T. Bongaerts (eds), *Proceedings of EUROSLA 6, Toegepaste Taalwetenschap in Artikelen*, # 55.
 1999 “Socializzazione e apprendimento della seconda lingua” [Socialization and second language acquisition]. *Etnosistemi*, 6: 76–91.
- Paradis, M.
 1993 “Linguistic, psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic aspects of ‘interference’ in bilingual speakers: The Activation Threshold Hypothesis”. *International Journal of Psycholinguistics*, 9: 133–145.
- Parker, R.
 1984 “Conversational grouping and fragmentation: A preliminary investigation”. *Semiotica* 50: 43–68.
- Pease-Alvarez, C. and Vasquez, O.
 1994 “Language socialization in ethnic minority communities.” In F. Genesee (ed.), *Educating Second Language Children*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 82–102.
- Poole, D.
 1992 “Language socialization in the second language classroom.” *Language Learning*, 42: 593–616.
- Psathas, G. and T. Anderson
 1990 “The ‘practices’ of transcription in conversational analysis.” *Semiotica*, 78: 75–99.
- Saville-Troike, M. and Kleifgen, J.
 1986 “Scripts for school: Cross-cultural communication in elementary classrooms.” *Text* 6: 207–221.
- Schegloff, E. A. and Sacks, H.
 1973 “Opening up closings.” *Semiotica* 8: 289–327.
- Schieffelin, B.B. and Ochs, E. (eds)
 1986a *Language Socialization across Cultures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schieffelin, B.B. and Ochs, E.
 1986b “Language socialization.” *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 15: 163–191.

- Schumann, J.
1978 *The Pidginization Process: A model for second language acquisition*. Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House.
- Scollon, R. and Scollon, M.
1981 *Narrative, Literacy, and Face in Interethnic Communication*. Norwood: Ablex.
- Scollon, R.
1979 "A real early stage: an unzipped condensation of a dissertation on child language." In E. Ochs and B.B. Schieffelin (eds), *Developmental pragmatics*. New York: Academic Press, 173–189.
- Speidel, G. and K. E. Nelson (eds)
1989 *The Many Faces of Imitation in Language Learning*. New York: Springer Verlag.
- Sterponi, L. and Pontecorvo, C.
1996 "Discourse at family dinner: How children are socialized through arguing." *Interaction et cognitions*, 1: 329–366.
- Tannen, D.
1984 *Conversational Style: Analyzing talk among friends*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Vion, R. and Mittner, M.
1986 "Activité de reprise et gestion des interactions en communication exolingue." *Langages*, 84: 25–42.
- Wagner-Gough, J. and Hatch, E.
1975 "The importance of input data in second language acquisition studies." *Language Learning*, 25: 297–308.
- Wittgenstein, L.
1953 *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wong-Fillmore, L.
1976 *The Second Time Around: Cognitive and Social Strategies in Second Language Acquisition*. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University.

Index of Authors

A

Adelswärd 94, 96
Auer xv, 12, 90, 98, 222, 223, 274,

B

Basso 43
Bauman 18, 142,
Bourdieu 6, 11, 93,
Briggs 142,

C

Cathcart-Strong 317, 325,
Cook-Gumperz xv, 118, 123, 132

D

Davies, B. 272
Davies C. 68,
Devereux 246, 247,

E

Ehlich 174, 190, 194

G

Gal 27
Goffman 11, 15–18, 117, 119–121, 125,
128, 131, 132, 135, 136, 225, 272, 280,
281, 298, 299,
Goodwin, Ch. 13, 132, 142,
Goodwin, M. H. 132, 142,
Gramsci 23, 188,
Grice 173, 317
Gumperz xiii, xiv, xv, 4, 11–13, 22, 27,
37, 41, 42, 45, 49, 59, 66, 67, 69, 73,
90, 97, 98, 136, 167, 173, 219, 221–
223, 225, 235, 273, 274, 277, 280, 288,
289, 295–297

Günthner xi, xiv, 12, 17, 18, 26, 27, 61,
67, 68, 70–72, 90, 131, 133

H

Habermas 4–7, 23, 28,
Hinnenkamp xvii, 90, 91, 173, 222, 274–
276
Hochschild 124, 128, 129, 136
Humboldt, W. v. 35, 36, 42
Hymes 4, 11, 12, 43, 291

J

Jacquemet xvi, 141, 144
Jefferson 10, 11, 259

K

Kern xv, 91
Kirkpatrick 68
Kleifgen 297, 326, 328
Knoblauch xiii, 17, 18, 20, 61, 70, 119,
131
Kotthoff 69, 70, 72

L

Lakoff 252
Lambert 249, 250
Leidner 121–126
Linell 215, 224, 248–250
Luckmann xiv, 7, 12, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25,
61, 66, 133, 195

M

Merritt 298
Miller, L. 73,
Müller xvii, 265–267

P

Philips 43, 71, 272

R

Rehbein xvi, 173–176, 181, 183, 190,
193–196, 249, 250

S

Sacks 10, 11, 185, 259, 264, 265, 271–
273, 280, 301

Saville-Troike 297, 326

Schegloff 10, 11, 213, 215, 219, 259,
274, 301

Schiffrin 70, 272, 291

Schütz xiii, 4–10, 14–16, 18–20, 22, 24,
25, 56, 80

Scollon 43, 73, 211, 295

T

Tannen 69

Thomas, R. H. 44

Tyler 68

W

Wax 44

Index of Subjects

A

accommodation strategies xix
American Indian(s) 38, 42–44, 46–49
anamnesis 216–217, 232, 234
anthropological linguistics 13
asymmetry/asymmetries xvi, xvii, xviii,
63, 66, 69, 71–74, 79, 131–133, 141,
275–276, 282, 290, 316
asymmetry/asymmetries of/in knowledge
xiv, 55, 59, 61, 63, 66, 67, 71–74, 76,
79
auxiliary device xvii, 174–180, 184, 186,
188, 194

B

backchannel 70
biographical narratives 94
British xvi, 12, 66–67
business communication 174
buying and selling 174, 195

C

calculability 120, 121
Camorra 143–144, 146–147
case history 216
casual speech 255–256, 266
categorisation/categorization/categoriza-
tion device 90, 112, 184–186
see also: cultural categorisation
Chinese 55–57, 59, 65, 67, 68, 70–72,
75–77, 79
co-membership 247
co-ordination/co-ordination device 6, 8,
9, 15
code-switching 26, 27, 158
cohesion xviii, 269–300, 309, 325

collaboration xv, 117–119, 121, 125,
131–133
communicative
action xiii, 4–9, 14, 18–19, 28, 179,
193
apparatus 191, 193, 194
budget 24
culture xiii, 5, 20, 25, 26, 28, 64–65,
126
environments 25, 125, 326
event 18
genre(s) 59, 61–63, 66–70, 72–74,
80, 84, 89, 108–109, 130, 131–
133, 136
knowledge 58–59, 63–64, 73
pattern 179
situation 61, 273, 328
styles 108
connectives 180–181, 187, 188
constellation 18, 175, 177, 247
context xii, xviii, 5, 7, 9, 11–17, 19, 21–
22, 25–26, 35, 43, 44, 47–51, 59, 71,
79, 90, 100, 101, 120, 124–125, 128,
130, 135, 137, 141, 144, 166–167, 185,
222–225, 237, 265, 273–274, 277, 291,
295–297, 309, 318–319, 321–322, 324–
326
contextualization xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xviii, 9,
12, 31, 35, 37, 59, 97, 98, 142, 167,
219, 220, 223, 225, 237, 273, 274, 280,
281, 291, 297
see also:
contextualization conventions xiii,
xiv, 12, 97, 219, 223, 225
contextualization cues xi, xiv, 12,
70, 97, 98, 167, 220, 273, 297

contextualize/contextualizing xvii,
 130, 167, 222–223
 conversation analysis xi, xiii, 4–5, 9–11,
 13–14, 17, 29, 238
 conversational maxims 317
 cooperation xiii, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, 68,
 102, 124, 131–132, 134, 173, 175, 177,
 219, 225, 263
 corrective cycle 224–225, 232–234, 236
 courtroom 69, 142–146, 148, 157, 161
 courtroom communication/courtroom
 interactions 142, 144
 criminal trials 142
 cross-cultural encounters 167
 cultural apparatus 188
 cultural categorisation 90, 112
 cultural praxis 225
 culturality 97

D

deference 110, 128, 135, 186, 188
 deixis 154, 158, 159, 182, 186
 diagnosis 216, 232
 dialogue interpreter/dialogue interpreting
 245–248, 249, 265
 directives 155, 157, 159
 discourse genres 272, 277
 discursive practices 37, 45, 51, 272

E

East German/East Germans/East Germany
 xv, 89, 91–94, 97–101, 103, 106–109,
 111–113
 Eastern communicative style 109
 Emotion/emotionality 129, 136
 see also:
 emotional labor 128–129, 132, 136
 Eritrean immigrant 275
 ethnicity 27, 137
 ethnocentrism 57
 ethnographic xii, xiv, xviii, 28, 35, 38,
 43, 49–50, 121, 246, 247, 277, 296
 ethnography of communication xi, xiii, 4,
 11, 12, 44–45, 246
 ethnotheoretical 61

F

false friend 255
 fieldwork 35, 125–126, 128, 133
 formality 109, 262, 264
 frame 13, 17, 44, 97, 103, 108, 111, 122,
 130, 135, 142, 160, 220–224, 238, 278–
 282, 284–285, 291
 framing 16, 68, 128, 137, 186, 223
 French xvii, 73, 174, 245, 247, 250–253,
 255–258, 263–264, 266
 Functional Pragmatics 193

G

gatekeeping 249–251, 255
 GDR 92–93, 96, 98, 108, 110
 gender 72, 113, 119, 291
 genre xi, xii, xv, xvi, xviii, 17, 20, 61–63,
 66, 68, 72, 74–76, 80, 89, 94, 96, 103,
 108–109, 130–131, 133, 136, 195
 see also:
 communicative genre
 German xv, xvi, xvii, 27, 51, 70–73, 75,
 79–80, 89–94, 97–98, 100–101, 103,
 106–113, 174, 177–178, 181–182, 184–
 189, 192, 194, 235, 238, 245, 247, 249–
 253, 255–256, 258–259, 264, 266
 globalization 58, 117, 119, 121
 government witness 142, 143
 grading expressions 257

H

habitus xvii
 hedging 93, 184
 hegemony xiii, 21, 23, 37, 141, 188
 honor 144, 147, 149, 151–153, 155, 156,
 161, 168

I

identity xviii, 21–23, 90, 94, 128–129,
 154–155, 157, 161, 246, 271–276, 282,
 289, 291
 ideology xi, xii, xiii, xvi, xviii, 23, 35, 37,
 38, 51, 109, 129, 142, 160
 immigrant 12, 275–276, 282, 289
 Indexicality 29, 280

Indian xiv, 27, 38, 42–44, 46–47, 49–50,
 66–67, 69, 71–72, 98
 indirectness 109, 110, 214
 informality 109, 127, 130, 131, 137
 institution 103, 187, 276, 284, 300
 see also:
 institutional context 79
 institutional interaction 274
 institutional setting 160
 intensification 160, 251–255
 interaction order xiii, 15–16, 18, 21–22,
 27, 29, 119–120, 131, 135–137
 interactional power xvi, 275–276, 290
 interactional sociolinguistics 271
 intercultural/interculturality xi, xviii, 89,
 94, 96–98, 108, 112, 211, 225, 236–
 237, 295
 see also:
 intercultural communication xi, xii,
 xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xviii, xix, 3, 5, 13,
 24, 26–28, 35, 37–38, 55, 79, 89–
 91, 108, 112, 114, 115, 117, 118,
 135, 136, 173, 174, 187, 189, 190,
 193, 211–213, 221, 225, 226, 235,
 237–238, 247, 275, 277, 295, 297,
 326–327
 intercultural encounters xi, xii, xiii,
 xiv, xvii, xviii, 70, 72, 326–327
 intercultural negotiation xvi, xvii
 interethnic 38, 40–41, 45, 173, 221, 275
 internationalization 118
 interpretative sociolinguistics xi, xiii, 4
 interpreter/interpreting xvii, xiv, xvii, xix,
 9, 236, 245–253, 255–256, 262–266,
 268, 270, 305
 interview xv, 12, 38, 45, 89, 92, 94, 98,
 101, 105, 108, 111, 118, 178, 250–251,
 280–282, 284, 290
 intracultural xvii, 58, 63–65, 74, 90, 212,
 221, 251
 intrusions 299, 308
 Italian xviii, 142–143, 145–146, 148,
 152–153, 158, 160, 166, 275, 277, 280,
 284, 288, 291, 296, 300, 302, 309, 317–
 318, 321, 323–326, 329, 330

J

Japanese 70, 73, 80
 job descriptions 103
 job interviews xv, 90, 91, 94, 96, 97, 103,
 108
 joke/joking 17, 59, 214, 258

K

Karuk 38, 41, 42, 44–47, 49, 50
 knowledge xii, xiii, xiv, xv, xvii, 3, 21–
 22, 24–25, 37, 40, 45, 55, 57–59, 61–
 67, 69, 71–76, 79, 90–94, 96, 97, 103,
 108, 112, 129, 145, 147, 151, 154, 164,
 166–168, 176–177, 214, 219, 221, 225,
 235–236, 247–248, 251, 255, 258, 265,
 274, 284, 296–297, 316, 323, 327
 Korean 68

L

language socialization 296, 300, 325
 legal system 142, 143
 life world 7
 linguistic ideology 23, 37
 linguistic variety 256
 lousy conversation 259, 264

M

majority 27, 36, 38, 42, 50, 51, 168, 302
 matrix construction 183–184
 media 20, 21, 23, 27, 50, 58, 161, 251
 mediated communication xiii, 18–22, 25–
 27
 mediating/mediation 18, 19, 21, 27, 143,
 193, 245–247, 250–251, 256, 259
 membership categories/membership
 categorization xviii, 97, 271, 184–187
 metapragmatic awareness xvi
 milieu 246, 326
 minority xiv, 27, 36, 38, 50, 51, 98, 300
 miscommunication 38, 43, 66, 118, 136,
 173–174, 212–213, 239, 288, 289,
 misinterpretation xiv, 71, 218, 220
 misunderstanding xii, xvii, 173–174,
 211–225, 232–238, 288–289, 313
 modality xviii, 61, 176

monocultural 97, 108, 112
 moral 57, 151, 156, 212, 235, 265
 Moroccan xviii, 168, 296, 300
 multi-party conversations xviii, 296, 317, 328
 multiculturalism 117–119

N

Naples 141, 144, 146–148, 168
 narrative 43, 51, 69, 96, 106, 141–142, 151–152, 159–160, 167, 232, 282–284, 317
 native xii, xiii, xiv, xvii, xviii, 68, 125, 146, 211, 238, 248, 273, 275–278, 280, 282, 287–291, 300, 304, 308–309, 326
 see also:
 Native American 38, 51, 69, 98
 native and non-native speakers 221, 289, 295
 non-natives xvii, 290
 negotiation xii, xiv, xvi, xvii, 174–175, 184, 188, 190, 194–195, 222, 225, 234, 266, 290
 non-verbal xi, 17, 194

O

objectivation 8, 9, 15
 overexplicitness 254

P

participation 17, 266
 see also:
 participation framework 18, 69, 275, 281, 301, 325
 participation structure 300
 penitenti 143–145, 148, 157, 167–168
 performance xvi, 4, 65, 94, 103, 123, 126, 128, 131–132, 134, 136, 142, 145, 148, 156, 160, 167
 politeness xv, xvi, 110, 120, 123–126, 129, 132, 134, 136, 188, 194, 235, 254
 power xvi, 21, 23, 36, 67, 73, 109, 131, 156, 167, 224, 275–276, 282, 284, 288, 290, 301
 preference organization 70, 71

prosodic xi, xii, xiii, 66, 67, 70, 110, 163, 259
 proverbial sayings/proverbs 67, 72

R

recipient design 59, 64, 94, 97, 112, 255
 reciprocity 7, 8, 10, 16, 18–19, 21–23
 see also:
 reciprocity of perspectives 55, 57, 62, 64, 74
 recontextualization 142, 161
 reflexivity 5, 9, 10, 14, 24
 relativity 35, 36
 rencontre 173–174, 194
 repair 61, 64–66, 131, 137, 213, 215–219, 223, 225, 233–238, 258, 263, 280–281
 repetition 51, 163, 176–177, 179, 224, 296–298, 305, 308, 319, 325
 rhetoric xii, 67
 rhythmic 49

S

script 122–126, 128, 130, 135–136, 297
 second language acquisition 297, 317, 326–327
 service xv, xvi, 117, 119–133, 135–136, 218
 see also:
 service encounter xvi, 120, 128, 130, 135
 service work 121, 123–124, 132, 135
 Shasta 38, 41, 44–45, 49–50
 silence 38–40, 42–44, 47–50, 298
 slang 253–254, 266
 social
 action 4, 5, 7, 13–15, 18, 28
 identity xviii, 94, 155, 157, 246, 271–273, 276, 291
 stock of knowledge 57–58
 speech exchange system 259
 speech markers 157
 stereotypes/stereotyping 37, 51, 64, 67, 74–75, 282, 291
 sub-cultural speech variety 259
 subdialogue 215, 218, 224–225, 233

T

- talk-in-interaction 213
- talking down 65, 216–217
- territorial
 - conflict 237
 - intrusion 236
- testimony 40, 69, 142, 145, 146, 148, 154, 156, 158, 163
- topos/topoi 111, 113
- translation 92–94, 245, 248–251, 253–255, 257, 258, 263–266, 291
- translatological 245, 249, 251–252
- Turkish 18, 51, 235, 249–250
- turn-taking 10, 13, 69, 116, 263

V

- vagueness 109, 110, 159
- vector of activity 298, 299, 305, 306, 314, 317, 326

W

- we-relation 15, 16
- West German/West Germany xv, 89–94, 97–98, 100–101, 103, 106–110, 112–113
- witness xvi, 41, 42, 44, 69, 141–143, 148, 154, 159, 162, 168
- work xv, 21, 26, 56, 118–119, 121–129, 131–137, 218, 223, 233, 246–248, 250–251, 276, 281, 291, 326–327
- see also:
 - work atmosphere 124
 - work relationships 118
 - workforces 126
 - workplace 118, 124–128, 131

In the PRAGMATICS AND BEYOND NEW SERIES the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication:

1. WALTER, Bettyruth: *The Jury Summation as Speech Genre: An Ethnographic Study of What it Means to Those who Use it*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1988.
2. BARTON, Ellen: *Nonsentential Constituents: A Theory of Grammatical Structure and Pragmatic Interpretation*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990.
3. OLEKSY, Wieslaw (ed.): *Contrastive Pragmatics*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1989.
4. RAFFLER-ENGEL, Walburga von (ed.): *Doctor-Patient Interaction*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1989.
5. THELIN, Nils B. (ed.): *Verbal Aspect in Discourse*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990.
6. VERSCHUEREN, Jef (ed.): *Selected Papers from the 1987 International Pragmatics Conference. Vol. I: Pragmatics at Issue. Vol. II: Levels of Linguistic Adaptation. Vol. III: The Pragmatics of Intercultural and International Communication* (ed. with Jan Blommaert). Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991.
7. LINDENFELD, Jacqueline: *Speech and Sociability at French Urban Market Places*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990.
8. YOUNG, Lynne: *Language as Behaviour, Language as Code: A Study of Academic English*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990.
9. LUKE, Kang-Kwong: *Utterance Particles in Cantonese Conversation*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990.
10. MURRAY, Denise E.: *Conversation for Action. The computer terminal as medium of communication*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991.
11. LUONG, Hy V.: *Discursive Practices and Linguistic Meanings. The Vietnamese system of person reference*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990.
12. ABRAHAM, Werner (ed.): *Discourse Particles. Descriptive and theoretical investigations on the logical, syntactic and pragmatic properties of discourse particles in German*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991.
13. NUYTS, Jan, A. Machtelt BOLKESTEIN and Co VET (eds): *Layers and Levels of Representation in Language Theory: a functional view*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990.
14. SCHWARTZ, Ursula: *Young Children's Dyadic Pretend Play*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991.
15. KOMTER, Martha: *Conflict and Cooperation in Job Interviews*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991.
16. MANN, William C. and Sandra A. THOMPSON (eds): *Discourse Description: Diverse Linguistic Analyses of a Fund-Raising Text*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1992.
17. PIÉRAUT-LE BONNIEC, Gilberte and Marlene DOLITSKY (eds): *Language Bases ... Discourse Bases*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991.
18. JOHNSTONE, Barbara: *Repetition in Arabic Discourse. Paradigms, syntagms and the ecology of language*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991.
19. BAKER, Carolyn D. and Allan LUKE (eds): *Towards a Critical Sociology of Reading Pedagogy. Papers of the XII World Congress on Reading*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1991.
20. NUYTS, Jan: *Aspects of a Cognitive-Pragmatic Theory of Language. On cognition, functionalism, and grammar*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1992.
21. SEARLE, John R. et al.: *(On) Searle on Conversation*. Compiled and introduced by Herman Parret and Jef Verschueren. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1992.

22. AUER, Peter and Aldo Di LUZIO (eds): *The Contextualization of Language*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1992.
23. FORTESCUE, Michael, Peter HARDER and Lars KRISTOFFERSEN (eds): *Layered Structure and Reference in a Functional Perspective. Papers from the Functional Grammar Conference, Copenhagen, 1990*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1992.
24. MAYNARD, Senko K.: *Discourse Modality: Subjectivity, Emotion and Voice in the Japanese Language*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1993.
25. COUPER-KUHLEN, Elizabeth: *English Speech Rhythm. Form and function in everyday verbal interaction*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1993.
26. STYGALL, Gail: *Trial Language. A study in differential discourse processing*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1994.
27. SUTER, Hans Jürg: *The Wedding Report: A Prototypical Approach to the Study of Traditional Text Types*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1993.
28. VAN DE WALLE, Lieve: *Pragmatics and Classical Sanskrit*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1993.
29. BARSKY, Robert F.: *Constructing a Productive Other: Discourse theory and the convention refugee hearing*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1994.
30. WORTHAM, Stanton E.F.: *Acting Out Participant Examples in the Classroom*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1994.
31. WILDGEN, Wolfgang: *Process, Image and Meaning. A realistic model of the meanings of sentences and narrative texts*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1994.
32. SHIBATANI, Masayoshi and Sandra A. THOMPSON (eds): *Essays in Semantics and Pragmatics*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1995.
33. GOOSSENS, Louis, Paul PAUWELS, Brygida RUDZKA-OSTYN, Anne-Marie SIMON-VANDENBERGEN and Johan VANPARYS: *By Word of Mouth. Metaphor, metonymy and linguistic action in a cognitive perspective*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1995.
34. BARBE, Katharina: *Irony in Context*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1995.
35. JUCKER, Andreas H. (ed.): *Historical Pragmatics. Pragmatic developments in the history of English*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1995.
36. CHILTON, Paul, Mikhail V. ILYIN and Jacob MEY: *Political Discourse in Transition in Eastern and Western Europe (1989-1991)*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
37. CARSTON, Robyn and Seiji UCHIDA (eds): *Relevance Theory. Applications and implications*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
38. FRETHEIM, Thorstein and Jeanette K. GUNDEL (eds): *Reference and Referent Accessibility*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1996.
39. HERRING, Susan (ed.): *Computer-Mediated Communication. Linguistic, social, and cross-cultural perspectives*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1996.
40. DIAMOND, Julie: *Status and Power in Verbal Interaction. A study of discourse in a close-knit social network*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1996.
41. VENTOLA, Eija and Anna MAURANEN, (eds): *Academic Writing. Intercultural and textual issues*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1996.
42. WODAK, Ruth and Helga KOTTHOFF (eds): *Communicating Gender in Context*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1997.
43. JANSSEN, Theo A.J.M. and Wim van der WURFF (eds): *Reported Speech. Forms and functions of the verb*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1996.

44. BARGIELA-CHIAPPINI, Francesca and Sandra J. HARRIS: *Managing Language. The discourse of corporate meetings*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1997.
45. PALTRIDGE, Brian: *Genre, Frames and Writing in Research Settings*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1997.
46. GEORGAKOPOULOU, Alexandra: *Narrative Performances. A study of Modern Greek storytelling*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1997.
47. CHESTERMAN, Andrew: *Contrastive Functional Analysis*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
48. KAMIO, Akio: *Territory of Information*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1997.
49. KURZON, Dennis: *Discourse of Silence*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
50. GRENOBLE, Lenore: *Deixis and Information Packaging in Russian Discourse*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
51. BOULIMA, Jamila: *Negotiated Interaction in Target Language Classroom Discourse*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1999.
52. GILLIS, Steven and Annick DE HOUWER (eds): *The Acquisition of Dutch*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
53. MOSEGAARD HANSEN, Maj-Britt: *The Function of Discourse Particles. A study with special reference to spoken standard French*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
54. HYLAND, Ken: *Hedging in Scientific Research Articles*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
55. ALLWOOD, Jens and Peter Gärdenfors (eds): *Cognitive Semantics. Meaning and cognition*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1999.
56. TANAKA, Hiroko: *Language, Culture and Social Interaction. Turn-taking in Japanese and Anglo-American English*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1999.
57. JUCKER, Andreas H. and Yael ZIV (eds): *Discourse Markers. Descriptions and theory*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
58. ROUCHOTA, Villy and Andreas H. JUCKER (eds): *Current Issues in Relevance Theory*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
59. KAMIO, Akio and Ken-ichi TAKAMI (eds): *Function and Structure. In honor of Susumu Kuno*. 1999.
60. JACOBS, Geert: *Preformulating the News. An analysis of the metapragmatics of press releases*. 1999.
61. MILLS, Margaret H. (ed.): *Slavic Gender Linguistics*. 1999.
62. TZANNE, Angeliki: *Talking at Cross-Purposes. The dynamics of miscommunication*. 2000.
63. BUBLITZ, Wolfram, Uta LENK and Eija VENTOLA (eds.): *Coherence in Spoken and Written Discourse. How to create it and how to describe it. Selected papers from the International Workshop on Coherence, Augsburg, 24-27 April 1997*. 1999.
64. SVENNEVIG, Jan: *Getting Acquainted in Conversation. A study of initial interactions*. 1999.
65. COOREN, François: *The Organizing Dimension of Communication*. 2000.
66. JUCKER, Andreas H., Gerd FRITZ and Franz LEBSANFT (eds.): *Historical Dialogue Analysis*. 1999.
67. TAAVITSAINEN, Irma, Gunnel MELCHERS and Päivi PAHTA (eds.): *Dimensions of Writing in Nonstandard English*. 1999.
68. ARNOVICK, Leslie: *Diachronic Pragmatics. Seven case studies in English illocutionary development*. 1999.

69. NOH, Eun-Ju: *The Semantics and Pragmatics of Metarepresentation in English. A relevance-theoretic account.* 2000.
70. SORJONEN, Marja-Leena: *Responding in Conversation. A study of response particles in Finnish.* 2001.
71. GÓMEZ-GONZÁLEZ, María Ángeles: *The Theme-Topic Interface. Evidence from English.* 2001.
72. MARMARIDOU, Sophia S.A.: *Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition.* 2000.
73. HESTER, Stephen and David FRANCIS (eds.): *Local Educational Order. Ethno-methodological studies of knowledge in action.* 2000.
74. TROSBORG, Anna (ed.): *Analysing Professional Genres.* 2000.
75. PILKINGTON, Adrian: *Poetic Effects. A relevance theory perspective.* 2000.
76. MATSUI, Tomoko: *Bridging and Relevance.* 2000.
77. VANDERVEKEN, Daniel and Susumu KUBO (eds.): *Essays in Speech Act Theory.* 2001.
78. SELL, Roger D. : *Literature as Communication. The foundations of mediating criticism.* 2000.
79. ANDERSEN, Gisle and Thorstein FRETHEIM (eds.): *Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude.* 2000.
80. UNGERER, Friedrich (ed.): *English Media Texts – Past and Present. Language and textual structure.* 2000.
81. DILUZIO, Aldo, Susanne GÜNTNER and Franca ORLETTI (eds.): *Culture in Communication. Analyses of intercultural situations.* 2001.
82. KHALIL, Esam N.: *Grounding in English and Arabic News Discourse.* 2000.
83. MÁRQUEZ REITER, Rosina: *Linguistic Politeness in Britain and Uruguay. A contrastive study of requests and apologies.* 2000.
84. ANDERSEN, Gisle: *Pragmatic Markers and Sociolinguistic Variation. A relevance-theoretic approach to the language of adolescents.* 2001.
85. COLLINS, Daniel E.: *Reanimated Voices. Speech reporting in a historical-pragmatic perspective.* 2001.
86. IFANTIDOU, Elly: *Evidentials and Relevance.* 2001.
87. MUSHIN, Ilana: *Evidentiality and Epistemological Stance. Narrative retelling.* 2001.
88. BAYRAKTAROĞLU, Arın and Maria SIFIANOU (eds.): *Linguistic Politeness Across Boundaries. The case of Greek and Turkish.* 2001.
89. ITAKURA, Hiroko: *Conversational Dominance and Gender. A study of Japanese speakers in first and second language contexts.* 2001.
90. KENESEI, István and Robert M. HARNISH (eds.): *Perspectives on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Discourse. A Festschrift for Ferenc Kiefer.* 2001.
91. GROSS, Joan: *Speaking in Other Voices. An ethnography of Walloon puppet theaters.* 2001.
92. GARDNER, Rod: *When Listeners Talk. Response tokens and listener stance.* 2001.
93. BARON, Bettina and Helga KOTTHOFF (eds.): *Gender in Interaction. Perspectives on femininity and masculinity in ethnography and discourse.* n.y.p.
94. McILVENNY, Paul (ed.): *Talking Gender and Sexuality.* n.y.p.
95. FITZMAURICE, Susan M.: *The Familiar Letter in Early Modern English. A pragmatic approach.* n.y.p.
96. HAVERKATE, Henk: *The Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics of Spanish Mood.* n.y.p.

97. MAYNARD, Senko K.: *Linguistic Emotivity. Centrality of place, the topic-comment dynamic, and an ideology of Pathos in Japanese discourse.* n.y.p.
98. DUSZAK, Anna (ed.): *Us and Others. Social identities across languages, discourses and cultures.* n.y.p.
99. JASZCZOLT, K.M. and Ken TURNER (eds.): *Meaning Through Language Contrast. Volume 1.* n.y.p.
100. JASZCZOLT, K.M. and Ken TURNER (eds.): *Meaning Through Language Contrast. Volume 2.* n.y.p.